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This thesis examines possible synergies and points of friction between 
understandings of disability that emphasise its social contingency and jurisprudential 
debates on substantive equality and access to social security in the context of the 
promotion of access to work for disabled persons in South Africa.  In consequence of 
an analysis of theoretical debates in the field of disability studies and how these find 
application in the sphere of employment equity law, it is concluded that, while social 
understandings of disability mostly focus on structural changes that would see 
people with disabilities who can and want to work gain access to such work, the 
positive obligations imposed on employers and the state in terms of equality rights 
and employment equity legislation are of limited depth and breadth.  It is proposed 
that one potential course of action to address the limited scope of equality law would 
be to emphasise the state’s obligations in terms of socio-economic rights where 
these rights are relevant to work inequality.  Particular emphasis is placed on how 
the interpretation and application of the right to access to social security could be 
used to activate government’s duties in respect of unemployment protection and 
work creation.  The conclusion reached is that while this strategy poses risks and 
has its limitations, it can be used to improve information gathering in respect of 
disabled work seekers that will aid planning and enforcement; to facilitate support for 
disabled work seekers who experience discrimination; to compel government to 
improve the implementation and enforcement of employment equity laws in respect 
of disabled work applicants; to catalyse a holistic approach to social security that 
considers the interrelationship between social assistance and promoting 
unemployment protection for disabled persons who are willing and able to work; and 
to provide different forms of support to disabled people who do not operate in the 
formal labour market, but who can and do perform work that falls outside the scope 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the research question 
 
Persons with disabilities are struggling to find and retain employment in South Africa. 
The Integrated National Disability Strategy White Paper of 1997 (INDS), in its 
situational analysis, estimated that 99% of disabled people are excluded from the 
open labour market in South Africa.1  That picture does not seem to have become 
any brighter over time.  The latest report of the Commission for Employment Equity 
(CEE) reveals that only 0.9% of the workforce of big employers in the formal labour 
market are persons with disabilities.2  The corresponding figure in 2003 was 1.3%,3 
so in percentage terms there has been a regression in disability representation. 
 
The poor representation in formal employment must be viewed in the context of the 
latest census’s estimation of a national disability prevalence rate of 7.5%.4  
Furthermore, Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) cautions that this figure “should not be 
used for purposes of describing the overall prevalence or profile of persons with 
disabilities in South Africa.”5  This is because the statistics exclude children under 
the age of five and “persons with psychosocial and certain neurological disabilities.”6  
People with disabilities in institutions such as boarding schools, residential care 
facilities and children’s homes were also excluded, as the surveys were only 
                                                          
1 South Africa. Office of the Deputy President. Integrated National Disability White Paper. (1997) 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1144&context=gladnetcollect 
(Accessed: 6 February 2015) (hereinafter referred to as “The INDS”) Chapter 1. 
2 CEE. 14th Commission for Employment Equity Annual Report 2011-2012. (2014) 
http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/documents/annual-reports/employment-equity/2013-
2014/14ceeannualreport.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 19. 
3 Ibid. 
4 StatsSA. Census 2011:  Profile of Persons with Disabilities in South Africa, Report No. 03-01-59. 
(2014) http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-01-59/Report-03-01-592011.pdf (2014) 
(Accessed: 6 February 2015) (hereinafter referred to as “StatsSA ‘Disability Profile’”) v.  
5 Ibid.  Some commentators have argued that disability prevalence is higher than official figures 
suggest and that it is rising (see H Kathard. Parliamentary Input to Public Hearings on Disability. 
Rehabilitation as a Human Right for Persons with Disabilities. (2012) 3). 
6 StatsSA ‘Disability Profile’ 2. 
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conducted in households.7  The relevance, use and limitations of survey data on 
disability is discussed in Chapter 6.8  
 
The under-representation of disabled persons in the labour market is consistent with 
a worldwide trend and is a cause and effect of their social exclusion, or inclusion on 
unfair terms.9  Throughout history, societies’ responses to what is regarded as 
atypical behaviour, experience and appearance range from charity to judgement, as 
well as the removal of people with atypical bodies from society.10  Organised 
disability movements throughout the world have fought this social oppression at 
international and local levels.  
 
In South Africa, oppression is more closely connected with race and, to a lesser 
extent, gender.11  The common sense definition of disability most people are likely to 
give is that someone is disabled “when their body or mind doesn’t work properly.” 12  
This way of thinking characterises disability as a problematic individual status, the 
solutions to which are to ‘fix’ the disabled person or to have others take care of the 
disabled person.13  This “personal tragedy theory of disability”14 has been challenged 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 See 6.3.1. 
9 See, for example, World Health Organization (WHO). World Disability Report. (2011) (hereinafter 
referred to as “WHO ‘Disability Report’”) 39, in which it is noted that descriptive data seems to indicate 
that disabled persons are at a disadvantage in respect of “educational attainment and labour market 
outcomes” in both developed and developing countries. 
10 E DePoy and SF Gilson. Studying Disability:  Multiple Theories and Responses. (2011) 9-10 
explain that historical analyses of disability reveal that: 
“1. What is atypical differs according to context. 
2. In each era there have been several potential, assumed and accepted explanations 
for a single atypical human characteristic. 
3. These explanations form the basis for legitimate characterization and subsequent 
response to category members. 
4. The responses proffered provide an analytic window on the beliefs, values, politics, 
economics, intellectual trends, and level of technological development of the times, 
as well as a reflective platform on how current definitions of disability influence how 
we interpret history.” [footnotes omitted] 
11 L Swartz and B Watermeyer. Introduction and Overview. In: B Watermeyer, L Swartz, T Lorenzo, M 
Schneider and M Priestley (eds). Disability and Social Change:  A South African Agenda. (2006) 1. 
12 D Marks. Disability:  Controversial Debates and Psychosocial Perspectives. (1999) ix; Swartz and 
Watermeyer 1.  
13 A Lawson. Disability and Equality Law in Britain:  The Role of Reasonable Adjustment. (2008) 18. 
M Priestley. Developing Disability Studies Programmes:  The International Context. In: B Watermeyer, 
L Swartz, T Lorenzo, M Schneider and M Priestley (eds). Disability and Social Change:  A South 
African Agenda. (2006) 19 (hereinafter referred to as “Priestley ‘Disability Studies Programmes’”) at 
25 writes:  “[T]here is a strong tradition in medicine and therapy concerned with measuring and 
investigating the limitations of the body.  Similarly, there is a strong tradition in psychology and 
3 
 
for the last four decades by disability movements in various parts of the world,15 who 
have argued that it has relegated disabled people to the margins of society, 
dependent on others and severely stigmatised.  Instead of focusing on what is wrong 
with the individual, the focus should be on the ways in which environmental, social 
and cultural barriers disable people.   
 
This shift from individual models of disability to what has broadly been termed the 
social model of disability has been credited with the development of disability as a 
human rights issue, instead of just a medical or welfare issue.16  In this work, I will 
use the phrase “social understandings of disability” to refer to both the social model 
of disability as developed in Britain, as well as other explanations that are not 
necessarily consistent with this model, but that nevertheless emphasise 
environmental, social and cultural factors to varying degrees.  Within this rubric I also 
include so-called interactionist approaches, which view disability as the interaction 
between individual characteristics and the physical and social environment. 
 
I will argue that while social understandings of disability have no doubt made and still 
make enormous contributions in shifting the terms of discussions on disability, some 
of the debates within disability studies reveal disagreements and grey areas that are 
often mirrored in conceptions of disability in legislation, policy documents and case 
law.  These uncertainties and inconsistencies are visible in who qualifies as disabled 
for protection from discrimination; the ways in which courts, tribunals and other 
relevant decision makers interpret and apply equality laws; and the underlying 
principles that shape the conception and implementation of social security laws and 
policies. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
counseling that also locates disability as a property of the individual, with an emphasis on how 
disabled people cope with their ‘limitations’ and how they negotiate social roles.” 
14 M Oliver. The Politics of Disablement. (1990) (hereinafter referred to as “Oliver ‘Disablement’”) 1. 
15 AS Kanter. “The Law:  What’s Disability Studies Got to Do with It or an Introduction to Disability 
Legal Studies.” (2010-2011) 42 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 403 
16 G Quinn, T Degener, A Bruce, C Burke, J Castellino, P Kenna, U Kilkelly and S Quinlivan. “Human 
Rights and Disability:  The Current Use and Future Potential of United Nations Human Rights 
Instruments in the Context of Disability.” (2002) 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HRDisabilityen.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 
(hereinafter referred to as “Quinn et al ‘UN Human Rights Instruments’”) 14. 
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Various South African policy documents recognise the social causes of disability and 
that a rights-centred approach to disability is required.17  According to the INDS, the 
reasons for the low employment rate of disabled people include low skills levels due 
to inadequate education, discriminatory practices by employers, past discriminatory 
and ineffective labour legislation, inaccessible and unsupportive work environments, 
inadequate and inaccessible provision for vocational rehabilitation and training, 
inadequate access to information and ignorance in society at large.18 
 
Yet, for all the rhetorical prominence of the social dimensions of disability and the 
express articulation of rights that can be claimed by persons with disabilities, it is 
clear that the inclusion of disabled people into formal labour structures is not 
progressing at a satisfactory rate.  The reasons for this slow progress are complex 
and multiple, integrated responses are necessary.  However, the parameters of this 
work have to be narrowed for practical reasons.  I will therefore limit myself to a 
consideration of the extent to which social understandings of disability have been 
integrated into selected South African laws that affect access to work for disabled 
persons.  I will also explore the possibilities and limitations of such integration.  
 
In most South African legal texts on employment equity, the social nature of disability 
is recognised and then followed by an exposition of how equality provisions in the 
                                                          
17 The INDS, in its Executive Summary, states:   
“Disability tends to be couched within a medical and welfare framework, identifying people with 
disabilities as ill, different from their non-disabled peers, and in need of care. Because the 
emphasis is on the medical needs of people with disabilities, there is a corresponding neglect 
of their wider social needs. This has resulted in severe isolation for people with disabilities and 
their families.  
Over the past decade, disabled people's organisations all over the world have worked to 
reposition disability as a human rights issue. The result is a social model for disability based on 
the premise that if society cannot cater for people with disabilities, it is society that must 
change. This model requires substantial changes to the physical environment. The goal must 
be the right of people with disabilities to play a full, participatory role in society.”  
See, also, South Africa. Department of Public Works. Disability Policy Guidelines. (2010) 
www.publicworks.gov.za/PDFs/documents/WhitePapers/Disability_Policy_Guideline.pdf 
(Accessed: 6 February 2015) 8; and South Africa. Department of Social Development. Policy on 
Disability. (2009) 10-11.  
18 Chapter 1.  This pervasive and varied nature of these challenges is also recognised in the WHO 
‘Disability Report’ (at 10) when it notes that disabled persons are less likely to attend school; more 
likely to be unemployed and to earn less than people without disabilities when employed; incur extra 
additional costs due to their disability, which means that they require more resources to achieve 
similar outcomes to people without disabilities; and households with disabled members are more 
likely to experience material hardship. 
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Constitution and legislation protect disabled persons.  In my view, further analysis is 
required of the extent to which the substantive legislative provisions and procedural 
mechanisms recognise or incorporate social understandings of disability, both at a 
micro and macro level.  
 
Charles Ngwena, in his LLD thesis,19 emphasises the difference between formal and 
substantive conceptions of equality and cogently argues that substantive equality 
has to be the bedrock of disability equality.  He then explains why, in his view, “social 
model” understandings of disability have to be integral to notions of substantive 
equality.  This study seeks to engage with and build on Ngwena’s elucidation of 
substantive equality and its relationship to what Ngwena terms the social model of 
disability.   
 
Our approaches differ in various respects.  Ngwena’s study is comparative in nature, 
while my focus is on South African laws and their implementation.  Secondly, his 
primary objective was the development of the “disability method” as an interpretive 
approach to equality.  While I do address issues of substantive equality, my primary 
emphasis is not on jurisprudential notions of equality.  Instead, most of the work is 
devoted to the nature of the positive obligations imposed on employers and 
government in respect of access to work, as well as the possibilities and limitations 
these hold in achieving the social goals that flow from social understandings of 
disability. 
 
I will argue that, in light of critiques of the social model of disability within disability 
studies, lawyers and policymakers have to develop a richer understanding of social 
explanations of disability that go beyond the traditional social model of disability.  
This is necessary because these critiques mirror many of the questions raised by 
scholars who explore different formulations of substantive equality.  Ngwena, in his 
study, indicated that he would not consider different formulations as it was not his 
                                                          
19 CG Ngwena. Disabled People and the Search for Equality in the Workplace:  An Appraisal of 
Equality Models from a Comparative Perspective. (2010) (hereinafter referred to as “Ngwena ‘Search 
for Equality’”) 2.  
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intention to come up with an equality blueprint.20  It is also not my intention to 
suggest a blueprint here, but I am of the view that exploring different formulations of 
substantive equality offers valuable engagement with what potential aims of the right 
to equality could be, not in a prescriptive way, but in the spirit of a dialogical 
consideration of potential options. 
 
The engagement with substantive equality in the context of access to work is also 
predicated upon my view that disability is similar to,21 but also different from, other 
identity markers such as race, gender and sexual orientation.  While it is useful to 
consider and learn from the parallels between disability and other markers of 
disadvantage, this work also reflects on differences between disability and these 
other markers.22  In particular, the centrality of impairment will be highlighted. 
 
“Dialogue within a heterogeneous public sphere in which historically disadvantaged 
groups are entitled as of right to ‘open access, participatory parity and socio-
economic equality’” is at the heart of Ngwena’s disability method, which he 
characterises as “a transformative interpretive methodology for establishing an 
inclusive universe of equality, that is, a universe that accommodates enabled people 
and disabled people in equal measure”.23  This study proceeds from the starting 
point that Ngwena’s adoption of Iris Young’s “heterogeneous public sphere”24 is a 
useful way of assessing process equity and that this approach has to animate both 
the conception of laws and their implementation. 
  
                                                          
20 Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ 339.  He writes:  
“I do not proceed, as other commentators have done, on the analytical footing that the search 
for a more substantive type of equality depends, inter alia, on exploring, comparing and 
contrasting the reaches of the equality of opportunities approach and the achievement of equal 
outcomes or results as the alternatives to the formal equality approach and ultimately settling 
on a particular type so that it becomes a blueprint.” 
21 See Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ 105, who reasons as follows:   
“As a site for the social construction of race, especially, apartheid offers a rich entry point for 
comprehending the epistemology of disability, the phenomena of oppression and structural 
inequality that are organised around the hegemony of a socially constructed bodily norm. 
Though apartheid and disablism do not share the same aetiology and ‘physical’ particularities, 
nonetheless, they share common mechanisms and effects in terms of the creation of 
subordinated difference and exclusionary citizenship.” 
22 See 4.4.4.2. 
23 Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ 338. 
24 Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ 65 fn 249. 
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Another gap in the existing literature is that disability is often discussed quite 
disparately in labour law and social security law.  Commentators recognise that 
disability definitions for anti-discrimination and social assistance eligibility, 
respectively, should not necessarily be the same.  My approach aims to integrate 
non-discrimination provisions into a larger conceptual framework that explores the 
intersections of substantive equality and access to social security or social 
protection.  
 
Similarly, when rights frameworks are set out in the literature, the principle paradigm 
has been one focused on equality, and non-discrimination in particular.  Along with 
the focus on equality, most of the discussions in the literature have articulated the 
protection of individual disabled persons’ rights when their employers have violated 
those rights.  While this dimension is important, it will be argued that South Africa’s 
articulation of a justiciable right to access to social security can be used more 
creatively, along with equality, to advance the interests of disabled work seekers 
without portraying them as objects of charity.   
 
However, the strategies to enforce obligations to protect, respect, promote and fulfil 
rights also need to evolve beyond reactive complaints or litigation once harm has 
eventuated.  More pro-active measures to ensure equality have to be considered. In 
this regard, I discuss the utility of the capability approach, as developed by Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum, as well as the enforcement of positive non-
discrimination duties, affirmative action duties and government’s positive obligations 
to facilitate access to work. 
 
1.2 Research question 
 
The research question is, “What are the potential synergies and points of friction 
between social understandings of disability and legal conceptions of equality and 




1.3 Research goals 
 
The goals of this research are as follows: 
(i) To examine the ways in which South African equality, labour and social 
security laws contribute to and inhibit the achievement of the emancipatory 
goals articulated by disability movements and in disability policies; 
(ii) To analyse the location of legal measures that seek to promote access to 
work for disabled persons within this emancipatory rubric; 
(iii) To consider the extent to which the imposition of positive legal duties on 
government and employers to promote access to work for disabled persons 
can facilitate the transformative change sought by disability movements; and 
(iv) To identify how equality and social security rights can be utilised by disability 
movements to both influence policy development and implementation to 
advance access to work for disabled persons and protect their interests 
through litigation. 
 
1.4 Research objectives 
 
The above goals can be distilled into the following research objectives: 
(i) To examine how, and to what extent, social understandings of disability are 
reflected in selected South African equality, labour and social security laws 
that seek to promote access to work for disabled persons; 
(ii) To critically engage with how disability rights discourse, particularly in respect 
of substantive equality, is implicated in the aspects identified in (i);  
(iii) Bearing in mind the above two objectives, to critically assess to what extent 
the positive obligations imposed on employers and government in respect of 
access to work for disabled persons can achieve the contested aims of 
substantive equality; and 
(iv) To analyse the benefits and weaknesses of potential equality strategies that 




1.5 Methodology and literature overview 
 
The study is conducted by virtue of desktop research that involves reference to the 
following literature:  
(i) Disability studies and other social science texts that articulate and critique 
social explanations of disability; 
(ii) Literature on rights theories, and disability rights theories in particular; 
(iii) Case law and commentaries on the South African Constitution and its Bill of 
Rights, in particular;  
(iv) South African labour and social security policies, legislation and case law that 
are relevant to access to work for disabled persons; and 
(v) Comparative policies, legislation and case law that may assist in the analysis 
and evaluation of the South African legal frameworks. 
 
The general spirit of the methodology adopted is encapsulated in the following 
passage that discusses the interrelationship between disability studies and law:25 
 
“Disability Studies […] offers the law and legal education the opportunity to 
critically examine the role of ‘normalcy’ within the law and within society, 
generally.  It challenges us to examine our unstated assumptions and requires 
us to recognize, appreciate, and most importantly, value differences among us.  
Since law itself is in the business of deciding how to recognize, legitimate, and 
allocate differences – different rights, responsibilities, resources, and even 
justice within society – Disability Studies offers an appropriate lens through 
which we can view the legal profession, and the meaning of difference within 
the legal system, and society.  Conversely, the field of law may also inform the 
field of Disability Studies by providing a context in which to examine the 
meaning of differences within our legal and extrajudicial systems.  It also may 
help us to see more clearly issues of power, privilege and participation.” 
  
                                                          
25 Kanter 405.  
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This review of social understandings of disability and the conception of rights 
required by these understandings has a threefold purpose.  Firstly, it critically 
assesses two pillars of disability discourse to ascertain what it can and cannot 
contribute to the advancement of disabled persons’ labour and social security 
interests in the context of access to work.  Secondly, it allows us to clarify some of 
the normative underpinnings of employment equity and social protection policies for 
disabled people, which promotes critical consciousness.  Thirdly, it also provides us 
with some standards against which we can benchmark the substantive provisions 
and the implementation of employment equity and social protection laws.  
 
1.6 Thesis structure and chapter overview 
 
1.6.1 Overall structure 
 
After this introductory chapter, the thesis proceeds to two chapters that set out 
theoretical debates on disability from the fields of disability studies and South African 
human rights law, respectively.  Chapters 4 and 5 then shift to a discussion of the 
content and implementation of selected equality laws that affect access to work for 
disabled persons.  The penultimate chapter considers how positive obligations in 
respect of access to work may be sourced from justiciable socio-economic rights, 
with a particular focus on the right to access to social security.  Finally, Chapter 7 
contains my concluding observations and suggestions for future research.  
 
1.6.2 Chapter breakdown 
 
Chapter 2 contains the evolution of understandings of disability; disability in South 
Africa, particularly as it relates to the legal frameworks for labour and social security; 
an overview of social understandings of disability and the implications of selected 
debates within disability studies for labour, equality and social security law.  The 
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focus in Chapter 3 is substantive approaches to equality and how such approaches 
align with perspectives on social understandings of disability, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 4 offers a critical analysis of what may be termed employers’ duties to 
refrain from discriminating unfairly in recruitment and selection.  This chapter also 
engages with the conceptualisation of disability for the purpose of identifying and 
circumscribing a protected class for the purposes of non-discrimination law.  Chapter 
5 then moves to a discussion of the potential and limitations of positive non-
discrimination duties (including reasonable accommodation duties) and affirmative 
action duties that may promote access to work for disabled work seekers.   
 
Chapter 6 concerns itself with the strategic potential and limitations of justiciable 
socio-economic rights in promoting access to work for disabled persons who can and 
want to work.  Particular attention is paid to the right of access to social security and 
how a generous and purposive approach to the scope of this right may lead to a 
holistic approach to social protection for disabled persons that would include efforts 
to promote their access to work. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the study and contains brief reflections on the extent to which 
the selected laws, policies and enforcement mechanisms incorporate social 
understandings of disability and how the features of such incorporation may affect 
endeavours to achieve substantive equality for disabled work seekers.  It ends with 




It is recognised that power inheres in terminology, for as the writer Toni Morrison has 
observed, “Definitions belong to the definers, not the defined”26.  It is therefore 
                                                          
26 T Morrison. Beloved. (1987) 190. 
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important that disabled persons’ perspectives are prioritised when choosing and 
employing terminology.   
 
The term “disabled people” or “disabled persons” will be used interchangeably with 
the term “people with disabilities” because there is no consensus among disabled 
people themselves on the terminology to be preferred.  While I am aware of the 
arguments for people-first terminology27 and that the United Nations (UN) has 
endorsed this in its Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 
some disability activists argue that the phrase “disabled people” also has its 
advantages in that it offers a direct antonym to “enabled” persons and implies a 
marginalised, identifiable social category.28   
 
Furthermore, prominent disability activists, particularly those who have championed 
the social model of disability, have argued that the phrase “person with a disability” 
obscures the distinction between disability and impairment.29  The former is the 
result of discrimination and should be opposed, while the latter is a functional 
limitation, which has to be managed.  They also argue that changing terminology will 
not change the reality of disabled people’s lives and the fact that negative 
connotations continue to attach to functional limitations or bodily difference.30  Given 
                                                          
27 See, for example, C Ngwena. The New Disability Convention:  Implications for Disability Equality 
Norms in the South African Workplace. In: OC Dupper and C Garbers (eds). Equality in the 
Workplace:  Reflections from South Africa and Beyond. (2010) (hereinafter referred to as “Ngwena 
‘New Disability Convention’”) 192 for a brief explanation that such terminology implies “both a 
relationship with, as well as a separation from, disability” and therefore is an affirmation that disabled 
persons are part of human diversity. 
28 See Ngwena ‘New Disability Convention’ 183-184, who chooses to use “disabled persons” or 
“disabled people”. 
29 V Finkelstein. The Commonality of Disability. In: J Swain, V Finkelstein, S French and M Oliver 
(eds). Disabling Barriers, Enabling Environments. (1993) http://disability-
studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/finkelstein-Commonality-of-Disability.pdf. (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 
2.  See, also, L Clark and S Marsh. “Patriarchy in the UK:  The Language of Disability.” (2002) 
www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Clark,%20Laurence/language.pdf (Accessed: 6 
February 2015) 2 who state, “The British civil rights movement has rejected the term ‘people with 
disabilities’, as it implies that the disabling effect rests within the individual person rather than from 
society.  The term ‘disabilities’ when used in this context refers to a person’s medical condition and 
thus confuses disability with impairment.  In addition it denies the political or ‘disability identity’ which 
emerges from the disabled people’s civil rights movement in a similar way to the Black and Gay 
political identities”. 
30 P Abberley. “The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of Disability.” 
(1987) 2(1) Disability, Handicap and Society 5 (hereinafter referred to as “Abberley ‘Concept of 
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these debates among disabled people, I will not favour one terminological orientation 
over another. 
 
The term “work” is used in a wider sense that goes beyond paid employment in the 
formal labour market.  It includes paid work, but also unpaid work within families and 
communities.31  The discussions on non-discrimination laws focus primarily on the 
duties of employers in the formal labour market to limit the scope of this work and 
because those laws operate mostly in that sphere.  The promotion of access to work 
as part of social protection, however, starts from the premise that it is necessary to 
value unpaid work and work in the informal economy to gain a more accurate picture 
of socially beneficial activities.  An expansive notion of work has been advocated by 
feminist movements as well as Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs),32 because 
women and disabled people often perform work that is not recognised socially, 
politically or economically. 
 
1.8 Limitations of the study 
 
This work is intended to be an audit of the extent to which positive obligations 
imposed on employers and government in respect of access to work incorporate and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Oppression’”) at 8-9 refers to what he terms the “naturalisation of impairment” and the fact that it 
implies deficiency.  He emphasises that he is not suggesting “that perceptions can be changed by 
changing words,” but that the “entrenched rejection of ‘impairment’ as a viable form of life” and the 
“‘commonsense’, ‘natural’ and ‘unconscious’ nature of ideologies of impairment, disability and 
handicap” have to be addressed.   
31 This is consistent with the notion of work that has been promoted by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO).  See ILO. Report of the Director-General:  Changing Patterns in the World of 
Work. (2006) http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-i-c.pdf (Accessed: 6 
February 2015) v-vi. 
32 See, for example, C Barnes. “A Working Social Model? Disability, Work and Disability Politics in the 
21st century.” (2000) 20(4) Critical Social Policy 441 (hereinafter referred to as “Barnes ‘Working 
Social Model?’”) who writes (at 451): 
“Indeed, […] work is a social creation; what is considered work at one point in time may not be 
perceived as such in another.  Moreover, to radically reconceptualize the meaning of work 
beyond the rigid confines of waged labour is not unprecedented in the modern context.  For 
instance, in its attempt to assert the role of women in a predominantly patriarchal society, the 
women’s movement has successfully redefined the meaning of work to include housework and 
childcare.  Furthermore, growing evidence suggests that because of the difficulties encountered 
when trying to balance the requirements of parenthood with those of the workplace, a situation 
which is especially problematic for those at the foot of the class system, many women are now 
beginning to seriously question the organization of the modern labour market.” 
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are consistent with social explanations of disability.  These social explanations are 
debated within disability communities and it would be presumptuous to critique the 
validity of these explanations here or their value in promoting the interests of 
disabled people.  An attempt is made to relay accurately, yet briefly, the salient 
features of the conceptual discussions of environmental, social and cultural causes 
of disability that are ongoing and warrant more attention by people who are more 
appropriately situated and qualified to express their views. 
 
This study does not include original empirical research and relies on social 
understandings of disability, as articulated and discussed by disability scholars.  
Many of these scholars are respected members of international and local disability 
movements and many of them are disabled themselves.  However, theoretical 
expositions do not (and cannot) capture all the realities of disabled people’s lives and 
are often within the exclusive purview of people who are privileged by virtue of their 
access to influential social institutions and communities.  As a result, the scope of 
the thesis has been limited to an audit of legal frameworks and provisions for 
consistency with these views, with the hope that relevant stakeholders, such as 
DPOs, policymakers and lawmakers, can use it as an input. 
 
A limitation related to the one expressed in the previous paragraph is that this work 
has, to a considerable extent, generalised disability.  This is inevitable, given that law 
and policy, as well as disability theory, do the same.  In my interactions with disabled 
people, either individually, as well as at conferences and seminars, it is clear that 
various factors impact on how social measures that seek to improve disabled 
people’s opportunities to participate are experienced.   
 
At one seminar, for example, a woman with a mobility impairment praised the 
changes in the public train she used and which made it easier for her to get around.  
Another woman, who had a visual impairment, responded that the signage in the 
same train, however, was not written in a big enough or bright enough font for her to 
be able to read it, nor were there voice directions that would inform her as to where 
she was and where the train would stop next.  Every attempt has therefore been 
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made to remain aware of the danger of generalisations, especially in processes at a 
micro level, and to emphasise the importance of managing these processes in ways 
that allow for the expression of a diversity of perspectives and experiences. 
 
Another limitation of the study is that its emphasis is access to work for disabled 
persons.  For reasons of practicality, “access” is used to refer to recruitment and 
selection processes only.  Medical and psychometric testing are not discussed in any 
great detail. 
 
Finally, as the author of this work, it is relevant for me to disclose that I have 
experienced functional limitations caused by bodily impairment for the past four 
years.  However, the nature of my impairment (which is not readily visible), my 
previous access to education, which has influenced the nature of my work, my social 
class and ready access to medical care have caused me to be able to manage my 
functional limitations relatively well.  This, in turn, has for the most part mediated any 
discrimination or other negative social, financial or personal consequences I may 
have experienced in employment or other facets of my life.  I am, however, aware 
that changes to my environment and social circumstances may change my realities.   
 
This thesis is therefore written from the perspective of a lawyer who takes a personal 
and professional interest in whether the rhetorical approval of social understandings 
of disability translates into concrete changes in the conception, interpretation, 
application and enforcement of equality and social security laws that seek to promote 







CHAPTER 2:  APPROACHES TO DISABILITY AND THEIR 




The objective of this chapter is to consider how disability has been constructed and 
to explore the social dimensions of disability, which are said to underpin disability 
laws and policies at international, regional and domestic levels.  Its envisioned 
outcome is to identify and set out themes that have to be explored in answering the 
primary research question, namely the extent to which South African equality, labour 
and social security laws that seek to promote access to work incorporate social 
explanations of disability and, if so, how they go about doing this. 
 
The chapter proceeds from two central premises.  Firstly, understandings of disability 
have to be situated within their social, economic, political and other contexts in order 
to ascertain why certain explanations have taken precedence in responses to 
atypical behaviour, experience and appearance.  Although it will not be possible to 
canvass fully how these contextual factors operate in specific situations, the social 
contingency of disability is at the heart of any approach that seeks to emphasise 
social and environmental barriers to disabled persons’ participation in various 
communities of which they are members. 
 
Secondly, it is important that the purpose for which disability is defined in given 
contexts is considered.  Such an approach has various justifications.  It would 
emphasise consistency between policy goals and policy implementation.33  It is also 
                                                          
33 The study of congruence between policy goals and implementation is part of implementation 
studies, a discernible research area within public policy studies.  It studies who puts policy into effect, 
how it is done and why it is done in a particular way (J Schofield. “Time for a Revival?  Public Policy 
Implementation:  A Review of the Literature and an Agenda for Future Research.” (2001) 3(3) 
International Journal of Management Reviews 245).  There are various rationales for studying policy 
implementation, including the development of ways to explain policy success or failure, predict policy 
outcomes, recommend policy and policy design norms and unify approaches to the study of activities 
that are inter-organisational in nature and involve multiple actors (Schofield 247).  As LJ O’Toole Jr. 
“Research on Policy Implementation:  Assessment and Prospects.” (2000) 10(2) Journal of Public 
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in keeping with a transformative constitutional vision that requires government and 
private actors to be accountable for transforming our society from one characterised 
by social exclusion or unfair terms of inclusion to one that constantly seeks to 
recognise and contribute to the realisation of all people’s potential.34  Finally, it is 
consistent with an approach to legislative interpretation that requires interpreters to 
give effect to the values of the Constitution within the parameters of the language 
used in enactments.35 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Administration Research and Theory 265 notes, policy implementers “continue to find themselves 
enmeshed in the vexing challenges of converting policy intent into efficacious action.”  See, also, PA 
Sabatier and D Mazmanian. “The Conditions of Effective Implementation:  A Guide to Accomplishing 
Policy Objectives.” (1979) 5(4) Policy Analysis 481. 
34 For perspectives on the South African constitutional project as one that seeks to transform society, 
see, inter alia, KE Klare. “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism.” (1998) 14(1) South 
African Journal on Human Rights 146; P Langa. “Transformative Constitutionalism.” (2006) 17(3) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 351; A van der Walt. “Tentative Urgency:  Sensitivity for the Paradoxes of 
Stability and Change in the Social Transformation Decisions of the Constitutional Court.” (2001) 16 
South African Public Law 1; H Botha. “Metaphoric Reasoning and Transformative Constitutionalism 
(Part 2).” (2003) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 20; D Moseneke. “Transformative Adjudication.” 
(2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 309.  Although labour law emphasises the 
importance of collective bargaining and the speedy resolution of disputes (see S Van Eck. “The 
Constitutionalisation of Labour Law:  No Place for a Superior Labour Appeal Court in Labour Matters 
(Part 1):  Background to South African Labour Courts and the Constitution.” (2005) 26(3) Obiter 549 
at 552), the Constitutional Court in NEHAWU v University of Cape Town and Others (2003) 24 ILJ 95 
(CC) para 16 stated that the inclusion of a right to fair labour practices in s 23 means that any statute 
that gives effect to that right must be construed purposively.  Ngcobo J noted that if such an approach 
implies that the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction in all labour matters, such implication is a product 
of our constitutional democracy, which “envisages the development of a coherent system of law that 
is shaped by the Constitution.” 
35 Section 39(2) of the Constitution reads:  “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing 
the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.”  In Investigating Directorate:  Serious Economic Offences and Others v 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others In re:  Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) para 21-26, Langa DP (as he then was) 
explained the import of this provision.  He stressed (at para 23) that “judicial officers must prefer 
interpretations of legislation that fall within constitutional bounds over those that do not, provided that 
such an interpretation can be reasonably ascribed to the section.”  M Bishop and J Brickhill. “‘In the 
Beginning was the Word’:  The Role of Text in the Interpretation of Statutes.” (2012) 129 South 
African Law Journal 681 at 684-685 point out that s 39(2) goes further than just requiring interpreters 
to choose textually plausible interpretations that are consistent with the Constitution over alternative 
meanings.  It goes further in three ways:  Firstly, it mandates that courts must have regard to the 
purpose and context of legislative provisions, even when the words or phrases are clear and 
unambiguous.  This context is not just of the Act itself or the history of the legislation, but extends to 
the history of our country, the need to transform our society so as to heal divisions and to build a 
democratic, open society in which all people’s quality of life is treated with equal respect and concern. 
Secondly, the injunction to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights goes beyond 
requiring consistency with specifically enumerated rights.  It is possible for a legislative provision not 
to be in conflict with any of the discrete rights in the Bill of Rights, but to still fall foul of s 39(2) 
because it conflicts with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights as a whole.  Thirdly, courts 
are required to choose an interpretation that best promotes constitutional values, even though there 
may be more than one.  This means that abstract values have to be balanced against one another, 
which often leads to an all-things considered balancing of disparate factors.  Another important 
feature of the approach mandated by the Constitution is that, even though s 39(2) only references the 
Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Court in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Another 2009 
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This chapter is structured as follows:  Part 2 briefly traces some material and cultural 
factors that influenced conceptions of and responses to disability.  Part 3 explores 
the contributions and limitations of purely social understandings of disability and 
identifies important themes we can use to explore if and how laws and policies 
incorporate social explanations of disability.  Part 4 briefly sets out the general 
purposes of labour and social security law, after which Part 5 presents a general 
framework that shows how the themes identified in Part 3 will be used to assess the 
incorporation of social explanations of disability into work creation and anti-
discrimination measures.  
 
2.2 Historical and contemporary influences on conceptions of and 
responses to disability  
 
Bodies36 that do not conform to stated or unstated ideals have been marked in 
societies from ancient civilisations to the present.37  Historical reflections on why and 
how people’s appearance, experience or behaviour have been characterised as 
atypical show that the processes and criteria are dependent on various cultural and 
material factors.38  These factors include dominant social values, the geographic and 
natural characteristics of a community, as well as its economic, political, religious 
and intellectual frameworks and principles.39  
 
The brief noting of material and cultural factors that have influenced conceptions of 
disability that follows is not intended to traverse the possibilities or the desirability of 
various articulations of disability, or to discuss which perspectives should be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1) SA 337 (CC) inferred a duty upon interpreters to choose interpretations that are consistent with 
and best promote structural provisions within the Constitution. 
36 DePoy and Gilson 7 define ‘body’ as more than just “the flesh container and its organic contents” 
and the term therefore also includes “the range of human phenomena that derive from bodies in 
action, thought, belief and experience”.  “The body is therefore comprised of the sensory body, the 
emotional body, the spiritual body, the economic body, the productive body, the expressive body, the 
body of ideas and meanings, and the body in multiple garb and spaces.”  The advantage of such a 
widened conception of ‘the body’ is that it integrates various elements of embodied human experience 
and it therefore allows for deeper understandings of diversity connected to such experience. 
37 DePoy and Gilson 9. 
38 C Barnes. A Legacy of Oppression:  A History of Disability in Western Culture. In: L Barton and M 
Oliver (eds). Disability Studies:  Past Present and Future. (1997) 3-4.  
39 DePoy and Gilson 13. 
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emphasised by equality, labour and social security laws in different contexts.  The 
focus will be on how laws and practices have been shaped by material and cultural 
factors, with a particular emphasis on Britain and, to a lesser extent, continental 
Europe.  This approach is not intended to reify Western historical perspectives as the 
only perspectives.  Rather, it is underpinned by the recognition that England’s Poor 
Laws influenced social policy and legislation in many countries, including South 
Africa, a former British colony.40   
 
2.2.1 Material and cultural factors that have impacted conceptions of and 
responses to disability 
 
In early Biblical texts41, various forms of impairment are mentioned.42  Some of these 
impairments were considered impure and served as valid bases on which to exclude 
persons with atypical features or characteristics from spiritual community. 43  
Paradoxically, the positive link between sin and defect then also gave rise to the 
ethical obligation to provide for disabled persons and ensure their limited inclusion.44   
                                                          
40 T Van der Merwe. “Events, Views and Ideologies which Shaped Social Security in South Africa.” 
(1997) 12(1-2) South African Journal of Economic History 77 at 89 notes:  “It comes as no surprise 
that South Africa, as a British colony, was strongly influenced by British ideas on social security.”  
41 BJ Gleeson. “Disability Studies: A Historical Materialist View.” (1997) 12(2) Disability and Society 
179, at 187, warns that it is a fallacy to read “material reality directly from ideological/ religious texts or 
aesthetical records.”  However, as E Bredberg. “Writing Disability History:  Problems, Perspectives 
and Sources.” (1999) 14(2) Disability and Society 189 points out (at 197), text may reflect an attitude, 
even if it does not confirm a widespread practice. 
42 Leviticus 21: 16-23 (New King James Version of the Holy Bible) reads:  “And the Lord spoke to 
Moses, saying, ‘Speak to Aaron, saying:  “No man of your descendants in succeeding generations, 
who has any defect, may approach to offer the bread of his God.  “For any man who has a defect 
shall not approach:  a man blind or lame, who has a marred face or any limb too long, “a man who 
has a broken foot or broken hand, “or is a hunchback or a dwarf, or a man who has a defect in his 
eye, or eczema or scab, or is a eunuch.  “No man of the descendants of Aaron the priest, who has a 
defect, shall come near to offer the offerings made by fire to the Lord.  He has a defect; he shall not 
come near to offer the bread of his God.  “He may eat the bread of his God, both the most holy and 
the holy; “only he shall not go near the veil or approach the altar, because he has a defect, lest he 
profane My sanctuaries; for I the Lord sanctify them [emphasis in the original].”’  
43 H-J Stiker. A History of Disability (translated by W Sayers). (1999) 30.  Care must be taken not to 
interpret this as an indication that all disabled persons were excluded from religious practice in early 
Christianity.  Bredberg (at 193) notes that the contrary is apparent from empirical evidence and cites 
three examples, one of which repudiates the passage in Leviticus cited in the previous footnote.  She 
argues that a more specific account of the settings in which disabled people were “excluded might 
yield more telling information about both religious practices and social attitudes concerning 
impairment.” 
44 Stiker 30.  He writes:  “Two opposing tendencies seem to me to run through the Judaism of the Old 
Testament:  that of violence, sacral order, and religious order, which tends to make the disabled one 
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Similarly, in Islamic texts, the concept of disability was not referenced, but Arabic 
terms for specific embodied conditions such as blindness, deafness, leprosy and 
lameness are used.45  Bazna and Hatab note that primary Islamic texts refer to two 
categories of persons that may today be regarded as having a disability, namely 
those with physical impairments and those who are socially marginalised.46   
 
‘Physical’ impairments were regarded as morally neutral, i.e. not the result of sin or 
punishment.  More space in the Qur’an is devoted to the plight of ‘the 
disadvantaged’, i.e. those who do not measure up to certain societal standards, 
including those related to family or tribal ties and origin, and social and economic 
status.47  Obligations are constantly imposed on the whole of society to improve the 
plight of the disadvantaged.48  Furthermore, persons who are unable to comply with 
specific rituals for good reasons, which may include physical or mental impairments, 
are often exempted from the duties required of Muslims without negative 
consequences.49 
 
In some early Greco-Roman civilisations, deformed infants were regarded as 
punishments from the gods and the state had the power to decide whether such 
infants were to be taken to unknown locations to be drowned or buried alive. 50  
However, responses to atypical bodies varied according to factors such as the 
reasons proffered for such occurrences, their frequency and the extent of the 
deviation from the norm.51  Conditions such as baldness, which were related to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the expelled victims, and that of ethics and social order, which strives not to contaminate the divine 
and, in contrast, to assume the obligation to situate the disabled within society.” 
45 MS Bazna and TA Hatab. “Disability in the Qur’an:  The Islamic Alternative to Defining, Viewing, 
and Relating to Disability.” (2005) 9(1) Journal of Religion, Disability and Health 5. 
46 Bazna and Hatab 23-24. 
47 Bazna and Hatab 24. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See, for example, V Rispler-Chaim. Disability in Islamic Law. (2007) 19-42 for a discussion of 
accommodations for disabled persons who are unable to comply with some or all of the requirements 
for the performance of certain religious duties (daily prayers, the fast of Ramadan, the Hajj and 
almsgiving).  Most of these requirements relate to the “state of purity and cleanliness” (at 19) of the 
believer.  In some instances, alternative methods of purifications or other concessions are allowed.  It 
is also notable that responses to persons with intellectual, neurological or psychosocial impairments 
vary in that there are different schools of thought on whether to recognise their performance of some 
religious duties (at 20).   
50 Stiker 39-40; DePoy and Gilson 12. 
51 DePoy and Gilson 12. 
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weakness, were tolerated, although not valued.52  At the positive end of the 
spectrum, Hephaestus, the god of fire, was mobility-impaired, but was portrayed as 
having extraordinary, magical power.53  Thus, it would appear that in the city-states 
of Ancient Greece, certain atypical characteristics were accepted and met with 
supportive societal responses, while others were not tolerated at all.  
 
There are varying accounts of responses to disability during the medieval period.  In 
terms of economic and social structures, feudalism consisted of a landlord 
subdividing his property into smaller portions that would be farmed by serfs or 
tenants.54  Every peasant who was homeless was required to work for a landlord in 
return for basic forms of support.  While serfs could not own property and could be 
bought and sold as property, they had paternalistic insurance against 
unemployment, sickness and old age.55  The state therefore felt no need to regulate 
the working and non-working poor.  However, that changed when slavery-serfdom 
was replaced by capitalism and the Bubonic Plague caused severe labour 
shortages.56   
 
With the demise of feudalism, the Church became the primary administrative body in 
control of poor relief.  The seeds for faith-based hospitals were sown, as members of 
the clergy in Christian and Islamic communities, as well as Buddhist monks in the 
Far East, were involved in giving medical care to those considered to be ill. 57  
However, the canonical approach did not focus as much on social control as it did on 
the spiritual rewards that resulted from showing charity to the ‘less fortunate’.58  As 
the economic and social burdens from the demise of feudalism became 
overwhelming, states in Europe stepped in and regulated the poor more stringently.  
                                                          
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 WP Quigley. “Five Hundred Years of English Poor Laws, 1349-1834:  Regulating the Working and 
Nonworking Poor.” (1996) 30(1) Akron Law Review 75. 
55 Quigley 76. 
56 Quigley 83 writes that the Bubonic Plague of 1348-1349 and famine killed a third of the English 
population, which created a severe labour shortage.  This broke down the feudal system and the 
liberated serfs roamed the country as beggars, vagrants and migratory workers.  See, also, F Fox 
Piven and RA Cloward. Regulating the Poor:  The Functions of Public Welfare (1993) 8. 
57 DePoy and Gilson 16.  These authors note that through the work of St Francis of Assisi, “the 
suffering of the poor and sick […] gave a moral role to the recipients of care as well as those providing 
care.” 
58 Stiker 67. 
22 
 
Fear of the poor saw such ‘risky’ persons increasingly being confined in alms 
houses.59  The disabled person had the status of the “cared-for, integrated 
marginalized”,60 a status that still persists in many contemporary communities. 
 
It is in the mid-1300s that the distinction between deserving and non-deserving poor 
people was first enshrined in legislation in England with the Statute of Labourers of 
1349-1350.61  These measures were taken in response to the severe labour 
shortages caused by the Black Plague and famine.62  As a result, the Statute 
legislated compulsory work, reduced compensation, set wage caps and provided for 
imprisonment if workers stopped working before their contracts came to an end and 
strict judicial enforcement through a special system.63  The relevance of the Statute 
for our understanding of disability is that it began with a method to prevent able-
bodied persons from begging: 
“It mandated every man or woman under 60 who is ‘free or bond, able in 
body’ and who does not have a job or their own home, ‘shall be bounden to 
serve him which so shall him require.’  Everyone able bodied under 60 was 
required to work.”64  
Similar measures were contained in the 1388, 1495 and 1504 versions of the Poor 
Laws.65   
 
The identification of disability therefore had implications for the size of the labour 
force during a period of severe labour shortages.  Up until 1563, the Church, 
although less powerful, had still played an important role in providing assistance to 
the poor.  However, Henry VIII, after the Protestant Reformation, dissolved all the 
monasteries and many poor people who had been cared for in and by these 
monasteries were now destitute.66  The English Poor Law of 1563 was the first 
                                                          
59 Ibid. 
60 Stiker 69.  He goes on (at 73) to trace the role of religious organisations in controlling the lives of 
the poor and cites the example of Zotikos, who was martyred in the early Christian era for having 
cared for lepers, and St Francis of Assisi, who began his life after conversion by kissing lepers.   
61 Quigley 87-88. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Quigley 85. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Quigley 95. 
66 Quigley 95. 
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legislative instrument in England that attempted comprehensive regulation of the 
poor and contained severe punishments for unauthorised beggars.67  As with the first 
Poor Laws in 1349-1350, there was a clear distinction between the deserving and 
undeserving poor. 
 
During the Enlightenment period, it became more common for the poor to be 
institutionalised.  The reasons for such internment are complex, but at least one of 
these reasons was to maintain social control.  Disabled people who were poor would 
have been institutionalised, as were specific categories of disabled people.  One 
example of the latter is offered by Stiker, who relates the situations of disabled war 
veterans in France, who were accommodated in the Hôtel des Invalides, approved 
by Louis XIV in 1674.68  Since not all these veterans were in Paris and many did not 
want to live sedentary lives, various detached companies were created in remote 
locations on French border outposts.  By 1702, there were 61 such companies.  
However, financial and disciplinary difficulties led to these companies for war 
veterans being populated on a merit-based system in terms of a 1724 ordinance.   
 
Although these internments were not occasioned by force, the intention was to 
prevent delinquency while providing care.  The veterans were also expected to work.  
They manufactured shoes and tapestries and cut material for clothing.  This labour 
was part of a growing trend to put the poor to work and this formula was exported as 
far as Canada, where workshops for the disabled were set up in Quebec.   
 
The Enlightenment period also saw a shift from belief in the supernatural to the 
systematic study of observable phenomena, an important example being Francis 
Bacon’s 1605 publication, Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning, Divine 
and Human.69  Leonardo Da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man also became the embodiment of 
the perfect human form upon which function and architecture are built to this day, 
                                                          
67 See Quigley 96-103 for an exposition of the main features of all the Poor Laws from 1536 to 1601. 
68 Stiker 100-102. 
69 DePoy and Gilson 18. 
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even though it is not an accurate representation of the average person’s physical 
proportions.70  
 
As the explanations for atypical behaviour, experience and appearance became 
more complex and religious hegemony receded to allow for analyses influenced by 
economic and social factors, a disproportionate number of poor people were 
classified as having atypical characteristics.71  Medicine was still in its infancy, so 
informal social arrangements did not always reflect a distinction in treatment 
between those who were atypical due to poverty and those who were atypical due to 
illness.72   
 
It is clear that economic means mediated the consequences of atypical behaviour or 
appearance.  Nobility who were eccentric, for example, would have had the 
possibility of inheriting family fortunes and had access to resources,73 while 
                                                          
70 B Borson. “Scale and Proportion:  The Architect’s Domain.” (2013) 
http://www.lifeofanarchitect.com/scale-and-proportion-the-architects-domain/ (Accessed: 6 February 
2015) notes:  “The drawing is based on the correlations of ideal human proportions with geometry 
described by the ancient Roman architect Vitruvius in Book III of his treatise ‘De Architectura’.”  
In The Ten Books of Architecture, written circa 25BC, at 3.1.2-3 Vitruvius Pollio (referred to as 
Vitruvius) writes (translation by MH Morgan available at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0073%3Abook%3D3%3
Achapter%3D1%3Asection%3D2 (Accessed: 6 February 2015): 
“For the human body is so designed by nature that the face, from the chin to the top of the 
forehead and the lowest roots of the hair, is a tenth part of the whole height; the open hand 
from the wrist to the tip of the middle finger is just the same; the head from the chin to the 
crown is an eighth, and with the neck and shoulder from the top of the breast to the lowest 
roots of the hair is a sixth; from the middle of the breast to the summit of the crown is a fourth. If 
we take the height of the face itself, the distance from the bottom of the chin to the underside of 
the nostrils is one third of it; the nose from the underside of the nostrils to a line between the 
eyebrows is the same; from there to the lowest roots of the hair is also a third, comprising the 
forehead. The length of the foot is one sixth of the height of the body; of the forearm, one 
fourth; and the breadth of the breast is also one fourth.”   
S Gilson and E DePoy. “Da Vinci’s Ill-Fated Design Legacy:  Homogenization and Standardization.” 
(2007) 5(7) International Journal of the Humanities 148 write that one of the most influential modern 
architects, Le Corbusier, used the golden ratio developed by Vitruvius and operationalised by Da 
Vinci as the human standard around which to build urban environments.  Unfortunately, so they 
argue, this standard is not realistic.  The Vitruvian Man is typically 8 heads tall, whereas the average 
person is 7½ or even 6½ heads tall.  They note (at 149):  “The use of these exaggerated male 
standards as the basis for fashioning environments and products literally design ‘who is in’ and ‘who 
is out’, who can function and who cannot, who is desirable for a space or product and who is not.”  
They therefore advocate (at 150) for “an international, interdisciplinary design field that responds to 
user needs, sustainability and technologies to solve the problems of human life.” 
71 DePoy and Gilson 19. 
72 DePoy and Gilson 20. 
73 CJ Kudlick. “Disability History:  Why We Need Another ‘Other’.” (2003) 108 American Historical 
Review 763 at 773-774 briefly reviews a book about Hugh Blair of Borgue, an autistic boy born to a 
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eccentrics in the lower classes were more likely to have been locked up in asylums 
with others who were considered ‘mad’ or aberrant in other ways.74  Similarly, 
Bredberg warns that the experience of blindness, to name but one example, was 
markedly different for lower- and upper-class Victorians.75 
 
During the Victorian era, Quetelet constructed ‘the average man’, an idea that still 
animates not only disability theory and practice, but the sciences more generally. 76  
Beirne summarises the import of this idea:77 
“In the early 1840s, especially after he became acquainted with the probabilistic 
error function in celestial mechanics, Quetelet insisted on the need to present 
not only the mean of a scale of given characteristics but also the upper and 
lower limits between which individuals oscillated.  Minor or "natural" variation 
around the mean was then identified by Quetelet as deviation that should 
attract no unusual attention; extraordinary variation (e.g., the height of giants 
and dwarfs) he saw as "preternatural. . . monstrous" [….]  In addition, Quetelet 
perceived that variation around the mean occurred not randomly but in a 
determinate order that approximated the principle of the normal distribution in 
celestial mechanics.  This principle, he now surmised, was also applicable to 
the distribution of all the nonphysical qualities of man.” 
 
The combination of ‘the average man’ and probability theory thus led to observation 
becoming prescription.78  When industrialisation and mass production started, 
mechanisation and standardisation were based on what the average person ought to 
be able to do in given circumstances:79    
                                                                                                                                                                                    
wealthy Scottish Family in the early 1700s.  His brother applied to court to have him legally declared 
ineligible to inherit the family fortune and his mother wanted to arrange a suitable marriage for him.  
The book describes his relationships with his family, neighbours and the community, which implies 
that he was not isolated socially.  DePoy and Gilson 19 also point out that where treatments for the 
atypical existed, these were available to those who could pay. 
74 Stiker 110.   
75 Bredberg 198. 
76 DePoy and Gilson 22; P Beirne. “Adolphe Quetelet and the Origins of Positivist Criminology.” 
(1987) 92(5) American Journal of Sociology 1140. 
77 Beirne 1159. 
78 DePoy and Gilson 22. 
79 DePoy and Gilson 23.  See, also, Finkelstein 11, who notes that one view, which he first espoused 
in 1980, is that the predominant factor in the disablement of groups of people is how people can 
participate in the creation of social wealth.  During times of small-scale manufacturing that people 
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“As industrialization advanced and associated economic productivity with 
legitimate goodness, links between standardized expectations, moral 
judgment, unemployment, and disproportionate poverty among people with 
activity, appearance, and/or experiential differences further located legitimacy 
of explanations in terms of productivity.  The attribution of “not” normal 
activity, appearance, and experience to assumed productivity limitation was 
and remains an important determination of current disability legitimacy.” 
 
As the 20th century progressed, the hegemony of ‘normality’, together with the rise of 
professional authority had a major impact on the way in which disability was 
conceived.  Stiker argues that after the First World War, the rise of the ‘mental’ 
asylum led to psychiatrists becoming ‘experts’ on madness and leaders of 
institutions for people who were essentially without rights.80  People with physical 
impairments were not in the asylums, but were often also institutionalised, unless 
their impairments could be used practically or for profit.81 He argues that as 
rehabilitation and medicalisation gained ground, the “disabled were no longer simply 
the poor.”82 
 
O’Brien notes that in the United States of America (USA) in the mid-1900s, the 
rehabilitation centre sought to replace asylums and institutions for persons with 
physical impairments.83  Such centres were typically staffed by “an interdisciplinary 
team of experts, which ideally included a psychiatrist, a physician, social workers, 
occupational and physical therapists, vocational rehabilitation experts and even an 
anthropologist” [emphasis in the original].84  This team would make a collective 
diagnosis, but the central assumption was that people with impairments were 
‘maladjusted’ and that their role as professionals was to help impaired individuals 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
could undertake in their homes, with single-person forms of transportation and small markets where 
people could exchange goods, it would have been possible for people with diverse attributes to 
participate in social wealth creation.  However, with the advent of more advanced machinery that was 
increasingly built to be operated by ‘normal’ people, many people were excluded.  
80 Stiker 138. 
81 Stiker 139. 
82 Ibid. 
83 R O’Brien. Crippled Justice:  The History of Modern Disability Policy in the Workplace. (2002) 7. 
84 O’Brien 8. 
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become closer to Quetelet’s ‘average man’, particularly with a view to increase their 
employability.85 
 
The above developments in the global North would have seeped into the attitudes 
and practices of those who administered the colonies that were being set up.  Jan 
Van Riebeeck, who arrived in South Africa in 1652 to set up a refreshment post, 
documented the first count of Europeans in December of that year.  All people, 
except women and children, were listed by occupation, including those who drew 
pay but were “sick generally in bed and many lazy idlers who do little work and who it 
would be better to discharge.”86  It is clear from this passage that there was a 
distinction between those who could not work due to illness and those who did not 
work because they were “lazy”.  
 
This distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor has animated the 
provision of social security in South Africa for a long time.  It fits in well with two main 
historical influences:  the British Poor Law tradition that viewed unemployment as a 
moral problem and free-market liberalism with its distrust of government 
intervention.87  However, the continental European influence did allow for 
government intervention.88  These interventions were initially carried out by ordinary 
people who became deacons in the church and who then had to take care of the 
poor, a system developed by John Calvin in Geneva.89 
 
Disabled persons who qualified for benefits were provided for, first by the church and 
then by government, mostly in the form of cash transfers or grants.  Formal social 
                                                          
85 Ibid. 
86 See M Nkosi. Mining Deep:  The Origins of the Labour Structure in South Africa. (2011) 4. 
87 Van der Merwe 101. 
88 S Van der Berg. “South African Social Security under Apartheid and Beyond.” (1997) 14(4) 
Development Southern Africa 481 at 485 asserts that one of the interesting aspects of the 
development of social security in South Africa is 
“the tension between the liberal Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire position, which is sceptical of social 
security, and continental European influences, which are more supportive of it [….]  The latter 
were dominant in the old Boer Republics and in the pre-British Cape Colony, and came to the 
fore again under Afrikaner nationalist rule, but then with a racial bias; laissez-faire enjoyed 
stronger support under direct British rule and later from the predominantly English business 
class.” 
89 Van der Merwe 79. 
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security started in 1665 when the Church and the Dutch East India Company 
partnered to provide cash benefits, food, clothes and housing to people in need, 
including disabled persons.90  Furthermore, disabled persons, the elderly and 
displaced individuals were often placed in the care of other households.91 
 
Although British rule was characterised by a reticence to provide poor relief, the 
Cape Province enacted the Masters and Servants Act92 in 1856.  This Act and 
related legislation provided for the care of destitute children, physically disabled 
persons and the poor.93  The Church was still heavily involved in social welfare and, 
after 1880, helped to establish, inter alia, institutions for disabled persons.94  In the 
Boer Republics, a more interventionist approach was followed, with an emphasis on 
relief to poor White persons, including public works programmes to provide short-
term employment.95 
 
When the Union of South Africa was formed, social welfare was regarded as a 
provincial matter, but the national government took over this function from the 
provinces, with the exception of Natal, in 1940.96  The emphasis was on in-kind 
benefits for which recipients had to return some service and it was made clear that 
assistance was to be made as unattractive as possible.97  Assistance to physically 
disabled persons persisted, though, and in 1946 the first Disability Grants Act was 
passed.98  The government refused to take a structural approach to social welfare, 
however, and the default was for individuals to take care of themselves.99 
 
It is clear that within the South African social security system, classification as 
disabled was, and still is, one means through which to gain access to benefits as a 
                                                          
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Act 15 of 1856. 
93 BW McKendrick. Introduction to Social Work in South Africa. (1990) 9. 
94 Van der Merwe 84. 
95 Van der Merwe 89. 
96 Van der Merwe 92. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Act 36 of 1946. 
99 McKendrick notes (at 22):  “State policy, often stated in parliamentary speeches and in the official 
government documents, is that the major onus for human well-being lies with the person himself, his 
family and the community.” 
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‘deserving’ poor person.  Historically, these benefits were provided within a 
framework of charity or philanthropy.   By the time the UN Year of Disabled Persons, 
1986, arrived, the South African Coordination Committee drafted a report100 that was 
framed in largely medicalised, paternalistic terms,101 but progress was apparent in 
the recognition of some social factors in the causes of disablement.102  
 
The summary of recommendations included reference to the development of  
education, training and work opportunities for disabled persons,103 as well as to 
“equal opportunities in both the open and sheltered labour market which must be 
recognised, and physical accessibility of the work environment which must be 
ensured.”104  However, the Committee stated that it did not recommend “[t]he 
adoption and integration of a human rights charter for disabled people in legislation.”  
The equalisation of opportunities was therefore not suggested in terms of a rights-
based framework and was therefore dependent on the benevolence of powerful 
economic, political and social actors. 
 
The Report recognised that many disabled persons were confined to institutions 
“their condition [did] not justify.”105  Institutionalisation of those deemed to have 
intellectual or psychosocial impairments, in particular, used to be the norm, but a 
process of de-institutionalisation, coupled with the development of community-based 
care, has commenced.106  The Mental Health Care Act107 (MHCA) now rests on 
                                                          
100 Department of National Health and Population Development. Disability in the Republic of South 
Africa:  Main Report Volume 1. (1987) (hereinafter referred to as “Disability in South Africa Report”). 
101 Disability in South Africa Report Chapter 5 (at 23) is titled “National Policy for Disabled Care”, while 
Chapter 6 (at 27) is headed “Structure for the Care of the Disabled”.  Chapter 2 (at 5-8), which seeks 
to address ethical concerns relating to disability, focuses primarily on “effective care of the disabled”. 
102 “Factors responsible for disablement” (Disability in South Africa Report Item 3.8 at 11) were listed 
as including “[a]n absence of accurate knowledge about disability, its causes, prevention and 
treatment.  This includes stigma, discrimination and misconceptions of disability”; “[c]onstraints, 
including a lack of resources, geographical distance, physical and social barriers that make it 
impossible for many people to take advantage of available services”; and “[l]ow priority in social and 
economic development for activities related to equalisation of opportunities, rehabilitation and the 
prevention of disability.”  
103 Disability in South Africa Report Item 7.2.6.2 (a)-(f) at 32. 
104 Disability in South Africa Report Item 7.2.6.2 (g) at 32. 
105 Disability in South Africa Report Item 3.7.3 at 10. 
106 R Lazarus. “Managing De-Institutionalisation in a Context of Change:  The Case of Gauteng, South 
Africa:  Review Article.” (2005) 8(2) South African Psychiatry Review 65 at 66.  He notes that despite 
evidence of extreme deficiencies in institutionalised care, some concerns about de-institutionalisation 
include “indiscriminate discharges”, “inadequate family and community preparation and support”, 
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three pillars, namely the human rights of mental health care users, an emphasis on 
integrated care involving the community at large, and the safety of the public.108  
Commentators have expressed concerns about the implementation of the MHCA, 
specifically in relation to “indiscriminate discharges, inadequate family and 
community preparation and support, inadequate community resources, inadequate 
continuity of mental health care, revolving door admissions and discharges, neglect  
and abuse, and homelessness.”109 
 
From the above, it is clear that a host of both material and cultural factors, such as 
the nature of the impairment, the economic policies and structures within a particular 
society, technological development, interpretations of religious texts and 
predominant intellectual traditions and social structures, to name but a few, have al l 
had an impact on and continue to influence the conception and interpretation of 
embodied difference and societal responses to such difference. 
 
For our purposes, we will take specific interest in working definitions of disability.  
These are the definitions used in policies and laws to inform decisions on whether 
individuals or groups need to be socially protected, in work and non-work contexts, 
or should benefit from social programmes that benefit disabled persons directly or 
indirectly. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“inadequate community resources”, “inadequate continuity of mental health care”, “revolving door 
admissions and discharges”, “neglect and abuse” and “homelessness”. 
107 Act 17 of 2002. 
108 M Freeman. “New Mental Health Legislation in South Africa – Principles and Practicalities:  A View 
from the Department of Health.” (2002) 5(3) South African Psychiatry Review 4.  The author stresses 
(at 7) that the third component, namely the safety of the public, is relevant only in a minority of cases, 
as “most people with mental illness are not violent or even prone to violence.” 
109 See fn 106.  See, also, E Kock. De-Institutionalisation of People with Mental Illness and Intellectual 
Disability:  The Family Perspective. (2009) 7 and AA Landman and WJ Landman. A Practitioner’s 
Guide to the Mental Health Care Act. (2014) 10, who caution that the “implementation of the MHCA is 
hindered by budgetary constraints, lack of facilities causing premature discharge of users, and 
structural and logistical difficulties.” 
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2.2.2. Working definitions of disability  
 
Grönvik, in his work on definitions of disability in the social sciences, displays a 
photograph of a body, with the person’s head and face ‘cut off’, in a wheelchair at the 
bottom of a flight of stairs and then proceeded to explain that the photograph could 
be seen to reflect no less than five conceptions of disability.110  Firstly, the everyday 
conception is that the person is disabled because he or she is in a wheelchair and 
cannot walk up the stairs.  This is a functional definition.  The second possibility is to 
conceive of disability as a result of the interaction between a person with impairment 
and his or her environment, i.e. the person in the wheelchair cannot get up the stairs.  
This is a relative or environmental definition of disability.   
 
The third possible definition is that the stairs are the reason why the person is 
disabled, with no reference to the person in the wheelchair at all.  Social barriers 
prevent people with impairments from participating in society and these barriers are 
the only causes of disability.  This definition is often referred to as ‘the social model 
of disability’.  One may also see that the person is in a wheelchair and therefore has 
access to a mobility aid, for which he or she may have had to apply.  As a result, he 
or she must have met some administrative definition of disability.  This is the fourth 
definition.  The fifth definition may arise if someone looking at the picture were to ask 
whether, even if other people or administrative systems regard the person as  
disabled, the person regards himself or herself as disabled.  This would be a 
subjective definition of disability. 
 
Grönvik points out that the complexity of what we mean by disability does not end 
with these five potential conceptions.111  The intersections of disability and various 
other identity markers such as gender, race, class, sexual orientation and nationality 
mean that regardless of the definition of disability one uses, people’s experiences of 
disability will vary.  Laws and policies therefore have to be sensitive to these lived 
experiences as influenced by complex, intersecting personal, environmental and 
                                                          
110 L Grönvik. Definitions of Disability in Social Sciences:  Methodological Perspectives. (2007) 11-12. 
111 Grönvik 12. 
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social variables.  The complexity also compels us to clarify why we are interested in 
disability in specific instances – the focus may be on people’s bodies, the built 
environment, bureaucratic systems, social movements or a combination of these.112 
 
Within international rights bodies such as the UN and within many domestic systems 
worldwide, including that of South Africa, it has been recognised that there has been 
a shift from functional definitions of disability that focus on the individual to relative or 
environmental definitions that regard disability as the result of interactions between a 
person said to have an impairment and his or her environment.  The UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), for example, seems to endorse 
the latter definition.  The choice of definition for anti-discrimination law is discussed 
in Chapter 4.113  For now, the focus will be on the theoretical and operational 
implications of the conceptual complexity of disability. 
 
Before we explore social explanations any further, some preliminary observations 
about models and theories may be apposite.  The social model of disability is not a 
social theory.  A theory aims to explain “how and why specific relationships lead to 
specific events”114 and therefore claims to offer “a limited and fairly precise 
picture”.115  In contrast, a model can at best be more or less useful, for “models are 
merely ways to help us to better understand the world, or those bits of it under 
scrutiny.  If we expect models to explain, rather than aid understanding, they are 
bound to be found wanting.”116   
 
A further cautionary observation relates to the overall usefulness of models.  
Ultimately, the aim should not be the development of distinct models, but rather the 
evolution of critical understandings of disability as a social construct manifested in 
                                                          
112 Ibid. 
113 See 4.4.4. 
114 JG Wacker. “A Definition of Theory:  Research Guidelines for Different Theory-Building Research 
Methods in Operations Management.” (1998) 16(3) Journal of Operations Management 361 at 364.  
115 MS Poole and AH Van de Ven. “Using Paradox to Build Management and Organization Theories.” 
(1989) 14(4) Academy of Management Review 562. 
116 See M Oliver. Understanding Disability:  From Theory to Practice. (1996) (hereinafter referred to as 
“Oliver ‘Understanding Disability’”) 40.  
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people’s lived experiences.117  For this reason, understandings of disability may be 
informed by various models originating from different disciplines or by gaps left by 
existing disciplines.118   
 
Models may overlap and the usefulness of particular models may vary from one 
instance to another, depending on factors such as the purpose of explaining 
disability and the contexts in which it is explained.  Contemporary and emerging 
explanations of disability may require radical changes to be made to social 
processes and institutions, some or all of which may be established and maintained 
by law.  It is against the backdrop of these general remarks that some critiques of 
social explanations are now considered. 
 
2.3 The move towards social explanations of disability 
 
The social model of disability has gained traction in recent decades at an 
international level and in many domestic jurisdictions, including South Africa.  In 
Western Europe, the social model has its genesis in the work of British activists who, 
in 1976, wrote: 
“In our view, it is society which disables…  Disability is something imposed on 
top of our impairments; by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and 
excluded from full participation in society.  Disabled people are therefore an 
oppressed group in society.” 119 
  
                                                          
117 M Oliver. “The Individual and Social Models of Disability.” (1990) http://disability-
studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/Oliver-in-soc-dis.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 2 warns that 
technical, semantic debates should not obscure the real issues, which relate to oppression, 
discrimination, inequality and poverty. 
118 See Kanter (2010-2011) at 419.  On the subject of disability studies, she writes that many scholars 
view various models of disability as part of an overall model that regards disability as a social 
construct.  While there may be some scholars who reject some of these models as inaccurate, the 
point remains that the medical, individual model of disability ought not to be the sole model through 
which to understand disability. 
119 Quoted in Priestley ‘Disability Studies Programmes’” 22.  MS Holmes. Fictions of Afflictions:  
Physical Disability in Victorian Culture. (2004) 7-11 suggests that Victorian literature contained 
perspectives that hinted at social explanations of disability.   
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The focus of the social model is therefore on all things that restrict disabled people, 
“ranging from individual prejudice to institutional discrimination, from inaccessible 
buildings to unusable transport systems, from segregated education to excluding 
work arrangements, and so on.  Further, the consequences of this failure do not 
simply and randomly fall on individuals but systematically upon disabled people as a 
group who experience this failure as discrimination institutionalised throughout 
society.”120 
 
While the classical articulations of the social model recognise that impairment, i.e. a 
partial or total loss of physical or mental functions, may be important in terms of 
describing the state of a person’s body, these do not recognise bodily impairment as 
the cause of disability.121  The restrictions imposed on persons with disabilities by 
impairment are thus not emphasised, and the model focuses rather on the ways in 
which society erects barriers to the full participation and advancement of disabled 
persons. 
 
There are many variations in emphasis in explanations of disability that can plausibly 
fall under the umbrella of social explanations, or alternatively, non-individual models 
of disability.  In legal discourse, the minority group model, which was developed in 
North America, has been popular.  This model views disabled persons as being part 
of an oppressed group in society who have suffered and are suffering systemic 
discrimination and social exclusion in similar ways to groups who are marginalised 
based on their race, gender, sexual orientation or other characteristics.122  The focus 
is therefore on identity and power relations in society.  
 
Activists first used the social model as a strategy.  Their primary objective was to 
debunk the overwhelmingly accepted starting point that disability is a personal 
tragedy and that sufferers either have to be fixed or exist as objects of charity. 123  
They specifically sought to challenge the hegemony of Western bio-medical 
                                                          
120 See Oliver ‘Understanding Disability’ 33 and Marks 3. 
121 See Oliver ‘Understanding Disability’ 35 and Oliver ‘Disablement’ 11. 




discourses in the explanation of disability, which they argued labelled disabled 
people with disembodied medical categories and served to pathologise disability 
while blaming disabled people for their conditions.124 
 
The social model’s primary message was simple and could be conveyed easily – 
society should look in the mirror when seeking the causes of disability, instead of 
evaluating individuals against ‘objective’, ‘medical’ standards developed by 
mainstream society.125  Less attention has been paid to the ways in which a social 
model, together with other models and theories, can impact on the construction of 
disability for purposes of social policy and the law. 
 
In South Africa, the disability movement has been influenced heavily by 
developments at international level,126 as well as resistance to apartheid.  Kathy 
Jagoe, an activist involved in the formation of Disabled People South Africa (DPSA), 
explains that the disability movement in the 1980s was influenced by the Black 
Consciousness Movement in two respects:  firstly, the importance of self -
representation was emphasised – disabled persons had to voice their own 
experiences and drive their own emancipation; and secondly, the marginalisation 
and deprivation experienced by people with disabilities were caused by the society in 
which they lived.127   
 
Disabled People South Africa’s initiatives were twofold, namely a political struggle in 
which disabled people claimed their rights, and a developmental project that sought 
                                                          
124 R Imrie. “Demystifying Disability:  A Review of the International Classification of Functioning, 
Disability and Health.” (2004) 26(3) Sociology of Health and Illness 290. 
125 See Kanter 420. 
126 Mike Du Toit, who later became the Secretary-General of Disabled People South Africa (DPSA), 
had attended the international conference of Rehabilitation International, at which disability activists 
walked out after their insistence that 50% of the Board of that organisation should be disabled 
persons was rejected.  This major change saw the formation of Disabled Peoples International, with 
the emphasis being on self-representation (Recounted in C Howell, S Chalklen and T Alberts. A 
History of the Disability Rights Movement in South Africa. In: Watermeyer, B; Swartz, L; Lorenzo, T; 
Schneider, M and Priestley, M (eds). Disability and Social Change:  A South African Agenda. (2006) 
49). 
127 Howell, Chalklen and Alberts 50. 
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to generate income through self-help.128  It was also felt that disabled people’s 
struggles could not be separated from the fight against apartheid, which is why 
DPSA located itself within the mass anti-apartheid movement and built relationships 
with many other civil society organisations.129  As early as 1990, DPSA met with the 
African National Congress (ANC) as the government-in-waiting and encouraged the 
inclusion of disability issues in that party’s position papers and other documents. 130  
This collaboration is apparent from the ANC’s draft Bill of Rights of 1993, which 
specifically mentions the role of DPSA in framing disabled persons’ rights.131 
 
One of the milestones for the disability rights movement was the adoption of a 
Disability Rights Charter in 1992.  The Charter was the result of a human rights 
advocacy campaign driven by Lawyers for Human Rights.132  This campaign’s 
primary purpose was ‘to mobilise opinion from disabled people themselves, based 
on their life experiences, to shape national policy and thinking on disability’.133  The 
campaign was so successful that it spawned a protest march by disabled people 
against the marginalisation and discrimination they experienced.134  The Charter was 
steeped in a human rights approach with the ultimate objective of building a society 
in which disabled persons would have their basic needs met and could live 
independently and free from discrimination, exploitation and abuse.135  
 
The human rights and development approach taken by the South African disability 
movement is, at the macro level, consistent with the social model of disability, 
because the central claim of the latter is that disability is caused wholly or 
                                                          
128 W Rowland. Nothing About Us Without Us:  Inside the Disability Rights Movement of South Africa. 
(2004).  See also Howell, Chalklen and Alberts 54. 
129 Howell, Chalklen and Alberts 54. 
130 Howell, Chalklen and Alberts 56. 
131 ANC. “A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa.” (1993) http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=231 
(Accessed: 6 February 2015) (hereinafter referred to as “ANC ‘Bill of Rights’”).  A note to article 9, 
which deals with disabled persons’ rights, reads:   
“This addition is in line with recommendations by the Disabled People of South Africa, which is 
actively promoting discussion amongst disabled people on their future constitutional rights, and 
which points out that there are nine million disabled persons in our country.” 
The relevance of this article to the interpretation of disabled persons’ constitutional rights is discussed 
in Chapter 6 (see 6.2.3.2). 
132 Howell, Chalklen and Alberts 57. 
133 M Masutha cited in Howell, Chalklen and Alberts 57. 
134 Howell, Chalklen and Alberts 57. 
135 The INDS Chapter 2. 
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substantially by social and environmental barriers that prevent disabled people from 
living independently and participating in their communities.  However, we would do 
well to examine the scope of social understandings of disability and consider what 
these can and cannot contribute to social policy, as well as legal theory and practice. 
 
2.3.1 Scope of and issues raised by social understandings of disability 
 
Various critiques of the social model of disability and of social understandings in 
general, are discernible.  The objective here is not an exhaustive discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of such understandings, but an assessment of what 
these offer policymakers and legislators, particularly within the realm of equality, 
labour and social security law. 
 
2.3.1.1 The body, its environment and the interrelationship between these 
 
Social understandings of disability vary in the degree to which disability is attributed 
to social and environmental factors.  Oliver’s statement that “disability is wholly and 
exclusively social” 136 is perhaps the most extreme variation.  Yet, even he points out 
that the social model is not meant to deal with the personal restrictions caused by 
impairments.137 
 
The distinction between impairment and disability has been explained thus: 
“Impairment:  Lacking part or all of a limb, or having a defective limb, 
organism or mechanism of the body; Disability:  The disadvantage or 
restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organisation which 
takes no or little account of people who have physical impairments and thus 
excludes them from the mainstream of social activities.”138 
                                                          
136 See Oliver ‘Understanding Disability’ 35.  
137 See M Oliver. “Defining Impairment and Disability:  Issues at Stake.” (1996) 
www.disability.co.uk/sites/default/files/resources/ex%20div%20ch3.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 
11.  
138 See Oliver ‘Disablement’ 11. 
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Various disability scholars argue that this dualistic distinction between the body and 
its material and social environment is untenable.  Hughes and Paterson recognise 
that while impairment has not been completely ignored by disability activists, 
theoretical emphasis on social relations and processes and the environment has 
meant that the impaired body has been treated as “an ahistorical, pre-social, purely 
natural object” instead of as a component of “history, culture and meaning.” 139  
These authors represent the binaries created by this approach in the following 
table:140 
 
Table I: Binaries created by separation of the body from its environment 
 
The biological The social 
Impairment Disability 
The body Society 
Medicine  Politics 
Therapy  Emancipation 
Pain  Oppression 
The medical model The social model 
 
Each binary couple along the horizontal axis excludes its opposite, but each concept 
includes the same terrains that are represented on the same vertical axis.  Within 
this scheme, “[t]he relationship of disabled people to their bodies is mediated by 
medicine and therapy, and has nothing to do with policy and politics.”141  Hughes and 
Paterson argue that by ceding the body to medicine in this way, the classical 
articulation of the social model means that “medicine is the sole master of the 
language of impairment and it acquires this sovereignty through its power to name 
bodily dysfunctions.”142 
  
                                                          
139 B Hughes and K Paterson. “The Social Model of Disability and the Disappearing Body:  Towards a 
Sociology of Impairment.” (1997) 12(3) Disability and Society 326. 
140 Hughes and Paterson 330. 
141 Hughes and Paterson 331. 
142 Hughes and Paterson 333. 
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However, medical discourses, at least at the level of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), have not been static in their conceptions of bodily functioning and disability.  
This is reflected in the way in which the WHO’s classification of the outcomes of 
health conditions has changed in the last three and a half decades.  The 
International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (ICIDH), 143 
adopted in 1980, characterised the “consequences of diseases” as follows:144  A 
disease caused impairment, which was defined as a loss or abnormality of bodily 
structures and functioning.  Impairment would then cause disability, which was 
defined as a lack of ability to perform a normal activity.  A disability could manifest as 
a handicap, which was regarded as a limitation in fulfilling a role in life. 
 
A major criticism of the ICIDH was that the three-tiered, linear causal model 
described above did not incorporate environmental factors and, furthermore, that it 
used negative terminology.145  Disability activists objected that disability was 
individualised and medicalised without any reference to its social, economic or 
political context.  Partly in response to these criticisms and after a fairly long revision 
process, all 191 member states of the WHO adopted the International Classification 
of Functioning, Disability and Health (the ICF) in 2001.146   
 
The laudable aims of the ICF are: 
“• to provide a scientific basis for understanding and studying health and 
health-related states, outcomes and determinants; 
• to establish a common language for describing health and health-
related states in order to improve communication between different 
                                                          
143 WHO. International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps:  A Manual of 
Classification Relating to the Consequences of Disease. (1980) 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/1980/9241541261_eng.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015).   
144 H Hemmingsson and H Jonsson. “An Occupational Perspective on the Concept of Participation in 
the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health – Some Critical Remarks.” (2005) 
59(5) American Journal of Occupational Therapy 570. 
145 G Stucki, A Cieza and J Melvin. “The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and 
Health:  A Unifying Model for the Conceptual Description of the Rehabilitation Strategy.” (2007) 39(4) 
Journal of Rehabilitation Medicine 39; Hemmingsson and Jonsson 570; Imrie 290.   
146 WHO. International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health. (2001) 
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users, such as health care workers, researchers, policy-makers and 
the public, including people with disabilities; 
• to permit comparison of data across countries, health care disciplines, 
services and time;   
• to provide a systematic coding scheme for health information 
systems.”147 
 
Unlike the ICIDH, the ICF “seeks to locate an understanding of disability at the 
intersection between the biological body and the social and institutional 












Figure 1: Interactions between the components of the ICF149   
 
Imrie summarises the basic scheme of the ICF succinctly: 
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“The ICF’s classification covers any disturbance in terms of functional states 
associated with health conditions at body, individual and society levels.  
Functional states include body functions and structures, activities at the 
individual level and participation in society.  As the ICF suggests, disability is 
the variation of human functioning caused by one or a combination of the 
following: the loss or abnormality of a body part (i.e. impairment); difficulties 
an individual may have in executing activities (i.e. activity limitations); and/or 
problems an individual may experience in involvement in life situations (i.e. 
participation restrictions).  […] ‘[T]he three dimensions are co-equals in 
significance and … are different facets … of a single emergent phenomenon, 
disablement’.  The ICF also notes that variations in human functioning (i.e. 
disability) are influenced by contextual factors, including environmental factors 
or aspects of the external or extrinsic world such as social systems and 
services, and personal factors, such as age, ethnicity, gender, social status, 
etc.”150 
 
While the ICF is clearly an attempt to steer a middle ground between the extremes of 
individual models on the one hand, and wholly social models on the other, 
commentators have recognised that further conceptual clarifications and 
developments are necessary in order for the ICF to be applied in a consistent 
manner that does not continue to exclude the voices of disabled people.  Some of 
these grey areas will pose challenges in the individualised, concrete situations in 
which decisions have to be made about whether to employ someone, as well as 
when courts or tribunals have to decide whether unfair discrimination or other unfair 
conduct has been perpetrated against disabled persons.   
 
As will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the stage of the legal or policy processes 
at which medical or social perspectives dominate is of cardinal importance.  If 
medical conceptions determine eligibility for protection from discrimination, these 
conceptions feed into the subsequent inquiries as to the fairness of the impugned 
                                                          
150 Imrie 292-293. 
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conduct in various ways.151  Similarly, if policies situate the ‘problem of disability’ 
within disabled individuals, the impetus for the imposition and enforcement of 
positive obligations on employers and other social actors is diluted, even if social 
understandings of disability enjoy rhetorical prominence.152 
 
2.3.1.2 Conceptualisation of impairment 
 
The ICF regards impairment as an objectively determinable fact.  It does recognise 
the interaction of the impaired body with social and institutional factors that change 
the meaning and consequences of that impairment, but the impairment itself is 
regarded as “‘pre-social’, biological, bodily difference.”153   
 
Many disability scholars take issue with such interactionist perspectives that do not 
recognise the social dimensions of impairment.  Paul Abberley argues that for 
disabled people, “the body is the site of oppression, both in form, and in what is done 
with it.”154  In his view, a failure to recognise that impairment is a social product 
intrinsically linked to capitalism inevitably leads to merely descriptive accounts that 
implicitly justify an oppressive social order.155   
 
In contrast to Abberley, Priestley is of the view that such approaches are not 
inherently oppressive, but concedes that they have produced an undue amount of 
oppressive research because bio-medical paradigms have been used to investigate 
social problems.156  An example of this phenomenon in which bio-medical paradigms 
are used to investigate social problems may be where research on depression 
emphasises individuals’ neurological deficits to the exclusion of social and 
environmental factors that may have negative influences on the individuals 
concerned. 
                                                          
151 See 4.3.3. 
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154 Abberley ‘Concept of Oppression’ 14. 
155 Ibid. 
156 M Priestley. “Constructions and Creations:  Idealism, Materialism and Disability Theory.” (1998) 
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Imrie also recognises that treating impairment as biologically and objectively 
measurable has the potential to measure disabled people’s bodies against what is 
‘natural’ or ‘normal’ and may be used to confer unequal treatment.157  However, he 
does not see this as an inevitable consequence and proposes that the ICF is more 
explicit about what he terms its “realist” perspective of impairment, which is that 
people’s relationships with their own physical bodies precedes their relationship with 
others and their environments.158 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4159, the construction of the relationship between 
impairment and disability is important in respect of access to work.  The binary 
created by the traditional social model is clearly not helpful, as a consideration of 
whether a person is able to perform the essential functions of a job necessarily has 
to engage individual impairment.  If impairment is determined in terms of biomedical 
approaches that do not take cognisance of social factors that impact this 
determination, disabled persons may be unnecessarily excluded.  We therefore have 
to examine evidentiary approaches closely, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.160  
 
2.3.1.3 Development of biopsychosocial perspectives beyond vague 
recognition of the integration of biological, social and environmental 
components  
 
No theoretical justifications are given for the biopsychosocial (BPS) framework 
espoused by the ICF, or its theoretical origins.161  Some commentators have argued 
that BPS theory is essentially a biological paradigm within social parameters and that 
it favours biomedical sciences over the social sciences.  Imrie expresses concern 
about the adequacy of BPS’s conception of social structures and processes. 
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This concern is partly borne out by Hemmingsson’s and Jonsson’s three central 
objections to the manner in which the ICF operationalises people’s participation in 
society.  Firstly, these authors argue that in terms of the ICF, the only way in which 
to assess whether a person does participate is through observation by a third party; 
the person’s “subjective experience of meaning” is ignored.162  This mode of 
operation is in direct opposition to the trend in occupational therapy in the last two 
decades to focus less on performance components and more on what people 
subjectively experience in daily life.163   
 
Hemmingsson’s and Jonsson’s second criticism is that the ICF definition of 
participation does not emphasise how people feel about their “opportunities to 
influence their daily lives and make decisions about personal questions”, in other 
words their autonomy.164  They argue that the objective components of autonomy, 
such as social structures, are catered for in the inclusion of environmental factors, 
but that once again, people’s subjective experiences are overlooked.165   
 
This aspect of whose perspectives are taken into account in determining the nature 
and extent of impairment, if any, may be important in determining whether employing 
a person with an impairment constitutes an unacceptable risk, an issue that came to 
the fore in the IMATU case, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.166  Similarly, we 
have to examine whether, when, and how disabled persons’ perspectives on their 
experiences of impairment are considered in decisions regarding reasonable 
accommodation, as became apparent in the Lucas case.167 
 
Hemmingsson’s and Jonsson’s third concern with the ICF’s operational isation of 
participation is what they term its “one-dimensional view on environmental factors as 
either facilitators or barriers for participation that in turn will decrease or increase the 
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person’s participation in a certain life situation.”168  They warn that one life situation 
may involve different kinds of participation that are related in a complex way:  An 
example is that a single environmental factor could simultaneously be a facilitator 
and a barrier for the same person, such as when a school assistant facilitates 
academic participation but hinders social participation.169  This complexity has to be 
taken into account when guidelines for employers are issued, as well as when 
employers decide on positive measures that will remove barriers to participation, in 
consultation with disabled persons and professionals who are called upon to assist.  
 
To summarise, therefore, the environmental or relative conception of disability, as 
embodied in the WHO’s ICF, seems to have gained influence in recent years, as it is 
regarded as a middle ground between the individual and social models of disability, 
respectively.  However, some conceptual gaps remain and will impact on how the 
lived experiences of disabled people are reflected in efforts to create substantive 
equality for disabled persons, including in respect of their access to work.   
 
2.3.2 A suggested theoretical typology of conceptions of disability 
 
In the previous section, we discussed the need to go beyond mere recognition of the 
interaction of vaguely formulated biological, social and environmental components.  
As shown in Tables II and III on page 48, Priestley posits that the juxtaposition of 
‘individual’ and ‘social’ perspectives needs to be supplemented by another 
dichotomy that is interrelated to the first, namely the “divergence between materialist 
and idealist levels of explanation.”  Materialist perspectives emphasise “the primacy 
of political economy in shaping culture while idealist […] analyses suggest the 
converse.”170 
                                                          
168 Ibid. 
169 Hemmingsson and Jonsson 573-574. 
170 Priestley ‘Constructions’ 76. K Marx. A Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right. In: K Marx. 
Selected Essays (translated by HJ Stenning). (1926) 8-9 encapsulates the materialist perspective 
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Priestley suggests that as a result of the above interactions, it is possible to consider 
approaches to social theory in general in two dimensions, as represented in Table II 
on page 48.171  Positions 1 and 2 focus on individuals and flow from the nominalist 
premise that social phenomena have no existence beyond how we perceive and 
interpret them.172  Positions 3 and 4 are more concerned with the collective and start 
from the premise that social phenomena have a ‘real’ existence beyond how we 
perceive and interpret them.173 
 
Position 1 places a high premium on knowledge gained from the observation and 
classification of bodies, while Position 2 values “knowledge derived from the 
experiences, beliefs and interpretations of individual actors.”174  Position 3 is 
concerned with how ‘real’ social structures (beyond people’s experiences), such as 
capitalism, patriarchy or imperialism, determine social relations.175  Position 4 is also 
realist in orientation, but proceeds from the idea that “social reality exists more in 
ideas than in material relations of power.”176 
 
Priestley then posits that the above typology, which is deliberately simplified and 
contains some gross generalisations, can be applied to disability theory too. 177  
Position 1 reflects what we know as ‘the medical model’ and essentially considers 
impairment as biologically determined.178  Position 2 is also an individual model, but 
instead of focusing on biology and the impaired body, its central concerns are how 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
The foundation of the criticism of religion is:  Man makes religion, religion does not make 
man.  Religion indeed is man’s self-consciousness and self-estimation while he has not found 
his feet in the universe.  But Man is no abstract being, squatting outside the world.  Man is the 
world of men, the State, society.  This State, this society produces religion, which is an 
inverted world consciousness, because they are an inverted world.”  
171 Priestley ‘Constructions’ 76. 
172 Ibid.  G Burrell and G Morgan. Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis:  Elements of 
the Sociology of Corporate Life. (1979) 5 explain the essence of nominalism thus: 
“The nominalist position revolves around the assumption that the social world external to 
individual cognition is made up of nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are 
used to structure reality.  The nominalist does not admit to there being any 'real' structure to the 
world which these concepts are used to describe.  The 'names' used are regarded as artificial 
creations whose utility is based upon their convenience as tools for describing, making sense of 
and negotiating the external world.” 
173 Priestley ‘Constructions’ 76-77. 
174 Priestley ‘Constructions’ 77. 
175 Priestley ‘Constructions’ 78. 
176 Ibid. 




personal experience and the negotiation of social roles between individuals produce 
disability.179  Examples include interpretive psychological analyses of how people 
‘adjust’ to impairment and the attitudes of non-disabled people towards people with 
impairments.180   
 
Position 3 is a social model that gained prominence in the work of writers such as 
Oliver, Finkelstein and Barnes.  It focuses on disability as material relations of power 
arising within a specific historical context.181  Analyses point to physical, structural or 
institutional barriers that disable and a central premise is that disabled people are 
disadvantaged not by impaired bodies and minds, but by society.182 
 
Position 4 is also a social model, but its starting point is that disability is an “idealist 
product of a society developing within a specific cultural context.”183  Within this view, 
atypical bodies exist in all societies, but social responses to such difference will vary 
according to predominant cultural perceptions and interpretations.184 
 
The four approaches set out by Priestley are not mutually exclusive and many 
disability scholars frequently combine perspectives,185 but his typology is helpful if 





                                                          
179 Priestley ‘Constructions’ 80. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Priestley ‘Constructions’ 81. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Priestley ‘Constructions’ 82. 
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Table II: Four paradigms for the study of social   Table III: Four approaches to disability theory 
phenomena (Priestley ‘Constructions’ 77)    (Priestley ‘Constructions’ 78) 
 
 Materialist Idealist   Materialist Idealist 
Nominalist Position 1 
 Subjective materialism 
 Social phenomena have 





 Social phenomena may 
be shaped by biology 
 
 Variate empiricism & 
biological determinism 
Position 2 
 Subjective idealism 
 Social phenomena have 
no real existence beyond 
the experience of 
voluntaristic individuals 
 Social phenomena may be 
shaped by attitudes & 
beliefs 




 Individual Position 1 
 Individual materialist 
models 
 Disability is the physical 
product of biology acting 





 Units of analysis are 
impaired bodies 
Position 2 
 Individual idealist 
models 
 Disability is the product 
of voluntaristic 
individuals (disabled & 
non-disabled) engaged 
in the creation of 
identities & the 
negotiation of roles 
 Units of analysis are 
beliefs & identities 
Realist Position 3 
 Objective materialism 
 Material society exists 
beyond the individual 
 Social phenomena may 
be shaped by political 
economy, structural 
patriarchy etc. 
 Historical materialism, 
structural feminism, 
social creationism & 
Marxist analyses 
Position 4 
 Objective idealism 
 Idealist society exists 
beyond the individual  
 Social phenomena may be 
shaped by social values, 
culture etc. 
 Positivist sociology, social 
constructionism & cultural 
relativism 
 Social Position 3 
 Social creationist 
models 
 Disability is the material 
product of socio-
economic relations 
developing within a 
specific historical 
context 
 Units of analysis are 
disabling barriers & 
material relations of 
power 
Position 4 
 Social constructionist 
models 
 Disability is the idealist 
production of societal 
development within 
specific cultural context 
 
 
 Units of analysis are 








2.3.3 Themes that flow from social explanations of disability  
 
From the above discussions, we can extract themes that can be used to analyse if 
and how laws and policies incorporate social explanations of disability.  These 
themes will be introduced here briefly and then expanded upon in the context of the 
relevant equality, labour and social security laws in subsequent chapters. 
 
2.3.3.1 The causes of disability  
 
An important component of the examination of the extent to which social 
understandings have been incorporated into laws and the enforcement of laws is the 
implicit and explicit assumptions made about the causes of disability.  Specific issues 
that may be of import include when the causes of disability are regarded as relevant, 
if at all; the respective weightings attached to social and individual causes and when 
these predominate; the conceptualisation of impairment; and, if social causes are 
recognised, whether the emphasis is on idealist or material causes.  
 
2.3.3.2 The conceptualisation of disadvantage 
 
Samaha offers an illuminating explanation of the difficulties inherent in any model or 
explanation that operates at a macro level.186  He argues that proponents of the 
social model of disability do not articulate the kind of disadvantage or disability they 
have in mind.  Does the disadvantage have to be absolute or relational?  If it is 
absolute, it means that some minimum standard has to be developed using 
independent benchmarks.  If a relational standard is adopted, who is the comparator 
group?  Would it be able-bodied people, other disabled people with a different type 
of disability or other disabled people with the same type of disability?  Also, how 
severe does the disadvantage have to be before it deserves attention and which 
dimensions of disadvantage are similarly worthy of attention?  These challenges are 
                                                          
186 See AM Samaha. “What Good is the Social Model of Disability?” (2007) 74 University of Chicago 
Law Review 1251 at 1264-1265. 
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not limited to social understandings of disability, but inhere in the conceptualisation 
of equality more generally, as will be discussed below.187 
 
2.3.3.3 Potential empirical inaccuracy  
 
The central claim of social understandings of disability is that the interaction of 
personal traits and social barriers causes disability.  This is not meant to be an 
empirical statement and it is not known how often social barriers or personal traits 
are primarily responsible for disability.188  It is also not known how causation varies 
with changes in variables such as income level, geographical location, geopolitical 
circumstances, state of development and culture.  This information is required for 
social planning purposes and is also needed when non-discrimination claims are 
brought before courts and tribunals. 
 
2.3.3.4 Implications of social explanations for institutional design and 
dispute resolution 
 
Social understandings may or may not contribute to the normative choices that 
influence whether individualised solutions are proposed or whether the social and 
physical environment has to change.  Samaha illustrates the differences in expertise 
that may be required if social, as opposed to individualised, responses have to be 
implemented in response to deafness:189   
 
“While economic cost considerations might call for a similar set of accounting 
skills, and medical knowledge is surely relevant to nearly any public policy 
involving physical and mental traits, social and environmental reengineering 
depend on additional skills if the policy mission is to be successful.  If 
government will subsidize cochlear implants or genetic screening, doctors and 
medical technicians along with economists will be useful.  But if government 
                                                          
187 See 3.4. 
188 Samaha 1263. 
189 See Samaha 1307. 
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intends to manufacture social settings in which deafness and other 
impairments are not socially disadvantageous, the policymakers and 
executors ought to be a more diverse group if not simply different.  Now 
sociologists, architects, political scientists, social psychologists, 
anthropologists, historians, and others with unique skill sets become more 
valuable.  Understanding disadvantageous environments, whether built or the 
product of social interaction, can be a matter of uncommon knowledge.  
Physicians, however, might be the last people asked for their opinion.”  
 
It follows, therefore, that the recognition of social causes of a disability may lead to 
different policy responses, which in turn will require different expertise to implement 
than if biomedical perspectives and responses were the focus.  At a micro-level, this 
may influence the professionals employers will hire to assist in the conception and 
implementation of reasonable accommodation measures. 
 
2.4 Objectives of labour and social security law and relevance of disability 
 
Now that we have considered the possible implications of social explanations of 
disability at a fairly abstract level, it would be useful to ask why we want to know who 
is disabled for purposes of labour and social security law.  Before we can engage 
with this question in any great depth, though, it may be useful to consider the overall 
purposes or objectives of labour and social security law as these relate to disabled 
people.  Some may argue that labour law and social security law regulate different 
spheres of human endeavour, but it is the intersections of these two fields of law that 
will be the focus of this thesis.  The phrase ‘labour and social security law’ is thus 
used, unless the context requires a separation. 
 
D’Antona argues that labour law, starting at the end of the 20th century, has 
experienced an identity crisis, the general features of which he explains thus: 
“Labour law’s identity crisis is tied to a transformation of its object, that is, 
labour, or at least the labour with which labour law was traditionally 
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concerned:  the status of ‘employee’ […] which, as everyone knows, does not 
now include, and never has included, all the labour that moves the 
mechanisms of the economy and gives form and life to the institutions of 
society.  So, the labour with which labour law has until now been concerned 
seems to be found less and less, […] and, where it is found, exhibits 
characteristics not readily reconciled with the traditional model.  The debate 
over job security starts here, as does the eventual revision of the normative 
criteria to identify ‘employment’.”190 
 
The recognition that labour law needs to change with regard to whom it protects and 
how it goes about doing so has meant that it still performs its traditional functions of 
ensuring freedom of association, collective bargaining and the elimination of 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.191  However, there are 
increased calls for an expansion of its social function to protect workers outside the 
traditional employment relation,192 for it to regulate the labour market rather than just 
the employment relationship193 and for it to take an active role in enhancing the 
capabilities of individuals.194 
 
Labour law and social security law intersect in various ways.  For most people, wage 
labour is the primary means through which to attain social security.  Employment-
based social insurance to cover risks such as unemployment and occupational 
injuries and diseases forms part of the social security system and is administered by 
the Department of Labour.  In some instances, inability to work or a lack of available 
employment is an eligibility requirement to qualify for social assistance.  
 
Labour and social security law affects disabled people in various ways, some of 
which are listed next: 
                                                          
190 M D’Antona. Labour Law at the Century’s End:  An Identity Crisis? In: J Conaghan, RM Fischl and 
K Klare (eds). Labour Law in an Era of Globalization. (2000) 32. 
191 See ILO. “Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.” 
www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/lang--en/index.htm (Accessed: 6 February 2015). 
192 T Teklè. Labour Law and Worker Protection in the South:  An Evolving Tension between Models 
and Reality. In: T Teklè (ed). Labour Law and Worker Protection in Developing Countries. (2010) 5. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Teklè 6. 
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(i) Disabled people may seek to enter or maintain employment, so labour law is 
implicated in that it provides protection against unfair discrimination in 
recruitment and selection processes and once people are employed;   
(ii) Labour law may also have work creation components that could benefit 
disabled people;   
(iii) People may sustain occupational injuries or contract occupational diseases 
that may render them unable to work, so they may require social insurance 
benefits.  Some people will also have private insurance to protect them 
against such risks.  They may need protection against unfair dismissal.  They 
may also need to be reintegrated once they are able to return to work; and 
(iv) People may develop impairments due to non-work causes.  They may have to 
be protected against unfair discrimination or unfair dismissal. 
 
As alluded to in Chapter 1,195 this thesis will focus on non-discrimination laws, as 
well as government’s positive obligations to facilitate access to work.  It is therefore 
the protection against discrimination ((iv) above), as well as the work creation 
measures at the intersection of labour and social security law ((ii) above) that will be 
the focus here.  The general aims and objectives of social security and how it 
implicates access to work are discussed in Chapter 6.196 
 
Positive measures exist at various levels of operation.  Policies are made, after 
which framework legislation is enacted to give effect to these policies.  Codes of 
Good Practice or other guidelines may be created to assist in implementation.  
Certain litigation mechanisms and processes may favour certain conceptions of 
disability.  All these policies and laws, as well as these processes, have to comply 
with the Constitution.  Strategies to challenge non-compliance may focus on policy 
processes before legislation is passed, seek remedies to change legislation after it is 
passed, challenge the implementation of legislation or policies or a combination of 
these. 
  
                                                          
195 See 1.1. 
196 See 6.2.3. 
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2.5 Broad analytical framework 
 
This chapter undertook a broad overview of some of the historical circumstances and 
events that have influenced conceptions of disability, many of which persist to this 
day.  The economic, social and political contingency of responses to atypical 
physical, intellectual and psychosocial characteristics are apparent.  It is also clear 
that the organisation of work has been instrumental in disabled persons’ exclusion 
from economic, as well as political and social processes. 
 
One of the striking historical features is the interrelationship of poverty and disability.  
Initially no distinction was drawn between poor people and disabled people.  
However, as labour shortages emerged, the category of disability was employed to 
distinguish ‘deserving’ poor persons from those deemed undeserving.  The category 
therefore has social, economic and political significance. 
 
Disability movements have struggled for recognition, but have made significant 
gains, one of which is the increasing recognition of the social contingency of 
disability.  In order to assess if and how these social understandings of disability are 
incorporated into selected equality, labour and social security laws that seek to 
promote access to work for disabled persons, the themes that flow from social 
understandings of disability, as discussed in 2.3, will be used to analyse the selected 
legal frameworks for non-discrimination and work creation in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  A 



















Figure 2:  Broad analytical framework to be used in the analysis of how social explanations of disability are incorporated 
within anti-discrimination and work creation measures   
1) Policy 
2) Framework legislation 
3) Regulations, Codes of Good 
Practice or Administrative 
Guidelines 
4) Institutional arrangements 
5) Dispute resolution 
mechanisms & processes 
Non-discrimination 
Government’s obligations 
to facilitate access to 
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1) Weights attached to individual, 
environmental & social factors, 
respectively 
2) Conceptualistion of impairment 
3) Nature of social factors: idealist 
or materialist 
4) Perspectives considered nominal 
or realist 
5) Conceptualisation of 
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Equality, Labour & social 
security measures 
Level of operation  
(all within a rights framework) 
Themes & sub-themes flowing from 
social explanations of disability 
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CHAPTER 3:  SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY AND CONCEPTIONS OF 
DISABILITY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, we explored the types of questions social understandings of 
disability require us to ask in our assessment of if and how equality, labour and 
social security laws incorporate the social dimensions of disability.  In this chapter, 
we examine substantive equality and how the debates discussed in the previous 
chapter offer opportunities to examine notions of substantive equality for disabled 
people in the context of access to work.  
 
This chapter has four broad objectives:  The first objective is to examine what 
substantive equality requires in general terms.  The second is to analyse how it has 
been articulated and applied in constitutional and labour jurisprudence.  The third 
objective is to consider synergies and areas of friction between social 
understandings of disability and notions of substantive equality as articulated and 
applied by South African courts.  Finally, the aim is to identify issues relating to 
substantive equality that may be of importance in the formulation of positive duties 
on employers and the state to promote access to work for disabled persons. 
 
The constitutional right to equality is considered here for various reasons.  The 
Constitution requires that all law and conduct comply with its provisions.197  Later 
analyses of reasonable accommodation duties have to bear in mind possibilities and 
constraints that flow from constitutional supremacy.  The Bill of Rights applies to all 
law and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. 198  It 
                                                          
197 Section 2 states:  “This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.”  Section 172(1)(a) 
provides:  “When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court must declare that any law 
or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency”. 
198 Section 8(1) of the Constitution.  “Organ of state” is defined in s239 of the Constitution as “(a) any 
department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; or  
(b) any other functionary or institution – 
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also applies to non-state actors to the extent that it is applicable, bearing in mind the 
nature of the right and the nature of the obligation imposed by the right.199  
 
The current chapter is limited to the rights framework.  It is recognised that structural 
and institutional limitations on power, which are provided for in the Constitution, 
affect people with disabilities.  So, for example, provisions relating to who may 
initiate and pass laws and how such laws must be passed, the scope of the courts’ 
authority to check legislative and executive power, the roles and obligations of the 
various levels of government within a system of cooperative government or the 
financial provisions within the Constitution may all have a profound impact on 
people’s lives.200  However, limitations of time and space make a narrowed focus 
inevitable. 
 
There are various reasons for the rights focus.  Firstly, the links between social 
understandings of disability and rights are generally recognised,201 but there is room 
for explorations into the nature of such links and how to optimise these links.202  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(i) exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial Constitution; 
or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation,  
but does not include a court or a judicial officer”, 
unless the context indicates otherwise. 
199 Section 8(2) of the Constitution. 
200 See, for example, CE Draper, C Lund, S Kleintjes, M Funk, M Omar, AJ Flisher and the Mental 
Health and Poverty Project Research Programme Consortium. “Mental Health Policy in South Africa:  
Development Process and Content.” (2009) 24(5) Health Policy and Planning 342 at 350-351 for a 
discussion of how mental health policy dissemination and implementation have been adversely 
affected by, inter alia, a lack of coordination between national and provincial levels of government and 
the lack of priority given to mental health within the provinces. 
201 The INDS (in its Executive Summary and in its situation analysis in Chapter 1) recognises the 
social model of disability as a consequence of viewing disability as a human rights issue.  It is 
arguable whether social understandings of disability have led to increased emphasis on the human 
rights of disabled people or whether there is a mutually supporting relationship rather than a 
unidirectional causal connection.  However, the links between social understandings of disability and 
rights discourse are apparent, even though the nature of these links may be more contentious.  See, 
inter alia, MA Stein. “Disability Human Rights” (2007) 95(1) California Law Review 75 (hereinafter 
referred to as “Stein ‘Human Rights’”); Samaha 1251 and Kanter 403.  See 1.5 in Chapter 1 for 
Kanter’s description of the connection between law and disability studies more generally.  
202 Some commentators, for example, distinguish between the social model of disability and what can 
loosely be termed a human rights model of disability – see, for example, Michigan Disability Rights 
Coalition. “Models of Disability.” (no date) www.mymdrc.org/models-of-disability.html (Accessed: 6 
February 2015).  See, also, T Shakespeare. Disability, Identity and Difference.  In: C Barnes and G 
Mercer (eds). Exploring the Divide:  Illness and Disability. (1996) 94 at 97, who notes that a minority 
group approach of disability [which a human rights model would emphasise] “is a weaker claim than 
the social model, focusing on power politics and identity politics, while not necessarily problematising 
disability itself.”  These tensions are addressed this work, but not necessarily within the rubric of 
differences between models of disability.  
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Secondly, South Africa has ratified the CRPD,203 which requires that states review 
their laws, policies and practices for compliance with its provisions.  Although South 
Africa’s international-law obligations are not the primary focus in this thesis, the 
Constitution mandates an international-law friendly approach to the interpretation of 
the rights in the Bill of Rights and legislation.204  It is therefore imperative that the 
implications of the CRPD for South African law and policy be considered where 
relevant to the issues at hand. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows:  Part 2 briefly considers commonalities and 
tensions between social understandings of disability on the one hand and rights 
discourse on the other.  The third section then examines what is meant by a 
substantive approach to equality in the context of disability.  Part 4 considers 
possible conceptual synergies and points of friction between capabilities, disability 
and substantive equality.  Part 5 contains a critical analysis of employment equity 
laws, with a particular focus on the definitions of disability used to determine the 
protected class.  
 
3.2 Social understandings of disability and rights  
 
Social understandings of disability require radical changes to the ways in which 
society functions so that disabled people are able to live autonomous lives and are 
included, on an equal basis with enabled persons, in the lives of their communities.  
Rights have the potential to contribute to this process of change, but also bear 
characteristics that may inhibit or prevent the changes sought by disability 
movements.  This section examines some aspects of the interrelationship between 
social understandings of disability and rights discourse. 
                                                          
203 See UN. “Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.” (2006) 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml (Accessed: 6 February 2015) for the 
CRPD and UN. “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.” (no 
date) http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=311 (Accessed: 6 February 2015) for its optional 
protocol. 
204 The Constitution mandates that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, interpreters “must consider 
international law” and “may consider foreign law” (ss 39(1)(b) and (c)).  Section 233 also states that 
when interpreting legislation, courts “must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 




3.2.1 Complementary aspects of the interrelationship between social 
understandings of disability and rights 
 
There are various reasons why social understandings of disability and rights 
discourse would be complementary, most of which flow from their communitarian 
ethos.  Firstly, asserting rights implies a community and challenges that community 
to balance the interests of individuals, groups and the state.205  Social 
understandings similarly require a focus on how society disables people.  Secondly, 
rights consciousness is not limited to awareness of rights that have been granted in 
the past, but also provides a discourse within which to persuade others to recognise 
new rights.206  Social understandings compel the identification of environmental and 
social barriers that impede disabled people, which may provide material with which 
to persuade communities and powerful actors to recognise rights in ways that impact 
positively on the lives of disabled people.  
 
Given these general similarities, it is not surprising that rights discourse and social 
understandings have been subject to similar critiques.  Rights detractors argue that 
rights are indeterminate, given the general terms in which these are articulated.207  
This argument is similar to the concerns that social understandings of disability are 
framed in the abstract and that they do not provide much insight into how society has 
to change.   
 
A second critique advanced by scholars within the Critical Legal Studies movement 
is that rights are internally incoherent because they protect contradictory interests, 
for example “freedom” and “security”.208  These contradictions, so the argument 
goes, lead to mystification and manipulation, which may alienate those who do not 
have the tools or resources to engage in rhetorical and legal battles.  Likewise, 
concerns have been raised that some social understandings of disability do not 
reflect the reality of all disabled people’s lives and that an over-emphasis on 
                                                          
205 M Minow. “Interpreting Rights:  An Essay for Robert Cover.” (1987) 96(8) Yale Law Journal 1860 
(hereinafter referred to as “Minow ‘Interpreting Rights’”) at 1867; J Nedelsky. “Reconceiving Rights 
and Constitutionalism.” (2008) 7(2) Journal of Human Rights 139. 
206 See Minow ‘Interpreting Rights’ at 1867. 
207 P Christie. “The Complexity of Human Rights in Global Times:  The Case of the Right to Education 
in South Africa.” (2010) 30(1) International Journal of Educational Development 3. 
208 See Minow ‘Interpreting Rights’ at 1864. 
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environmental and social barriers drowns out people’s lived experiences of bodily 
impairment, as well as the limitations in functioning caused by such impairment. 209 
 
For all the general consistencies between and complementary characteristics of 
social understandings of disability and rights discourse, several aspects of the 
relationship between social understandings and rights require consideration.  At the 
heart of this inquiry is the interrelationship between the personal characteristics of 
the disabled person and his or her physical, social and cultural environment.  In the 
previous chapter, we examined how disability scholars have theorised this aspect of 
this interrelationship.210  Some rights scholars have also examined the balance 
between the individual and social dimensions in our conception of rights.   These 
authors posit that all rights, whether classified as civil, political or social, have “an 
atomistic dimension that seeks to erect barriers between individuals and society, and 
a social dimension that seeks to connect individuals and protect collective 
allegiances.”211   
 
The atomistic and social dimensions of rights have different starting points.  The 
former assumes that individuals need to be protected from state power and that such 
individuals must have autonomy to make decisions based on their own values that 
are exempt from judgement.212  It emphasises individual preferences and the ability 
of individuals to advance their interests on their own; collective alliances are only 
recognised if these result from individual choice.213  The emphasis is on individuals’ 
separateness and differences, not the commonalities that are shared with others. 214   
 
In contrast, the social dimension of rights is premised on individuals as constituted 
by their communities.  It recognises that people’s choices, or lack thereof, are 
influenced by the social circumstances within which they find themselves – by 
                                                          
209 See 2.3.1.1 and 4.4.4.1. 
210 See 2.3.1. 
211 DM Davis, P Macklem and G Mundlak. Social Rights, Social Citizenship, and Transformative 
Constitutionalism:  A Comparative Assessment. In: J Conaghan, RM Fischl and K Klare (eds). Labour 
Law in an Era of Globalization. (2002) 511 at 521. 
212 JM Woods. “Justiciable Social Rights as a Critique of the Liberal Paradigm.” (2003) 38 Texas 
International Law Journal 763 at 767-768. 
213 Davis, Macklem and Mundlak 521. 
214 Woods 768. 
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“institutional structures, normative baselines, legal entitlements and social norms.” 215  
What makes a community is itself a normative ideal in that it depends on the nature 
and extent of the human relationships recognised by members of that community. 216  
The social dimension of rights therefore seeks to influence the nature of community, 
more specifically the creation of social supports that “maximize[] opportunities for 
individuals to construct and live a rich and interactive life.”217 
 
It is arguable that both the atomistic and social dimensions of rights are required to 
protect the individual’s separateness from, as well as his or her connection with, 
others.218  Given that these dimensions are present in all rights, it is possible to 
advance people’s social wellbeing not only through the invocation and realisation of 
social rights, but also through an emphasis on the social dimensions of civil and 
political rights.  Similarly, it is possible to interpret social rights in a manner that 
emphasises their atomistic dimensions.  It is therefore important that we look at the 
dimensions of whatever rights are invoked, not merely their categorisation. 
 
I will argue that the links between social understandings of disability and the 
recognition of the social dimensions of the rights to equality and social security are 
imperative if we are to move away from a conception of rights that always prizes 
individual autonomy through law over the construction of relationships that enable 
understanding between human beings.  Young and Quibell argue that rights are 
unsuccessful at improving the social situation of people with intellectual disabilities 
because  
“people still do not know how to treat others who are different; they are not 
aware of the variety of social institutions or practices necessary for particular 
‘entitlements’, or even that such ‘entitlements’ are necessary.  The irony is that 
                                                          
215 Davis, Macklem and Mundlak 522. 
216 S Avineri and A de-Shalit. Introduction. In: S Avineri and A de-Shalit (eds). Communitarianism and 
Individualism. (1992) 6-7. 
217 Davis, Macklem and Mundlak 522.  See, also, A Sen. “Response to Commentaries.” (2002) 37(2) 
Studies in Comparative International Development 78 who writes (at 79):  “Human beings live and 
interact in societies, and are, in fact, societal creatures.  It is not surprising that they cannot fully 
flourish without participating in political and social affairs, and without being effectively involved in joint 
decision making.  But, in addition, I have tried to argue that our understanding of what our own needs 
are and what values and priorities we have reason to espouse may themselves depend on our 
interactions with others, and draw on the knowledge and discernment that can be generated only by 
open public discussion.”   
218 Davis, Macklem and Mundlak 522. 
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it is the conception of human nature which the notion of ‘rights’ promulgates 
that reinforces this situation, where individual autonomy and the force of law 
takes precedence over the necessary ability of humans, as social animals, to 
understand each other” [emphasis in the original].219 
 
My response to their critique will flow through this chapter and subsequent chapters.  
It acknowledges that rights discourse by itself will never be enough and may not 
always be the appropriate means through which to foster understanding between 
people.  However, where rights are invoked, as they invariably will be, it is possible 
to formulate these in a way that aims to foster meaningful engagement between 
employers and employees, including work seekers, who are historically and currently 
marginalised.  This focus on understanding has to be reflected in the contextual 
factors that animate our understanding of what substantive equality requires in 
concrete cases, in particular the content we give to positive duties on employers and 
government to promote access to work and the mechanisms we create to enforce 
such duties.   
 
I will preface the discussion of equality and related rights with a few brief remarks 
about the general tensions between social understandings of disability and rights 
discourse.  It is clear from the previous chapter that social understandings aim to 
improve our analyses and appreciation of the causes of disability,220 while rights are 
concerned with collective choices in our structuring of relationships of power and 
responsibility.  Ideally, social understandings of disability should animate not only 
rights rhetoric, but the marrow or content of rights.  If the central claim in social 
understandings of disability is that society and not disabled people should change, 
then a critical component of any right would have to be the duties it imposes on 
actors that could remove disabling barriers.  As is foreshadowed above, some 
aspects of rights discourse pose challenges to its ability to serve disabled people 
and the creation of a more equitable society.   
  
                                                          
219 DA Young and R Quibell. “Why Rights are Never Enough:  Rights, Intellectual Disability and 
Understanding.” (2000) 15(5) Disability and Society 747 at 758. 
220 See 2.3. 
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3.2.2 Tensions between social understandings of disability and rights 
discourse 
 
The parameters of this work do not allow for an extensive discussion of tensions 
between social understandings of disability and rights discourse, but these are 
central to how rights can affect the lived experiences of disabled people.  These 
tensions are not limited to rights discourse and disability, but the scope of the study 
requires specification.  Even the concept of disability is too broad, given the diversity 
of experiences that may fall under the umbrella of disability.  Nevertheless, a few 
general concerns, which warrant further inquiry, will be mentioned below.   
 
Firstly, rights discourse can be opaque, conceptually complex and access to it may 
be difficult or impossible for marginalised groups, including many people with 
disabilities.  This inaccessibility is illustrated in the following quotation:   
 
“People with the disabilities called intellectual disabilities, developmental 
disabilities, learning disabilities, and the like, some people with experiences 
causing them to identify as psychiatric survivors, even people with types of 
physical or chronic issues which cause fatigue — all of these people may 
benefit from not having to wade through walls of jargon in order to read about 
themselves.  They would also benefit from not being expected to learn how to 
write in these ways in order for their voices to be heard.”221 
 
Given the positive correlation between disability and poverty,222 other factors make 
rights discourse inaccessible or, some may argue, unattractive, to marginalised 
                                                          
221 E Grace. “Cognitively Accessible Language (Why We Should Care).” (2013) 
http://thefeministwire.com/2013/11/cognitively-accessible-language-why-we-should-care/ (Accessed: 
6 February 2015).  Young and Quibell at 753 argue that “the failure of ‘rights’ to ensure justice for 
people with intellectual disabilities” occurs at various levels consistent with the longstanding critique 
that “the enforcement of these ‘rights’ requires a participatory involvement in abstract legal 
frameworks absent amongst the very groups that ‘rights’ are supposed to aid.  In short, to empower 
oneself, one requires rights, but to exercise rights, one has to be in an empowered position.” 
222 See 1.1 fn 18.  See, also, South Africa. Taylor Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social 
Security System for South Africa (2002):  Report No 9:  Social Security for People with Disabilities. 
http://www.sarpn.org/CountryPovertyPapers/SouthAfrica/taylor/report9.php (hereinafter referred to as 
“Taylor Committee Report No 9”) (Accessed: 6 February 2015), in which it is noted (at 358) that 
“[p]oor individuals make up a disproportionately large share of the disabled population.”  The 
Committee cites two reasons for this phenomenon, namely that “poverty increases vulnerability to 
disability” and that “disability increases vulnerability to poverty”. 
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groups.  One pertinent example is that many disabled work seekers may be 
prevented or dissuaded from challenging unfair discrimination by factors such as 
inaccessible transport systems, inequitable education, inaccessible and expensive 
legal processes and prejudiced attitudes. 
 
The structural distances that may exist between human rights groups and disabled 
persons also inhibit the potential of rights as means through which to effect change.  
Odinkalu, in an article on why more Africans do not use human rights language, 
argues that people for whom human rights are a matter of life and death are aware 
of the injustices perpetrated against them and that a particular discourse alone will 
not advance their condition:   
 
“What they need is a movement that channels these frustrations into articulate 
demands that evoke responses from the political process.  This the human 
rights movement is unwilling or unable to provide.  In consequence, the real life 
struggles for social justice are waged despite human rights groups – not by or 
because of them – by people who feel that their realities and aspirations are not 
adequately captured by human rights organizations or their language.”223 
 
These ruptures between many human rights organisations and the most 
marginalised people are at odds with social understandings of disability, which are 
premised on the popular slogan within disability movements worldwide:  ‘Nothing 
About Us Without Us’.224  The presence of some disabled people within human rights 
movements or within bureaucratic structures is important.  However, that alone is not 
a guarantee of real difference in the lives of the most marginalised disabled people.  
Inequities in social and economic power require political participation and the 
formulation and implementation of redistribution policies.225 
  
                                                          
223 CA Odinkalu. “Why More Africans Don’t Use Human Rights Language.” (1999) 
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_01/articles/602.html (Accessed: 6 
February 2015).  According to him, a major consequence of this fissure between those who wield 
human rights language and the people it is meant to serve is that “‘human rights’ has increasingly 
become the specialized language of a select professional cadre with its own rites of passage and 
methods of certification.”   
224 See 2.3 fn 126 and fn 127.  
225 S Hassim. “The Gender Pact and Democratic Consolidation:  Institutionalizing Gender Equality in 
the South African State.” (2003) 29(3) Feminist Studies 504 at 507. 
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Another factor that may potentially dilute the appeal of rights discourse is that it is 
often used in ways that convert people’s real experiences into empty abstractions. 226  
These abstractions would be particularly acute within formal legal processes that 
value impartiality and in which emotion may often be regarded as inimical to 
reason.227  An important dimension of disabled people’s struggles has arguably been 
the articulation of their experiences in ways that challenge damaging and often 
generally-accepted assumptions that they are helpless and in need of a cure or, 
failing that, charity.  If rights discourse smothers narratives that can promote better 
understandings of disabled people’s experiences and their viewpoints, it becomes 
oppressive. 
 
A related concern is that meaningful social change has to be preceded by significant 
numbers of people realising that they are implicated in a social problem and showing 
a willingness to act.  However, as Minow points out, “[t]he ways in which we talk 
about social problems disincline people to identify themselves as persons burdened 
by those problems.  The ways we talk also allow individuals to feel remote from other 
people’s problems.”228  Within employment spheres, underlying views on how 
employers should relate to employees and the social commitments employers 
should bear will influence this aspect.  We therefore have to remain self-conscious 
about how we use language, including rights languages, to reference disability, 
especially in light of our relationships to disability and to disabled people.  This issue 
will be of particular relevance in Chapter 5, when I examine how disability is 
                                                          
226 M Tushnet. “An Essay on Rights.” (1984) 62(8) Texas Law Review 1363 at 1364. 
227 See M Minow. “Words and the Door to the Land of Change:  Law, Language and Family Violence.” 
(1990) 43(6) Vanderbilt Law Review 1665 (hereinafter referred to as “Minow ‘Land of Change’”) for a 
critique of how the language and processes in courts and bureaucracies often dilute people’s 
experiences of domestic violence.  This is done by invoking the distinction between public and private, 
as well as the virtues of rational reason in contradistinction to emotional, subjective decision-making.  
See, also, MC Nussbaum. “The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education.” (1993) 45(6) 
Stanford Law Review 1627, who discusses the way in which emotion is viewed in the law:  “A simple 
polar opposition between emotion and reason and even in some cases between emotion and moral 
judgment is commonly relied on both by those who believe that emotions have no place in judicial 
thinking and by those who believe that they do.  Nobody pauses to ask what, more precisely the 
relationship between emotion and reason actually is, what emotions themselves are, whether and 
how they are based on belief, whether and how they embody conceptions of their objects, whether 
and how they can be modified by argument.  These are the elementary starting points for 
philosophical investigations of emotion, from Plato on through Ronald de Sousa.  There is a 
remarkable degree of consensus in recent philosophical work – and in anthropological and 
psychological work as well – that emotions are not just mindless pushes and pulls, but forms of 
perception or thought highly responsive to beliefs about the world and changes in beliefs.  
Nonetheless judges proceed as if none of this discussion were taking place.” 
228 Minow ‘Land of Change’ 1686. 
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constructed in the guidelines to employers on the employment of disabled 
persons.229 
 
The scope of this work does not allow for a discussion on how to mitigate these 
tensions.  The premises from which the subsequent discussion follows bear mention, 
however.  Firstly, the emphasis is on giving content to rights in concrete cases, 230 
although it is accepted that courts may not always be the best arbiters of what is 
required.  This is particularly true when solutions have to be creative and in response 
to individual needs within localised circumstances.231   
 
The second premise relates to the traditional distinction between civil and political 
rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights (hereinafter referred 
to as ‘social rights’) on the other.232  As Stein has noted, recent identity-specific 
                                                          
229 See 5.5.1. 
230 Nedelsky (at 143) writes:  “Once we acknowledge the changing and contested quality of basic 
rights, the problem of protecting them from democratic abuse is transformed. We do not have to 
abandon the basic insight that democracy can threaten individual rights, but we must see that the 
problem of defending individual rights is inseparable from the problem of defining them.”  This 
premise is emphasised, particularly in light of the criticism that has been leveled at the Constitutional 
Court for its tendency to reason within a loose framework of abstract values rather than by giving 
content to rights:  See, for example, See S Woolman. “The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights.” (2007) 
124(4) South African Law Journal 762, who asserts (at 763) that “[f]laccid analysis in terms of three 
vaguely defined values – dignity, equality and freedom – almost invariably substitutes for more 
rigorous interrogation of constitutional challenges in terms of the specific substantive rights found in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution.  If the drafters of the Constitution had intended such a substitution, the 
structure and the language of the Bill of Rights would have reflected that intention.  It doesn’t.  
Moreover, this strategy – of speaking in values – has freed the court almost entirely from the text, and 
thereby grants the court the licence to decide each case as it pleases, unmoored from its own 
precedent.”  He goes on to state that the vagueness that ensues as a result of this direct resort to 
values violates the rule of law because it “makes it difficult for lower court judges, lawyers, 
government officials and citizens to discern, with some degree of certainty, how the basic law is going 
to be applied, and to know, with some degree of certainty, that the basic law is going to be applied 
equally.”  See, also, A Cockrell. “Rainbow Jurisprudence.” (1996) 12(1) South African Journal on 
Human Rights 1, who argues (at 11-12) that in some instances the Constitutional Court has invoked 
values in ways that assume “normative harmony rather than normative discord” when it is clear that 
values – for example, freedom and equality – “will not always pull in the same direction.”  
231 While it is understandable that courts are weary of making decisions that could have far-reaching 
budgetary and other consequences, judicial officers do have remedial flexibility that allows them to be 
sensitive to separation of powers concerns (Davis, Macklem and Mundlak 520-521).  Rather than 
conceiving the role of courts as being to impose a constitutional order, we would be better served if 
we viewed courts as being one set of contributors to the building of a constitutional order (JS Liebman 
and CF Sabel. “A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined:  The Emerging Model of School 
Governance and Legal Reform.” (2003) 28(2) New York University Review of Law and Social Change 
183 at 281). 
232 At international level and in most domestic systems, social rights are marginalised as compared to 
so-called civil and political rights.  P Hunt. Reclaiming Social Rights:  International and Comparative 
Perspectives. (1996) asserts (at 9) that although social rights are marginalised at both levels, they are 
better recognised at the international level than the national.  See, also, P Alston. “Out of the Abyss:  
The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” 
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human rights instruments have integrated both types of rights.233  The consequences 
of this integration as a result of an increased focus on social rights234 were described 
succinctly by Simon Deakin: 
 
“As the social claims are framed in the language of civil and political rights, they 
become accommodated to certain aspects of neo-liberal economic logic.  This 
is a process with unsettling and unpredictable effects.  On the one hand, 
market discourses, based on notions of contract, competitiveness, and 
efficiency, enter the field of labour and social law; on the other, market relations 
are infused by notions of equality of access to economic resources drawn from 
the jurisprudence of social rights.  In both respects, the familiar division 
between the ‘social’ and the ‘economic’ is blurred.”235 
 
When we provide protection from discrimination and when we seek the creation of 
spaces for people with disabilities to work and have that work recognised, we have 
to address the vexed question of how such measures fit within an orthodoxy that has 
the market economy and private law as the seemingly neutral, objective arbiters of 
how relationships between various economic actors are to be constructed.  Williams 
points out that the trend in countries that hold global economic power has been to 
subsume welfare policy into private law:  “At best, welfare smooths out rough edges 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1987) 9(3) Human Rights Quarterly 332 at 351 (“[T]he content of the Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights was not based upon any significant bodies of domestic jurisprudence as was the 
case with civil and political rights. […] [T]he range of rights recognized in the [Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights] was, with the exception of labor-related rights, considerably in advance of 
most national legislation”).  Davis, Macklem and Mundlak 511 offer a comparison of social rights 
adjudication in Canada, Israel and South Africa, respectively.  These authors note (at 515) that while 
the three jurisdictions differ in the extent to which social rights are formally recognised, the status of 
social rights is the subject of ongoing debate and in all three countries there exists “uneasiness about 
the constitutional consequences of social citizenship”. 
233 Stein ‘Human Rights’ 110. 
234 The term ‘social rights’ is used here to denote a whole range “from the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security to the right to share in the full in the social heritage and to live the life 
of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society” (TH Marshall. Citizenship and 
Social Class. In: J Manza and M Sauder (eds). Inequality and Society:  Social Science Perspectives 
on Social Stratification. (2009) 148 at 149).  Marshall 148 proposed this definition of social rights as 
part of his division of citizenship into three parts or elements, namely civil, political and social:  “The 
civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, 
freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and 
the right to justice.  […] By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of 
political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the 
members of such a body.” 
235 S Deakin. Social Rights in a Globalized Economy. In: P Alston (ed). Labour Rights as Human 
Rights. (2005) 25 at 26. 
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of the free market (what are technically called ‘market imperfections’ or 
‘externalities’).”236  Individual autonomy is emphasised more than the construction of 
mutually supportive relationships.  Williams therefore argues that any progressive 
critique has to question the distributional consequences of the background rules and 
assumptions that govern the so-called free market.237  
 
The themes extrapolated from the discussion of social understandings of disability in 
the previous chapter238 offer an opportunity to engage with how the background rules 
and assumptions in respect of equality law, and anti-discrimination law in particular, 
affect disabled people.  It necessarily entails what Deakin terms the blurring of the 
economic and the social.  While this work does not engage extensively with where 
the line ought to be drawn in terms of state intervention in what is regarded as an 
autonomous market, the starting point is that private law rules that govern the market 
give effect to distributional choices.  These choices are reflected at various stages, 
including the content we give to rights and our construction of the duties that flow 
from such rights.  We therefore have to examine those aspects closely at various 
stages – when considering the content and scope of the right to equality, when 
deciding whether discrimination is justifiable or not, when analysing the processes 
through which disabled people can vindicate their right to equality and when 
assessing the monitoring and evaluation of progress in the realisation of disabled 
people’s rights in the work context. 
 
It is recognised that the right to equality is not the only right that will be implicated in 
the struggles disabled people are fighting and will continue to fight.  In many 
instances, choices will have to be made as to whether to frame a claim in terms of 
the right to equality or in terms of a socio-economic right such as the right to access 
housing, health care or social security.  The intersections of the right to access to 
social security and equality in the context of the promotion of access to work for 
disabled persons will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
  
                                                          
236 LA Williams. Beyond Labour Law’s Parochialism. In: J Conaghan, RM Fischl and K Klare (eds). 
Labour Law in an Era of Globalization:  Transformative Practices and Possibilities. (2000) 93 at 99. 
237 Williams 100-101. 
238 See 2.3.3. 
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3.3 The substantive approach to equality 
 
One of the central features of the Constitutional Court jurisprudence is its insistence, 
at least in principle, that our Constitution requires a substantive, as opposed to 
merely a formal, approach to equality.239  Ngcobo J in Bato Star reminds us why this 
is so: 
 
“In this fundamental way, our Constitution differs from other constitutions which 
assume that all are equal and in so doing simply entrench existing inequalities.  
Our Constitution recognises that decades of systematic racial discrimination 
entrenched by the apartheid legal order cannot be eliminated without positive 
action being taken to achieve that result.  We are required to do more than that.  
The effects of discrimination may continue indefinitely unless there is a 
commitment to end it.”240 
 
Fredman explains the distinction between and the effects of the two articulations 
thus: 
“Formal equality is premised on an abstract individual, judged on personal 
merit.  Born out of the struggles against slavery, racism, and sexism, formal 
equality insists that such group-based characteristics are irrelevant; and seeks 
to replace their use in allocative decision-making by merit-based criteria.  In 
doing so, however, formal equality fails to recognise that it is only in some 
contexts that these characteristics are irrelevant and detrimental.  The ongoing 
effects of past discrimination mean that the opportunities and life course of 
many continue to be affected by their race, ethnicity or gender. […] Instead, 
formal equality holds out as universal and neutral the characteristics of the 
dominant group, expecting conformity to the norm as the price for equal 
treatment.”241 
                                                          
239 See, inter alia, Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) para 42; National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) para 61; Minister of 
Finance and Another v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) para 31.   
240 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) 
SA 490 (CC) para 74. 
241 S Fredman. “Providing Equality:  Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty to Provide.” (2005) 
21(2) South African Journal on Human Rights 163 at 165.  S Fredman. Facing the Future:  
Substantive Equality Under the Spotlight. In: OC Dupper and C Garbers (eds). Equality in the 
Workplace:  Reflections from South Africa and Beyond. (2010) (hereinafter referred to as “Fredman 
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In another contribution, she usefully summarises some of the principal 
characteristics of substantive equality:  It views the individual within his or her social 
context and focuses on the disadvantage caused by a prohibited ground rather than 
the prohibited ground itself; it chooses to focus on outcomes more than treatment; it 
views identity and difference in a positive light; it seeks to advance individuals rather 
than to ensure only consistency; and it transcends fault to require positive duties to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil.242 
 
One of the central building blocks of substantive equality is its linking of status and 
disadvantage.243  Status refers to those individual and group characteristics that have 
made people targets of oppression and exploitation.  These include the so-called 
prohibited grounds of discrimination.  Disadvantage connotes socio-economic or 
material disadvantage.  This linking of status and disadvantage requires us to 
consider how we construct status and disadvantage, respectively, as well as their 
interrelationship.  The rest of this chapter poses some of these questions in the 
context of employment equity for disabled people, relying on some of the insights 
gleaned from the discussion on social understandings of disability in Chapter 2. 
 
Before we analyse the law as manifested in legislation and jurisprudence, let us 
consider how we formulate what we want substantive equality to achieve.  Hepple 
notes that equality as an ideal has been given at least seven different meanings:  
“(1) respect for equal worth, dignity and identity as a fundamental human right; 
(2) eliminating status inequality and disadvantage; (3) consistent treatment/ 
formal equality; (4) substantive equality of opportunity; (5) equality of 
capabilities; (6) equality of outcomes; (7) fairness.”244 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Substantive Equality Under the Spotlight’”) 15 at 17 notes that formal equality, although it clearly has 
its limitations, has wrought significant positive change:  “It has taken many years of political struggle 
to reach the point of recognition that gender and race are irrelevant criteria for key political and civil 
rights.  Political thinkers from Aristotle onwards regarded gender as a relevant criterion for access to 
citizenship rights, ascribing only to men the rationality required to qualify as a subject of rights.  It 
hardly needs to be stated that the key initial achievement of the new democracy in South Africa was 
to remove all racial references from the criteria for access to basic rights.” 
242 Fredman ‘Substantive Equality Under the Spotlight’ 18. 
243 Fredman ‘Substantive Equality Under the Spotlight’ 15.  
244 B Hepple. Equality:  The Legal Framework. (2014) 18.  
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All but one – consistent treatment/ formal equality – could be argued to fall under the 
rubric of substantive equality.  This illustrates that, while we may agree that, in 
principle, substantive equality is to be preferred over formal equality, we may differ 
on how we ought to conceive of substantive equality.  
 
The intention here is not to examine which specific notion of substantive equality is 
to be preferred, because it may be that one notion is effective in certain situations, 
while others are more suited to different circumstances.  Rather, the approach here 
will be to focus on three formulations – equality of opportunity, equality of results or 
outcomes and equality of capabilities and to consider these formulations in the light  
of debates on social understandings of disability within disability studies.  The 
equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes dichotomy has traditionally been 
prominent in debates on substantive equality, while equality of capabilities is 
increasingly recognised as an important perspective that undergirds approaches to 
human development. 
 
3.3.1 Equality of opportunities and equality of results  
 
Equality of opportunities, which is the most prevalent approach in the international 
context, is based on the notion that arbitrary factors over which people have no 
control, such as race, gender and disability, should not dictate those people’s life 
chances.245  On the face of it, this seems an uncontroversial proposition.  However, 
as Frankel points out, the universal appeal of equality of opportunity should arouse 
suspicion.246  Some commentators have pointed out that equality of opportunity can 
carry within it vastly opposing ideals.247  It can house a libertarian type of equality that 
refers to equality of ‘procedural’ opportunities such as equal opportunity to apply for 
a job.  The underlying assumption is that societal structures are mostly fair and will 
allow deserving, hard-working individuals to rise to the top.248  
                                                          
245 Quinn et al ‘UN Human Rights Instruments’ 17. 
246 C Frankel. “Equality of Opportunity.” (1971) 81(3) Ethics 191 at 192.    
247 Ibid. 
248 In this formulation, equality of opportunity could be reduced to the removal of supply-side barriers 
without efforts to equip marginalised groups to benefit from such removals (S Fredman. “Changing 
the Norm:  Positive Duties in Equal Treatment Legislation.” (2005) 12(4) Maastricht Journal of 




Alan Freeman argues that, in the American context, the “myth” of equality of 
opportunities has been perpetuated by people across the political spectrum. 249  In his 
view, the basis of equality of opportunity is individualism, which “does not permit one 
to notice the […] reality of a pervasive and recurring class structure.”250  The deep-
seated cultural valorisation of the “self-made” person with outstanding talents creates 
a culture of competition in which one has to be more deserving than others. 251  While 
such a culture may have its advantages, it may also exact heavy personal tolls – on 
those who have made it and those who have not – and impact negatively on the 
formation and maintenance of mutually supportive social relationships.252  
 
Atypical or impaired bodies disturb this emphasis on individualism, which is premised 
on the body as a “compliant instrument of the limitless will.”253  As Miceli notes,  
“[T]he reality is that no human body or mind (regardless of disability) is ―a 
‘compliant instrument of the limitless will,’ despite the rhetoric of liberal 
individualism predicating that all citizens are meant to be economically self-
sufficient and independent in thought and action.  This ideology is premised on 
the belief that people can do whatever they want to do (such as climbing Mount 
Everest or being a star basketball player) as long as they put their minds to or 
will themselves to accomplishing the task at hand.  Furthermore, the rhetoric 
employed by this ideology intentionally renders any disability as a character 
flaw as espoused by the failure of one’s ―limitless will to make his or her body 
and/ or mind a compliant instrument.”254 
  
                                                          
249 A Freeman. “Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity:  A Critical Legal Essay.” 
(1988) 23 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 295 at 362. 
250 Freeman 363. 
251 Freeman (at 364-374) describes how what he perceives to be an unduly individualist culture 
operates within American academia. 
252 Freeman (at 376) observes:  “The world of perfectly realized meritocracy might well be an unhappy 
one for many if not most of its residents.” 
253 R Garland Thomson. Extraordinary Bodies:  Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and 
Literature. (1997) 43.  She notes (at 26) that even within emancipatory movements that emphasise 
other identity categories, for example some feminist movements, assumptions are made based on 
“the liberal ideology of autonomy and independence”, which may undermine some disabled women’s 
struggles. 
254 MG Miceli. “The Disavowal of the Body as a Source of Inquiry in Critical Disability Studies:  The 
Return of Impairment?” (2010) Critical Disability Discourse/Discours Critique dans le Champ du 
Handicap 2 at 4. 
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Equality of opportunity does not necessarily have to be as formal and individualistic 
as described by Freeman.255  It may also connote a richer equality that not only 
considers procedural opportunities, but people’s capacities to make use of these 
opportunities.256  This latter formulation would be more amenable to redistribution 
and, if one moves along a continuum, may eventually evolve into an equality of 
outcomes approach.257 This porous boundary between the two concepts has led 
Fredman to opine that the equality of opportunity/ equality of result dichotomy is “less 
than helpful”, as both concepts can be applied narrowly or expansively.258  This is 
also why they these concepts are discussed under the same heading here, even 
though, theoretically, they appear to be distinct.259 
 
Equality of results, rather than focusing on inputs, requires that every person, 
regardless of his or her ability to contribute to society, is entitled to a minimum level 
of social and economic protection.  Standard articulations of equality of results have 
been criticised for not engaging adequately with what it is that we are seeking to 
equalise.  Is it resources, welfare, happiness?260  Equality of outcome has also been 
argued to “deny the importance of individual responsibility and choice.” 261  People 
should not envy others’ prosperity if such other individuals have made better choices 
that caused them to be better off.  This latter criticism would clearly emanate from 
those advocating a procedural equal-opportunities approach. 
                                                          
255 More substantive conceptions of equality of opportunity have been interpreted by some 
commentators as being different from a commitment to a strict meritocracy – see D Michailakis. 
“When Opportunity is the Thing to be Equalised.” (1997) 12(1) Disability and Society 17 at 25. 
256 RM Veatch. The Foundations of Justice:  Why the Retarded and the Rest of Us have Claims to 
Equality. (1986) 123-125. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Fredman ‘Changing the Norm’ at 376.  She further stresses that “[o]pportunities are difficult to 
quantify and they are frequently reduced to results for the purposes of monitoring or impact 
assessment.”  See, also, A Phillips. “Defending Equality of Outcome.” (2004) 12(1) Journal of Political 
Philosophy 1 at 13 who argues that in cases of unequal political representation between different 
genders and races, equality of opportunity may be the primary objective, but equality of outcome will 
be the test for identifying whether this objective is achieved.  
259 Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ at 339 argues that equality of outcomes is more radical than equality 
of opportunity because it unambiguously concerns itself with just outcomes and redistribution.  This 
perception is shared widely, as noted by Phillips at 2:  “In both academic and popular discourse, the 
pursuit of outcome equality has been regarded as a politics of envy, an attack on anyone whose 
aspirations or achievements stray above a supposed norm. […] Politicians have been particularly 
down on the politics of envy, and mostly opt for what they see as the less controversial equality of 
opportunity:  of course people should not expect to end up with the same bundle of commodities or 
same level of happiness, but it is fair enough that they should expect to have the same opportunities 
to thrive.” 




Apart from philosophical objections to an equality-of-outcomes paradigm, there may 
be difficulties in measuring and interpreting results.262  Fredman points out that equal 
pay or equal representation between men and women in the workforce may be 
easily understood, but it is more difficult to quantify results in respect of services. 263  
An example would be how to measure equality of results in respect of the medical 
services to which different groups have access, particularly if the health care needs 
of the respective groups are not the same.   
 
Fredman also warns that even if results are apparent, qualitative factors are relevant 
to interpreting these results and interpreters will have to be sensitive to context when 
doing so.264  She cites the gender gap as an example:265 a narrowing of that gap in a 
particular sector may just mean that men’s salaries have decreased, or that overall 
salaries have diminished.  Similarly, an increase in the number of women in higher 
pay grades may also mean that more women are conforming to male norms by, for 
example, leaving child care work to other, often low-paid women.  From this 
example, it is apparent that sensitivity to contextual factors will require us to make 
social choices that strike appropriate balances between remedying unequal 
outcomes through a focus on individuals and those achieved through structural 
changes.  As will be discussed in Chapter 5, this balance is particularly important 
when we consider the utility of reasonable accommodation for specific disabled 
people, as opposed to structural changes to norms and processes that allow more 
disabled persons to participate in their communities.266   
 
3.3.2 Equality of capabilities 
 
Equality of capabilities aims to address some of the shortcomings or gaps in the two 
approaches discussed above.  The capability approach was developed in the 1980s 
by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum in the context of human development, 
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specifically assessing people’s well-being and quality of life.267  Nussbaum, in 
particular, has written extensively about the relationship between capabilities and 
human rights and is explicit in her use of the capabilities approach as a partial theory 
of justice.268  
 
The capabilities approach centres on ‘functionings’, namely “what a person is able to 
do or be”.269  A ‘capability’ is the opportunity someone has to achieve a set of 
functionings she has reason to value.270  This allows us to distinguish between “(i) 
whether a person is actually able to do things that she would value doing, and (ii) 
whether she possesses the means or instruments or permissions to pursue what she 
would like to do (her actual ability to do that pursuing may depend on many 
contingent circumstances) [emphasis in the original].”271   
 
The capabilities approach combines the substantive-opportunities and outcomes 
approaches, since it focuses on what people have the opportunity to achieve.  It 
does not measure outcomes in terms of utility or access to resources, because it 
acknowledges human diversity in our abilities to convert resources into 
functionings.272  It also recognises that access to resources is not just the result of 
personal choice and activity.273  Furthermore, because capabilities constitute the 
freedom to choose certain functionings and not the functionings per se, they show 
respect for people’s autonomy to choose which functionings they want to achieve for 
                                                          
267 C Harnacke. “Disability and Capability:  Exploring the Usefulness of Martha Nussbaum’s 
Capabilities Approach for the UN Disability Rights Convention.” (2013) 41(4) Journal of Law, Medicine 
and Ethics 768 at 769; H Hanisch. “Book Review:  Frontiers of Justice.  Disability, Nationality, Species 
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269 A Sen. “Human Rights and Capabilities.” (2005) 6(2) Journal of Human Development 151 
(hereinafter referred to as “Sen ‘Human Rights and Capabilities’”) at 153.  Functionings encompasses 
a wide range of ‘doings’ and ‘beings’, such as having bodily health and integrity, being able to control 
one’s environment, developing good self-esteem and being socially well-integrated (see M Toboso. 
“Rethinking Disability in Amartya Sen’s Approach:  ICT and Equality of Opportunity.” (2011) 13(2) 
Ethics and Information Technology 107 at 109). 
270 A Sen. “Freedom of Choice:  Concept and Content.” (1987) 
www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/previous/en_GB/wp-
25/_files/82530817594427220/default/WP25.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) (hereinafter referred to 
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272 Sen ‘Freedom of Choice’ 14. 
273 B Hepple. The Aims and Limits of Equality Laws. In: OC Dupper and C Garbers (eds). Equality in 





Sen points out that freedom has both a procedural and an opportunity dimension.275  
To illustrate the distinction, he uses the example of a woman, Natasha, who wants to 
stay at home.  If an authoritarian ruler were to tell Natasha that she must stay at 
home, the opportunity aspect of her freedom is not curtailed as substantially as if she 
was forced to go out (she is doing what she would have done anyway), but the 
process aspect is immediately violated because she is not allowed to choose.  Sen is 
at pains to point out276 that the capabilities perspective “has considerable merit in the 
assessment of the opportunity aspect of freedom”, but “cannot possibly deal 
adequately with the process aspect of freedom”.  This is so because capabilities 
focus on individual advantages and do not say enough about the “fairness or equity 
of the processes involved, or about the freedom of citizens to invoke and utilise 
procedures that are equitable”.277 
 
Another important normative question is the consideration of why we value freedom.  
Sen notes that in most economic theories, freedom is regarded as instrumental – it is 
valued because it is a means to attain access to resources or commodities. 278  
However, theorists such as James Buchananan and Karl Marx have argued that 
freedom has inherent value as an end in itself.279  The choosing itself is of value, 
regardless of what it gets the person who is choosing.   
 
Some commentators have argued that the focus on individual freedoms means that 
the approach does not take into account the needs of the broader community.  Sen280 
acknowledges that evaluative choices about which freedoms to prioritise in given 
circumstances are inescapable, but chooses not to engage fully in how such 
priorities are to be determined.  He concedes that there may be basic capabilities 
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that would be in any capability set in any society.  However, unlike Nussbaum, he 
has been reticent to propose a fixed list of capabilities.  He offers three reasons for 
this:  First, capabilities are assessed for different purposes and the contents of any 
list would be contingent upon the reasons for its compilation.  Second, social 
conditions in a specific context may determine priorities.  Third, public discussion 
and democratic deliberations could lead to a better understanding of “the role, reach, 
and the significance of particular capabilities”.281 
 
Nussbaum argues that freedom cannot be seen as a general good and that “[s]ome 
freedoms contain injustice in their very definition”.282  She therefore regards a list of 
basic capabilities as indispensable and has compiled an open-ended, broadly-stated, 
adjustable list of “central human capabilities”.283  In her view, a list does not prevent a 
particular community from deciding on implementation and from deliberating on the 
specific details of the general norms contained in her list.284  It therefore caters to 
pluralism and can be applied in various social, economic and cultural contexts, while 
protecting the basic freedoms of marginalised persons. 
 
Sen’s reticence to compile a list of capabilities and his reasons for doing so are 
arguably relevant in efforts to ensure that disabled persons are able to participate, on 
an equal basis with enabled persons, in the life of their communities.  However, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 6, difficult questions arise as to which disabled persons 
want to and are able to work and whether work, as it is structured within society, is 
inherently exploitative and therefore not an aspiration worth pursuing.285  The 
complexity of the issues requires that rights and duties are negotiated in procedurall y 
equitable ways that balance the interests of disabled and enabled persons.  In the 
context of access to work, the interests of disabled work seekers, prospective 
employers and the community in general have to be taken into account.   
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3.4 Capability, disability and substantive equality 
  
While the capabilities approach has been simplified here and many of its challenges 
have not been discussed to any great extent, its emphasis on freedom and human 
diversity is useful in thinking about the normative underpinning of rights.286  It is a 
general conceptual framework that allows us to question and examine general 
ethical norms, while at the same time leaving space for us to consider its practical 
contributions and actual workings in specific circumstances.287  A focus on the latter 
aspect is valuable because it allows us to test implementation against stated 
objectives and to ‘strip down’ the theory in order to make it more accessible and 
user-friendly and less prone to misinterpretation.288  This section will consider 
aspects of the general objectives of the capability approach, while its implications in 
specific circumstances will be discussed when analysing disability equality 
jurisprudence below.  
 
3.4.1 Formulation of the outcomes to be achieved 
 
The first general feature of the capability approach that is useful for thinking about 
disability rights is its identification of the most relevant outcome as the freedom to 
choose a set of functionings.  In this way, there is express recognition of the fact that 
many disabled people may not achieve the same functionings with the same basket 
of resources as enabled people.289  Furthermore, the fact that general utility is not the 
outcome also means that disabled people who are content with their functional 
differences are not regarded as being less well-off.290  This implies a positive 
conception of difference and is consistent with a broader approach of not viewing the 
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288 Ibid. 
289 Sen ‘Freedom of Choice’ 12-14.  He cogently argues (at 14) why a focus on commodities or 
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status of disability as problematic, but rather focusing on the disadvantages 
associated with that status. 
 
The foundational acknowledgement of human variation means that disability is 
viewed as one of several reasons why people vary in their ability to convert personal 
means into functionings.  Sen offers a non-exhaustive list of factors that may 
influence people’s ability to convert means into functionings:291   
 
“(1) physical or mental heterogeneities among persons (related, for example, to 
disability, or proneness to illness); (2) variations in non-personal resources 
(such as the nature of public health care, or societal cohesion and the 
helpfulness of the community); (3) environmental diversities (such as climactic 
conditions, or varying threats from epidemic diseases or from local crime); or 
(4) different relative positions vis-a-vis others (well illustrated by Adam Smith’s 
discussion, in the Wealth of Nations, of the fact that the clothing and other 
resources one needs ‘to appear in public without shame’ depends on what 
other people standardly wear, which in turn could be more expensive in rich 
societies than in poorer ones)” [emphasis in original]. 
 
Although it is not clear from this passage whether Sen conceives of disability itself as 
something other than a personal variation, it is possible to interpret his formulation as 
supportive of an individual approach to disability.  The more generous interpretation 
would make allowance for the possibility that he is referring to personal impairment , 
rather than disability, as a partly or wholly social phenomenon.  It could also lead to 
the conclusion that his identification of individual and external factors as relevant to 
well-being is consistent with social understandings of disability. 
 
3.4.1.1 Equality, dignity and freedom 
 
The fact that outcomes are measured in terms of people’s freedom to choose also 
implies that the capability approach views each human being as an end in herself.  
This is consistent with the normative underpinnings of social understandings of 
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disability as well as the aims of substantive equality as formulated by the South 
African Constitutional Court.  As expressed by Quinn and Degener, 
“[r]ecognition of the value of human dignity serves as a powerful reminder that 
people with disabilities have a stake in and a claim on society that must be 
honoured quite apart from any considerations of social or economic utility.  
They are ends in themselves and not means to the ends of others.  This view 
militates strongly against the contrary social impulse to rank people in terms of 
their usefulness and to screen out those with significant differences.”292 
 
The Constitutional Court has repeatedly affirmed its view that the bedrock value 
upon which equality rests is dignity.293  Ackermann, who was a judge on the 
Constitutional Court when it developed its approach to equality,294 argues that “as a 
                                                          
292 Quinn et al ‘UN Human Rights Instruments’ 14.  In S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) para 38, 
Ackermann J emphasised that human beings “are creatures with inherent and infinite worth; they 
ought to be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means to an end.”  This formulation is 
consistent with the ethical conception of dignity as formulated by Emmanuel Kant, quoted in LWH 
Ackermann. “Equality and Non-Discrimination:  Some Analytical Thoughts.” (2006) 22(4) South 
African Journal on Human Rights 597 at 609-610:   
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“[A] human being regarded as a persona, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is 
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293 The Court has distinguished between reliance on dignity as a value that underpins equality on the 
one hand, and violations of the right to dignity on the other.  In the words of Sachs J in National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 
(CC) para 124,  
“[t]he former is based on the impact that the measure has on a person because of membership 
of an historically vulnerable group that is identified and subjected to disadvantage by virtue of 
certain closely held personal characteristics of its members; it is the inequality of treatment that 
leads to and is proved by the indignity.  The violation of dignity under s 10, on the other hand, 
contemplates a much wider range of situations.  It offers protection to persons in their multiple 
identities and capacities.  This could be to individuals being disrespectfully treated, such as 
somebody stopped at a roadblock.  It could also be to members of groups subject to systemic 
disadvantage, such as farm workers in certain areas, or prisoners in certain prisons, such 
groups not being identified because of closely held characteristics, but because of the situation 
they find themselves in.  These would be cases of indignity of treatment leading to inequality, 
rather than of inequality relating to closely held group characteristics producing indignity.” 
294 The judgment he wrote with O’Regan and Sachs in Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another 1997 (3) 
SA 1012 (CC) was the first to cement the principle that unfair discrimination “principally means 
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matter of clear principle, the value of human dignity, and nothing else, is what gives 
meaning in the law to the concepts of equality and non-discrimination”.295   
 
He has elaborated on this contention in his book Human Dignity:  Lodestar for 
Equality in South Africa.  One of the central arguments in the book is  
“that the words ‘equality’, ‘equal’, or ‘unequal’, in order to be meaningful, can 
only be used as attributive parts of speech and not as predicative nouns or 
adjectives.  The terms ‘attributive’ and ‘predicative’ are, however, not used […] 
in a strictly grammatical sense, but in a special logical sense that requires 
identification of the object referred to (human dignity, for example), in order that 
the appropriateness of the attributive term (equal or equality) can be judged.  
The vital question, so consistently ignored in legal equality analysis, is:  ‘With 
regard to what are all human beings equal? [emphasis in the original]’”296 
 
The Constitutional Court’s answer to the question posed by Ackermann is that 
people ought to be equal in terms of the respect and concern with which they are 
treated.297  They have this worth by virtue of being human and whether there has 
been infringement of their dignity is to be objectively assessed.298 
 
Various objections have been raised to the dignity-centred approach to equality.  
Some commentators argue that there is no constitutional justification for this 
approach and that overreliance on dignity renders the value of equality nugatory 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
treating persons differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who 
are inherently equal in dignity” (at para 31).   
295 See Ackermann at 599.  He renounces the dictum in Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another para 33 
that other forms of discrimination may not impact on dignity, but nevertheless “affect persons 
adversely in a comparably serious manner.” 
296 L Ackermann. Human Dignity:  Lodestar for Equality in South Africa. (2012) 21. 
297 Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another para 32; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and 
Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) para 28 (dignity lies in the 
acknowledgment of “the value and worth of all individuals as members of our society”); Hoffmann v 
South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 27 (“At the heart of the prohibition of unfair 
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298 R Krüger. “Equality and Unfair Discrimination:  Refining the Harksen Test.” (2011) 128(3) South 
African Law Journal 479 (at 489) notes that while this Kantian conception of dignity does not take into 
account the subjective feelings of the complainant, the Court has on at least one occasion formulated 
an approach that takes into account the complainant’s feelings (see City Council of Pretoria v Walker 
1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) para 81, in which the Court stated that “[n]o members of a racial group should 
be made to feel that they are not deserving of equal concern, respect, consideration and that the law 
is likely to be used against them more harshly than others who belong to other race groups”). 
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within the constitutional scheme.299  Others view the reliance on dignity as too 
individualistic and inimical to a transformative equality jurisprudence that places 
group-based material disadvantage at the centre of struggles for equality.  In the 
words of Albertyn and Goldblatt,  
 
“[T]he replacement of disadvantage with dignity returns us to a liberal and 
individualised conception of the right.  The centrality of disadvantage, 
vulnerability and harm, and their connotation of group-based prejudice – the 
essence of the right – is lost. […] The enquiry tends towards a concern with 
individual personality issues rather than an understanding of more material 
systemic issues and social relationships.  The definition of equality in terms of 
dignity or disadvantage is not an academic debate.  It has profound implications 
for the application of the right to the cases, and for the evolution of our 
jurisprudence as a whole.” 300 
 
Fredman301 recognises that the invocation of dignity has at times led to an 
unfortunate de-linking of substantive equality and socio-economic disadvantage in 
South African and Canadian jurisprudence.  In her view, it has also operated to 
abstract equality from power relations in society.  However, she does not regard 
these obstacles as insurmountable, and supports her argument by citing the 
                                                          
299 A Fagan. “Dignity and Unfair Discrimination:  A Value Misplaced and a Right Misunderstood.” 
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Constitutional Court’s judgment in the Khosa case, in which Mokgoro J emphasised 
that the exclusion of permanent residents from social assistance schemes affected 
their socio-economic as well as their personality interests.302  
 
In my view, the concept of dignity is not inherently individualistic; it does not have to 
operate to exclude structural inequalities.  Its malleability may be a weakness, which 
some commentators have tried to address by suggesting more specific normative 
objectives for dignity.303  Others argue that while dignity may be one value that 
assists us in explaining the ethical foundations of equality, it is too vague to ever 
assist us in providing clear normative underpinnings for equality because it can 
house many disparate approaches.304  McConnachie has therefore suggested that 
instead of examining dignity, our focus ought to shift to how the Constitutional Court 
actually justifies its decisions in equality cases.305   
 
For purposes of this work, it is not necessary to express a view on the dignity-
centred approach to equality.  It is not clear to me why one would have to limit the 
ethical foundations for equality to one specific value.  The values, like the rights in 
the Bill of Rights, can be mutually supportive and interdependent.  It is against this 
backdrop that I propose that the value of freedom can play a more prominent role in 
underpinning equality for disabled people, particularly as it relates to access to work.  
This freedom can be viewed within a framework of dignity or viewed as a related, yet 
independent value.   
 
Why a focus on freedom?  Firstly, the nature of the disadvantage disabled people 
face means that conceptual aspects relating to freedom can crystallise our normative 
commitments in a way that supports dignity’s commitment to viewing people as ends 
in themselves.  If freedom is emphasised, for example, policies for the provision of 
social services would be planned in a consultative way that respects the autonomy of 
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305 McConnachie 612, 620-628.   
84 
 
service users.  If disabled persons wish to work, an emphasis on freedom would lead 
to disapproval of paternalistic social assistance schemes that do not respect the 
economic, as well as the social needs of beneficiaries. 
 
The disadvantage disabled people face relates to their social, as well as their 
economic marginalisation.  Albertyn explains that “[s]ocial inequalities construct 
patterns of inclusion and exclusion in which identity and culture, values and 
behaviours of a particular group are stigmatised, marginalised and/ or denigrated, 
while another group is affirmed and privileged.”306  This group may become 
vulnerable to physical and psychological violence and be politically marginalised. 307  
Economic inequality, on the other hand, lies in “unequal access to, and distribution 
of, basic needs, opportunities and material resources”.308  The distinction between 
economic and status disadvantage is often of no practical significance, as the 
connection between status-based discrimination and economic discrimination is a 
close one.309 
 
I will argue more fully in Chapter 6 that, when we provide positive measures to 
create opportunities for disabled people to earn a living, the conceptual distinction 
between the procedural and opportunity aspects of freedom, as well as between 
freedom as inherently valuable and instrumental to achieving other outcomes, 
becomes of cardinal importance.310  Attention to these distinctions will prevent us 
from addressing socio-economic disadvantage in ways that perpetuate stereotypes 
and stigmatise disabled people.  It may also reduce the risk of infringing on the 
procedural dimension of disabled people’s freedom while attempting to promote the 
opportunity aspect of freedom.  
 
A second, related, justification for expanding upon the use of freedom in ensuring 
access to work is that freedom as used in the capability approach recognises the link 
between status and socio-economic disadvantage, which is one of the central 
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assumptions of substantive equality.  However, because different aspects of freedom 
are distinguished, the interrelationship between status and disadvantage can 
arguably be problematised in more sophisticated ways.   
 
One example is that the individual’s freedom to choose functionings can be balanced 
more transparently against communal interests than the more abstractly defined 
dignity.  Such an approach would integrate well with a conceptual framework that 
views rights as means of constructing power relations in society.  It also allows us to 
have clearer perspectives on the relative weight granted to atomistic and social 
dimensions of rights.  We would still need a separate normative ethical framework to 
evaluate the relative weights to attach to various freedoms, but a focus on freedom 
in itself can arguably provide conceptual illumination. 
 
The third reason that I think freedom may be beneficial relates to the political 
economy of ideas.  Freedom is invoked in development economics discourse that 
takes a people-first approach to productivity.  In this way, there is a more discernible 
link to the labour sphere, which can arguably compete better against deeply 
entrenched, profit-driven perspectives than abstract appeals to regard people as 
ends in themselves.  This strategic potential is of particular importance in the context 
of pro-active approaches to equality, which rely on the buy-in of employers and 
employees at the organisational level.  This aspect will be more fully discussed in 
Chapter 5.311   
 
A fourth reason for the invocation of freedom is related to the third, namely that 
capability discourse allows us to address some of the weaknesses of rights 
discourse.  First, it provides economic justifications for the imposition of positive 
duties and therefore bridges the gap between constitutional rights and their 
application in the economic sphere.  Second, it does not carry the cultural or political 
baggage that rights discourse does, even though it has been shown that rights 
precede the Western Enlightenment period and are invoked in different forms in 
various societies.312  Third, because the capability approach directly focuses on what 
people are able to do and to be, it does not have to jump the hurdle of the public/ 
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private divide that has hampered the implementation of rights in spheres in which 
marginalised groups are oppressed.  This includes the work sphere. 
 
3.4.2 Ultimate transformational goals  
 
In arguing for the infusion of capability theory into justifications that underpin the right 
to equality for disabled people in the work sphere, I have aimed to give effect to a 
transformational vision of substantive equality.  Such a vision has the following 
attributes: 313  It emphasises the effect of discrimination on complainants rather than 
comparing the treatment received by complainants with that experienced by similarl y 
situated individuals.  In doing so, it recognises the lived realities of marginalised 
groups and is sensitive to the social and historical dimensions of inequality.  In 
eschewing equal treatment, it refuses to view difference as inherently negative.  
Overall, a substantive approach concerns itself with the amelioration and eventual 
eradication of systemic subordination or disadvantage. 
 
Fredman also identifies four potential aims of equality that have similar content:  
“First, it should break the cycle of disadvantage associated with outgroups.  
Second, it should promote respect for the equal dignity and worth of all, thereby 
redressing stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence because of 
membership of an out-group.  Third, it should entail an accommodation and 
positive affirmation and celebration of identity within community, and, finally, it 
should facilitate full participation in society.”314 
 
Most of the above aims do not expressly incorporate elements of process equity.  
One could perhaps argue that all the aims have a process dimension and that 
Fredman’s fourth aim, in particular, could incorporate such a dimension.  These aims 
are also not specific to particular protected groups such as disabled persons.  In 
order to enrich our understanding of the aims in respect of promoting access to work 
for disabled persons, it is perhaps necessary to think more explicitly about process 
equity.  This aspect is addressed in Chapter 5.   
                                                          
313 The four attributes that follow are identified in C Albertyn. “Substantive Equality and 
Transformation in South Africa.” (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 253 at 258. 
314 Fredman ‘Changing the Norm’ 377. 
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It may also be necessary to consider the particular ways in which disabled persons 
are excluded from work and from society in general.  Ngwena’s development of what 
he terms a “disability method” is a useful articulation of interconnecting 
considerations that have to animate the assessment of norms, standards or 
practices that distinguish between disabled and enabled persons.315  He articulates 
these considerations as follows: 
 
“(1) whether the norm, standard or practice is conscious about, or oblivious to, 
disability as social oppression; (2) whether the norm, standard or practice is 
dialogic in the sense of admitting a plurality of interactive voices and reflecting 
equal power relations so as to create space for an egalitarian playing field, or 
is, instead, monologic in the sense of admitting only a dominant voice and 
reflecting unequal power relations as to privilege an enabled social group and 
disadvantage a disabled social group; (3) whether the norm, standard or 
practice admits the experience and equality aspirations of disabled people as a 
diverse but distinct social group that has been historically excluded or 
marginalised in ways that do not essentialise disabled people as a group and 
as individuals; and (4) if the norm, standard or practice is monologic and 
exclusionary, how rather than whether it can be reformed to accommodate 
disability and provide an alternative to existing social structures in a manner 
that is costless to the person accommodated as part of constructing an 
inclusive egalitarian society.”316 
 
Ngwena stresses that all these considerations are interrelated and should not be 
considered in a separate, formal manner.317  Similarly, I argue that Albertyn’s 
characteristics of transformative equality, Fredman’s aims of equality and Ngwena’s 
‘disability method’ are all mutually reinforcing and offer general normative guidelines 
when assessing disability equality.  
  
                                                          
315 C Ngwena. “Developing Juridical Method for Overcoming Status Subordination in Disablism:  The 
Place of Transformative Epistemologies.” (2014) 30(2) South African Journal on Human Rights 275 
(hereinafter referred to as “Ngwena ‘Developing Juridical Method’”) at 303.  He developed this method 
in his LLD thesis (see Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ fn 19) completed in 2010, but I have elected to 
use the most recent source. 




I also suggest that, in order to achieve these aims, an approach that centres 
capabilities holds advantages because it recognises: 
  “That a positive role is required of institutions in removing barriers or 
constraints and making sure that the opportunities to flourish are real; 
 that some people may need more and different resources to enjoy 
genuine freedom and fair access to opportunities; 
 that a life of genuine and valuable choices for each individual leads to a 
better society for everybody; and 
 that its aims should be to narrow gaps in real opportunities and real 
freedoms, not by reducing the freedoms of some but by increasing the 
opportunities of those suffering persistent disadvantage.”318 
 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has considered what rights, and the equality right, in particular, can 
contribute to disabled persons’ struggle for inclusion.  It has emphasised the 
complementary aspects of social understandings of disability and rights discourse, 
but has also highlighted possible tensions between what social understandings 
require and what rights as legal instruments can deliver.   
 
I also considered what substantive equality requires in general terms and suggested 
that an emphasis on the value of freedom, as well as an approach that centres 
capabilities, may be beneficial for promoting access to work for disabled persons.  
Furthermore, I briefly set out possible aims and objectives of transformational 
equality for disabled persons, as articulated by Albertyn, Fredman and Ngwena. 
 
With these normative considerations in mind, we can now proceed to consider the 
current employment equity laws and selected state measures to promote access to 
work for disabled persons.  As will become apparent in the analyses that follow, the 
                                                          
318 Hepple ‘Aims and Limits’ 11. 
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transformative potential of these laws is inhibited in various ways, including in the 
adverse impact of structural disadvantages that prevent disabled work seekers from 
seeking legal remedies, unequal bargaining power between prospective employers 
and work seekers, regulatory weaknesses that dilute the impact of attempts to 
change oppressive organisational norms and the limited role laws play in changing 
attitudinal barriers.  Possible solutions to these challenges will require consultative 












In the previous chapters, much of the discussion was focused on the social 
contingency of disability and the consequences of recognising this social dimension, 
the normative underpinnings of the right to equality and the aims of substantive 
equality in general, as well as in respect of disabled persons in particular.  The next 
three chapters proceed to the legal framework that operates to promote access to 
work for disabled persons:  the prohibition on discrimination; the positive non-
discrimination duties and affirmative action duties imposed on employers and the 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that have been put in place; and selected 
positive duties on government. 
 
4.1.1 Broad objectives 
 
This chapter has two broad objectives.  The first is to set out the salient features of 
the non-discrimination framework provided by the Constitution, the EEA and the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA).  The 
second is to examine the duty on employers to refrain from discriminating against 
disabled work seekers.  Specific attention will be paid to how these laws incorporate 
social understandings of disability, their potential to contribute to substantive 




4.1.2  The approach to the equality analyses in this chapter  
 
In keeping with the principle of constitutional avoidance,319 the EEA or the PEPUDA 
would be the first port of call for aggrieved persons who allege unfair discrimination, 
unless the remedy they seek is the invalidation of a legislative provision on 
constitutional grounds.  However, the ‘test’ for unfair discrimination articulated by the 
Constitutional Court in Harksen v Lane NO and Others320 is the cornerstone of the 
discrimination provisions in the PEPUDA and has been applied in the context of the 
EEA.  Differences in the application of these two Acts will therefore be noted, but not 
elaborated upon.  Similarly, differences between the Acts and s 9 of the Constitution 
will be noted, but will not be the focus of this discussion.    
 
This approach is chosen in light of the primary research question.  That question 
requires that our principal engagement is with the contextual factors that inform how 
courts, legislators, human resources professionals and employees may construct 
working definitions of disability and view positive duties that may be imposed to 
remedy disabled people’s disadvantage.  The technical application of ‘tests’ by 
courts, while important, will therefore receive less attention and will only be 
discussed insofar as these implicate views on how to construct disability for 
purposes of anti-discrimination. 
 
4.1.3 Chapter structure 
 
This chapter is structured as follows:  Part 2 discusses the salient equality provisions 
in the Constitution, the EEA and the PEPUDA.  Part 3 then considers the use of 
contextual factors in the various stages of the equality ‘test’, as set out in Harksen, 
and argues for the development of a more context-sensitive approach to the 
determination of who should be protected on the grounds of disability.  Part  4 
examines the current approach to determining who is disabled for purposes of non-
                                                          
319 In NAPTOSA and Others v Minister of Education, Western Cape and Others 2001 (2) SA 112 (C) 
123I-J, Conradie J stated that where there is no constitutional challenge to the Labour Relations Act 
(LRA) 66 of 1995, cases have to be brought within the regulatory framework it establishes and that 
direct reliance on the constitutional right to fair labour practices was therefore unacceptable.  See fn 
323 for a discussion of the same principle in relation to s 9 and the PEPUDA 4 of 2000.   
320 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC).  
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discrimination law.  Finally, Part 5 considers the position of disabled work seekers in 
terms of their ability to utilise these laws as well as the potential of the prohibition on 
discrimination to contribute to transformative change. 
 
4.2 Legal framework for equality in the labour context  
 
4.2.1  Equality provisions in the Constitution 
 
The Constitution expresses its commitment to equality, both as a founding value and 
as a justiciable right.321  Section 9(1) provides that everyone is equal before the law 
and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  Section 9(2) allows for 
positive measures that will promote the achievement of equality and that are 
designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons that are 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.  Sections 9(3) and (4) prohibit discrimination 
by public and private actors, respectively, on a number of listed, non-exhaustive 
grounds including disability.322  Finally, s 9(5) provides that discrimination on a listed 
ground is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. 
 
As alluded to above, courts and labour tribunals will consider most instances of 
unfair discrimination in terms of the EEA and the PEPUDA instead of the 
Constitution.  The dispute resolution processes provided for in the legislation are 
meant to be more accessible to complainants and tailored to the contexts in which 
disputes arise.  However, where the constitutionality of provisions in the EEA or the 
PEPUDA is challenged, those provisions will be tested against s 9 of the 
                                                          
321 Equality appears as a value in various parts of the Constitution.  It is first mentioned in the 
preamble, with the recognition that the Constitution was adopted to ensure, amongst other things, that 
every citizen is equally protected by the law.  Section 1 states that South Africa is founded on, inter 
alia, human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.  
Section 3 provides that all citizens are equally entitled to the benefits and privileges of citizenship and 
are equally subject to the duties and responsibility of citizenship.  Section 7 emphasises that the Bill of 
Rights affirms the democratic values of equality, human dignity and freedom.  Similarly, s 39 enjoins 
any court, tribunal or forum to interpret the Bill of Rights in ways that promote equality, human dignity 
and freedom.  Section 36 provides that limitations of rights may only be achieved through laws of 
general application and to the extent that such limitations are reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on equality, dignity and freedom. 
322 The listed grounds are “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”     
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Constitution.323  Another instance where the constitutional right will be applied directly 
is where the remedy sought is the invalidation of a provision in an Act of 
Parliament.324  That remedy is only available under the Constitution and the final 
decision has to be made by the Constitutional Court.325 
 
4.2.2  Legislation giving effect to the right to equality:  Jurisdictional 
choices 
 
Section 9(4) envisions the enactment of legislation to further give effect to the 
prohibition on unfair discrimination.  Both the PEPUDA and the EEA were enacted in 
terms of s 9(4).  Other legislation also seeks to give effect to the right to equality.  
The Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995, for example, offers employees 
protection against unfair discrimination in cases of dismissals,326 rights of 
association,327 benefits and unfair practices related to promotion, training or 
disciplinary action against them.328  However, since the primary research objectives 
of this study (see 1.1) relate to disabled people’s access to employment, the EEA 
                                                          
323 See MEC for Education:  KwaZulu-Natal and Others v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 40 in 
which Langa CJ said the following:  “This Court has held in the context of both administrative and 
labour law that a litigant cannot circumvent legislation enacted to give effect to a constitutional right by 
attempting to rely directly on the constitutional right.  To do so would be to ‘fail to recognise the 
important task conferred upon the legislature by the Constitution to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights’.  The same principle applies to the Equality Act.” 
324 C Albertyn, B Goldblatt and C Roederer. Introduction to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention 
of Unfair Discrimination Act. (2001) 31. 
325 Sections 172(1(a) and 167(5) of the Constitution. 
326 Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA provides that a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for such 
dismissal is “that the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly, on 
any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language, 
marital status or family responsibility.”  Section 187(2)(a) states that despite s 187(1)(f), a dismissal 
will be fair if the reason for it relates to the inherent requirements of the particular job. 
327 Section 5 states that nobody is allowed to discriminate against an employee for exercising her 
rights under the LRA. 
328 Section 186(2) reads:   
“‘Unfair labour practice’ means any unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and 
an employee involving— 
(a) unfair conduct by the employer relating to the promotion, demotion, probation (excluding 
disputes about dismissals for a reason relating to probation) or training of an employee or 
relating to the provision of benefits to an employee; 
(b) the unfair suspension of an employee or any other unfair disciplinary action short of 
dismissal in respect of an employee; 
(c) a failure or refusal by an employer to reinstate or re-employ a former employee in terms of 
any agreement; and 
(d) an occupational detriment, other than dismissal, in contravention of the Protected 
Disclosures Act, 2000 (Act No. 26 of 2000), on account of the employee having made a 
protected disclosure defined in that Act [emphasis in the original].” 
94 
 
and the PEPUDA will remain the focus.  This approach is not meant to deny the 
importance of protection against unfair dismissal or unfair labour practices for 
disabled employees.  Many of the contextual factors discussed here may also be 
relevant to dismissals or labour practices.  However, the central research question 
relates to access to work at first instance and the focus is therefore on recruitment 
and selection. 
 
In cases where alleged unfair discrimination does not relate to a dismissal or an 
unfair labour practice, a decision has to be made as to whether the EEA or the 
PEPUDA applies.329  Once that choice is made, the case must be decided within the 
four corners of whichever one of the Acts applies.330 
 
The prohibition on unfair discrimination in the EEA applies to all employers, 
regardless of their turnover or the number of people employed.331  It applies in 
respect of employees already in the employ of the employer, as well as applicants 
for employment.332  The EEA defines an employee as:  
“any person other than an independent contractor who— 
(a) works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to 
receive, any remuneration; and 
(b) in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an 
employer….”333 
  
                                                          
329 Section 20(3) of the PEPUDA reads:  
“The clerk of the equality court must, within the prescribed period of receiving such notification, 
refer the matter to a presiding officer of the equality court in question, who must, within the 
prescribed period, decide whether the matter is to be heard in the equality court or whether it 
should be referred to another appropriate institution, body, court, tribunal or other forum 
(hereafter referred to as an alternative forum) which, in the presiding officer's opinion, can deal 
more appropriately with the matter in terms of that alternative forum's powers and functions.” 
In Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v George and Others 2007 (3) SA 62 (SCA) para 5, 
Cameron J stated that the effect of s 20(3)(a) is that a presiding officer, when receiving an equality 
complaint, first has to decide on the best forum for the matter to be heard. 
330 MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal and Others v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 40.  The Court 
recognised that there may be challenges to the constitutionality of the legislation, but in the absence 
of such challenges, cases must be decided in terms of the relevant Act.   
331 Section 4 (1). 
332 Section 9. 
333 Section 1. 
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This definition is relatively open-ended and appears in other labour statutes too.334  It 
rests on the common-law distinction between an employee and an independent 
contractor, which traditionally had been used to determine when an employer should 
accept liability for the wrongful acts of an employee.335   
 
Paul Benjamin describes the approach of the South African courts to determining 
who an employee is as follows: 
“Historically, the approach of the South African courts to determining who is an 
employee shows a trend found in many countries.  Initially, the courts sought a 
single definitive touchstone of the employment relation.  Until the 1950s, the 
courts regarded the employer’s right of control over the employee as the 
defining element.  Later the conventional wisdom accepted that an employment 
contract could exist (particularly in the case of highly skilled or senior 
employees) in the absence of control, and the courts asked whether the 
employee was integrated into the employer’s organization.  The vogue of the 
‘organization’ test was short-lived, and in 1979 it was rejected as ‘vague and 
nebulous’.  For the last two decades, the South African courts have applied a 
multi-factoral approach – the ‘dominant impression’ test.”336 
 
He laments that the factors that have traditionally been considered within the 
‘dominant impression’ test do not take adequate account of the relative bargaining 
power of the parties involved.337  In his view, the failure to take a purposive, 
contextual approach to the question of whether a particular category of workers 
ought to be protected in relation to specific aspects of the labour relationship results 
in many vulnerable workers being excluded from the protection of labour law. 338  
Some legislative amendments have tried to offer partial remedies to these 
                                                          
334 Section 213 of the LRA first defined ‘employee’ in this way and it is duplicated in the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 75 of 1997 (s 1), the Employment Equity Act (EEA) and the 
Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 (s 1).  The Employment Services Act 4 of 2014 in s 1 states that it 
uses ‘employee’ as defined in the BCEA. 
335 P Benjamin. Who Needs Labour Law?  Defining the Scope of Labour Protection. In: J Conaghan, 
RM Fischl and K Klare (eds). Labour Law in an Era of Globalization. (2000) 75 at 82. 
336 Ibid. 




exclusions, but the effectiveness of these is open to question.339  
 
A restrictive definition of who qualifies as an employee may affect various categories 
of workers who are in atypical work relationships.340  Some reasons for these 
workers’ atypical status may relate to disability.  Disabled people themselves may 
choose to take on or be forced into non-standard employment.  Many employers 
may choose to employ disabled people only on more informal terms because of 
prejudice, stigma or harmful stereotypes or because of perceptions that it may be 
more costly than employing persons without disabilities.  
 
Some reasons may relate to a combination of disability and trends in the labour 
market itself – one of the key characteristics of the post-apartheid labour market has 
been a relatively rapid increase in atypical employment, particularly for younger 
workers341 and workers at lower job levels.342  Disabled people are more likely to be 
                                                          
339 Section 200A of the LRA creates a presumption that a person who is working for another person, 
regardless of the form of the contract, is an employee if any one or more of the following factors are 
present:   
“(a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another 
person; 
(b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person; 
(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that 
organisation; 
(d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per month 
over the last three months; 
(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or 
renders services; 
(f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or 
(g) the person only works for or renders services to one person.” 
The section provides that persons earning above an amount determined by the Minister of Labour are 
excluded from the operation of the presumption.  According to Benjamin (at 92), this provision was 
included after organised business expressed concerns that the presumptions would be abused by 
skilled consultants.  Where employees earn equal to or below that amount, they can approach the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) for an advisory award on whether 
relevant persons are employees.  There is also a Code of Good Practice (published as GN 1774 in 
GG 29445 of 1 December 2006 and available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/labour-relations-act-
code-of-good-practice-who-is-an-employee-notice-1774-of-2006-2007-01-22 (Accessed: 6 February 
2015)) on who qualifies as an employee, as required by s 200A (4). 
340 ES Fourie. “Non-Standard Workers:  The South African Context, International Law and Regulation 
by the European Union.” (2008) 11(4) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 110 at 111 notes that 
various terms are used to refer to workers who are excluded from labour regulation:   
“‘Atypical’, ‘non-standard’, or even ‘marginal’ are terms used to describe these new workers 
and to refer to those engaged, for instance, in part-time work, contract work, self-employment, 
temporary, fixed-term, seasonal, casual, piece-rate work, or to employees supplied by 
employment agencies, home workers and those employed in the informal economy.” 
341 H Bhorat and H Cheadle. “Labour Reform in South Africa:  Measuring Regulation and a Synthesis 
of Policy Suggestions.” (2009) 
http://www.dpru.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/36/DPRU%20WP09-139.pdf 8 
(Accessed: 6 February 2015). 
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employed at lower levels due to a host of material and cultural factors.343 
 
Concerns about the exclusions from employee status are mediated somewhat by the 
fact that persons aggrieved by alleged unfair discrimination can invoke the PEPUDA 
if they fail to establish an employment relationship that falls within the ambit of the 
EEA.  The PEPUDA does offer remedies similar to those available under the EEA. 344  
However, in the interests of equality we would do well to monitor differences in the 
remedies awarded in terms of the respective pieces of legislation. 
 
The PEPUDA expressly provides that it does not apply in cases where the EEA 
applies.345  Sometimes the import of this provision in specific cases may be 
uncertain.  In Strydom v Chiloane,346 for example, an employee had racially abused a 
colleague.  The High Court recognised that such conduct could constitute hate 
speech in terms of the PEPUDA, as well as unfair discrimination in terms of the 
EEA.347  Hartzenberg J held that in such cases, the more serious breach of the law, 
which in his view was the racially discriminatory conduct rather than the hate speech, 
should determine the appropriate forum.348  This line of reasoning is questionable 
and rests on creating hierarchies of unlawful conduct.  Criteria that focus on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
342 The Department of Labour Minimum Standards Directorate. Policy Proposals for New Employment 
Standards Statute Green Paper. (1996) 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/17002_gen156_0.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) at 15-16 
explains the plight of atypical, non-standard or marginal workers:  
“Most of these employees are particularly vulnerable to exploitation because they are unskilled 
or work in sectors with little or no trade union organisation or little or no coverage by collective 
bargaining. A high proportion are women. Frequently, they have less favourable terms of 
employment than other employees performing the same work and have less security of 
employment. Often they do not receive "social wage" benefits such as medical aid or pension 
or provident funds.   
These employees therefore depend upon statutory employment standards for basic working 
conditions. Most have, in theory, the protection of current legislation, but in practice the 
circumstances of their employment make the enforcement of rights extremely difficult. Others 
are excluded and consideration must be given to their inclusion.” 
343 The chairperson of DPSA, in a parliamentary meeting on 6 March 2013, noted that state 
departments chase the 2% employment target for disabled people, but do not do enough to enhance 
the employment experience of disabled people, generally employ such persons at entry level and only 
in certain categories.  The minutes of this meeting are available at Parliamentary Monitoring Group. 
“Disabled People South Africa Briefing on Education, Employment & Accessibility Challenges.” (2013) 
(hereinafter referred to as “Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘DPSA Briefing on Education’”) 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130306-disabled-people-sa-challenges-faced-people-disabilities-
schools-gover (Accessed: 6 February 2015). 
344 Section 21 of PEPUDA. 
345 Section 5(3). 
346 2008 (2) SA 247 (T). 
347 At para 15. 
348 At para 16. 
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needs of complainants, the suitability of each forum and the remedies that it can  
provide are arguably more appropriate.349  However, the Court held that even if its 
reasoning is wrong and there is dual jurisdiction, the Labour Court had exclusive 
jurisdiction to decide disputes about the application and interpretation of the EEA.  
The Magistrate in the Equality Court should therefore have referred the dispute to 
the Labour Court. 
 
The difficulties some employees may encounter in securing access to the Labour 
Court are alleviated by amendments to the EEA that commenced in August 2014. 350  
These new provisions allow some parties to refer discrimination cases 351 in which 
conciliation has failed to the CCMA for arbitration.  These parties are employees who 
bring cases of sexual harassment, employees who earn below a certain threshold to 
be determined by the Minister of Labour and any party to a dispute where all the 
parties agree to arbitration.352 
 
4.2.3 Discrimination provisions in the EEA 
 
Section 6(1) of the EEA echoes the constitutional prohibition on discrimination and 
includes a non-exhaustive list of grounds.353  Unlike the Constitution, it expressly 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of “any arbitrary ground.”  This catch-all ground 
only started to operate in August 2014 and its potential import will be discussed 
below. 
  
                                                          
349 In this regard, section 20(4) of the PEPUDA is instructive.  It provides a non-exhaustive list of 
factors a presiding officer must take into account when deciding whether a matter should be referred 
to another forum in terms of s 20(3).  These factors are: 
“(a) The personal circumstances of the parties and particularly the complainant; 
(b) the physical accessibility of any contemplated alternative forum; 
(c) the needs and wishes of the parties and particularly the complainant; 
(d) the nature of the intended proceedings and whether the outcome of the proceedings could 
facilitate the development of judicial precedent and jurisprudence in this area of the law; 
(e) the views of the appropriate functionary at any contemplated alternative forum.” 
These factors, it is submitted, must be taken into account, regardless of whether there is dual 
jurisdiction or not. 
350 See Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013. 
351 This excludes unfair dismissals, which must be dealt with in terms of Chapter VIII of the LRA. 
352 Section 10(6) of the EEA. 
353 All the listed grounds in the Constitution are included and the EEA adds three more grounds, 
namely “HIV status”, “political opinion” and “family responsibility”. 
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The same amendment that added the ‘arbitrary’ ground also incorporated an express 
prohibition of unequal pay for unequal work into the EEA.  Section 6(4) now 
provides:  “A difference in terms and conditions of employment between employees 
of the same employer performing the same or substantially the same work or work of 
equal value that is directly or indirectly based on any one of the grounds listed in 
subsection (1), is unfair discrimination.”  Subsection (5) then gives the Minister of 
Labour the power to prescribe criteria and the methodology for assessing what 
constitutes work of equal value after consultation with the CEE.  The Minister has 
published the aforementioned criteria and proposed methodology.354   
 
Section 11 of the EEA contains the amended onus provisions for claims of unfair 
discrimination.  If discrimination is alleged on a listed ground, the employer has to 
prove that said discrimination “did not take place as alleged” or “is rational and not 
unfair, or otherwise justifiable”.  If discrimination is alleged on an arbitrary ground, 
the employee bears the onus of proving irrationality, discrimination and unfairness. 
 
The EEA gives the Labour Court the power to provide a just and equitable remedy 
when an employee has been discriminated against unfairly.355  It provides a non-
exhaustive list of possible remedies, such as compensation, damages, an order that 
an employer must take steps to prevent future occurrences of unfair discrimination, 
an order that a non-designated employer must comply with the EEA affirmative 
action provisions as if it were a designated employer, an order for the removal of an 
employer’s name from the register of employers who have filed employment equity 
reports with the Director-General of the Department of Labour and publication of the 
Court’s order.356  
  
                                                          
354 See South Africa. Department of Labour. Employment Equity Regulations. (GN R595 in GG 37873 
of 1 August 2014) www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/legislation/regulations/employment-
equity/amendment/2014eereglang.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) (hereinafter referred to as “EE 
Regulations”). 
355 Section 50(2). 
356 Section 50(2)(a)-(f). 
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4.2.4  Discrimination provisions in the PEPUDA 
 
Section 6 of the PEPUDA prohibits the State or any person from discriminating 
unfairly against anyone.  It is more specific than both the Constitution and the EEA in 
that it contains sections that deal explicitly with discrimination on the basis of race, 
gender and disability, respectively.   
Section 9 reads: 
“[N]o person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the ground of 
disability, including— 
(a) denying or removing from any person who has a disability, any supporting 
or enabling facility necessary for their functioning in society; 
(b) contravening the code of practice or regulations of the South African Bureau 
of Standards that govern environmental accessibility; 
(c) failing to eliminate obstacles that unfairly limit or restrict persons with 
disabilities from enjoying equal opportunities or failing to take steps to 
reasonably accommodate the needs of such persons.” 
 
In contrast to the Constitution and the EEA, the PEPUDA also contains a definition of 
discrimination.357  Prohibited grounds are defined to include listed grounds such as 
disability,358 as well as any ground that “causes or perpetuates systemic 
disadvantage”, “undermines human dignity” or “adversely affects the equal 
enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious manner that is comparable 
to discrimination” on a listed ground.359  The onus provisions360 differ from those 
contained in s 9(5) of the Constitution and the EEA, because a complainant always 
has to make out a prima facie case of discrimination and if he or she succeeds, the 
onus then shifts to the respondent to prove fairness.361  This approach applies 
                                                          
357 See 4.4.1. 
358 The listed grounds in the definition of “prohibited grounds” in s 1 are exactly the same as those in s 
9(3) of the Constitution.  Section 34 of the PEPUDA states that “[i]n view of the overwhelming 
evidence of the importance, impact on society and link to systemic disadvantage and discrimination 
on the grounds of HIV/AIDS status, socio-economic status, nationality, family responsibility and family 
status”, serious consideration must be given to include them as listed grounds.  It provided for a 
process to possibly have these grounds included within the listed grounds, but these have not been 
included yet.  However, they may be considered as analogous grounds, provided for in para (b) of the 
definition of prohibited grounds in s 1. 
359 Section 1. 
360 Section 13. 
361 Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer 51. 
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regardless of whether discrimination is on a listed ground or an analogous ground.  
Apart from the overall burden of proving prima facie discrimination, a complainant 
who alleges discrimination on a ground that is not listed has to prove that such a 
ground qualifies as a prohibited ground.362 
 
Section 14 deals with the determination of fairness.  It starts off by providing that 
measures designed to advance persons or groups who have been discriminated 
against unfairly do not constitute unfair discrimination.  Subsection (2) then states 
that in determining the fairness of discrimination, attention has to be paid to the 
context, the factors listed in subsection (3) and “whether the discrimination 
reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons according to objectively 
determinable criteria, intrinsic to the activity concerned”.  The factors listed in 
subsection (3) are: 
 
“(a) Whether the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human dignity; 
(b) the impact or likely impact of the discrimination on the complainant; 
(c) the position of the complainant in society and whether he or she suffers from 
patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group that suffers from such patterns 
of disadvantage; 
(d) the nature and extent of the discrimination; 
(e) whether the discrimination is systemic in nature; 
(f) whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose; 
(g) whether and to what extent the discrimination achieves its purpose; 
(h) whether there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous means to 
achieve the purpose; 
(i) whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such steps as being 
reasonable in the circumstances to— 
(i) address the disadvantage which arises from or is related to one or more of 
the prohibited grounds; or 
(ii) accommodate diversity.” 
  
                                                          
362 Section 13(2)(b)(i) read with s 1(1)(xxii)(b). 
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As Langa CJ noted in the Pillay case, the factors mentioned in subsection (3) contain 
factors that constitutional jurisprudence has discussed as part of the unfairness 
inquiry as well as factors it reserves for the justification inquiry in terms of s 36 of the 
Constitution.363  The Court declined to comment on the constitutionality of this 
approach.  O’ Regan J, in her dissenting judgment in Pillay, lamented the interpretive 
difficulties occasioned by s 14.  In her view, the relationship between the overarching 
requirement that the differentiation be reasonable and justifiable according to 
objective criteria intrinsic to the activity at issue (s 14(2)(c)), and the factors listed in 
subsection (3), is not clear.364  This lack of clarity is unfortunate and may well be 
constitutionally problematic, but that issue will not receive further attention here. 
 
The PEPUDA makes provision for a wide array of remedies in cases of unfair 
discrimination, including damages,365 unconditional apologies,366 orders to restrain 
future breaches or to direct positive steps to stop breaches of the Act,367 orders to 
reasonably accommodate a group or class of people,368 orders for the 
implementation of special measures to address contraventions of the Act, 369 orders 
for respondents to conduct audits of specific policies and practices 370 and supervisory 
orders that require respondents to submit progress reports to the court or a relevant 
constitutional institution.371  
 
4.3 Context in the equality ‘test’ 
 
Before engaging with relevant and potentially challenging contextual factors, I will 
use this section to discuss where in the ‘legal test’ for assessing discrimination such 
factors are considered.  The constitutional approach will be discussed first, while the 
EEA and the PEPUDA equality provisions will be discussed only insofar as these 
differ from what is provided for in the Constitution.   
                                                          
363 At para 70. 
364 At para 137. 
365 Sections 21(2)(d) and 21(2)(e). 
366 Section 21(2)(j). 
367 Section 21(2)(f). 
368 Section 21(2)(i). 
369 Section 21(2)(h). 
370 Section 21(2)(k). 
371 Section 21(2)(m). 
103 
 
4.3.1  The ‘test’ for unfair discrimination 
 
In IMATU and Another v City of Cape Town,372 one of the few cases where disability 
was actively considered as a ground for discrimination, Murphy AJ followed the steps 
as set out by the Constitutional Court in its equality ‘test’.  That ‘test’ was set out as 
follows in Harksen v Lane NO and Others:373 
“(a) Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people?   
If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate 
government purpose?  If it does not then there is a violation of s 8(1).  
Even if it does bear a rational connection, it might nevertheless amount to 
discrimination. 
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination?  This requires a 
two-stage analysis: 
(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to ‘discrimination’?  If it is on 
a specified ground, then discrimination will have been established.  If 
it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there is 
discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is 
based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to 
impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings 
or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner. 
(ii) If the differentiation amounts to ‘discrimination’, does it amount to 
‘unfair discrimination’?  If it has been found to have been on a 
specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed.  If on an 
unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the 
complainant.  The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact 
of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her 
situation.   
                                                          
372 (2005) 26 ILJ 1404 (LC). 
373 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 54. Harksen was decided in terms of s 8 of the interim Constitution, but 
its pronouncements on the equality right remain authoritative and have been endorsed and followed 
by the Constitutional Court on numerous occasions.  Ackermann J, in National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) para 15, performed an equality analysis on 
the assumption that the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence and analysis in relation to s 8 of the 
Interim Constitution is equally applicable to s 9 of the Constitution, even though there are differences 
in the wording of the respective provisions.  See Krüger 479 fn 2 for a list of cases in which the 
Harksen test has been endorsed and applied.  The Harksen ‘test’ also forms the basis of the central 
anti-discrimination provisions in the PEPUDA. 
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If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to 
be unfair, then there will be no violation of s 8(2). 
(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to 
be made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations 
clause (s 33 of the interim Constitution).” 
 
In determining whether the discrimination is fair or unfair, Goldstone J set out the 
following non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered objectively and cumulatively:   
“(a) The position of the complainants in society and whether they have 
suffered from patterns of disadvantage in the past;  
(b) The nature of the provision or power that discriminates and the purpose it 
seeks to achieve; and  
(c) With due regard to the aforementioned factors and any other relevant 
factor, the “extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights or 
interests of the complainants and whether it has led to an impairment of 
their fundamental dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably 
serious nature.”374 
 
From the above, contextual factors are expressly foreseen to find application in three 
phases.  The first instance is where the differentiation is not on a specified ground 
and the factfinder has to determine whether it is based on attributes or 
characteristics that could potentially harm the fundamental human dignity of the 
complainant or cause harm of a comparably serious nature.  The second instance is 
when determining whether the discrimination is fair or unfair.  The third instance is 
when there has been a finding of unfairness and the inquiry turns to whether such 
unfair discrimination could nevertheless be justifiable in terms of s 36 of the 
Constitution.375 
  
                                                          
374 At para 52. 
375 In President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 77, 
Kriegler J distinguished between the justification inquiry and the fairness inquiry:  “[F]actors that would 
or could justify interference with the right to equality […] are to be distinguished from those relevant to 
the [fairness enquiry].  The one is concerned with justification, possibly notwithstanding unfairness; 
the other is concerned with fairness and with nothing else.”   
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Some commentators have discussed the duplication of factors in the various phases 
of the Harksen ‘test’ and different opinions exist as to whether the unfairness and 
justification inquiries ought to be separate and distinct.376  Both the EEA and the 
PEPUDA collapse those inquiries.  As noted above,377 the factors to be considered in 
determining fairness in the PEPUDA include factors that, in terms of prior 
constitutional jurisprudence, would only be considered in the justification inquiry.  
Similarly, as Murphy AJ pointed out in IMATU, the EEA fairness inquiry may also 
include the consideration of factors that in jurisprudence on s 9 of the Constitution 
have been considered in the justification stage.378  He further noted that s 6(2)(b) of 
the EEA contains the most important defence to a claim for unfair discrimination in 
the employment context, namely that it is based on an inherent requirement of the 
job. 
 
4.3.2  The use of the Harksen ‘test’ in labour jurisprudence  
 
The Labour Appeal Court in the Mias case379 set out the general approach to unfair 
discrimination in terms of the EEA succinctly: “Is there a differentiation?  If so, is it 
discriminatory?  If so, is it unfair either directly, on one or more of the specified 
grounds, or indirectly?”  This dictum has not been applied consistently. 
  
                                                          
376 Krüger (at 489) argues that in a complaint based on an analogous ground, the impact of the 
discrimination on the complainant is considered when determining whether there is discrimination and 
again when deciding whether such discrimination is unfair (the first and second instances mentioned 
here).  Most commentators have expressed the view that the unfairness and justification inquiries (the 
second and third instances here) are separate and serve different functions, but acknowledge the 
overlap in factors to be considered in each phase (see, e.g. IM Rautenbach. “Die Verband Tussen die 
Gelykheidsbepaling en die Algemene Beperkingsbepaling in die Handves van Regte.” (1997) Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 571 at 575-580; C Albertyn and J Kentridge. “Introducing the Right to 
Equality in the Interim Constitution.” (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 149 at 175-
176; JD van der Vyver. “Gelykberegtiging.” (1998) 61 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse 
Reg 367).  Krüger, however, argues that the inquiry into the fairness of the discrimination and the 
assessment of the reasonableness of unfair discrimination in terms of s 36 (where s 36 is applicable) 
essentially requires consideration of similar factors, that the Constitutional Court has not engaged in a 
meaningful justification inquiry in unfair discrimination cases and that practically it would be better to 
collapse these two phases of the Harksen ‘test’ into what she terms a ‘fairness-cum-justification 
analysis’ (at 503-505).   
377 See fn 363 and accompanying text. 
378 At para 100. 
379 Mias v Minister of Justice and Others [2002] 1 BLLR 1 (LAC) para 21. 
106 
 
Darcy Du Toit380 has expressed the view that the Harksen framework leaves too 
much leeway to employers, who should be held to different standards than organs of 
state acting in a non-employment context.381  He argues that allowing for the 
possibility that discrimination (which is pejorative) on prohibited grounds may be fair 
“must blunt the purpose of the very constitutional clause which is purportedly being 
applied.”382  His justification for this assertion is that in the employment context “it 
may still seem natural to many that certain categories of people – such as black 
people, or women, or young people, or people with disabilities – cannot reasonably 
be appointed to certain positions which they have never occupied or entrusted with 
certain responsibilities which they have never exercised.”383  Such exclusions may be 
permissible based on inherent requirements of the job, but in a context of pervasive, 
systemic discrimination, an open-ended notion of fair discrimination is, in his view, 
dangerous.384   
 
A more technical strand of Du Toit’s reasoning is that the Harksen ‘test’ was 
developed before the EEA came into effect.  With the advent of the EEA, cases of 
discrimination that fall within its ambit have to be decided within the four corners of 
that Act.  The EEA expressly requires that it be interpreted in compliance with the 
ILO Convention 111 of 1958 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation). 385   
 
The cumulative effect of Du Toit’s reasoning has implications for how we think about 
discrimination as well as our assessments of whether discrimination is fair.  In his 
                                                          
380 D Du Toit. “Protection against Unfair Discrimination in the Workplace:  Are the Courts Getting It 
Right?” (2007) Law, Democracy and Development (Special Issue) (hereinafter referred to as “Du Toit 
‘Protection against Unfair Discrimination’”) 1; D Du Toit. “The Evolution of the Concept of ‘Unfair 
Discrimination’ in South African Labour Law.” (2006) 27 Industrial Law Journal 1311; D Du Toit. The 
Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination:  Applying Section 3(d) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
In: OC Dupper and C Garbers (eds). Equality in the Workplace:  Reflections from South Africa and 
Beyond. (2010) (hereinafter referred to as “Du Toit ‘Applying s 3(d) of the EEA’”) 139; D Du Toit. 
“Submission on Employment Equity Amendment Bill of 2012.” (7 August 2013). 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130807-employment-equity-amendment-bill-employment-services-
bill-public-hearings-day-1 (Accessed: 6 February 2015) (hereinafter referred to as “Du Toit 
‘Submission to Parliament’”).  
381 Du Toit ‘Protection against Unfair Discrimination’ 1-2.  
382 Du Toit ‘Applying s 3(d) of the EEA’ 140. 
383 Du Toit ‘Applying s 3(d) of the EEA’ 141. 
384 Ibid. 
385 Section 3(d) reads:  “This Act must be interpreted in compliance with the international law 
obligations of the Republic in particular those contained in the International Labour Organisation 
Convention (No. 111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.” 
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view,386 any interpretation of ‘discrimination’ in terms of the EEA must be consistent 
with the definition of ‘discrimination’ in Convention 111.  Furthermore, he argues that 
the only defences to claims of unequal treatment on listed or unlisted grounds will be 
affirmative action measures, the inherent requirements of the relevant job and any 
measures taken against a person suspected of, or who is engaging in, “activities 
prejudicial to the security of the State.”387  In the absence of those defences an 
employer, in order to escape censure, must prove that the treatment in question 
amounts to mere differentiation and not discrimination, or was based on a legitimate 
or permissible ground.  In terms of this approach, a general defence of ‘fairness’ will 
not be open to employers.388   
 
Du Toit’s arguments were presented at the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NEDLAC) and when the 2014 amendments to the EEA were 
discussed in Parliament, but were ultimately rejected. The Department of Labour’s 
response was that the NEDLAC parties had purposely decided not to have a 
definition of discrimination because a definition may unintentionally decrease the 
scope of discrimination and work to the detriment of vulnerable workers. 389  It also left 
the open-ended fairness defence intact.  I will not express firm opinions on these 
issues here.  Instead, I will be pragmatic in my approach by accepting that the open-
ended fairness standard will persist, particularly in light of the fact that the fairness 
and justification inquiries have been collapsed in the EEA and the PEPUDA.  
However, du Toit’s warning that the interpretation and application of contextual 
factors used to assess the fairness of or justifications for discrimination may work to 
the detriment of vulnerable workers will influence the discussion of context.    
  
                                                          
386 Du Toit ‘Protection against Unfair Discrimination’ 6-7. 
387 See articles 4 and 5 of Convention 111. 
388 Du Toit ‘Applying s 3(d) of the EEA’ (at 156) argues that the word ‘unfair’ in s 6(1) of the EEA is 
technical rather than substantive.  It is meant to identify the prohibited activity, not to postulate a 
standard for assessing its lawfulness or unlawfulness.  Hepple ‘Can Discrimination be Fair?’ at 2-3 
agrees with Du Toit’s views and argues that a standard of proportionality to assess the fairness of or 
justifications for discrimination is preferable to a vague and open-ended fairness standard. 
389 Parliamentary Monitoring Group. “Employment Services Bill; Employment Equity Amendment Bill:  
Department Response to Public Submissions.” (20 August 2013) 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130820-employment-services-bill-employment-equity-amendment-
bill-department-response-public-submissions (Accessed: 6 February 2015). 
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On the assumption that an open-ended fairness standard will persist, let us turn our 
attention to the role of context in the equality ‘test’, as applied in the constitutional 
and labour jurisprudence on unfair discrimination.  Once again, we are less 
concerned here with the jurisprudential utility of the test390 than with how context is 
implicated in the conceptualisation of disability and disadvantage.  Also, ‘context’ is 
used broadly to refer to historical, social and environmental factors that impact on 
the present-day realities of disabled people and the communities in which they live or 
to which they want to gain access.  
 
4.3.3  Context in defining the protected class:  A jurisprudential gap 
 
Are there phases of the equality ‘test’ that ought to be more sensitive to context?  
Saras Jagwanth, in a critique of the Constitutional Court’s decision in City Coucil of 
Pretoria v Walker,391 has argued that the way in which the Constitutional Court deals 
with categorisation and difference in the second stage of the equality analysis – that 
is, the consideration of whether discrimination is found to have occurred – means 
that historical disadvantage is overlooked at that stage.392  In Walker, the 
Constitutional Court reasoned from the premise that township residents are still 
predominantly Black and that the residents of historically White municipalities are still 
predominantly White and therefore accepted that a differentiation on the basis of 
geography amounted to discrimination on the basis of race.393 
 
Sachs J, in his dissenting judgment, opined that where differentiation is direct, South 
Africa’s history of institutionalised racism and sexism dictates that it be treated as 
prima facie discrimination, which then triggers the presumption of unfairness. 394  In 
terms of this approach, a complainant would not be required to show prejudice, as 
                                                          
390 Arguments that the dignity standard can be refined to provide better justifications for courts’ 
reasoning (see, e.g. Krüger 479; S Cowen. “Can ‘Dignity’ Guide South Africa’s Equality 
Jurisprudence?” (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights 34) exist, but so do arguments 
that a better understanding of dignity will not necessarily provide adequate justifications for courts’ 
decisions (see, e.g. McConnachie 609).  These debates on the utility of dignity to explain courts’ 
reasoning is related to, but distinct, from debates as to whether it ought to be the only value that 
underpins the right to equality. 
391 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC). 
392 S Jagwanth. “What is the Difference?  Group Categorisation in City Council of Pretoria v Walker 
1998 (2) SA 363 (CC).” (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights 200. 
393 Per Langa CJ at para 32.  
394 City Council of Pretoria v Walker para 107. 
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any classification based on prohibited grounds raises the spectre of potential 
prejudice.  Where discrimination is indirect, though, Sachs J was of the view that a 
complainant would have to lead evidence of adverse impact.395  For him, “[t]he mere 
coincidence in practice of differentiation and race, without some actual negative 
impact associated with race, is not […] enough to constitute indirect discrimination 
on the grounds of race.”396  
 
Jagwanth does not agree with the different approach to direct and indirect 
discrimination, respectively, advocated by Sachs J.  She argues that the protected 
grounds are stated in neutral terms such as ‘race’ or ‘gender’, but that the protection 
is targeted at marginalised races and genders.397  In her view, therefore, the Court’s 
mechanical, decontextualised approach to identifying the protected class allows 
someone belonging to a privileged race or gender to benefit unduly from two 
presumptions, namely that differentiation is automatically assumed to be 
discriminatory and that it is unfair.  Jagwanth finds such an approach to be 
incongruous with the equality right’s central purpose, which, in her opinion, is to 
redress historical disadvantage.398   
 
Albertyn and Goldblatt recognise that prejudice suffered by the group within which 
the complainant falls should ideally have been considered at the first stage, but 
argue that the unfairness stage will necessitate consideration of the contextual 
factors Jagwanth wants a court to consider when it decides whether differentiation 
amounts to discrimination.399  In the end, so their argument goes, the analysis as a 
whole does give effect to the central purposes of substantive equality.  Furthermore, 
they suggest that it may be advantageous to make it easier for people to pass the 
first stage before weeding out undeserving claims at the unfairness stage.400  
In essence, there are two advantages a complainant from a privileged race or 
                                                          
395 At para 107 he stated:  “[I]n the case of differential impact of an indirect nature I feel that there is 
no scope for any such per se assumption of discrimination, and that some element of prejudice, 
whether of a material kind or to self-esteem, has to be established. Only then can it be said that 
“prima facie proof of discrimination” on one of the specified grounds exists [….]” 
396 At para 105. 
397 Jagwanth 205. 
398 Jagwanth 200. 
399 C Albertyn and B Goldblatt. Equality. In: S Woolman and M Bishop (eds). Constitutional Law of 




gender would have over someone who claims differentiation on an analogous 
ground.  Firstly, discrimination is assumed.  Secondly, the complainant would not 
bear the onus of proving the unfairness of such discrimination.  The second 
advantage is diluted by the fact that the overall inquiry is focused on the effect of 
discrimination on complainants, regardless of where the burden of proof falls.  A 
perusal of case law also shows that some claimants have succeeded in their claims 
even if they were not able or required to show that discrimination against them has 
been on a listed ground.401  However, judicial acknowledgement that claimants are 
part of a historically marginalised group is important for reasons other than its 
potential impact on the case at hand.  This is especially significant when one 
considers that the most prevalent ideas about disability fail to regard it as a form of 
social oppression in the same way as, for example, racism and sexism. 
 
The first advantage, namely the assumption that discrimination has occurred, may 
also have consequences beyond its immediate impact on the case.  The judicial 
understanding of ‘discrimination’ is pejorative.402  The recognition of specified 
grounds flows from the acknowledgement that certain groups have been 
marginalised.  In my view, therefore, the operation of an assumption of discrimination 
in favour of persons who fall within a historically privileged group has consequences 
for the recognition aspect of substantive equality,403 regardless of whether it affects a 
complainant’s prospects of success or not.  It obscures the reasons for protecting 
certain groups and creates a false equivalence between dominant and 
marginalised.404  Such an approach also sits uncomfortably with understandings of 
rights as primarily being concerned with the regulation of relationships of power.405 
                                                          
401 See, for example, IMATU and Another v City of Cape Town (2005) 26 ILJ 1404 (LC), Larbi-Odam 
and Others v MEC for Education (North-West Province) and Another 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC); 
Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
402 In Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) (at para 31), Ackermann J, 
O’Regan J and Sachs J stated: “Given the history of this country we are of the view that 
‘discrimination’ has acquired a particular pejorative meaning relating to the unequal treatment of 
people based on attributes and characteristics attaching to them.” 
403 This aspect is discussed more extensively in 4.5. 
404 As Jagwanth argues (at 204), it ignores “that difference is very rarely about mere distinctions, but 
inequalities of power.”   
405 M Minow. Making All the Difference:  Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law. (1990) (hereinafter 
referred to as “Minow ‘Making All the Difference’”) 15 argues for “a shift in the paradigm we use to 
conceive of difference, a shift from a focus on the distinctions between people to a focus on the 
relationships within which we notice and draw distinctions.”  She therefore sees an approach of 
“embedding rights within relationships” as a more promising alternative than dismissing rights 
altogether or viewing them only as means through which to protect individual autonomy. 
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Institutionalised racism and sexism operated to oppress Black people and women, 
so it is incongruous that White people and men, who are generally privileged within 
race and sex categorisations, should, without more, benefit from presumptions that 
are justified by recourse to a decontextualised historical narrative.  Having said that, 
there are dangers inherent in treating all the protected grounds in the same manner.  
Race as a protected ground in the South African context is complicated by the fact 
that while economically White people as a group still hold enormous structural 
power, they are a political minority.406  The same cannot be said for men or enabled 
persons. 
 
Even if one accepts that race or sex classifications inherently raise suspicions of 
discrimination, it does not follow that the appropriate response is to hold that 
discrimination is established if differentiation takes place on listed grounds.  A better 
approach, in my view, would be to require all complainants to prove prima facie 
discrimination without the aid of a presumption and to invoke contextual factors that 
will make it easier for complainants who belong to groups who have suffered 
systemic disadvantage or who are vulnerable in the present and in relevant contexts, 
to establish prejudice.  This is the approach that would be taken in terms of the 
PEPUDA and, it is submitted, it is the more appropriate one for purposes of the EEA. 
 
A related reason why a context-sensitive approach to the first stage of the unfair 
discrimination inquiry is necessary is that the different stages of the inquiry are not 
unrelated.407  One example is that there may be a negative correlation between 
conceptions of disability as individual deficit and the likelihood that employers are 
found to have acted unfairly or, where relevant, the likelihood that unfair 
discrimination is found to be justifiable.  In my view, therefore, Albertyn and 
Goldblatt’s response to Jagwanth that the other stages of the Harksen inquiry can 
                                                          
406 The Constitutional Court recognised this reality in Walker when Langa DP noted (at paras 47-48):   
“The respondent belongs to a group that has not been disadvantaged by the racial policies and 
practices of the past. In an economic sense, his group is neither disadvantaged nor vulnerable, 
having been benefited rather than adversely affected by discrimination in the past. […] The 
respondent does however belong to a racial minority which could, in a political sense, be 
regarded as vulnerable. It is precisely individuals who are members of such minorities who are 
vulnerable to discriminatory treatment and who, in a very special sense, must look to the Bill of 
Rights for protection. When that happens a Court has a clear duty to come to the assistance of 
the person affected.” 
407 Jagwanth 204. 
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remedy the decontextualised identification of a protected class is unsatisfactory, at 
least in the context of disability.  It ignores the political and analytical relevance of 
contextually grounded identifications of protected groups, as well as the 
interrelationship between the various stages of the unfair discrimination inquiry.  
 
As will be discussed more fully below,408 disability is different from protected grounds 
such as gender and race in that classification as disabled is often central to disabled 
people’s oppression.  As Paul Abberley notes, “[w]hile in the cases of sexual and 
racial oppression, biological difference serves only as a qualificatory condition of a 
wholly ideological oppression, for disabled people the biological difference, albeit […] 
itself a consequence of social practices, is itself a part of the oppression.”409  
Definitions of disability that portray impairment solely as an objectively determinable, 
biomedical fact – and I will argue that the EEA definition falls into that category – are 
part of a grand narrative that leaves unquestioned the ways in which societal norms 
oppress disabled people.   
 
Failures to contextualise the protected ground of disability create the spectre that, in 
order to receive protection from social oppression, one has to first satisfy oppressive 
definitions of disability that ignore that oppression.  It is important that we consider 
why this contradiction persists and how our thinking about social causes of disability, 
the nature of rights and legal processes, substantive equality and non-discrimination, 
and the social and economic role of employment may have to shift in order to 
develop a coherent, consistent approach to create and sustain more opportunities for 
disabled people to access work.   
 
4.3.4  Symmetrical or asymmetrical approach to disability? 
 
Even though disability appears to differ from race and gender in that it directly 
references a marginalised social status, some have argued that enabled persons 
should be able to claim that they have been discriminated against on the basis that 
they are not disabled.  A literal reading of the Constitution, the EEA and the 
                                                          
408 See 4.4.4. 
409 Abberley ‘Concept of Oppression’ 8. 
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PEPUDA makes such a reading possible.  These provisions prohibit discrimination 
“on one or more grounds”,410 including disability or “on the ground of disability.”411 
 
The European Union Employment Equality Directive uses similar wording in that it 
seeks to combat “discrimination on the grounds of […] disability […] as regards 
employment and occupation.”412  Commentators have differed on whether this 
implies a symmetrical or asymmetrical approach to disability.  Skidmore is of the 
view that, unlike race and gender, it is “only discrimination on grounds of disability 
and not ‘non-disability’ that is prevented by the Directive.”413  Waddington, on the 
other hand, argues that the Directive can be interpreted as embracing a symmetrical  
approach in that it protects individuals from discrimination “on the grounds that they 
are disabled as well as discrimination on the grounds that they are not disabled.” 414 
 
An asymmetric approach is more protective of disabled persons’ rights, as it would 
prevent enabled persons from challenging positive action that seeks to advance 
disabled people.415  Positive measures that constitute valid restitutionary measures 
do not constitute unfair discrimination in South African law.  This means that a 
symmetrical approach is not likely to stymie affirmative action measures that seek to 
advance disabled people.  However, there is a possibility that reasonable 
accommodation measures or other forms of positive action that are not targeted at 
advancing disabled people as a class may be challenged on the basis that these 
disadvantage enabled persons. 
  
                                                          
410 Section 9(3) of the Constitution and s 6(1) of the EEA. 
411 Section 9 of the PEPUDA.   
412 Council of the European Union. “Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 Establishing 
a General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation.” (2000) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0078:en:HTML (Accessed: 6 February 
2015) Article 1. 
413 P Skidmore. “European Development.  EC Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in 
Employment:  Towards a Comprehensive Community Anti-Discrimination Policy?” (2001) 30(1) 
Industrial Law Journal 126 at 131. 
414 L Waddington. Implementing the Disability Provisions of the Framework Employment Directive:  
Room for Exercising National Discretion. In: A Lawson and C Gooding (eds). Disability Rights in 
Europe.  From Theory to Practice. (2005) as quoted in D Schiek, L Waddington and M Bell (eds). 
Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law. 
(2007) 130. 
415 Schiek, Waddington and Bell 131. 
114 
 
If the protected class is identified in a mechanical, decontextualised manner, as was 
employed in Walker, a symmetrical approach could result in an enabled person who 
challenges a reasonable accommodation measure receiving the benefit of having 
discrimination presumed because the differentiation is on the listed ground of 
disability.  Such a complainant would also be assisted by a presumption that the 
discrimination was unfair. 
 
As was argued above, such an approach is incongruous with a substantive approach 
to equality that emphasises the adverse consequences of categorisation, as 
opposed to viewing categorisation itself as inherently negative.  Even if this 
argument is not accepted – and there are good arguments for why it should not be 
accepted, perhaps more so on some grounds than others – an appropriate balance 
would be to require all complainants to show prejudice in order to prove 
discrimination.  If some relevant contextual factors are then considered at this stage, 
it would make it easier for disabled persons than for enabled persons to show 
adverse impact.  It will also require engagement with why complainants are 
protected, which hopefully will lead to a more contextually grounded unfairness 
inquiry.  
 
4.4 Disability discrimination and disadvantage  
 
I have noted that discrimination is regarded as pejorative because it impairs the 
fundamental human dignity of complainants.  However, this is a vague description 
and does not offer much insight into the disadvantage that is to be prevented or 
remedied.  Disadvantage is implicated in two related, yet distinct ways in unfair 
discrimination claims.  Firstly, a complainant has to show that differentiation has had 
some adverse impact on her fundamental human dignity.  Secondly, the contextual 
inquiry as to whether someone falls within the protected class of disability requires 
an examination of her position in society, whether she belongs to a group that has 
suffered systemic discrimination and the impact of the discrimination on her 
fundamental human dignity.  The first inquiry into disadvantage relates to the 
immediate consequences of the impugned differentiation.  The second inquiry is 
115 
 
further removed from the differentiation at issue and attempts to situate the 
complainant within social structures and power relations. 
 
It is important that we examine how the non-discrimination provisions construct the 
relationship between disability and disadvantage.  The first component of this inquiry 
implicates decisions on whether there is immediate disadvantage that flows from a 
complainant being a member of a protected class.  We therefore have to consider 
whether there is a causal link between a protected ground and the differentiation, as 
well as whether the complainant falls within one or more protected grounds.   
 
The second component of how the link between disability and disadvantage is 
constructed is how complainants’ and disabled persons’ positions in society are 
interpreted and how those interpretations influence outcomes.  The social positioning 
of complainants is an important component in the analysis of whether discrimination 
is unfair.    
 
4.4.1  Determination of discrimination 
 
The Constitution and the EEA do not define discrimination, but the PEPUDA does.  
Given that both the EEA and the PEPUDA seek to give effect to the right to equality 
in the Constitution, it is arguable that, unless compelling reasons are advanced for 
interpreting discrimination differently under the two Acts, the definition in the 
PEPUDA can be of assistance in defining discrimination under the EEA.416  This is 
so despite the fact that the legislature chose not to include a definition of 
discrimination when the EEA was amended in 2013. 
 
The PEPUDA defines discrimination as  
“any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation 
which directly or indirectly— 
(a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or 
(b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from,  
                                                          
416 Someone who is disadvantaged by the approach to discrimination in the EEA because it is less 
favourable than the approach in the PEPUDA could allege that the difference is an infringement of her 
right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  
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 any person on one or more of the prohibited grounds”.417 
 
One of the differences between having a definition of discrimination and the 
approach adopted in Harksen is that there is no presumption of discrimination if 
differentiation is on a listed ground.  Complainants have to make out a prima facie 
case of discrimination as defined.  The conception of discrimination is therefore not 
one that focuses on different treatment, but on whether differentiation has resulted in 
harm or prejudice.418  This approach is arguably different from that followed in 
Walker, where different treatment on the grounds of race was held to constitute 
discrimination without the complainant having to prove actual prejudice.  As argued 
above, this approach is questionable for the purposes of disability. 
 
Disabled work seekers will have to show that the differentiation they are challenging 
has imposed a burden, obligation or disadvantage or has withheld a benefit, 
opportunity or advantage.  For present purposes, let us focus on the withholding of a 
work opportunity.  In most instances, it would not be too difficult for a complainant 
who is not appointed to prove such non-appointment.  However, she will also bear 
the onus of proving the link between the differentiation and on one or more of the 
prohibited grounds.419  This is a difficult burden to discharge when most of the 
information necessary to sustain such a claim will be within the peculiar knowledge 
of the prospective employer.   
 
Dupper and Garbers explain that complainants will often have to rely on 
circumstantial evidence that may not be readily available or may be of questionable 
quality.420  In Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead,421 for example, Ms Whitehead 
alleged that she had received a job offer from Woolworths and that it was retracted 
                                                          
417 Section 1. 
418 Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer 32. 
419 See C Garbers. The Prohibition of Discrimination in Employment:  Performance and Prognosis in a 
Transformative Context. In: Malherbe, K and Sloth-Nielsen, J (eds). Labour Law into the Future:  
Essays in Honour of D’Arcy du Toit. (2012) 18 at 21.  OC Dupper and C Garbers. Employment 
Discrimination:  A Commentary. In: C Thompson and P Benjamin (eds). Labour Law. (2002) CC1 
(hereinafter referred to as “Dupper and Garbers ‘Employment Discrimination’”) at CC1-28 write:  “The 
need to show the link between the differentiation and the listed ground in order to establish 
discrimination sounds like a deceptively simple exercise.  However, it needs to be pointed out that in 
practice, it has proved to be one of the most difficult hurdles for applicants to cross.” 
420 Dupper and Garbers ‘Employment Discrimination’ CC1-84. 
421 (2000) 21 ILJ 571 (LAC). 
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after she disclosed her pregnancy.  The differing factual conclusions reached by 
judges, in the Labour Appeal Court, illustrate the difficulty in proving that a decision 
not to hire a person was related to a prohibited ground.422 
 
4.4.2  Direct and indirect discrimination 
 
The prohibitions on discrimination in the Constitution, the EEA and the PEPUDA all 
include both direct and indirect discrimination.423  The distinction between direct and 
indirect discrimination is relevant because the nature of the link between the 
impugned differentiation and the complainant’s resultant disadvantage differs.  In 
Police and Prison Rights Union and Others v Department of Correctional Services 
and Another, the Court distinguished between the two forms of discrimination: 
 
“Direct discrimination refers to situations in which some people are treated 
differently from others on the basis of their race, sex, religion or other protected 
trait.  Indirect discrimination on the other hand occurs when an employer 
utilises an employment practice that is apparently neutral, but 
disproportionately affects members of disadvantaged groups in circumstances 
where it is not justifiable.”424 
                                                          
422 Zondo AJP held (at para 24) that Ms Whitehead was unable to prove a causal connection between 
her non-appointment and her pregnancy.  This was because she was not able to show that, “but for 
her pregnancy, she would have been appointed to the position despite the appellant having another 
candidate who was better suited for the job than herself.”  Conradie JA (at paras 42-43, 48-50) found 
that Woolworths had not adduced sufficient evidence to show that continuity of employment for at 
least 12 months was in fact an inherent requirement of the job.  The only reasonable inference 
therefore was that Ms Whitehead’s pregnancy was the reason for her non-appointment.  Willis JA 
held (at para 76):  “It is impossible, in my view, ex post facto, to unscramble the events and 
determine, within a comfortable margin of certainty, whether but for the fact of her pregnancy, the 
applicant would have secured the permanent position.”  After considering the evidence, he concluded 
(at para 133):   
“The dominant impression is that the decision of the employer was influenced not so much by 
the pregnancy of the employee per se but rather by a range of factors which it could 
legitimately take into account, including her unavailability. The dominant impression is thus not 
one of an employer averse to pregnant women being employed by it. It is also not one of an 
employer that unreasonably seeks to avoid the employment of pregnant women. It is clear that 
the employee’s pregnancy was not the sole reason for her not being offered the permanent 
position.” 
423 City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) para 30; National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice at para 63. 
424 Police and Prison Rights Union and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Another 
(2010) 31 ILJ 2433 (LC) para 123. 
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Dupper and Garbers425 note that there may be various reasons why employers would 
make direct discrimination public – they “may be comfortable” in their bigotry; they 
may feel that they are acting in the best interests of the people they are 
discriminating against; the discrimination may be based on an ingrained stereotype 
accepted as common knowledge; employers may rely on the prejudices of fellow 
employees in justifying their conduct as inevitable; employers may be discriminating 
openly, but feel that they are doing so on a neutral basis or for a laudable purpose; 
and employers “may simply be caught by the times”. 
 
Stereotyping and stigmatisation of disabled people mean that it is possible that 
discrimination against such persons may not be regarded by employers as 
problematic.  Ironically, the pervasiveness of prejudice makes it easier for 
complainants to present direct evidence that the discrimination is based on a 
disability.  If no such direct evidence exists, a complainant has to lead circumstantial 
evidence that leads to the conclusion that the discrimination was based on his or her 
disability, which in many cases is difficult to do successfully.426 
 
Indirect discrimination occurs where apparently neutral requirements, policies or 
practices “operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory practices.”427  
Fredman argues that the multiplicity of definitions of indirect discrimination in the 
European Community and United Kingdom (UK) laws reveal “a deep-seated set of 
ambiguities in the concept.”428  She then goes on to identify three classes of indirect 
discrimination.429  The first class focuses on the effect of a measure on an individual 
rather than on the group to which the individual belongs.  This approach negates the 
need for complex statistical evidence to show disproportionate impact on particular 
groups; all that has to be shown is that the individual is adversely affected because 
of his or her belonging to a group.  However, it has been criticised for stressing 
                                                          
425 OC Dupper and C Garbers. The Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination. In: E Strydom (ed). Essential 
Employment Discrimination Law. (2004) 31 (hereinafter referred to as “Dupper and Garbers 
‘Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination’”) at 42. 
426 Dupper and Garbers ‘Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination’ 42-43. 
427 Dupper and Garbers ‘Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination’ 44. 
428 S Fredman. “Equality:  A New Generation?” (2001) 30(2) Industrial Law Journal 145 (hereinafter 
referred to as “Fredman ‘New Generation’”) at 161. 
429 Fredman ‘New Generation’ 161-162. 
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formal equality and for blurring the line between direct and indirect discrimination. 430 
The second approach Fredman identifies is one in which group disadvantage has to 
be established.  If this is established, discrimination is assumed unless the 
respondent can justify it with reference to non-discriminatory measures.  If the 
measure is justified, the disproportionate impact on the disadvantaged group will be 
allowed to continue.  The third approach is similar to the second, except that there is 
no justification defence.  The emphasis is squarely on equality of results. 
 
The South African approach to indirect discrimination seems to fall into the second 
category in Fredman’s classification.  Courts have not required complex statistical 
evidence to show impact on a group.  In Leonard Dingler, the Labour Court held that 
where only 8 out of 50 Black employees were paid on a monthly basis, the restriction 
of staff benefit to employees who received monthly remuneration constituted indirect 
discrimination.431  Dupper and Garbers argue that while this “cavalier attitude” may 
work in obvious cases and a robust approach to numbers may help in other cases, 
sophisticated statistical evidence may be required to prove more subtle forms of 
indirect discrimination.432 
 
4.4.3  Indirect discrimination on the grounds of disability 
 
On the face of it, indirect discrimination may appear to be less important for disability 
because complainants would find it easier to challenge an employer on the basis that 
there has been a failure to make reasonable accommodation.  Where the latter 
approach is taken, complainants will not have to prove that there has been a 
disproportionate impact on a group, but merely that differentiation imposes burdens 
or withholds advantages from them.   
 
Another important difference is that reasonable accommodation has to be tailored to 
particular disabled people, whereas indirect discrimination concerns impact on a 
group of persons and would therefore require generally applicable adjustments to 
                                                          
430 Lawson 163. 
431 Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd and Others (1998) 
19 ILJ 285 (LC) at 293 per Seady AJ. 
432 Dupper and Garbers ‘Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination’ 48. 
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work environments or work processes.  While this aspect means that it may be 
easier to claim reasonable accommodation, the fact that a successful claim for 
indirect discrimination could result in remedies that address deeper structural 
impediments may make it a strategically attractive option for those who litigate in the 
public interest or on behalf of DPOs.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, s 5 of 
the EEA, which provides for positive non-discrimination duties, may be of particular 
relevance.433 
 
Garbers434 argues that indirect discrimination claims are not pursued often because 
the concept is poorly understood by the people who matter, because such claims are 
difficult and time-consuming to litigate and because statistical evidence is required to 
prove disproportionate impact.  Furthermore, he argues that in a context where 
strong affirmative action measures are sanctioned, the potentially transformative 
prohibition on indirect discrimination assumes a less important role.  Given these 
factors, he foresees that indirect discrimination is likely to be used on an ad hoc 
basis in cases where disproportionate impact is relatively obvious.  Even if this 
prediction proves accurate, there is still potential for disabled people to challenge 
indirect discrimination, especially when one considers that there is limited scope for 
aggrieved individuals to challenge failures to ensure affirmative action through 
litigation.435 
 
In Singh v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others,436 the 
complainant had not been shortlisted for several positions as a magistrate.  One of 
the issues that had not been fully traversed in argument was that the advertisement 
for the posts had stated as one of the requirements a valid driver’s licence. 437  Ms 
Singh, due to her visual impairment, could not obtain a driver’s licence.438  Ledwaba J 
did not pronounce on this matter, but if one were to apply the second formulation of 
indirect discrimination, as discussed above, the issue would be whether the 
requirement that applicants possessed a valid driver’s licence impacted 
                                                          
433 See 5.3.1. 
434 Garbers 26-27. 
435 See 5.3.3.3. 
436 2013 (3) SA 66 (EqC). 
437 Interestingly, this requirement was absent at the shortlisting and interview stages of the selection 
process – see para 16. 
438 Para 17. 
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disproportionately on a group of persons.   
 
An important issue would be whether the relevant group encompasses blind or 
visually impaired people only or whether it should include all disabled people who 
are unable to obtain a driver’s licence due to their disability.  How the relevant group 
is circumscribed is relevant in the assessment of disproportionate impact, because if 
the group is defined more broadly, such assessment is likely to be more favourable 
to complainants.439  Given that disability encompasses varied conditions in interaction 
with diverse environments, it is arguable that disproportionate impact should be 
assessed in relation to persons who share the same disability, as is required by the 
British Equality Act.440   
 
Even within such a requirement, there is scope to interpret “the same disability” 
broadly or narrowly.  An example would be where a job applicant stutters and is 
required to deliver an oral presentation as part of the interview process, even though 
the relevant job does not require oral presentation skills.441  The group on which the 
disproportionate impact is to be assessed could either be defined broadly as persons 
with speech impairments or narrowly as people who stutter.442  South African courts 
have followed a flexible approach to indirect discrimination and it is submitted that 
the identification of the relevant group has to be made on a case-by-case basis, 
bearing in mind that the ultimate purpose of indirect discrimination is to remedy 
structural barriers that have been rendered invisible by prior practice.  
 
If seemingly neutral differentiation does have a disproportionate impact, the second 
issue is whether it is objectively justifiable.443  A court is required to assess whether 
there is a legitimate purpose and whether the means chosen to effect such purpose 
are rational and proportionate.  A laudable motive or the absence of malice is not a 
                                                          
439 The cases in which indirect discrimination have been alleged have mostly focused on race – see, 
e.g. City Council of Pretoria v Walker, Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard 
Dingler (Pty) Ltd and Others, SADTU obo Makua v Mpumalanga Education Department [1999] 5 
BALR 638 (IMSSA). 
440 Section 6(3)(b). 
441 See A Tyrer. “Indirect Discrimination.” (2012) 
http://www.stammeringlaw.org.uk/discrimination/indirect.htm (Accessed: 6 February 2015). 
442 Ibid. 
443 Leonard Dingler 293C-D. 
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valid justification,444 even though some cases have erroneously ignored this 
principle.445 
 
4.4.4  The prohibited ground of disability 
 
The ambit of the prohibited ground of disability is an important indicator of the extent 
to which social understandings of disability permeate operational legislative 
provisions.  Space constraints prevent an extensive analysis of each of the eligibility 
requirements for disability.  These analyses have been conducted by other 
commentators.446  However, I will briefly set out the basic legal provisions and then 
highlight selected aspects of how these provisions give expression to, as well as 
inhibit the realisation of, the normative commitments engendered by social 
understandings of disability and an emphasis on substantive equality. 
 
The Constitution and the PEPUDA do not contain definitions of disability.  The EEA 
defines “people with disabilities” as “people who have a long-term or recurring 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits their prospects of entry into, 
or advancement in, employment.”447  Certain forms of impairments are expressly 
excluded from the ambit of disability.  These include, but are not limited to, the 
following:   
 
“sexual behaviour disorders that are against public policy; self-imposed body 
adornments such as tattoos or body piercing; compulsive gambling, tendency 
                                                          
444 Leonard Dingler 293G.  See, also, City Council of Pretoria v Walker para 43 in which Langa DP (as 
he then was) stated that proof of intention to discriminate is not a threshold requirement for either 
direct or indirect discrimination. 
445 See MJ Moifo. Indirect Discrimination in the Workplace:  A Comparison between South Africa and 
the United States of America. (2012) 32-40 for a brief discussion of the most relevant cases. 
446 See, inter alia, C Ngwena. “Deconstructing the Definition of ‘Disability’ Under the Employment 
Equity Act:  Social Deconstruction.” (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 613; C 
Ngwena. “Deconstructing the Definition of ‘Disability’ Under the Employment Equity Act:  Part II (Legal 
Deconstruction).” (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as 
“Ngwena ‘Legal Deconstruction’”) 116; R Lake. Discrimination against People with Mental Health 
Problems in the Workplace:  A Comparative Analysis. (2005) 136-183; M Christianson. Disability 
Discrimination in the Workplace. In: E Strydom (ed). Essential Employment Discrimination Law. 
(2004) 154 at 164-173 and E Klinck. People with Disabilities. In:  MP Olivier, N Smit and ER Kalula 
(eds). Social Security:  A Legal Analysis. (2003) 311 at 313-317. 
447 Section 1 of the EEA. 
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to steal or light fires; disorders that affect a person’s mental or physical state if 
they are caused by current use of illegal drugs or alcohol, unless the affected 
person is participating in a recognised programme of treatment; and normal 
deviations in height, weight and strength, and conventional physical and mental 
characteristics and common personality traits.”448  
 
In IMATU, Murphy AJ used the above definition of “people with disabilities”, which he 
sourced from Item 5 of the Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of Disability in the 
Workplace,449 to interpret the meaning of “disability” in s 6(1) of the EEA.  Clearly he 
used an erroneous source, as the EEA itself defines “people with disabilities”.  Be 
that as it may, most commentators have accepted the definition of “people with 
disabilities” to circumscribe the protected class for purposes of Chapter 2 of the 
EEA.450  
 
Ngwena,451 however, argues that “people with disabilities” is meant to apply only in 
respect of Chapter 3 of the EEA, which deals with affirmative action measures.  In 
his view, the requirement that the impairment must be substantially limiting is 
unnecessary for defining the protected class for anti-discrimination purposes, but 
necessary for limiting who qualifies as persons with disabilities for purposes of 
affirmative action.  For present purposes, I will assume that the definition of “people 
with disabilities” applies in respect of both Chapters 2 and 3 of the EEA.452 
  
                                                          
448 Item 5.1.3(iv). 
449 South Africa. Department of Labour. Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of Disability in the 
Workplace. (2001) http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/legislation/codes-of-good-ractise/employment-
equity/code-of-good-practice-on-disability-in-the-workplace (Accessed: 6 February 2015) (hereinafter 
referred to as “the Disability Code”) para 90.  The Code was issued in terms of s 54(1)(a) of the EEA 
in August 2002.  Its aim is to provide information to employers in the implementation of the Act.  
450 Christianson 165 and Lake 141 use the definition without comment, while Garbers 28 fn 45 argues 
that the Disability Code clearly foresees the use of the definition in the prohibition on discrimination.  
451 Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ 450-451. 
452 While I agree that there may be good reasons to take a restrictive approach to the class of 
beneficiaries for purposes of affirmative action, I am of the view that such restrictions ought not to be 
based on the nature and extent of functional limitations, but on indicators of social marginalisation that 
may or may not correlate with these. 
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When the EEA amendments of 2013 were debated in Parliament, the Department of 
Labour made it clear that it is a conscious choice not to have a more specific 
definition of disability in the EEA.453  The preferred approach relies on the above 
statutory definition that is then amplified in the Disability Code as well as the 
Technical Assistance Guidelines on the Employment of People with Disabilities 
(TAG). 
 
4.4.4.1 Impairment as the cornerstone of disability 
 
Ngwena reasons that impairment has to form the basis of how we define disability as 
a protected class, because otherwise it would be difficult to distinguish disability from 
other categories such as race, gender and pregnancy.454  If one bears in mind that 
some constitutional scholars had suggested that there should be no listed grounds in 
the Interim Constitution and that judges should decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether unfair discrimination has occurred,455 it becomes clear that having clearly 
defined protected categories was a choice made by the constitutional drafters and 
the legislators who drafted subsequent non-discrimination legislation.    
 
Specified grounds provide guidance to judges as to when differentiation may or may 
not be acceptable.  Such guidance mediates any concerns around the separation of 
powers, particularly in a context in which the transformation of the judiciary is 
contentious.456  In theory, at least, guidance also promotes consistency in decision-
making, an important component of the rule of law.457  It may also aid judicial 
                                                          
453 Department of Labour. “Response to Employment Equity Amendment Bill, 2012.” (2013) 
http://www.pmg.org.za/files/130820eeab.ppt (Accessed: 11 August 2014). 
454 Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ 451.   
455 H Corder, S Kahanovitz, J Murphy, C Murray, K O’Regan, J Sarkin, H Smith and N Steytler. A 
Charter for Social Justice:  A Contribution to the South African Bill of Rights Debate. (1992) 30-32. 
456 Fears that an unelected, unrepresentative minority would inhibit the collective wishes of duly 
elected representatives of the people are exacerbated in a context in which the legal profession and 
the judiciary do not reflect broadly the demographics of the South African population.  See N 
Manyathi-Jele. “Women and the Judiciary.” (2014) 546 De Rebus 6-10 for a discussion of the 
difficulties in securing racial and gender representivity on the bench.  See, also, M Pieterse. 
“Possibilities and Pitfalls in the Domestic Enforcement of Social Rights:  Contemplating the South 
African Experience.” (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 882 at 904, who notes that “a large scale 
transformation of judicial culture and practice [is] necessary in order for judicial vindication of human 
rights to be fruitful.” 
457 J Raz. The Rule of Law and its Virtue. In: A Kavanagh and J Oberdiek (eds). Arguing about Law. 
(2013) 181 at 183-184 argues that one of the principles that flows from the rule of law is that laws 
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accountability in that judges can rely on reasoning that has developed in relation to 
particular protected grounds, which could improve the contextual explanations they 
are able to provide for their decisions.  This same feature may, however, become a 
weakness in that relevant similarities and relationships with other protected grounds 
are not recognised, as intimated by Mokgoro J in Larbi-Odam.  She warned that 
“[t]he temptation to force them [the protected grounds] into neatly self-contained 
categories should be resisted.”458  
 
In the same passage she made several general observations about the specified 
grounds in the Interim Constitution: 
“What the specified grounds have in common is that they have been used (or 
misused) in the past (both in South Africa and elsewhere) to categorize, 
marginalise and often oppress persons who have had, or who have been 
associated with, these attributes or characteristics.  These grounds have the 
potential, when manipulated, to demean persons in their inherent humanity and 
dignity.  There is often a complex relationship between these grounds.  In some 
cases they relate to immutable biological attributes or characteristics, in some 
to the associational life of humans, in some to the intellectual, expressive and 
religious dimensions of humanity and in some cases to a combination of one or 
more of these features.” 
 
Four interrelated aspects of this exposition bear mention in the context of disability.  
Firstly, historical context is important in the interpretation of the protected categories, 
including decisions on their respective ambits.  Secondly, what the grounds have in 
common is that differentiation on those grounds has the potential to impair people’s 
dignity.  Thirdly, the features of the protected grounds which Mokgoro J mentions are 
particularly relevant for disability in that the debates on conceptions of disability are 
in essence about which features of disability to emphasise.  Fourthly, the 
intersections of disability with other protected categories have to be taken into 
account to ensure a more holistic understanding of discrimination and how it affects 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
must be relatively stable:  “Stability is essential if people are to be guided by law in their long-term 
decisions.”  He further asserts (at 190) that “the law to be law must be capable of guiding behaviour, 
however inefficiently.” 
458 Larbi-Odam and Others v MEC for Education (North-West Province) and Another 1998 (1) SA 745 
(CC) para 16. 
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people as individuals and as members of certain groups in our society. 
 
The purpose of non-discrimination and having protected groups has to guide our 
interpretation of the meaning of disability in this context.  This is a simple, yet easily 
overlooked principle in the context of disability.  Historically, disability has been 
implicated in the law in limited circumstances that focus on disability as injury.  
These include decisions on whether people should be awarded compensation for 
personal injury in terms of the law of delict; who can be excused from work and 
should be entitled to social benefits, such as social assistance, workers’ 
compensation and compensation for road accidents; whether people have the 
capacity to manage their own affairs or enter into contracts; and whether people 
have the requisite criminal capacity.   
 
The nature of most of these legal processes lends itself to the entrenchment of 
disability as deficit and personal tragedy.  While impairments create difficulties for 
many people and ignoring these difficulties may in itself be oppressive,459 the 
tendency of the law to individualise means that the systemic social and economic 
factors that frequently produce impairments are often left out of legal narratives.  The 
determination of the protected class and the explanation for the existence of such a 
class is one of the few opportunities we have to engage with the lives and 
circumstances of disabled people and to consider disability as social oppression. 
 
Furthermore, one of the consequences of social oppression is that “the negative 
stereotypes and material disadvantages connected to disability” may often 
encourage “people, where possible, to normalise suffering and disease so as to not  
include themselves in a despised and disadvantaged sub-group.”460  It is arguable 
that this stigma was at least partly responsible for the position adopted by the AIDS 
Law Project in its capacity as amicus curiae in the Hoffmann case.  It argued that 
one of the reasons asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals should not be regarded as 
                                                          
459 See, for example, Miceli 6. 
460 Abberley ‘Concept of Oppression’ 17. 
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disabled is because they “are entirely capable of discharging employment duties.” 461  
This view equates disability with incapacity and disregards social and environmental 
factors as causes of disability. 
 
It is therefore regrettable that the emphasis in defining disability remains on the 
functional limitations of the individual disabled person, rather than on social 
oppression related to bodily difference or impairment.  The public policy exclusions, 
in particular, are extreme in their failure to acknowledge social oppression as an 
important cause of disability.  Perpetrators of discrimination against people who are 
excluded are not required to explain their conduct, policy or practice.462  The 
employability of the excluded person is ignored.463  Instead of limiting rights in terms 
of a reasoned balancing exercise, the exclusions are based on stereotypes and 
stigmatise certain types of impairments.464 
 
Ngwena argues that the emphasis on individual functioning can partly be attributed 
to the seepage of social welfare definitions of disability, which are inevitably 
restrictive, into definitions used in non-discrimination law.465  Another possible 
reason relates to the continued hegemony of the medical profession in matters 
concerning impairment.  Perju argues that the early proponents of the social model, 
as a matter of political strategy, chose not to theorise about medical impairments at 
all.466  There have therefore not been concerted, structured attempts to construct 
impairment differently for purposes of non-discrimination law.  Courts, understanding 
their role as being to weed out undeserving claims and to interpret legislation in ways 
that make it administrable, therefore had nothing with which to replace the persistent 
biomedical approach to disability and are still clinging to it today.467 
                                                          
461 AIDS Law Project. “Main Submissions on behalf of Amicus Curiae.” (2000) 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/cgisirsi/iYXvL8nIe6/MAIN/193180011/523/1268 
(Accessed:  6 February 2015).  See, also, F Bhabha. “Disability Equality Rights in South Africa:  
Concepts, Interpretation and the Transformation Imperative.” (2009) 25(2) South African Journal on 
Human Rights 218 (hereinafter referred to as “Bhabha ‘Disability Equality’”) at 230-231. 
462 CG Ngwena. Reasonable Accommodation. In: JL Pretorious, E Klinck and CG Ngwena (eds). 




465 Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ 422. 
466 VF Perju. “Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction of Disability in the European 
Union and the United States.” (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 279 at 282-283. 
467 Perju 283. 
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He notes that in the American and European context, the path dependency of the 
definition of disability has been an important factor in whether the relevant role 
players have been willing to adapt the definition of disability in conformity with a 
social approach.468  One option is to delete medical impairments from the definition 
of disability altogether, but Perju argues that this may be too radical a suggestion in 
light of the centrality of medical impairments to the construction of disability in the 
legal context.469  
 
A more moderate alternative is to find ways of articulating the social effects of 
medical impairments, rather than to focus on the nature of such impairments.470  This 
moderate option is illustrated in the Disability Code, which states that  
“the scope of protection for people with disabilities in employment focuses on 
the effect of the disability on the person in relation to the working environment, 
and not on the diagnosis or the impairment.”471 
 
However, this principle is not reflected in the eligibility requirements for disability.  
Lake, for example, notes the Disability Code’s definition of a mental impairment as a 
“clinically recognised condition or illness that affects a person’s thought processes, 
judgment or emotions.”472  She argues that the requirement that a condition be 
“clinically recognised is inconsistent with the principle that the emphasis is on the 
effect of impairments rather than the impairments themselves; that it privileges 
medicalisation, which will make dispute resolution more expensive; that some 
diagnoses, such as some personality disorders, are stigmatising; and that the 
emphasis on clinical diagnosis is biased towards allopathic medicine.473  She 
therefore recommends the removal of the requirement of clinical recognition from the 
Disability Code or, alternatively, that a clinical diagnosis should only be regarded as 
prima facie proof of the existence of a mental impairment.474 
  
                                                          
468 Perju 287, 347. 
469 Ibid. 
470 Perju 347. 
471 Item 5.1. 
472 Lake 143-144.   
473 Lake 151-152. 
474 Lake 153. 
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It is important to note that challenges to biomedical approaches to impairment may 
emanate from within the medical fraternity itself.  As noted in Chapter 2, for example, 
approaches from within occupational therapy have shifted from a sole focus on 
objective observation of people’s participation to now also include people’s 
experiences of their own participation.475  In the next chapter, the discussion of the 
IMATU case will illustrate the differing approaches that medical professionals took in 
assessing whether someone was able to do a particular job.476  
 
4.4.4.2 The importance of the recognition of social oppression  
 
The central purpose of the protected class of disability in non-discrimination law is 
not to weed out undeserving claims.  Such an approach perpetuates the prejudiced 
view that marginalised groups, such as disabled persons, are out to “cheat the 
system” to gain unearned benefits.477  Even if the protected class is defined broadly, 
the other requirements for an unfair discrimination claim will still have to be satisfied. 
 
Bagenstos articulates what I agree should be the guiding principle in determinations 
of whether someone can claim protection from discrimination on the grounds of 
disability when he writes: 
“‘Disability’ is a condition in which people – because of present, past, or 
perceived ‘impairments’ – are viewed as somehow outside of the ‘norm’ for 
which society’s institutions are designed and therefore are likely to have 
systematically less opportunity to participate in important areas of public and 
private life.  Even though people with ‘disabilities’ may have vastly different 
medical conditions – indeed, many may experience no medical limitations at all 
– they have one crucial thing in common:  a socially assigned group status that 
                                                          
475 See 2.3.1.3.  See, for example, M Motimele. Disability and Violence:  A Narrative Inquiry into the 
Journey of Healing. (2013) 32, where the research methodology used in the field of occupational 
therapy was aimed at uncovering people’s experiences of occupational participation after they had 
acquired an impairment through violent incident(s).  This qualitative approach required participants to 
“reflect on the past and the present – and share their experience embedded within a context.”  
476 See 5.4.5. 
477 S Yee. “Where Prejudice, Disability and ‘Disablism’ Meet.” (2000) 
http://www.dredf.org/international/Yee0.3.html (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 18 argues that in the 
American context, the suspicion with which disabled persons are often regarded has fuelled media 
reports of undeserving claimants and a backlash against the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
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tends to result in systematic disadvantage and deprivation of opportunity.”478 
 
Various consequences flow from an approach that centres social oppression.  In 
terms of this approach, functional limitations will be the focus not at the initial stage 
of determining eligibility for protection, but when determinations are made as to 
whether discrimination is unfair and whether unfair discrimination is justifiable.  If 
impairment is regarded as an indispensable component, its social effects, rather than 
its nature and extent, will be emphasised.  Furthermore, in cases where physical, 
intellectual or psychosocial conditions have been mitigated so that they do not affect 
functioning, disability may still flow from the stigma and negative stereotypes that 
lead to disadvantage.479  Similarly, perceived disability and differentiation on the 
basis of association with a disabled person could bring complainants within the 
protected class.480  
 
An important aspect of the recognition of disability as social oppression is to examine 
the nature of disability oppression.  The similarities between the oppression 
experienced by disabled persons and that experienced by other groups on the basis 
of race and gender are important.481  There are also instances in which disability and 
                                                          
478 SR Bagenstos. “Subordination, Stigma, and ‘Disability’.” (2000) 86(3) Virginia Law Review 397 at 
401. 
479 See HM Government. Office of Disability Issues. Equality Act 2010 Guidance on Matters to be 
Taken into Account in Determining Questions Relating to the Definition of Disability. (2011) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/85010/disability-
definition.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) for examples of how the British Equality Act has 
incorporated some elements of social understandings of disability into its definition of disability.  
These include the recognition of managed or treated conditions as disabilities (on this view, the 
IMATU decision that someone with insulin-dependent diabetes is not disabled would be incorrect); the 
inclusion of persons with cancer, multiple sclerosis or HIV infection from the point at which they are 
diagnosed and protection for those who had disabilities in the past, as well as those who are 
perceived to have an impairment. 
480 Lake 176 references a Draft Code of Good Practice on Disability in the Workplace, which provided 
(at para 5) for perceived impairments and discrimination based on association with a disabled person 
in the following terms:   
“Employers may not unfairly discriminate against employees or applicants for employment, 
because the employer suspects or believes, whether the belief or suspicion is correct or not, 
that the applicant or employee has an impairment that amounts to a disability, or that they have 
been disabled or they are, or have been, associated with other people who are, or have been, 
disabled.  People in a relationship, or association with, or those who have responsibility for, a 
person with a disability, have, under the Act, Chapter II's rights to protection against unfair 
discrimination but not Chapter III's affirmative action protections.” 
This provision did not make it into the Code of Good Practice that was adopted and which still applies. 
481 See, for example, Ngwena as cited in fn 21. 
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other categories of marginalisation, such as race, gender or class, intersect to create 
multiple forms of oppression, including within disability movements.482  However, as 
Abberley points out,  
“[a] crucial feature of oppression and the way it operates is its specificity, of 
form, content and location; so to analyse the oppression of disabled people in 
part involves pointing to the essential differences between their lives and 
those of other sections of society, including those who are, in other ways, 
oppressed.”483 
 
Abberley’s call for specificity would require consideration of whether, and if so, how 
specific conditions or impairments are stigmatised.  Those classified as having 
intellectual impairments, for example, may experience challenges that wheelchair 
users are not confronted with and vice versa.  Similarly, the nature of the oppression 
experienced by people whose atypical characteristics or impairments are visible may 
be materially different from that experienced by people whose deviations from the 
‘norm’ are invisible.   
 
Improved understanding of the specific ways in which stereotyping or stigma 
operates may alert those interacting with disabled individuals of their own prejudices 
that may adversely affect such disabled persons.  It may also translate into a 
genuine valuing of difference that transcends mere tolerance.  In the words of Addis, 
“[t]o have reciprocal empathy is to first attempt to understand the Other, but there 
cannot be understanding of the Other if one is not prepared to engage the Other in a 
dialogue.”484 
                                                          
482 J McKenzie. Disability Activism and Participation. In: T Lorenzo (ed). Disability Catalyst Africa:  
Intentions, Pillars and Players. (2011) 13 at 15 writes: 
“The disability movement has, for obvious reasons of identity and political action, highlighted 
a disability identity and given minimal recognition to the fact that every person has multiple 
identities of which disability may be only one.  Experience in other social movements informs 
us that the dangers of such an approach are that other forms of difference are submerged 
and the movement runs the risk of duplicating social inequalities […] within the movement.” 
483 Abberley ‘Concept of Oppression’ 7. 
484 A Addis. On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration. In: I Shapiro and W Kymlicka (eds), 
Ethnicity and Group Right:  Nomos XXIX. (1997) 112 at 121. 
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It may also transpire that specific conditions or impairments are regarded as 
incompatible with the performance of specific kinds of work.  For example, an insulin-
dependent diabetic such as Mr Murdoch from the IMATU case may be less likely to 
experience prejudicial attitudes when applying for a position as an accountant than 
when he applied for a job as a firefighter.  Similarly, it mattered that Mr Hoffmann, 
who was HIV-positive, wanted to work as a cabin attendant for a commercial airline 
and not in some other capacity where he would be less likely to work in close 
proximity to passengers. 
 
4.5 Causes of discrimination and the limitations of duties to refrain from 
discriminating  
 
The EEA prohibition on discrimination is limited to those caused by an “employment 
policy or practice”.485  Theron argues that while the EEA makes a symbolic statement 
regarding systemic inequality, one of the constraints is the fact that the only form of 
aberrant conduct that falls within the scope of unfair discrimination is harassment. 486  
In his view, only “the most misguided employer would adopt a policy that would 
flagrantly discriminate.”487  This means that the only scope the EEA offers for 
addressing systemic inequality will be through remedying discriminatory employment 
practices or through the creative use of the prohibition on harassment.488 
 
In contrast to the limited scope of the EEA non-discrimination provisions, the 
PEPUDA’s definition recognises that discrimination can be caused by “any act or 
omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation.”  The causes 
of discrimination that are recognised clearly include structural impediments to the 
                                                          
485 Section 6(1). 
486 J Theron. Plus ça Change:  Re-inventing Inequality in the Post-apartheid Workplace. In: OC 
Dupper and C Garbers (eds). Equality in the Workplace:  Reflections from South Africa and Beyond. 





advancement of protected groups.489  The PEPUDA expressly recognises these 
impediments and requires that  
“[t]he existence of systemic discrimination and inequalities, particularly in 
respect of race, gender and disability in all spheres of life as a result of past 
and present unfair discrimination, brought about by colonialism, the apartheid 
system and patriarchy”  
be acknowledged and taken into account.490 
 
In this spirit, the Act’s expansive definition of discrimination includes “unwritten and 
often hidden rules, forms of behaviour and attitudes.”491  It also implies that 
discrimination can be caused by ongoing situations and not just discrete conduct. 492  
However, there is a limit to anti-discrimination law’s potential to address structural 
inequalities.  As Hepple notes, “legal concepts have to be relatively clear and they 
can be enforced only against identified persons.”493  The required clarity of concepts 
will be discussed in the next chapter, while the imposition of duties and their 
enforcement receive attention below. 
 
Disadvantage has traditionally been characterised as either social or economic, or to 
put it differently, disadvantage may relate to social misrecognition or to the 
distribution of economic resources.494  Redistribution has traditionally been thought to 
be the primary concern of social policy in the welfare state, whereas recognition is 
dealt with through laws, with equality rights as the bedrock of protection. 495  However, 
                                                          
489 Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer 33. 
490 Section 4(2)(a). 
491 Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer 33. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Hepple ‘Aims and Limits’ 12. 
494 Fredman ‘Redistribution and Recognition’ 214.  A Silvers. “Protection or Privilege?  Reasonable 
Accommodation, Reverse Discrimination, and the Fair Costs of Repairing Recognition for Disabled 
People in the Workforce.” (2005) 8 Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 561 at 566 explains 
recognition and misrecognition thus:   
“Attaining proper recognition for citizens is a very important democratic good.  Proper 
recognition develops from a social environment that is respectful of the kind of individual each 
really is.  Such an environment sustains individuals by affirming the equal social inclusion of 
people of their kind.  Protecting the inclusion of different kinds of people sometimes requires 
facilitating the social arrangements needed by their group or kind to flourish, given the way 
they live their lives.  Misrecognition occurs when the social environment excludes, impedes, 
or belittles people because of their group or kind.” 
495 Fredman ‘Redistribution and Recognition’ 214. 
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it is increasingly recognised that this dichotomy should not hide the interactions 
between these types of disadvantage.  Fredman points to three developments that 
emphasise the interrelationship between distribution and recognition:  (i) the relative 
economic disadvantage of marginalised groups, such as Black people and women; 
(ii) groups such as disabled people, who had previously only been dealt with in terms 
of welfare, now being protected by anti-discrimination laws; and (iii) justiciable socio-
economic rights means that economic disadvantage is now infused with rights 
analyses, which had not been the case before.496 
 
The economic exclusion of disabled people is related to the fact that unfounded 
assumptions are made about their ability to participate, socially as well as 
economically.  Their economic exclusion, in turn, reinforces the notion that they are 
not economically and socially useful citizens.497  However, as Hepple points out, anti-
discrimination law is directed at “only specific elements in the many causes of 
disadvantage, mainly those which arise from a specific status such as race or 
gender.”498  Furthermore, disputes at a micro level will require fairly specific causal 
connections between the respondent’s actions, practices or circumstances for which 
the respondent can be held responsible on the one hand, and the complainant’s 
disadvantage – which must be linked to a status, as defined – on the other hand.   
 
The major consequence of the legal requirements of conceptual specificity and the 
proof of close causal connections is that deep structural barriers to disabled people’s 
participation cannot be addressed solely through negative, reactive prohibitions on 
discrimination.  It is recognised that positive duties have to be imposed in order to 
achieve substantive equality.  However, these positive duties may straddle 
prohibitions on discrimination as well as form part of affirmative action programmes 
targeting the advancement of marginalised groups. 
  
                                                          
496 Fredman ‘Redistribution and Recognition’ 215. 
497 P Abberley. “The Significance of Work for the Citizenship of Disabled People.” (1999). 
http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/Abberley-sigofwork.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 
(hereinafter referred to as “Abberley ‘Significance of Work’”) 5 notes that disabled people’s social 
exclusion is intimately related to their exclusion from work. 
498 Fredman ‘Redistribution and Recognition’ 215. 
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A constraint that operates in respect of disabled job applicants flows from a 
combination of the reactive, adversarial nature of the remedy provided by the EEA or 
the PEPUDA and the structural exclusion that disabled people face in multiple 
spheres.  Many, if not most, disabled people in South Africa will not be able to bring 
such claims without support.  Furthermore, job applicants who in many instances 
would be desperate for employment are even less likely to be able to litigate.  
Aggrieved applicants with mobility impairments may find that court buildings are not 
accessible,499 or those with other impairments may also face structural barriers that 
make litigation even more unattractive.  
 
If an applicant falls under the protection of the EEA and earns below a certain 
threshold, the 2013 amendment to the EEA will assist in that claims for unfair 
discrimination can now be referred to the CCMA, instead of the Labour Court being 
the first port of call for aggrieved persons.500  Given how recent the amendments are, 
it is not possible to assess how effectively and efficiently the CCMA will discharge 
this new function.  The advantage of CCMA jurisdiction is that the processes are less 
formal.  However, there are competitive advantages if employers are able to secure 
the services of legal counsel, while job applicants appear without representation or 
are represented by union shop stewards. 
  
                                                          
499 W Holness and S Rule. “Barriers to Advocacy and Litigation in the Equality Courts for Persons with 
Disabilities.” (2014) 17(5) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1906 at 1912-1913 identify three 
barriers to access to the Equality Courts:    
“Firstly, some Equality Courts are geographically (and financially) inaccessible.  Secondly, the 
negative and insensitive attitudes of frontline workers impact on the ability of persons with 
disabilities to bring equality claims to and access the services of the Equality Court.  These 
barriers also constitute discrimination and flout article 13 of the CRPD, which requires the 
provision of support for persons with disabilities to access the justice system.  Thirdly, cultural 
norms and fears impede access to courts and the agency of persons with disabilities to bring 
these claims.  Examples of this are the requirement that traditional leaders provide "permission" 
to persons with disabilities to sue, and a similar requirement of permission from the in-laws of 
women with disabilities.  This contravenes the state's obligation to alter social norms regarding 
persons with disabilities under article 8 of the CRPD.” 
500 See 4.2.2. 
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4.6 Concluding remarks 
 
Duties to refrain from discriminating have a role to play in ensuring that disabled 
people who are willing and able to work are not prevented from doing so.  However, 
difficulties of proof in cases of both direct and indirect discrimination inhibit the 
effectiveness of these remedies.  Furthermore, the biomedical-impairment based 
eligibility requirements for disability may restrict the class of persons that can rely on 
the EEA’s protection.  
 
The choice of how to define the prohibited ground of disability is influenced by and 
reflects normative commitments.501  If the definition is determined in a manner that 
implicates dominant groups in the historical and continued marginalisation of the 
protected class, the natural consequence is an emphasis on the social dimensions of 
rights, which is more consistent with both social understandings of disability and 
notions of substantive equality. 
 
Duties of restraint do not address structural impediments to disabled persons’ 
access to work.  We therefore have to examine in which circumstances failures to 
act can constitute unfair discrimination.  The imposition of positive duties constitutes 
an acknowledgement that structural inequalities require that certain groups be 
treated differently in order to function within a society in which the norms are skewed 
in favour of dominant groups.  In order to establish how these duties seek to remedy 
disadvantage and how effective they are, we have to examine their content, who the 
duty bearers are and how they are enforced.  These matters are addressed in the 
next two chapters. 
 
  
                                                          
501 PE Berg. “Ill/Legal:  Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in 
Antidiscrimination Law.” (1999) 18(1) Yale Law and Policy Review 1 at 23 writes:  “In 
antidiscrimination law, the types of impairments included in and excluded from the category of 
disability […] reveal the values and normative assumptions that underlie and are reinforced by this 
body of law.” 
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The previous chapter engaged with prohibitions on discrimination, but discussion 
was limited to the duties to refrain from discriminating.  This chapter now moves to 
positive duties imposed on employers, with particular emphasis on the duty to 
provide reasonable accommodation.  Reasonable accommodation is emphasised 
due to its importance, but also because affirmative action for disabled people in more 
general terms would warrant more attention than can be devoted to it here.  
Affirmative action will therefore only be discussed insofar as it is relevant to 
reasonable accommodation. 
 
Another delimitation on the treatment of reasonable accommodation here is that the 
duty will only be discussed as it relates to employers.  For job applicants, reasonable 
accommodation duties on government that may be sourced from the PEPUDA may 
be of the utmost importance in ensuring their access to work.  An example is 
inaccessible transportation systems that hamper disabled people in their search for 
work or in their access to workplaces once they have secured work.502  
 
Part 2 of this chapter focuses on the rationale for reasonable accommodation and 
how it fits within the framework of South African equality law.  Part 3 examines 
reasonable accommodation as a positive duty.  In Part 4, some aspects relating to its 
implementation, and the implementation of positive duties more generally, are 
highlighted.  Parts 5 and 6 then analyse how positive duties give effect to social 
understandings of disability and may promote substantive equality and structural 
change.  
                                                          
502 See, for example, s 9 of the PEPUDA. 
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5.2 Reasonable accommodation 
 
5.2.1 The rationale for reasonable accommodation 
 
The positive obligation to reasonably accommodate persons with disabilities has 
been described as ‘central to’, ‘at the core of’ and as ‘the most important aspect of’ 
disability non-discrimination laws.  In the words of Lisa Waddington,  
 
“[T]he obligation to make a reasonable accommodation is based on the 
recognition that, on occasions, the interactions between an individual’s inherent 
characteristics, such as impairment, sex, religion or belief, and the physical or 
social environment can result in the inability to perform a particular function or 
job in the conventional manner.  The characteristic is therefore relevant in that it 
can lead to an individual being faced with a barrier that prevents him or her 
from benefiting from an employment opportunity that is open to others who do 
not share that characteristic.  The resulting disadvantage is exclusion from the 
job market, or a restricted set of employment opportunities.”503 
 
There have been continuous debates in various jurisdictions about the nature of 
reasonable accommodation duties and how these ought to be construed.  Some 
commentators have characterised them as preferential treatment that, from a 
neoclassical economic perspective, constitute efficiency burdens.504  In this view, 
                                                          
503 L Waddington. Reasonable Accommodation. In: D Schiek, L Waddington and M Bell (eds). Cases, 
Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law. (2007) 629 
at 631. 
504 SD Harris and MA Stein. “Workplace Disabilities.” (2008) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1226433 (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 4.  MA 
Stein. “The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations.” (2003) 53(1) Duke Law Journal 79 
(hereinafter referred to as “Stein ‘Disability Accommodations’”) at 119 writes:  “The comprehensive 
normative goal of neoclassical economics is to design efficient legal regimes.  As such the model 
begins from the premise that markets for goods and services operate efficiently.  As part of this 
postulate it is assumed that markets determine prices, free bargaining is the norm, and knowledge is 
completely and symmetrically disseminated, resulting in prices based on production.  Under this 
theory, market forces also discipline employers with irrational (and thus inefficient) tastes against 
particular groups by driving those employers from the market.”  See, also, SR Bagenstos. “'Rational 
Discrimination', Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights.” (2003) 89(5) Virginia Law 
Review 825 at 825-826, who notes that commentators in the US – those in favour of reasonable 
accommodation measures as well as those opposed to them – have generally sought to draw a sharp 
distinction between reasonable accommodation and non-discrimination in terms of the ADA.  At 828 
he explains:  
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accommodations incur costs and are redistributive in a way that traditional 
prohibitions on discrimination are not.505  For this reason, so the argument goes, 
duties to accommodate must be interpreted restrictively, because it is not fair to 
saddle employers with the costs of redistribution and it may not be fair to other 
employees.  In terms of this model, employers, when forced to hire disabled people, 
bear costs that they would not have otherwise incurred.506 
 
Critiques of this neoclassical perspective question its underlying assumptions.  The 
first objection is that the labour market does not, in fact, function efficiently in 
allocating work to people with disabilities, because employers do not have the 
information necessary to choose the workers who would yield the highest net 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“The conventional wisdom, as evidenced by a near-consensus in the literature, seems to be 
that there is a fundamental normative difference between antidiscrimination requirements and 
accommodation mandates: Antidiscrimination requirements call on employers to forego acting 
on illegitimate preferences (like aversive prejudice) that they ought not to have in the first 
place, while accommodation mandates prohibit employers from acting on the normally 
legitimate desire to save money. Those who take this view and are skeptical of 
accommodation mandates believe that one who discriminates is deserving of moral 
condemnation, while one who simply fails to accommodate should not be condemned.  Those 
who take this view and endorse accommodation mandates acknowledge that the argument 
for requiring accommodation is more difficult and controversial than the argument for 
prohibiting discrimination. But in either case, there is a major difference in substance between 
antidiscrimination requirements and accommodation mandates.” 
505 Silvers ‘Protection or Privilege’ 571 cites the US Supreme Court decision in US Airways, Inc. v 
Barnett 535 US 391 (2002) http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-1250.ZS.html (Accessed: 6 
February 2015) as an example of this type of reasoning.  In that case a cargo handler was injured on 
duty and could no longer lift baggage.  He was transferred to the airline’s mail room.  After two years 
his position was declared biddable and in terms of the seniority-based system the employer had 
imposed unilaterally, anyone who was more senior than Mr Barnett could take his job.  Two 
employees bid for his job in terms of this system and he requested that he be accommodated by 
being assigned permanently to the mail room.  The airline considered his request but eventually 
refused, saying that it would not be fair to other employees, who had to abide by the seniority system.  
The Court (at 5) held that reasonable accommodations in terms of the ADA required the employer to 
treat disabled employees “differently, i.e. preferentially”.  In the Court’s view, such preferential 
treatment should not ordinarily trump a seniority system, even if the employer imposed such a system 
unilaterally and was not contractually bound to maintain it.  Justice Breyer recognised that the 
preferential treatment may be necessary to achieve the ADA’s “basic equal opportunity goal” (at 5), 
but held that seniority systems promote fair, uniform treatment of employees (at 12) and employers 
therefore need only show the existence of such a system in order to justify the refusal of a disability 
accommodation.  This general rule applies unless a disabled employee can prove special 
circumstances that require the accommodation to trump the seniority rule.  A similar neoclassical 
economic approach is reflected in the US Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v Garrett 531 US 356 (2001) http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-
1240.ZS.html (Accessed: 6 February 2015), in which Chief Justice Rehnquist (at 14) suggested that 
the ADA’s requirement that employers make facilities readily accessible and usable by disabled 
people coerced state employers into acting irrationally by not using scarce financial resources to hire 
employees that could use existing facilities. 
506 Stein ‘Disability Accommodations’ 120. 
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productivity.507  Writing in the American context, Verkerke508 uses the example of an 
employer hiring a person with a disability that is not readily apparent.  In the absence 
of a duty to accommodate, that employer may simply dismiss the employee on the 
grounds of disability.  That same employee may then apply for subsequent positions 
with other employers and the cycle could repeat itself, until eventually even 
employers who are well-matched to the employee will not hire her.  Harris509 invokes 
another type of information asymmetry in which employers are unwilling to divulge 
information needed to plan for accommodations and disabled employees are 
reluctant to divulge information related to their impairment.  He notes that even when 
an employee is hired, an employer may be ill-equipped to make particular 
accommodations.  The result of these asymmetries is that the parties do not discuss 
or agree upon cost-effective accommodations.  
 
Harris and Stein510 point to another weakness in the premise that the labour market 
is efficient.  If 'efficiency' means total labour costs and the costs of accommodations 
minus total labour productivity, it fails to take into account the benefits of disability 
accommodations to other workers, the organisation or clients.  One example is the 
improvement of telecommunication systems.  Furthermore, the costs of 
accommodations that are said to be in favour of disabled people, but which benefit 
others, cannot then be charged only to individual disabled people and as a once-off 
expense.   
 
The second objection to the neoclassical economic approach relates to its 
assumption that labour markets are competitive.  This assumption may be materially 
flawed if each firm presents with barriers to entry, which includes “firm-specific skills 
                                                          
507 Harris and Stein 5. 
508 JH Verkerke. “Is the ADA Efficient?”(2002-2003) 50 University of California Los Angeles Law 
Review 903 at 911.  Verkerke explains (at 910) that employee turnover – the process through which 
employees move from one job to another – is essential to labour market efficiency, which requires 
that employees are well matched to the jobs tasks.  Under conditions of incomplete or asymmetric 
information, Verkerke reasons (at 910-911), three types of inefficiencies may result:  (i) mismatching 
occurs when employers have inadequate information about current or prospective employees; (ii) 
churning happens when employees change jobs, but the changes do not improve the match between 
those employees and their jobs; and (iii) scarring is when employers rely on market signals that are 
influenced by, inter alia, information deficiencies, to refuse to hire workers who could in fact be 
productive. 
509 SD Harris. “Disabilities Accommodations, Transaction Costs, and Mediation:  Evidence from the 
EEOC’s Mediation Program.” (2008) 13 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 1 (hereinafter referred to as 
“Harris ‘Disabilities Accommodations’”) at 9-10. 
510 Harris and Stein 7-8.  
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and knowledge, job matching or efficiency wages.”511  In this scheme, the employer 
and incumbent employees create a bilateral monopoly that may strengthen over 
time.  If this is empirically established – and in the US context some argue that there 
is evidence that making accommodations to employees may not always decrease 
net productivity – it means that employers could, in certain circumstances, gain from 
making accommodations.512 
 
The third objection is that disabled workers may not require accommodations as 
often as is suggested and that accommodations may not be inherently costly.513  The 
issue of costs is important, because if accommodations are regarded as 
redistributive devices better decided in the policy domain, courts are likely to be 
conscious of separation of powers concerns and may be reluctant to interfere.  
Furthermore, courts may be reticent to order individual employers to bear the costs 
of inequalities for which they cannot be held directly responsible.   
 
A fourth difficulty critics have raised is that the neoclassical economic approach is 
generally underpinned by cost-benefit concerns that do not take into account the 
ethical choices extending beyond narrow financial trade-offs.514  Nussbaum515 
argues that in any situation which requires choice, we have to answer the ‘obvious 
question’ – what shall we do?  This question may be easy or difficult to answer and 
may involve consideration of the methodology to be used in answering it. 516  
However, sometimes we ought to ask an oft-overlooked second question, the tragic 
question – is any of the alternatives open to us free from moral wrongdoing?  Insofar 
as morality and law are not coterminous, morality may be used in the sense of the 
                                                          
511 Harris and Stein 9. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Harris and Stein 10. 
514 Apart from the ethical concerns, there are two main arguments against cost-benefit-analysis (CBA) 
(see Stein ‘Disability Accommodations’ 184-185).  The first concern is that CBA weighs all money 
equally, which works in favour of wealthy people, for whom each additional dollar may be less 
valuable due to diminishing returns.  A second criticism is that CBA “values the present at the 
expense of the future by utilizing a discount rate.”  This is because money depreciates in value due to 
inflation, which means that there may be instances in which future damage is not prevented because 
the discount rate would indicate that such prevention is uneconomical.  However, Stein ‘Disability 
Accommodations’ (at 185) points out that CBA will not always discount benefits, because the 
proceeds of current savings may be used for other worthwhile causes.    
515 MC Nussbaum. “The Costs of Tragedy:  Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis.” (2000) 
29(S2) The Journal of Legal Studies (hereinafter referred to as “Nussbaum ‘Costs of Tragedy’”) 1005. 
516 Nussbaum ‘Costs of Tragedy’ 1006.  
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‘objective, normative value system’ established by the Constitution,517 as well as to 
connote the moral underpinnings of the rights in the Bill of Rights.  Thus, the second 
question would be whether any of the options available to us would compromise the 
value system established by the Constitution or infringe on anyone’s constitutionally 
protected right(s).  
 
It is within the context of these debates on the rationale for reasonable 
accommodation and the discussions on social understandings of disability and 
substantive equality in previous chapters, that we can now turn to how reasonable 
accommodation duties are framed in the context of work in South Africa.  The next 
section explores the meaning of ‘accommodation’ and the nature of the duty. 
 
5.2.2 The meaning of ‘accommodation’ 
 
‘Reasonable accommodation’ is defined in the EEA as “any modification or 
adjustment to a job or to the working environment that will enable a person from a 
designated group to have access to or participate or advance in employment.”518  An 
accommodation519 is therefore any measure that changes the way work is usually 
performed and its goal is to allow suitably qualified disabled people to participate on 
an equal basis with others.520  In Pillay, Langa CJ noted that reasonable 
accommodation is “particularly appropriate in specific localised contexts, such as an 
individual workplace or school, where a reasonable balance between conflicting 
                                                          
517 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 56. 
518 Section 1.  This wording on the aim of reasonable accommodation is similar to that of the 
European Employment Equality Directive Council Directive 2000/78/EC (27 November 2000) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0078:en:HTML (Accessed: 6 
February 2015), which in Article 5 states that reasonable accommodations are appropriate measures 
that would “enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in 
employment, or to undergo training.” 
519 Other jurisdictions refer to “accommodations” as “adjustments” or “steps” or “appropriate 
measures:  see L Waddington. “When it is Reasonable For Europeans to be Confused:  
Understanding When a Disability Accommodation is 'Reasonable' From a Comparative Perspective.” 
(2007) 29 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 317 (hereinafter referred to as “Waddington 
‘Reasonable Europeans’”) at 321. 
520 South Africa. Department of Labour. Technical Assistance Guidelines on the Employment of 
People with Disabilities. (2007) http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/documents/useful-
documents/employment-equity/Useful%20Document%20-%20EEA%20-
%20Technical%20Assistance%20Guidelines%20on%20the%20employment%20of%20people%20wit
h%20disabilities.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) (hereinafter referred to as “TAG”) Item 6.1.  See, 
also, Waddington ‘Reasonable Europeans’ 320. 
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interests may more easily be struck.”521 
 
The type of accommodation required in each case is dependent on a range of 
factors:  the employee and his or her impairment, the employer and the relevant 
work environment and the systemic consequences of providing or not providing 
accommodation in particular cases.  It is therefore understandable that no closed list 
of possible accommodations exists.   
 
The TAG state that the criteria for reasonable accommodation include three 
interrelated factors: (i) the measure must remove barriers that prevent a qualified 522 
disabled person from participating fully and from reaching his or her potential; (ii) the 
measure must allow the specific disabled person to “enjoy equal access to the 
benefits and opportunities of employment”, including promotion; and (iii) employers 
are allowed to choose the most cost-effective means consistent with the two 
aforementioned criteria.523 
 
The TAG recognise that the type of accommodation required will depend on 
variables such as the nature and essential functions of a job, the work environment 
and the nature of the impairment.524  Throughout the various sections, the TAG 
make use of examples that flow from experiences in South African workplaces.  
Various impairments are cited and an explanation is provided of the reasonable 
accommodations that had been provided in each case.  Item 6.9 contains a 
                                                          
521 At para 78. 
522 Sections 20(3), (4) and (5) of the EEA set the following general principles as to who is “suitably 
qualified” and how employers should go about making that determination:  “(3) For purposes of this 
Act, a person may be suitably qualified for a job as a result of any one of, or any combination of that 
person’s— 
(a) formal qualifications;  
(b) prior learning;  
(c) relevant experience; or  
(d) capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to do the job. 
(4) When determining whether a person is suitably qualified for a job, an employer must— 
(a) review all the factors listed in subsection (3); and 
(b) determine whether that person has the ability to do the job in terms of any one of, or any 
combination of those factors. 
(5) In making a determination under subsection (4), an employer may not unfairly discriminate against 
a person solely on the grounds of that person’s lack of relevant experience.” 
523 TAG Item 6.2. 
524 TAG Item 6.1. 
144 
 
“[r]epresentative list of examples of reasonable accommodation.”525  
 
It is clear that the concept of reasonable accommodation is not only used in relation 
to people with disabilities, but may also be necessary to include Black people and 
women fully into workplaces.526  The scope of this thesis does not allow for 
engagement with reasonable accommodation for women and Black people, but it is 
important to bear in mind that accommodations have to be sensitive to all identity 
markers where they intersect.  For example, an accommodation that alleviates the 
effects of impairment, but which is abhorrent to a particular employee due to cultural 
or religious beliefs, may not be reasonable.  
 
5.2.3 The characterisation of reasonable accommodation in South African 
employment law 
 
In South Africa, reasonable accommodation duties are non-discrimination, as well as 
affirmative action measures.  This dual characterisation is not readily apparent, as 
the EEA only makes explicit mention of reasonable accommodation in Chapter 3, 
which deals with affirmative action.  However, there are various reasons why one 
can infer that failure to accommodate may constitute unfair discrimination.   
 
Firstly, section 5 of the EEA requires employers to take steps to eliminate unfair 
discrimination in employment policies and practices.  It therefore envisages positive 
action to eliminate both direct and indirect discrimination. Reasonable 
                                                          
525 The list includes adaptations to facilities to make them more accessible, adaptations to equipment 
or the acquisition of new equipment, re-organising workstations, changing training and assessment 
materials, re-assigning non-essential functions to other persons and providing support such as sign-
language interpreters, job coaches or readers.  The examples cited in the Disability Code and TAG do 
not provide much detail about the nature and position of the employers who had implemented the 
measures cited and the processes that were followed in effecting these. 
526 See, for example, South Africa. Department of Labour. Green Paper on Employment and 
Occupational Equity. (GN 804 in GG 17303 of 1 July 1996) 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/17303_gen373_0.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 31, 
where it is suggested that some measures will form part of most employment equity plans.  These 
measures include:  “plans for building physical infrastructure to accommodate women and disabled 
people; [and] investigation of more flexible hours, work-related day-care and assistance with transport 
or housing, if they would help level the playing ground for applicants or employees from historically 
disadvantaged groups.” See, also, Ngwena ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ 7-44 – 7-60 for a 
discussion on reasonable accommodation of pregnancy and maternity; family responsibility; and 
religion and culture.   
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accommodation seems to be particularly relevant where indirect discrimination is at 
issue, for, as Langa CJ has observed in the context of the PEPUDA, it is often an 
appropriate principle where “discrimination arises from a rule or practice that is 
neutral on its face and is designed to serve a valuable purpose, but which 
nevertheless has a marginalising effect on certain portions of society.”527   
 
The guidelines on disability in employment indicate, explicitly and implicitly, that 
reasonable accommodation is both a non-discrimination and an affirmative action 
duty.  The TAG explicitly endorse this view.528  Furthermore, the Disability Code 
states that the reasonable accommodation requirement applies to all disabled job 
applicants and employees, which would not be the case had it been regarded only 
as an affirmative action measure.529  The duty is also owed to individual employees, 
which is at odds with it being solely an affirmative action measure.530  While the rules 
of statutory interpretation do not allow guidelines to statutes to be the sole 
determinants of meaning of such statutes, these guidelines may serve as aids to 
interpretation when more than one plausible interpretive option exists.531 
 
There are other external justifications for the view that reasonable accommodation is 
a non-discrimination measure.  In constitutional and labour jurisprudence, failures to 
reasonably accommodate have been framed as violations of other individual 
rights.532  The Constitutional Court in two separate, but related, instances has used 
                                                          
527 At para 78. 
528 Item 6.1 at 13. 
529 Disability Code Item 6.3.  The TAG are confusing when they state that “[a]ll designated employers 
under the Act and Code ‘should reasonably accommodate the needs of people with disabilities’” 
[emphasis added].  This is clearly not meant to convey that it is only an affirmative action measure, as 
the next sentence explicitly provides otherwise. 
530 Disability Code Item 6. 
531 See C Botha. Statutory Interpretation:  An Introduction for Students. (2012) 153-154. 
532 In the labour context, it has been utilised in relation to respect for diverse religious and cultural 
beliefs and practices (see, for example, Dlamini and Others v Green Four Security (2006) 27 ILJ 2098 
(LC); Department of Correctional Services and Another v Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union 
(POPCRU) and Others (2011) 32 ILJ 2629 (LAC); Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v Mmoledi 
and Others (2012) 33 ILJ 2812 (LAC)). See, also, F Mégret and D Msipa. “Global Reasonable 
Accommodation:  How the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Changes the Way 
We Think About Equality.” (2014) 30(2) South African Journal on Human Rights 252 at 255-257 for a 
brief discussion on how reasonable accommodation as a concept originated in the US and Canada in 
the context of respect for religious diversity and how international law, even before the advent of the 
CRPD, regarded the denial of reasonable accommodation as a violation of rights.  The UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in General Comment No. 5 available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/epcomm5e.htm (Accessed: 6 February 2015) para 15, had 
already stated in 1994 that for purposes of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
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reasonable accommodation in cases that do not implicate disability.  Firstly, the 
concept has animated the balancing exercise that needs to take place when deciding 
whether a limitation of a constitutional right is justifiable and therefore 
constitutional.533  Secondly, it is one of numerous factors that may be relevant in the 
assessment of whether discrimination was fair or unfair.534 
  
A further justification is that legislation must be interpreted in compliance with South 
Africa’s international obligations,535 so the fact that the CRPD considers failure to 
reasonably accommodate disabled persons as a form of discrimination is critically 
important.536  Article 5(2) of the CRPD requires signatory States to “prohibit all 
discrimination on the basis of disability.”  Article 2, which defines discrimination, 
explicitly states that it includes “denial of reasonable accommodation.” 
 
Finally, in the context of the domestic legislative framework for equality, reasonable 
accommodation is regarded as a non-discrimination principle.  The PEPUDA states 
explicitly that failure to provide reasonable accommodation constitutes unfair 
discrimination.537  It is difficult to see why it would be a non-discrimination measure in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), “'disability-based discrimination’ may be defined as including any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference, or denial of reasonable accommodation based on 
disability which has the effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of 
economic, social or cultural rights” [emphasis added].  See, also, Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ 472-
483 for a discussion of the development of reasonable accommodation jurisprudence in the US and 
Canada. 
533 See Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) and Prince v 
President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope and Others 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC). 
534 See MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Others v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC). 
535 Section 39 of the Constitution. 
536 The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has urged several States party to the 
CRPD to include in their legislation the denial of reasonable accommodation as a form of 
discrimination.  See, for example, “Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities:  Spain.” (2011) http://www2.ohchr.org/SPdocs/CRPD/6thsession/CRPD-C-
ESP-CO-1%20.doc (Accessed: 6 February 2015) para 20; “Concluding Observations on the Initial 
Report of Argentina as Approved by the Committee at its Eighth Session.” (2012) 
http://www.mindbank.info/item/1387 (Accessed: 6 February 2015) para 11; “Tunisia:  Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.” (2011) 
http://www.mindbank.info/item/1369 (Accessed: 6 February 2015) para 13; “Concluding Observations 
on the Initial Report of Costa Rica.” (2014) 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD%2fC%2fCRI
%2fCO%2f1andLang=en (Accessed: 6 February 2015) para 12. 
537 Section 9(c) states that unfair discrimination includes a failure “to eliminate obstacles that unfairly 
limit or restrict persons with disabilities from enjoying equal opportunities” or a failure to “take steps to 
reasonably accommodate the needs of such persons.”  Furthermore, in the determination of 
unfairness in terms of s 14, one of the factors that needs to be considered is whether the respondent 
has taken reasonable steps in the circumstances to “address the disadvantage which arises from or is 
related to one or more of the prohibited grounds” or to “accommodate diversity” (s 14(3)(i)).   
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terms of the PEPUDA, but not in terms of the EEA.  This is so especially in light of 
the fact that the EEA does not contain a definition of discrimination, while the 
PEPUDA does.  When appropriate, the latter could therefore be used as an aid in 
the interpretation of the former. 
 
5.3 Reasonable accommodation as a positive duty 
 
Reasonable accommodation is a mechanism through which to rectify the systemic 
exclusion and subordination faced by disabled people.  Its basis in substantive 
equality is clear in its insistence that disabled people be treated differently to enabled 
persons.538  What is less clear is where it fits into the conceptual framework of 
positive duties required by employment equality law.  If it is both a non-discrimination 
duty and an affirmative action measure, what are the consequences for job 
applicants and prospective employers?  I will argue that, given the advantages of 
reasonable accommodation as a positive non-discrimination duty, reasonable 
accommodation as an affirmative action measure is not that important as an end in 
itself.  However, affirmative action mechanisms, if they were to be implemented 
effectively, could play an important role in creating more favourable environments 
within which reasonable accommodation duties can be negotiated and effected.  
 
5.3.1 The general positive non-discrimination duties 
 
Recruitment and selection criteria and processes that exclude disabled people, 
either directly or indirectly, and do not relate to the inherent requirements of jobs or 
that can be otherwise justified as fair, constitute unfair discrimination.  Section 5 of 
the EEA places obligations on employers to take positive steps to eliminate unfair 
discrimination in employment policies and practices.  This is a positive non-
discrimination duty that requires employers to take steps proactively, in advance of 
specific acts of discrimination.539  Reasonable accommodation is a positive non-
                                                          
538 Ngwena ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ 7-21. 
539 Piliso v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd and Others (2007) 28 ILJ 897 (LC) para 77. 
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discrimination duty, so it is implicated in s 5, but only insofar as it implicates 
employment policies and practices.540   
 
5.3.2 The affirmative action duties 
 
Designated employers bear the affirmative action duty to “identify and eliminate 
employment barriers, including unfair discrimination, which adversely affect people 
from designated groups.”541  The duty to provide reasonable accommodation is 
provided for separately from the general duty to eliminate barriers.542  This 
separation does not mean that failures to accommodate do not constitute barriers to 
employment – the definition of reasonable accommodation in s 1 clearly foresees 
that it will enable a person from a designated group to access, participate or advance 
in employment.  What it does imply is that employment barriers are not limited to 
those that require adjustments or modifications to jobs or work environments. 
 
An important difference between the reasonable accommodation duty and other 
aspects of the duty to eliminate unfair discrimination is that the former is more 
appropriate in particular, localised contexts where the interests of specific employers 
and employees have to be balanced.543  It is reactive and a response to the needs of 
a particular person, hence the reference in the definition to “a person”.544  The other 
aspects of the non-discrimination duty are likely to apply to general barriers that may 
affect all people within particular designated groups in more or less the same 
manner and may therefore have a more anticipatory element.  For the anticipatory 
aspects, the limitation is likely to relate to whether courts are of the view that the 
                                                          
540 The non-exhaustive definition of ‘employment policy or practice' in s 1 of the EEA states that it 
includes  
“recruitment procedures, advertising and selection criteria; the appointment process; job 
classification and grading; remuneration, employment benefits and terms and conditions of 
employment; the working environment and facilities; training and development; performance 
evaluation; promotion, transfer and demotion; disciplinary measures and dismissal.” 
541 Section 15(2)(a). 
542 Section 15(2)(c). 
543 Pillay para 78.  
544 This is in contrast to the so-called anticipatory reasonable adjustment duties in Britain that 
developed because the applicable legislation at the time referred to the accommodation of disabled 
persons in the plural, which was interpreted to mean that the duty arose before a duty bearer was 
presented with a specific disabled person.  See Lawson 92-93. 
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employer is the appropriate duty bearer, particularly if deficits are structural in nature 
and relate to socio-economic entitlements for which the state is the primary duty-
bearer.  This aspect of state duties and their role in the achievement of access to 
employment for disabled people will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
5.3.3 Differences between non-discrimination and affirmative action 
 
In most respects the positive non-discrimination duty is stronger than the affirmative 
action duty for reasons relating to the respective duty bearers and protected classes.  
The relevant enforcement mechanisms in respect of the duties both have their 
strengths and weaknesses, as will be discussed below.545 
 
5.3.3.1 The duty bearers 
 
Affirmative action duties are imposed only on designated employers in terms of the 
EEA.  The Act requires designated employers to design and implement affirmative 
action measures.  It is also possible for non-designated employers to voluntarily 
assume the duties of a designated employer, a course of action incentivised through 
the preferential procurement frameworks sanctioned by s 217 of the Constitution.546  
                                                          
545 See 5.3.3.4. 
546 This section reads: 
“(1) When an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or any 
other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in 
accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in that 
subsection from implementing a procurement policy providing for— 
(a) categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and 
(b) the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination. 
(3) National legislation must prescribe a framework within which the policy referred to in 
subsection (2) must be implemented.” 
The framework legislation mentioned in subsection (3) is the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act 5 of 2000.  This Act and its regulations (Preferential Procurement Regulations, 2011 
(GN R502 in GG 34350 of 8 June 2011) www.cacadu.co.za/content/download/67 (Accessed: 6 
February 2015)) provide for the calculation of a fixed score based on a firm’s Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) levels.  Employment equity is an important component. 
The BBBEE Act 53 of 2003 in s 1 states that it provides for measures aimed at 
“the economic empowerment of all black people including women, workers, youth, people with 
disabilities and people living in rural areas through diverse but integrated socio-economic 
strategies that include, but are not limited to— 




Apart from some employers’ voluntary assumption of affirmative action duties, the 
Labour Court, upon findings of unfair discrimination against employees, is 
empowered to order non-designated employers to assume affirmative action duties 
as if they were designated employers.547  This remedy may assist in those cases 
where indirect discrimination against disabled people inheres in various aspects of a 
respondent employer’s work policies and practices.  
 
However, for the most part, only designated employers are compelled to take 
affirmative action measures.548  In contrast, failures to remove employment barriers 
and to provide accommodation that constitutes unfair discrimination would be 
actionable against all employers and other duty bearers to whom the EEA and the 
PEPUDA apply.   
 
5.3.3.2 Entitlement to reasonable accommodation 
 
An unfair discrimination claim founded on an employer’s alleged failure to reasonably 
accommodate a job applicant can be asserted by anyone who falls within a protected 
group, whether listed or unlisted, as is illustrated by constitutional and labour 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(b) facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by 
communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises; 
(c) human resource and skills development; 
(d) achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the 
workforce; 
(e) preferential procurement; and 
(f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black people [emphasis 
added].” 
The Act and its Codes of Good Practice (there is a generic BBBEE Code of Good Practice published 
in GG 36928 of 11 October 2013 available at 
http://www.dti.gov.za/news2013/code_gud_practice10102013.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015), as 
well as various sector-specific Codes) create a system in which firms are awarded BBBEE ratings 
based on their efforts to facilitate the empowerment of Black people in terms of five components:  (i) 
ownership, (ii) management control, (iii) skills development, (iv) new enterprise and supplier 
development and (v) socio-economic development.  These ratings affect the ability of firms “to 
successfully tender for Government and public entity tenders and (in certain sectors like mining and 
gaming) to obtain licences.  Private sector clients also increasingly require their suppliers to have a 
minimum BBBEE rating in order to boost their own BBBEE ratings.”  See Werksmans Attorneys. 
“Amendments to the BBBEE Act and the Codes Explained.” (2014) http://www.werksmans.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/040002-WERKSMANS-bbbee-booklet.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 6. 
547 Section 50(2)(d). 
548 See Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2013 (3) SA 486 (LC) para 119, in which 
Shaik AJ stated:   
“The implementation of affirmative action measures is not a choice; it is mandatory.  




jurisprudence.549  Affirmative action, on the other hand, is limited to those who qualify 
as members of one or more of the designated groups, namely women, Black people 
and people with disabilities.  The beneficiaries of affirmative action measures are 
therefore members of a more narrowly defined protected class.  It also means that 
recognition as a “person with a disability” assumes more importance for purposes of 
affirmative action, because no analogous grounds operate.  
 
5.3.3.3 Different enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms 
 
In an unfair discrimination claim, an aggrieved job applicant would either approach 
the CCMA to conciliate the dispute (if the EEA applies) or bring an unfair 
discrimination claim in the Equality Court with jurisdiction (if the PEPUDA applies).  
Within the scheme established by the EEA, if conciliation fails, any party to the 
dispute may refer it to the Labour Court for adjudication.  Some employees who earn 
below a certain threshold may refer a dispute to the CCMA for arbitration, which is a 
more cost-effective option than the Labour Court.   
 
The unfair discrimination dispute resolution mechanism is therefore reactive; there 
must be an allegation of direct or indirect discrimination against one or more 
employees.  That does not mean that the duty only commences when the employer 
is presented with a disabled work seeker.  The TAG require employers to examine 
their job advertisements, job profiles and the like to identify and remove barriers, 
which implies that the duty starts before an individual disabled job applicant appears 
on the scene.  These duties flow from sections 5 and 6 of the EEA, regardless of 
whether their fulfillment would qualify as the provision of reasonable accommodation.  
 
The judgment in Singh v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and 
Others550 raised, inter alia, the issue of the different positive duties that may apply in 
recruitment and selection.  The Equality Court held that the failure to consider the 
applicant’s gender and/ or disability was unfairly discriminatory.  It therefore ordered 
the respondents to reconsider the shortlisting for the relevant posts and the 
                                                          
549 See Ngwena ‘Legal Deconstruction’ 124. 
550 2013 (3) SA 66 (EqC). 
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applicant’s application in light of her gender, disability and other relevant factors. 551  
Furthermore, the respondents were ordered to revise selection criteria so that not 
only race and gender, but also disability, will be relevant in the appointment of 
magistrates.552  Finally, the Court gave the respondents ten months within which to 
“make a formal and comprehensive statement of policies and criteria to be used and/ 
or applied in short-listing, evaluation and appointment for positions as Magistrates 
which policies and criteria must clearly mention that the provisions of section 174 (2) 
and section 9 of the Constitution will be taken into consideration in the short-listing 
and the filling of the posts.”553 
 
The respondents sought to justify their failure to mention disability in their selection 
criteria on the basis that s 174(2) of the Constitution requires that the judiciary 
broadly reflects the racial and gender composition of South Africa and omits any 
mention of disability.554  Ledwaba J found this submission unpersuasive and 
reasoned that s 174(2) had to be read in the context of the Constitution as a whole 
as well as in the context of the PEPUDA.555  He emphasised s 9(3) of the 
Constitution, which prohibits the state from discriminating unfairly on the basis of 
disability.556  He also took into account s 4(2) of the PEPUDA, which enjoins those 
applying the Act to take into account systemic discrimination and inequalities, 
“particularly in respect of race, gender and disability in all spheres of life as a result 
of past and present unfair discrimination, brought about by colonialism, the apartheid 
system and patriarchy.”557  Finally, he considered South Africa’s international 
obligations and noted that the CRPD requires active measures to promote the 
employment of disabled people.558  In light of these factors, he found that the 
Constitution and the PEPUDA impose a positive duty on the state to promote the 
employment of disabled people.559 
  
                                                          
551 At para 1. 
552 Ibid. 
553 Ibid. 
554 See paras 20-22. 
555 At para 26. 
556 At paras 26-27. 
557 At para 15. 
558 At paras 34-36, 40. 
559 At paras 47-50. 
153 
 
If a designated employer fails to make reasonable accommodation part of its 
affirmative action plans, an aggrieved individual has to rely on the dispute-resolution 
mechanisms provided for in Chapter 3 of the EEA.  In terms of this scheme, the 
relevant employer’s failure to comply with its duties under the EEA are enforced 
through an administrative system of compliance orders issued by labour 
inspectors,560 requests561 or recommendations562 by the Director-General of Labour 
and, eventually, hefty fines.563  Importantly, unless these remedies have been 
exhausted, no recourse can be had to a court of law or a labour tribunal, such as the 
CCMA, to resolve the dispute.564 
  
                                                          
560 The powers and functions of labour inspectors are set out in ss 35-38 of the EEA.  One of these 
powers is to issue compliance orders against defaulting employers.  In terms of s 37(6), the Director-
General may apply to the Labour Court to have a compliance order made an order of that Court. 
561 Section 43 empowers the Director-General to review an employer’s compliance with the EEA.  
Subsection (2) provides that in order to effect this review, the Director-General: “(a) request an 
employer to submit to the Director-General a copy of its current analysis or employment equity plan;
 (b) request an employer to submit to the Director-General any book, record, 
 correspondence, document or information that could reasonably be relevant to the 
 review of the employer’s compliance with this Act; 
(c) request a meeting with an employer to discuss its employment equity plan, the 
 implementation of its plan and any matters related to its compliance with this Act; or  
(d) request a meeting with any—  
(i) employee or trade union consulted in terms of section 16; 
 (ii) workplace forum; or 
 (iii) other person who may have information relevant to the review.” 
562 Section 44 provides for the Director-General to either approve a designated employer’s 
employment equity plan or to recommend, in writing, the steps an employer must take in relation to 
the plan, its implementation or in relation to the employer’s compliance with the EEA.  Any other 
prescribed information may be included in the recommendation. 
563 The amounts of the fines are specified in Schedule 4 to the EEA.  These fines, though heavy in 
monetary terms, are a last resort after repeated failures to comply and they may be applied for at the 
discretion of the Director-General.  Section 45 provides that if an employer fails to act on a request or 
recommendation of the Director-General, the latter may apply to the Labour Court for an order 
directing the employer to comply with the request or recommendation.  As an alternative, if the 
employer fails to justify its failure to comply, the Director-General may request that the Labour Court 
impose a fine on that employer. 
564 There are two conflicting judgments at the Labour Court level on whether a person aggrieved by 
an employer’s failure to implement affirmative action is allowed to institute an unfair discrimination 
claim.  In Harmse v City of Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 1130 (LC), Waglay J held that such an individual 
action is possible.  However, Tip J, in Dudley v City of Cape Town (2004) 25 ILJ 305 (LC) reached the 
opposite conclusion, holding that the dispute resolution mechanisms are the only vehicle through 
which to enforce an employer’s affirmative action duties and that the legislature never intended for 
there to be individual remedies for aggrieved persons.  On appeal (Dudley v City of Cape Town and 
Another [2008] 12 BLLR 1155 (LAC)), the Labour Appeal Court elected not to pronounce on whether 
an individual action is ruled out completely in these circumstances, but held that the administrative 
dispute resolution mechanisms have to be exhausted before individual claims are pursued. 
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In sum then, the non-discrimination duties apply to a wider class of duty bearers, 
encompass a broader class of beneficiaries and the dispute resolution mechanisms 
are available to individuals through the CCMA, the Labour Court or the Equality 
Court.  These forums are empowered to award proactive remedies565 as well as 
reactive remedies suited to individual complainants.  
 
5.3.3.4 The role of affirmative action measures and their interrelationship 
with positive non-discrimination measures  
 
In light of the availability of positive non-discrimination measures and their relative 
advantages over their affirmative action counterparts, questions arise as to the utility 
and role of positive duties as affirmative action measures.  Ngwena cites two 
reasons for omitting affirmative action from his scheme for transformational 
equality566.  First, he argues that affirmative action would only benefit some disabled 
people while leaving intact exclusionary structural arrangements.   
 
In his own words,  
“The aim is to ensure the inclusion of disabled people as an entire class in an 
egalitarian universe of equality so that they can, as of right, be recognised and 
participate in society at a level of parity with other groups. An underpinning 
premise in this discourse is that equality as a right ought to be sufficiently 
responsive to remedying the subordinated status of all protected groups 
through treating lack of accommodation as a form of unfair discrimination. 
Affirmative action with its focus on advancing remedies that tweak the 
outcomes of attitudinal discrimination but leaving structural inequality intact and 
its modus operandi of only privileging the lucky few decidedly detracts from the 
main premise of this study.”567 
  
                                                          
565 Holness and Rule 1918 note that generous standing provisions, as well as the systemic remedies 
in the PEPUDA, are potentially groundbreaking in that these remedies could lead to structural 
changes.  See 4.2.4 for the potential remedies to be awarded in terms of the PEPUDA.  




The second reason relates to his view that affirmative action incurs costs that 
paradoxically undermine the values and goals that it seeks to promote.568  For him, 
affirmative action reifies group identities, privileges some groups at the expense of 
others and oversimplifies equality claims.  It therefore risks oversimplifying equality 
and freezing, rather than doing away with, antagonism.  The better route, he 
reasons, is to link economic recognition to need rather than group association. 
 
The approach I take to affirmative action and disability is different.  In my view, 
neither affirmative action nor positive non-discrimination duties by themselves are 
sufficient to create and sustain transformative equality.  This is because both types 
of duty have strengths and weaknesses.  Moseneke J, in Barnard, reminded us that 
“restitution measures, important as they are, cannot do all the work to advance social 
equity.”569  Positive non-discrimination duties are not a cure on their own, either.570   
 
As Fredman notes, unfair discrimination claims are reactive, dispute resolution takes 
its toll on individuals in terms of time, human and financial resources and progress is 
generally ad hoc.571  Furthermore, labour tribunals and courts have taken a 
conservative approach to the imposition of positive non-discrimination duties.572  This 
may stem from normative commitments that eschew the imposition of positive duties 
on non-state actors in order to vindicate social rights.573  It also ties in with 
conceptions of rights as shields against state interference, rather than social 
mechanisms that allow the state to regulate marginalised groups’ access to social 
goods.  
 
The fact that affirmative duties require designated employers to identify and remove 
employment barriers and provide reasonable accommodation allows for the creation 
of structures and processes that might not otherwise be fashioned.  In this way, it is 
                                                          
568 Ibid. 
569 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC) para 33. 
570 In Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2002 (3) SA 468 (T) 477F, Van der 
Westhuizen J stated:  “[T]he recognition of substantive equality means, inter alia, that equality is more 
than mere non-discrimination.”  Perhaps this was not meant to include positive non-discrimination 
duties, but even inclusive of such duties, I argue that non-discrimination alone is insufficient. 
571 Fredman ‘Changing the Norm’ 372. 
572 E Fergus and D Collier. “Race and Gender Equality at Work:  The Role of the Judiciary in 
Promoting Workplace Transformation.” (2014) 30(3) South African Journal on Human Rights 484 at 
486. 
573 See 3.2.2. 
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reflective of an overall constitutional and legislative framework that recognises non-
discrimination and affirmative action as mutually supportive mechanisms.574  In my 
view, this integrated approach calls for strategies that combine the two mechanisms 
in ways that promote substantive equality.  I therefore part ways with Ngwena’s 
approach and disagree with his claim that affirmative action is “philosophically and 
strategically peripheral” to the achievement of sustainable transformative equality for 
disabled people.575   
 
With regard to the second strand of Ngwena’s argument, I concede that affirmative 
action risks reifying exclusionary group identities, particularly if implemented in ways 
that only emphasise superficial representation by numbers.576  The Constitutional 
Court has recognised that group-based restitutionary measures are in tension with 
the individual rights of members of non-designated groups.577  The EEA itself 
                                                          
574 Moseneke J in Van Heerden (at para 32) stated:  “Remedial measures are not a derogation from, 
but a substantive and composite part of, the equality protection envisaged by the provisions of section 
9 and of the Constitution as a whole.  Their primary object is to promote the achievement of equality.  
To that end, differentiation aimed at protecting or advancing persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination is warranted provided the measures are shown to conform to the internal test set by 
section 9(2).” 
575 Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ 100. 
576 In Barnard, the various judges warned against treating restitutionary measures as ends in 
themselves (at para 30), against an over-emphasis on race as a yardstick when disadvantage is 
much more complex (para 80) and against a superficial focus on representavity (at para 149).  
Ngwena bases his arguments on Nancy Fraser’s criticism of affirmative action (see Ngwena ‘Search 
for Equality’ 99 fn 361), which includes that it attends to surface allocations without disrupting 
systemic inequality, that it unintentionally marks beneficiaries as deficient and always in need of more 
allocations and that it fails to achieve recognition that is transformational because it emphasises 
differentiation without destabilising master dichotomies on, for example, race and gender.  It is not 
possible to engage fully with these arguments here, save to note that while they have merit, it does 
not follow that these weaknesses render affirmative action negligible or unable to play some role in 
transformative endeavours. 
577 Ngcobo J (as he then was) in Bato Star Fishing  (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 76 specifically acknowledged the difficulties 
transformative practices may occasion: “The measures that bring about transformation will inevitably 
affect some members of the society adversely, particularly those coming from the previously 
advantaged communities.  It may well be that other considerations may have to yield in favour of 
achieving the goal we fashioned for ourselves in the Constitution.  What is required, though, is that 
the process of transformation must be carried out in accordance with the Constitution.”  
The Constitutional Court in Van Heerden (at para 37) set three requirements for constitutionally valid 
restitutionary measures:  “The first yardstick relates to whether the measure targets persons or 
categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination; the second is whether 
the measure is designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of persons; and the third 
requirement is whether the measure promotes the achievement of equality.”  The third requirement 
clearly would take into account the effect of the measure on the overall vision of substantive equality.  
Indeed, Moseneke J expands on this requirement by stating (at para 44) that a remedial measure 
“should not constitute an abuse of power or impose such substantial and undue harm on those 
excluded from its benefits that our long-term constitutional goal would be threatened.”  In Barnard, all 
three judgments recognised the tensions between the social goal of restitution and the effects it might 
have on individuals who are members of non-designated groups (see South African Police Service v 
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implicitly acknowledges this tension and seeks to mediate it by prohibiting quotas 
and any other measures that would constitute an absolute bar to the advancement of 
non-designated groups.578   
 
These difficulties and risks are complex and it is not possible to discuss them in any 
great depth here.  For present purposes, I proceed from the premise that these 
challenges do not strip affirmative action of utility.  I assume – driven as much by 
inconclusive views on the advantages and disadvantages of affirmative action as by 
pragmatism – that it can offer recognition to disadvantaged groups without unduly 
harming members of privileged groups579 and that it can curb still-rampant privilege 
linked to membership of groups advantaged by unfair discrimination.580   
 
My choice to engage with affirmative action also flows from my view that if we do not 
fashion it in ways that link it to structural, substantive equality, it will only operate in 
the realm of superficial identity politics.  That does not have to be the case.  My 
primary interest in affirmative action duties in the present context is their potential to 
create spaces in which structural barriers to the employment of disadvantaged 
groups can be identified and addressed, as well as their potential to compel the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC) paras 30-32 (per Moseneke J), paras 93-94 (per 
Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ) and paras 178-179 (per Van der Westhuizen J)).  
578 Sections 15(3) and (4). 
579 As Mokgoro J points out in Van Heerden (at para 76),“The reason for the enactment of section 9(2) 
is to authorise restitutionary measures for the advancement of those previously disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination. Whenever a group is given certain advantages it must follow that it receives 
more than others in the context of the particular measure which is being enacted. But the measure will 
not necessarily be enacted with the aim of taking from one group to give to another. […] It would be 
contrary to the spirit of section 9(2) and inimical to its purpose to require the state to show that it has 
insufficient resources to give advantages equally, every time that it attempts to enact a restitutionary 
measure which advances those previously disadvantaged.” 
580 See Silvers ‘Protection or Privilege’ 562, who argues that a distinction must be drawn between 
restitutionary measures that seeks to share privilege and those that seek to shift privilege: “Sharing 
recognition, rather than shifting it, is fair to both previously well recognized and previously 
misrecognized groups.  Only sharing recognition diminishes both the majority's and the minority's 
exposure to misrecognition.  Sharing recognition means that previously privileged workers may lose 
their privilege, but no others gain it.  Nor are previously privileged workers now transformed into 
‘others’ who are distanced from preferment.  Their situation is worsened only in the very attenuated 
sense that expansions of workforce recognition may enlarge the numbers of individuals with whom 
they compete.  These two strategies incur different kinds of losses for members of majority groups.  
Shifting recognition does not cure disparities in opportunity.  Instead, previously privileged majority 
workers lose their privilege to previously misrecognized minority workers, who will now enjoy the 
privilege the majority has lost [emphasis in original].”  This distinction between sharing privilege and 
shifting privilege is arguably what has to be borne in mind when considering the validity of affirmative 
action measures.  How to go about doing that in individual cases, particularly where disability is 
concerned, is an important issue, but falls beyond the scope of the discussion here. 
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collection and administration of employment statistics for disabled people and other 
disadvantaged groups.   
 
As I will discuss below, there are weaknesses in the current affirmative action 
framework that stymy its potential to contribute more meaningfully.  However, my 
starting point is that, in principle, affirmative action, coupled with positive non-
discrimination duties, can be of strategic value in endeavours to improve access to 
employment for disabled people. 
 
Let us then consider what affirmative action duties have to offer.  Affirmative action 
measures are defined in the EEA as those “designed to ensure that suitably qualified 
people from designated groups have equal employment opportunities and are 
equitably represented in all occupational levels in the workforce of a designated 
employer.”581  As noted before, it includes the duty to identify and remove 
employment barriers that adversely affect Black people, women and people with 
disabilities.  It also specifically includes reasonable accommodation.  These two 
duties, I argue, overlap considerably with the positive non-discrimination duties 
recognised in s 5 of the EEA as well as in s 14 of the PEPUDA.  
 
Apart from the two duties already mentioned, affirmative action may also include 
measures to further diversity based on equal dignity and respect; measures to 
ensure that Black people, women and disabled persons are represented at all 
occupational levels and to retain and develop such persons through, inter alia, 
training programmes.582  As mentioned above, the EEA endorses preferential 
treatment and the setting of numerical goals to ensure equitable representation of 
people from the designated groups, but it explicitly prohibits quotas.583  It also 
protects members of non-designated groups in that no affirmative action measure 
may erect “an absolute barrier” to their prospective or continued employment or to 
their advancement.584 
  
                                                          
581 Section 15(1). 
582 Section 15(2). 
583 Section 15(3). 
584 Section 15(4). 
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As briefly outlined above, the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that the EEA 
foresees are administrative in nature.  An employee or trade union representative 
may bring any contraventions of the EEA to the notice of other employees, the 
employer, a labour inspector, a workplace forum, the Director-General of Labour, a 
trade union or the CEE.585  This is a monitoring mechanism that appears to 
encourage firm-specific consultations on and solutions to difficulties as a first step. 586  
Furthermore, the EEA requires all designated employers to “prepare and implement 
an employment equity plan which will achieve reasonable progress towards 
employment equity in that employer’s workforce.”587  In Gordon v Department of 
Health:  KwaZulu-Natal,588 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the appointment of 
a Black male candidate in the absence of an employment equity plan was inherently 
irrational and arbitrary.  Mlambo J stated the following in the course of judgment:  
 
“The injunction that the public service must be broadly representative is an 
important one.  It enjoins those in charge to strive towards representativity.  
This in my view calls for attention to be focused on the respects in which the 
service is not representative and what measures should be implemented to 
achieve the required representativity.  This suggests that a properly considered 
policy or plan to address the situation as opposed to ad hoc means is the way 
to go to achieve representativity.  It must therefore be so that ad hoc and 
random action is impermissible.”589 
 
In Stone v South African Police Service,590 the South African Police Service had 
acted in terms of an employment equity plan when it preferred to appoint a Black 
male instead of his White counterpart.  However, this employment equity plan had 
not been submitted to and approved by the Department of Labour at the relevant 
times.591  The Labour Court held that Gordon was not authority for the proposition 
that only measures in terms of employment equity plans that had been submitted to 
                                                          
585 Section 34 of the EEA. 
586 J Grogan. Workplace Law. (2014) 142. 
587 Section 20.  See, also, South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 
(CC) para 40, in which Moseneke ACJ (as he then was) seems to interpret s 20 as being peremptory. 
588 (2008) 29 ILJ 2535 (SCA). 
589 At para 23. 
590 [2013] 1 BLLR 70 (LC). 
591 At para 13. 
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and approved by the Department of Labour were valid.  In my view, this was the ratio 
of the decision in Stone and not, as Grogan appears to suggest,592 that a plan is not 
a prerequisite for valid affirmative action measures.593  
 
It therefore seems that designated employers, at least in theory, would be required to 
act more proactively in making reasonable accommodation part of an employment 
equity plan.  The enforcement structures and mechanisms, if implemented 
effectively, lend themselves to examinations of employment barriers faced by 
disabled people and how to go about removing these barriers.  It falls beyond the 
scope of this work to discuss these structures and mechanisms extensively.  
However, some salient features will be mentioned in order to illustrate how these 
compulsory structures offer opportunities for building capacity to comply with both 
affirmative action and positive non-discrimination duties.   
 
Firstly, a senior manager has to be appointed to drive affirmative action, which aims 
to ensure buy-in from top management.594  There is also a requirement of 
consultation between employers and representative unions or employee 
representatives.595  Every effort should be made to include persons from designated 
and non-designated groups.596  The manner and form of consultations are not 
prescribed, but Klinck usefully summarises the content of consultation that flows 
from guidelines that are not legally binding, as well as from the EEA itself: 
                                                          
592 Grogan 141 fn 12. 
593 At para 31 LaGrange J stated:  “[I]n Gordon’s case, the provincial health department had no plan 
or policy of affirmative action, and the successful candidate was appointed simply on the basis that 
his appointment would promote representivity.  The SCA held that his appointment could not 
constitute a policy or practice “designed to achieve the adequate protection and advancement of 
persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable 
their full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms [emphasis in the original]”, which was a 
precondition for defending an appointment on the basis of race prior to the EEA.  But nowhere in the 
SCA decision did the Court say that only an employment equity plan which had been approved 
by the Department of Labour in terms of the EEA could provide a defence to an unfair 
discrimination claim [footnotes omitted and bold emphasis added].”  He then went on to quote s 6(2) 
and s 2 of the EEA and noted (at para 33):  “Nowhere in these provisions is it suggested that only 
affirmative action measures approved by the Department of Labour in terms of the EEA could provide 
a defence to an unfair discrimination claim.” 
594 S 24(1) of the EEA; Item 7.1 of the Code of Good Practice:  Preparation, Implementation and 
Monitoring of Employment Equity Plans (GNR 1394 of 23 November 1999) (hereinafter referred to as 
“Code of Good Practice:  EE Plans”) http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/legislation/codes-of-good-
ractise/employment-equity/code-of-good-practice-on-employment-equity-plans (Accessed: 6 February 
2015). 
595 S 16 of the EEA; Item 7.2.8 of the Code of Good Practice:  EE Plans. 
596 Item 7.2.6 read with Item 7.2.8 of the Code of Good Practice:  EE Plans. 
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 “the training of representatives on the Employment Equity Act; 
 regular communication between representatives and their constituencies, 
including reasonable opportunity to meet and report back to employees 
and management; 
 regular communication between the consultative forum and employees not 
directly or indirectly involved in any of the processes;  
 disclosure of all relevant information by the parties to the consultation and 
the employer in terms of section 18 of the Employment Equity Act, 
including information from the employer that elucidates its reasons for 
proposing certain affirmative action programmes or measures.  On the 
other hand, employers have to duly consider the proposals and viewpoints 
of parties to the process; and 
 adequate time for all of the above, including regular meetings.”597 
Consultation needs to take place on the workplace analyses, the preparation and 
implementation of the employment equity plan and the employment equity report to 
be submitted to the Department of Labour. 
 
These structures and mechanisms are part of proactive equality strategies, as 
conceptualised by Fredman.598  The advantages of proactive strategies include the 
following: (i) the persons who are expected to effect change – policymakers, 
implementers, service providers and the like – are expected to take initiative; (ii) 
individual complainants do not have to take on the financial, emotional and other 
burdens of litigation; and (iii) change occurs through systematic means rather than in 
an ad hoc manner.599 
 
However, proactive strategies pose challenges of their own.  Fredman notes that 
such measures often confuse means and ends and pay inadequate attention to the 
                                                          
597 ME Klinck. Employment Equity Plans. In: JL Pretorius, ME Klinck and CG Ngwena (eds). 
Employment Equity Law. (2014) 10-3 at 10-14(1). 
598 Fredman ‘Changing the Norm’ 373.  She identifies two types of proactive strategies (at 374):  the 
first is ‘mainstreaming’, which involves infusing equality principles, strategies and practices into the 
policies and day-to-day activities of organisations.  The second category is more specific and is 




goals to be achieved.600  This weakness can be ameliorated if the interrelationship 
between reactive and proactive strategies is highlighted and utilised.  Unfair 
discrimination cases require courts and labour tribunals to frame normative 
principles, which in turn could animate proactive norm-setting.  
 
Now that we have considered the scope, nature and interrelationship between the 
various duties, we can turn our attention to the content of reasonable 
accommodation duties and how such duties are circumscribed.  Given the scope of 
this thesis, the emphasis will fall on the role of reasonable accommodation in 
recruitment and selection.  It is, however, not wise to completely separate the 
different stages of the employment process, as systemic disadvantages in one part 
of the system, for example, retention, may affect other parts, such as recruitment 
and selection.  As discussed above,601 this effect may not even be internal to one 
employer only, but may impact on how other employers view a disabled job applicant 
in subsequent applications for work. 
 
5.4 Considerations in the implementation of reasonable accommodation 
 
5.4.1 When accommodation is to be provided 
 
The duty to accommodate is owed to job applicants and employees who are suitably 
qualified.  The Disability Code foresees that accommodations may be required 
during recruitment and selection; in the work environment; in the way work is 
allocated, evaluated and rewarded; and in work benefits and privileges.602  The TAG 
expand on this and alert employers to the fact that changes to the work, the work 
environment or the employee’s impairment occur and that reasonable 
accommodation duties therefore have to be reviewed on a continuous basis.603    
                                                          
600 Fredman ‘Changing the Norm’ 375. 
601 See 5.2.1. 
602 Item 6.4. 
603 Item 6.5.  The examples that are given are when an employee tells her supervisor that she now 
only has the use of her left arm and is struggling to type high volumes of documents for a new work 




The employer need not accommodate someone who cannot perform the essential 
functions of a job after reasonable accommodation has been provided.604  This is 
consistent with the defence in unfair discrimination cases that an employee or job 
applicant is unable to perform the inherent requirements of the job.605   
 
The essential functions of the job are usually contained in the job description, which 
the TAG suggest should be indicated in the advertisement for positions.606  The 
Code of Good Practice on Integration of Employment Equity into Human Resource 
Policies and Practices requires that “each task or duty in the job description is 
essential to be able to perform the job and is not overstated.”607  Other criteria that 
may be relevant to protecting disabled applicants include the fact that competency 
specifications should be “objective and avoid subjective elements that can be 
interpreted differently”, that experience requirements must be essential and that job 
criteria must not “disadvantage employees from designated groups.”608 
 
The TAG indicate that disabled applicants must be afforded opportunities to disclose 
their accommodation requirements voluntarily.609  Where it is self-evident that an 
applicant may require accommodations, the employer should enquire and 
reasonably respond to any relevant requests.610  The TAG, however, warn that 
detailed information about accommodations must only be requested after it has been 
determined that applicants are suitably qualified and conditional job offers have been 
                                                          
604 TAG Item 6.2. 
605 See s 6(2)(b) of the EEA, which provides that is not unfair discrimination to “distinguish, exclude or 
prefer any person on the basis of an inherent requirement of a job.”  See, also, s 187(1)(f) and s 
187(2)(a) of the LRA, which reads:   
“(1) A dismissal is automatically unfair if the employer, in dismissing the employee, acts 
contrary to section 5 or, if the reason for the dismissal is […] (f) that the employer unfairly 
discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, 
but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language, marital status or 
family responsibility; […] 
(2) Despite subsection (1) (f) – (a) a dismissal may be fair if the reason for dismissal is based 
on an inherent requirement of the particular job.” 
606 Item 7.4. 
607 South Africa. Department of Labour. Code of Good Practice on Integration of Employment Equity 
into Human Resource Policies and Practices. (2007) http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/legislation/codes-
of-good-ractise/employment-equity/code-of-good-practice-on-integration-of-employment-equity-into-
human-resource-policies-and-practices (Accessed: 6 February 2015) Item 6. 
608 Ibid.  Item 6.3.1 of the TAG also requires job specifications to be “drafted to ensure that they do not 
unnecessarily exclude people with disabilities.” 




made.  Only the information highlighted in Chapter 7 of the TAG, which mostly 
relates to the inherent requirements and the essential functions of the particular job 
and how the applicant will go about satisfying and performing these functions, is 
regarded as relevant.611  Detailed questions regarding potential accommodations 
before conditional job offers are made may lead to the inference that a candidate 
was not selected because the employer did not want to make reasonable 
accommodation.612 
 
The TAG offer general guidance on how to frame advertisements so that they are 
not unnecessarily exclusionary, on making interview venues accessible, on how 
interviewers should go about interacting with disabled persons and on how pre-
employment skills assessments and testing must not be biased and must test for 
essential functions only.613  Furthermore, these emphasise that other staff members 
must be sensitised and made aware of diversity.614  They also encourage employers 
to consult disabled employees on those employees’ career progression and 
                                                          
611 TAG 26-31.  Ngwena (2014) notes that “essential functions” are used in the Disability Code in 
addition to the “inherent requirements of the job” to indicate what a disabled employee needs to be 
able to do, either with or without reasonable accommodation, in order to be appointable.     
612 TAG Item 6.4. 
613 TAG Items 6.3 and 7.5.  It is not possible to eliminate all biases, as some of these are held 
unconsciously and operate subtly.  In this regard, see SR Bagenstos. “The Structural Turn and the 
Limits of Antidiscrimination Law.” (2006) 94(1) California Law Review 1 at 5-10.  See, also, A Rycroft. 
“Obstacles to Employment Equity?  The Role of Judges and Arbitrators in the Interpretation and 
Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies.” (1999) 20 Industrial Law Journal 1411 at 1416, who 
notes that some institutions have adopted a method that is sometimes referred to as ‘targeted 
selection’.  This method aims to remove undue subjectivity from the selection process and requires 
the following:   
“(a) the prior articulation of attributes or competencies sought in the applicant; (b) the weighting 
to be given to each attribute or competency; (c) the preparation of specific questions which 
relate directly to the chosen attributes and competencies and which are to be put to each 
applicant; (d) the private evaluation of each candidate by each member of the selection 
committee according to the agreed weighting; and (e) the totalling of scores to arrive at a rating 
or ranking of applicants.” 
Rycroft argues that without such a carefully recorded process, selection committees may experience 
difficulties in justifying their decisions.   
614 TAG Items 9.2 and 9.6.  Muzi Nkosi, the Chief Executive Officer of Disability Indaba, an 
organisation that provides disability awareness training, has warned that the low level of 
understanding of disability as a human rights and development issue means that disabled people 
continue to be excluded from development processes despite the political will to effect change.  He 
suggests that before the recruitment of disabled people even starts, all employees have to be 
sensitised to disability, the rationale for legislative interventions such as reasonable accommodation 
and affirmative action and other relevant issues.  If this step is omitted, disabled people who are 
employed may find the workplace alienating, which may lead to low retention rates of disabled people.  
See M Nkosi. “Striving for Equality and Redress the Imbalances of the Past.” (2012) 
http://laylacassim.co.za/pdf/Muzi%20Nkosi%20-%20Striving%20for%20Equality.pdf (Accessed: 6 
February 2015).   
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objectives, including any training and other needs that they may have.615 
 
5.4.2 The inherent requirements of the job defence 
 
The legislature has left it up to courts to decide the ambit of the ‘inherent 
requirements’ standard on the facts and in the circumstances of each case.616  The 
‘inherent requirements’ standard has been interpreted restrictively by courts in South 
Africa.617  Dupper and Garbers explain that since the inherent requirements defence 
would constitute a limitation of the right to equality in the Constitution, it has to be 
interpreted restrictively.618  This approach was accepted by the Labour Court in 
IMATU.619   
 
5.4.3 The interpretation of ‘reasonable’ and ‘unjustifiable hardship’ in 
circumscribing the duty 
  
The term 'reasonable' could be interpreted to modify the accommodation itself, the 
duty on the duty bearer, or both.620  In some jurisdictions, courts and tribunals have 
interpreted 'reasonable' to mean that the accommodation must be 'appropriate' or 
'effective'.621  On this interpretation, 'reasonable' only modifies the accommodation 
itself.  In other jurisdictions, 'reasonable' serves to delineate the duty imposed on the 
duty bearer, either by itself or in conjunction with a provision that an accommodation 
does not have to be made if it would result in undue or unjustifiable hardship for the 
duty bearer.622  
 
The South African framework uses 'reasonable' to refer to a balancing exercise that 
is explained as follows in the TAG:  
“On the one hand, this may involve identifying and determining the 
                                                          
615 TAG Chapter 10. 
616 Grogan 126. 
617 Grogan 127.  However, see the judgment of Willis JA in Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead (2000) 
21 ILJ 571 (LAC) para 123.   
618 Dupper and Garbers ‘Employment Discrimination’ CC1-59. 
619 At para 101. 
620 Waddington ‘Reasonable Europeans’ 322. 
621 Ibid. 
622 Mégret and Msipa 267. 
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effectiveness of the accommodation and, on the other, whether the 
implementation of such accommodation will create difficulty or expense that will 
seriously disrupt the operation of the business.  The assessment should also 
take into account the impact of providing or failure to provide accommodation to 
the employee and the systemic patterns of inequality in society.  The objectives 
of the Act and the Constitution should also be considered.”623  
 
This weighing of various interests is in keeping with the approach adopted by the 
CRPD.  In HM v Sweden,624 the first individual communication to be considered by 
the Committee, a two-stage process was used in balancing the interests of the 
disabled person and the duty bearer.  The author of the petition had a chronic 
connective tissue disorder that, by the time of the petition, had confined her to her 
home.625  The Committee accepted that the only rehabilitation option that would be 
effective was hydrotherapy, which required the author to install a pool in her house 
for this purpose.626  She had requested planning permission from her local authority 
so that she could extend her house to accommodate the indoor pool, but her 
application was refused because the extension would have been in conflict with the 
City Development Plan.627  Various appeals ensued, but the original refusal was 
confirmed.  The author then petitioned the Committee.  
 
The two-stage approach to the reasonable accommodation inquiry first saw the 
Committee accepting the evidence that hydrotherapy would be the only effective 
rehabilitation option.628  It then considered whether the accommodation sought would 
impose a disproportionate or undue burden.  In this regard, the Committee decided 
that the relevant legislation itself permitted departure from a City Development Plan, 
so it was possible to fashion reasonable accommodation measures that would allow 
people with disabilities “the enjoyment or exercise of all human rights on an equal 
basis with others and without any discrimination.”629  The relevant State party had 
                                                          
623 TAG Item 6.12. 
624 UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. HM v Sweden. (2012). 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/CRPD.C.7.D.3.2011.doc (Accessed: 6 February 
2015).  
625 At paras 2.1 and 2.2. 
626 At para 2.2. 
627 At paras 2.3 – 2.7. 




also not indicated that the accommodation would create a disproportionate or undue 
burden.630  The failure to accommodate the author was therefore “disproportionate 
and produced a discriminatory effect.”631   
 
5.4.4 The effectiveness of the accommodation 
 
In respect of the effectiveness of the accommodation, a measure that is likely to 
remove all the disadvantage or difficulties experienced by a disabled employee is 
more likely to be found to be reasonable if the negative consequences for the 
business of the employer are not pronounced.  However, doubts about the likely 
effectiveness of a measure do not automatically render it unreasonable.632  
 
Some conditions are unpredictable and recur sporadically, so it may be difficult to 
predict the effectiveness of particular accommodations.  The most obvious examples 
are psychosocial conditions such as depression and bipolar disorder.  In Beart v HM 
Prison Service,633 an occupational health professional had recommended that an 
employee who suffered from depression be relocated to another prison after having 
difficulties with her line manager.  The Court of Appeal noted that no doctor could 
have been certain that the relocation would cure the employee’s depression, but took 
into account that the relevant doctor thought that it could.634 
  
                                                          
630 Ibid. 
631 At para 8.8.  The Committee went further and stated the following:  “Accordingly, the Committee 
concludes that the author’s rights under articles 5(1), 5(3), 25 and the State Party’s obligations under 
article 26 of the Convention, read alone and in conjunction with articles 3 (b), (d), and (e), and 4(1) (d) 
of the Convention, have been violated.”  At para 8.9 the Committee dealt with one of the 
consequences of the refusal to accommodate as follows:  “The rejection of the author’s application for 
a building permit has deprived her of access to hydrotherapy, the only option that could support her 
living and inclusion in the community.  The Committee therefore concludes that the author's rights 
under article 19(b) of the Convention, have been violated.” 
632Beart v HM Prison Service [2003] EWCA Civ 119 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2003/119.html (Accessed: 6 February 2015).  
633 Ibid. 
634 At para 43. 
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5.4.5 Unjustifiable hardship 
 
The TAG emphasise that “unjustifiable hardship” is a stricter test for employers to 
meet than the “undue hardship” standard employed in some other jurisdictions. 635  
This stricter test is said to be grounded in an appreciation of the lack of employment 
and accommodation experienced by disabled persons in South Africa.  Given the 
context-specific nature of the test, it seems that the application of whatever standard 
in particular situations, rather than what the standard is called, will be the primary 
factor in how narrowly or generously employers’ duties are interpreted.  Be that as it 
may, the negative impact of the accommodation on the business of the employer is 
an important consideration in determining whether an accommodation would cause 
unjustifiable hardship to the business of the employer. 
 
One negative impact is that the financial cost of an accommodation may be 
prohibitive for a particular employer at a particular time.  This determination does not 
apply generally across employers and over disparate time periods.636  As the TAG 
note, “[d]isabilities or impairments, jobs, equipment and technology and work design 
are dynamic in nature.”  Employers and employees therefore have to continuously 
monitor developments and make adjustments where needed and if such adjustments 
would not constitute an unjustifiable hardship.637 
 
The cost of an accommodation has both a relative and an absolute dimension.  The 
relative dimension requires the cost to be balanced against the effectiveness of the 
accommodation and the consequences of providing or failing to provide it.  In Pillay, 
Langa CJ emphasised that reasonable accommodation may “incur additional 
hardship or expense in order to allow all people to participate and enjoy all their 
rights equally.”638  He went on to say that the difficult question is not whether positive 
action is necessary, but “how far the community must be expected to go to enable 
those outside the ‘mainstream’ to swim freely in its waters.”639 
                                                          
635 TAG Item 6.11. 
636 TAG Item 6.13. 
637 Ibid. 
638 At para 73. 
639 At para 76. 
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The cost also has an absolute dimension in the sense of inquiring whether a 
particular employer can afford an accommodation.  Here the employer’s position and 
circumstances are the focus.  Some of the factors that would be relevant include: (i) 
the financial and human resources at the disposal of the employer; (ii) whether the 
employer is a public-sector or private-sector organisation; (iii) whether the employer 
is a large corporation or a small, medium or micro enterprise; and (iv) the nature of 
the employer’s business. 
 
Hardship does not only relate to financial cost.  Although practical considerations will 
often have a financial dimension, the fact that the TAG refer to “difficulty or expense 
that will seriously disrupt the operation of the business”640 (emphasis added) 
indicates that difficulties need not relate to expense.  Other forms of hardship may 
include adverse impacts on the day-to-day running of a business.  An example may 
be if the entrance to a workspace where a job applicant who uses a wheelchair is 
due to work is partially blocked and the employer is unable to wait for however long it 
would take to remove the obstacle.641 
 
Another potential hardship would be if there would be unacceptable health and 
safety risks if an accommodation were to be made.  Although IMATU and Another v 
City of Cape Town642 was not a case in which a reasonable accommodation was 
sought, it does hold important guidelines on the use of risk assessments in deciding 
whether or not employing a person with a serious health condition or impairment 
would constitute an unacceptable risk.  The City of Cape Town had refused to 
appoint Stuart Murdoch, the second applicant, as a firefighter because he was an 
insulin-dependent diabetic.  Two occupational health specialists had considered 
Murdoch’s health and fitness for duty, and despite recognising that his condition was 
optimally controlled and that he was physically fit, recommended that his application 
be refused.643  In their view, the risk of Murdoch suffering a hypoglycaemic attack 
while fighting fires may have eventuated in injury to himself, his colleagues, the 
public or the employer.644 
                                                          
640 Item 6.12. 
641 Lawson 83. 
642 (2005) 26 ILJ 1404 (LC). 




The City of Cape Town had called a risk management expert to testify on the risk 
posed by employing an insulin-dependent diabetic as a firefighter.  The Court 
summarised the salient aspects of his evidence as follows:  
 
“He testified that it is impossible to use an exact numerical yardstick of 
measurement of probability in the case of an insulin dependent diabetic 
firefighter being injured at a firefighting incident as there can be no assessment 
prior to the event of the permutation of circumstances which could lead to a 
hypoglycaemia attack coupled with circumstances in which this could lead to 
severe injury or death.  However, he relied on a riskrating tool, which applied 
numerical values to three factors: the probability of an incident where the event 
occurs (“likelihood”), the frequency of occurrence of the event (“exposure”) and 
the consequence. In assessing the risk of a severe hypo on the fire ground 
causing injury or death, Rowen pegged its likelihood as “conceivable, but very 
unlikely (hasn’t happened yet)” with a corresponding value of 0,5 out of 10; its 
exposure as “continuous” with a value of 10 out of 10; and its consequences as 
“very serious” with a value of 15 out of 100. This generated a risk score of 75 
(0,5 x 10 x 15) leading to a risk classification of “substantial risk: correction 
needed”.  This then required the removal of the risk and the best way to 
achieve that was a blanket ban on the employment of diabetics as 
firefighters.”645 
 
The Court was not satisfied with this method of risk assessment.646  Murphy AJ 
noted that while this method may have been useful for purposes of business 
planning, it was not suitable for use in justifying discrimination that would infringe the 
dignity of a group of individuals.  It relied too easily on generalised assumptions and, 
in Murdoch’s case, could not take account of critical factors such as his optimal 
control of his condition, his awareness of his blood sugar levels and his ability to 
adjust accordingly.  Those factors, in the Court’s view, would have adjusted the risk 
rating considerably.  Furthermore, there was other evidence that suggested that the 
risk was minimal.647 
                                                          
645 At para 70. 
646 At para 71. 
647 At para 72. 
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The Court reached the conclusion that the evidence, taken as a whole, indicated that 
diabetics such as Murdoch did run the real, albeit small, risk of developing 
hypoglycaemia.  However, it was clear that the risk will vary from person to person, 
which is why the ILO Convention and policies in other parts of the world require 
individualised risk assessments and that a person’s competence to perform the 
inherent requirements of a job not be based on stereotypes.648 
 
The Court’s assessment of the risks posed is commendable.  It was greatly assisted 
by the evidence of one of the foremost medical experts on diabetes in the country. 649  
This expert’s focus on the individual and what he or she is able to do was of great 
help, but it is notable that the two other medical experts who testified relied on 
generalised risk assessments without taking into account Mr Murdoch’s individual 
traits and circumstances.  While a discussion of the analysis of expert evidence by 
courts and labour tribunals falls beyond the scope of this work, it is important to note 
that the methods used by medical professionals in drawing conclusions on medical 
aspects of disability may be based on unwarranted generalisations.650 
 
5.4.6 Some procedural aspects 
 
Decisions on reasonable accommodation must be based on objective assessments 
of facts and circumstances.651  In the Lucas case, the arbitrator had the following to 
                                                          
648 At paras 73-77. 
649 At para 30, Murphy AJ noted that “the court had the benefit of the evidence of South Africa’s 
leading authority on diabetes, Prof Bonnici, who is also an accredited expert internationally.” 
650 See M du Plessis and L Meintjes-Van der Walt. “Forensic Entomology:  Relevant to Legal Dispute 
Resolution?” (2004) 29(3) Journal for Juridical Science 100 at 113-114 for a discussion on some 
aspects relating to the probative value of expert testimony.  Of particular relevance is the following 
dictum of the Appellate Division (now the Supreme Court of Appeal) (per Wessels JA) in Coopers 
(South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämfung MbH 1976 (3) SA 352 (A) 
371F-G: 
“[A]n expert's opinion represents his reasoned conclusion based on certain facts on data, which 
are either common cause, or established by his own evidence or that of some other competent 
witness.  Except possibly where it is not controverted, an expert's bald statement of his opinion 
is not of any real assistance.  Proper evaluation of the opinion can only be undertaken if the 
process of reasoning which led to the conclusion, including the premises from which the 
reasoning proceeds, are disclosed by the expert [emphasis in the original].” 
651 TAG Item 6.12.  For an application of this principle, see Smith v Churchills Stairlifts plc [2005] 
EWCA Civ 1220, in which a business which sold, inter alia, radiator cabinets, insisted that its sales 
representatives carry full-sized products with them when meeting potential clients.  Mr Smith had 
applied for a position as a sales representative, but could not carry a full-sized cabinet due to his 
medical condition.  The employer refused to adapt its sales strategy to allow Mr Smith to work with a 
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say about the process to be followed: 
 
“It would seem that deciding what is reasonable depends on the circumstances 
of the workplace and the employee.  The employer and the employee should 
adopt a collaborative problem-solving approach to modify employment 
practices to give the employee with the disability opportunities for job 
performance that would be similar, if not equal to a similarly situated employee 
who does not have any disabilities.  How much and what kind of adjustments 
are “reasonable” is difficult to determine. […]  The goal is ultimately to facilitate 
greater retention and employment for people with disabilities.  Of course one 
would have to consider the extent, the purpose, arrangements of the 
accommodation and the employer’s resources.”652 
 
The employer should consult the employee and, where necessary, technical experts.  
In Ferreira, the Labour Court held that the failure by a big retail bank to refer the 
employee to an occupational therapist was unreasonable.653  The employer would 
have been better able to assess the possibilities for accommodation had an expert 
assessment been made.   
 
Consultations between the disabled employee, the employer and any technical 
experts have to take place in good faith and the employee must be made aware of 
the role of external role players.  In Lucas, Christie A found that it was not objectively 
justifiable for the employee to have refused to submit to an assessment by an 
occupational therapist, but that the employee had reasonably formed the impression 
that such an assessment was not directed at her retention, but at her dismissal. 654  
The consultative nature of the process was also evident in that the arbitrator held 
that Mrs Lucas could correct what she viewed as factual errors in the occupational 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
smaller model of the cabinet and withdrew the offer of sending him on a training course after he had 
passed the interview stage.  The Court held (at paras 44, 45 and 50) that in the determination of 
reasonableness the fact that an employer “held a view that was genuine, relevant to the 
circumstances and which provided a more than insignificant reason for the treatment” did not preclude 
a court or tribunal from holding that the employer should nevertheless have made the adjustment. 
652 National Education Health and Allied Workers’ Union (NEHAWU) obo Lucas and Department of 
Health (Western Cape) (2004) 25 ILJ 2091 (BCA) 2103C-E. 
653 Ferreira and Standard Bank of SA (2006) 27 ILJ 1547 (CCMA) para 46. 
654 National Education Health and Allied Workers’ Union (NEHAWU) obo Lucas and Department of 
Health (Western Cape) (2004) 25 ILJ 2091 (BCA) para 44. 
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therapist’s report.655  However, she could not request that the occupational therapist 
change her findings and recommendations.656  
 
5.5 Positive duties, social understandings of disability and substantive 
equality 
 
Reasonable accommodation has clearly been accorded a central place in the legal 
framework that seeks to contribute to substantive equality.  It is a definite step 
forward in the realisation of substantive equality, because it proceeds from the 
starting point that unequal treatment may sometimes be necessary to show equal 
respect and concern.  It aids in the construction of difference as a positive aspect of 
society in that it encourages the inclusion of people who may have to go about 
achieving work tasks in different ways.  It also encourages decision-makers not to 
rely on stereotypes about disabled people, because it requires an individualised 
assessment of an employee’s abilities and requirements for accommodation.  In 
terms of process, the required consultations with disabled people regarding 
accommodations that may be necessary will contribute towards awareness raising, 
which may in turn influence more people’s understanding of disability as social 
oppression and lead to reflections on how the environment and social processes can 
be made to be more inclusive. 
 
However, such a context-specific remedy brings its own challenges.  There are 
various aspects inherent to reasonable accommodation as a measure, as well as 
aspects related to its implementation and enforcement, that place constraints on its 
potential to contribute to substantive equality in the recruitment and selection of 
disabled people. 
 
The first class of constraints operates because reasonable accommodation is 
individualised.  It requires the appearance of a specific employee whose situation 
                                                          




has to be assessed and whose needs must be balanced against those of the 
employer.  Complex, process-driven change initiated and sustained by managers at 
all levels and colleagues who do not view difference as inherently negative or 
substantive equality as the privileging of marginalised persons or groups, are 
required.   
 
I will argue here that various aspects of reasonable accommodation and how it is 
implemented and enforced in South Africa constrain its ability to contribute to 
substantive equality.  Each of these is subsequently discussed in more detail.  
Firstly, disability is not constructed as social oppression, which weakens the impetus 
to change workplaces from the outset.  Secondly, the command-and-control 
approach to regulation under the EEA means that attitudinal barriers are not 
addressed, and that insufficient financial and human resources are available to 
create and sustain the complex processes required for transformative change.   
 
Thirdly, reasonable accommodation and its focus on individualised solutions has the 
potential to be applied in ways that allow particular disabled individuals to participate 
without addressing the structural norms that caused the exclusion in the first place.  
Fourthly, reasonable accommodation processes may become oppressive if they 
privilege medical power and authority at the expense of disabled people’s 
experiences.  Finally, there may be ways in which applicants for employment who 
require accommodation are at a relative disadvantage to existing employees who 
require accommodation. 
 
5.5.1 Failure to construct disability as social oppression 
 
Within contemporary South African social relations, race and, to a lesser extent, 
gender, are associated with oppression.  Individual, medicalised conceptions of 
disability predominate.657  Unfortunately, this hegemony of individual conceptions 
persists in the TAG. 
  
                                                          
657 See 4.4.4.1. 
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Throughout the TAG, the examples that are used to frame the situation in which 
reasonable accommodation has to be provided emphasise people’s impairments 
rather than how the environment or social processes are not suited to accommodate 
these.  The following is an example of what appears: 
 
“Situation 
A call centre consultant with a physical disability has difficulty typing with his/ 
her hands at great speed. 
Solution 
At minimal cost to the employer, the consultant is allowed to type with a mouth 
stick or use voice input/output depending on preference, both of which allow the 
consultant to fall within the acceptable typing speed range.”658 
 
If a social understanding of disability had been employed, the focus of the situational 
analysis would have been that the typing facilities were not amenable to use by 
people who do not type optimally with their fingers or that the targets may have been 
unreasonable.  Abberley makes a similar point when he objects to how questions 
regarding the prevalence and nature of disabilities are framed in many censuses and 
surveys.659  He uses the following illustrations from a survey conducted in England, 
Wales and Scotland.  The questions reflect an individual, medical conception of 
disability: 
“1) What complaint causes you difficulty in holding, gripping or turning things?  
2) Do you have a scar, blemish or deformity which limits your daily activities?  
3) Have you attended a special school because of a long-term health problem 
or disability?  
4) Does your health problem/ disability affect your work in any way at 
present?”660  
                                                          
658 TAG Item 6.1. 
659 Abberley ‘Significance of Work’ 4. 
660 Abberley ‘Significance of Work’ 3. 
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Abberley then formulates the same questions from the perspective of the social 
model of disability: 
“1a) What defects in the design of everyday equipment like jars, bottles and lids 
causes you difficulty in holding, gripping or turning them?  
2a) Do other people’s reactions to any scar, blemish or deformity you may have 
limit your daily activities?  
3a) Have you attended a special school because of your education authority’s 
policy of sending people with your long-term health problem or disability to such 
places?  
4a) Do you have problems at work as a result of the physical environment or 
the attitudes of others?”661 
The focus in the second set of questions is on how environmental and attitudinal 
barriers, sometimes in conjunction with a person’s personal characteristics, disable 
them.   
 
As discussed above, locating disability in the individual rather than in social 
processes and physical environments absolves dominant groups from responsibility.  
As Minow points out, locating difference in social relations means that disadvantage 
flowing from such difference “becomes a problem of social choice and meaning, a 
problem for which all onlookers are responsible.”662  In the realm of reasonable 
accommodation, if the starting point is that the job applicant’s impairment is the 
'situation', it is easier for those who bear reasonable accommodation duties to view 
them as 'favours' to disabled people.   
 
This starting point is at odds with a view of accommodation for disabled people as 
one way in which to adapt society so that more people can participate.  As Langa CJ 
pointed out in the Pillay case, “[d]isabled people are often unable to access or 
participate in public or private life because the means to do so are designed for able-
bodied people.”663  Workplaces are structured in ways that facilitate performance by 
                                                          
661 Ibid. 
662 Minow ‘Making All the Difference’ 119. 
663 MEC for Education:  KwaZulu-Natal and Others v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) para 74. 
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people without disabilities;664 in that sense, choices have been made to 
accommodate people without disabilities.  That basic premise, I submit, is the one 
that ought to permeate the TAG.  Unfortunately, in terms of explaining the 
circumstances that may warrant accommodation, the TAG reverts to individual 
understandings of disability and blunts appreciation of disability as social oppression.  
 
5.5.2 Proactive duties, but reactive, command-and-control enforcement 
 
The positive duties in the EEA are proactive to some extent, but a major weakness 
lies in the enforcement of the duties, including reasonable accommodation.  Hepple 
argues that a paradox of many transformative equality schemes is that “while one of 
the main aims of such schemes is to increase the participation of disadvantaged 
groups in institutions, the introduction and implementation of the schemes only rarely 
involve the active participation of those groups.”665  As a result, the holders of power 
design schemes that rely on top-down, command-and-control enforcement 
mechanisms.666 
 
He cites two theoretical reasons for what he terms the failure of transformative 
equality schemes that rely on top-down enforcement.667  Firstly, they interfere with 
rights to private property, which most holders of power resist, and do not pay 
attention to mediating the tensions between substantive equality and private 
property.  Secondly, transformative equality schemes rely on law to effect social 
change, but are underpinned by a hierarchical view of society with law at the top.  
 
The EEA, unfortunately, illustrates these weaknesses.  The emphasis here is not on 
the regulatory scheme, so an extensive discussion thereof will not be done.  
                                                          
664 JO Cooper. “Overcoming Barriers to Employment:  The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation 
and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act.” (1991) 139(5) University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1423 at 1430. 
665 B Hepple. “Transformative Equality:  The Role of Democratic Participation.” (2013). 
www.upf.edu/gredtiss/_pdf/2013-LLRNConf_SirBobHepple.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 
(hereinafter referred to as “Hepple ‘Transformative Equality’”) 1-2.  
666 Hepple ‘Transformative Equality’ 2. 
667 Hepple ‘Transformative Equality’ 4 and 7. 
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However, one example that lies at the heart of the first weakness identified by 
Hepple will be used.  This is the TAG’s approach to the costs of reasonable 
accommodation to employers. 
 
These guidelines state:   
“Although employers are not required to provide accommodation that poses an 
‘unjustifiable hardship’, it is a well-known fact that employing the wrong person 
for the job results in greater expense in the long run.  Employers often report 
that the benefits to employing people with disabilities often outweigh the cost of 
reasonable accommodation.”668    
 
The “well-known fact” that job mismatching leads to greater costs is not referenced 
or explained.  There is no explanation of how “employing the wrong person for the 
job” is relevant to providing reasonable accommodation.  There may be other 
applicants without disabilities who are also “right” for the job and, as some law and 
economics scholars in the US have pointed out, it would be perfectly rational for 
employers to want to minimise costs in their organisation in the short term.669   
 
The rationale for employers having to bear costs is not linked to the systemic 
oppression of disabled people and how employers are implicated in redistribution.  
Instead, a weak case regarding the instrumental value of employing disabled people 
is proffered.  Various critiques have been leveled against the use of the business 
case for ensuring redistribution.  Nkomo, for example, writes in the context of 
affirmative action as applied in two South African organisations: 
 
“[I]nstrumental positioning of diversity (i.e. as competitive advantage) may 
result in diluting the value of diversity because inclusion often requires 
assimilation to organisational priorities.  Indeed, black, coloured, and Indian 
                                                          
668 TAG Item 6.14.1. 
669 See 5.2.1. 
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employees were valued as long as they fitted into the existing organisational 
culture.  A very instrumental orientation may also lead to a neglect of social 
justice whose main goal is to redress inequalities between dominant and 
oppressed groups.”670 
 
It may be strategically beneficial to emphasise the instrumental value of diversity.  
However, if this aspect is over-emphasised, it may inhibit changes to assimilationist, 
oppressive norms.  A culture may develop in which organisations use diversity to 
their benefit when it is expedient to do so, but without centering social justice 
concerns or the rights of marginalised groups.  
 
Hepple671 has advocated for the use of ‘reflexive regulation’, which differs from a 
command-and-control approach in that it seeks to tap into the motivations, customs 
and structures of those who are regulated.672  In a reflexive scheme, incentives are 
provided for organisations to self-reflect and to engage with interest groups.  The 
state or enforcement agency provides information and advice and negotiates 
change.  Deterrent sanctions are used as a last resort.  If one assesses the EEA’s 
scheme for enforcing positive duties against these characteristics of ‘reflexive 
regulation’, some of its shortcomings are emphasised. 
 
5.5.3 Limitations in enforcement 
 
The EEA and the Code of Good Practice:  EE Plans do not expand on the details of 
the consultative processes required.  Although there is limited empirical information 
                                                          
670 S Nkomo. “Moving from the Letter of the Law to the Spirit of the Law:  The Challenges of Realising 
the Intent of Employment Equity and Affirmative Action.” (2011) 77(1) Transformation:  Critical 
Perspectives on Southern Africa 122 at 131. 
671 Hepple ‘Transformative Equality’ 12. 
672 On such an approach, the reasons why businesses may not hire people with disabilities will be 
examined and strategies to address these barriers will underpin the regulatory response.  See, for 
example, B Peck and LT Kirkbride. “Why Businesses Don’t Employ People with Disabilities.” (2001) 
16(2) Journal of Vocational Rehabilitation 71.  These authors consider fears that may prevent 
employers from hiring people with disabilities, such as fears over unknown costs of hiring disabled 
persons, fears that disabled employees may require additional supervision and that this may have an 
adverse impact on productivity, fears that it may be difficult to dismiss disabled employees who do not 
perform and fears that disabled persons are not qualified to perform well.  They also suggest 
strategies that vocational rehabilitation specialists may adopt to alleviate these fears. 
180 
 
on the enforcement of positive duties under the EEA, two studies in this regard were 
conducted and reported on in 2005 and 2008, respectively.673  A review of 
consultation with trade unions under the EEA, carried out by the Graduate School of 
Business at the University of Cape Town, showed that trade unions agreed on the 
following: (i) they are not properly consulted on employment equity; (ii) employers 
only provided them with information relating to, and consulted them on, basic 
matters; (iii) they [trade unions] did not place employment equity high on the agenda, 
partly because shop stewards were not well equipped to monitor employment equity 
measures and their implementation; and (iv) they relied on government to enforce 
affirmative action.674 
 
A 2008 study commissioned by the Department of Labour showed that in Gauteng 
province, labour inspectors were of the view that the most serious problems were 
that employment equity plans were not central to workplaces and that employment 
equity forums were not representative.675  This limited representation is likely to be 
exacerbated for disabled people, who are under-represented in workplaces in 
general.676  An official at the Department of Labour also admitted that the 
Department had not enforced the EEA optimally since 2001 and that the emphasis 
was on measuring procedural compliance.677 
 
These consultation processes are not directly relevant to job applicants, but may 
affect them indirectly.  Workplaces that have a culture of consultation and are used 
to engaging with employees may be more likely to be receptive to requests for 
reasonable accommodation at all stages of the employment process.  The 
transaction costs of assessing job applicants’ reasonable accommodation needs and 
                                                          
673 Hepple ‘Transformative Equality’ 21-22. 
674 Cited in Hepple ‘Transformative Equality 21. 
675 Cited in Hepple ‘Transformative Equality’ 22. 
676 See 1.1. 
677 Hepple ‘Transformative Equality’ 22. 
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taking decisions on whether accommodation can be provided are also likely to be 
lower for employers who are already engaging in such processes.678   
 
5.5.4 Need for more guidance 
 
The EEA does not offer much ongoing advice and support to employers regarding 
compliance with the latter’s positive duties.  The CEE is established by the EEA. 679  
It consists of a chairperson and eight other part-time members.680  Its principal 
functions relate to advice to the Minister of Labour and issuing reports to the Minister 
regarding compliance with the Act.681  These functions are limited if one considers 
the inadequate awareness of disability issues and the fact that exclusion of disabled 
people often inheres in standard work processes and environments, the relative 
novelty to employers of having to provide reasonable accommodation and the fact 
that many impairments raise medical issues about which many employers may be 
unable to consult technical experts.   
  
                                                          
678 RH Coase. “The Problem of Social Cost.” (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 at 15 set out 
some of the costs associated with transactions:   
“In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes 
to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct 
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.” 
Harris ‘Disabilities Accommodations’ 6 notes that commentators have also added other costs of 
market transactions, including those relating to search and information gathering, bargaining and 
decision-making.  He argues (at 607) that because the scope and content of reasonable 
accommodations are deliberately left open-ended, the transaction costs of negotiating these 
accommodations are generally higher than for other discrimination-related matters. 
679 Section 28. 
680 Section 29(1) of the EEA. 
681 These functions are set out in s 30 of the EEA: 
“(1) The Commission advises the Minister on— 
(a) codes of good practice issued by the Minister in terms of section 54; 
(b) regulations made by the Minister in terms of section 55; and 
(c) policy and any other matter concerning this Act. 
(2) In addition to the functions in subsection (1) the Commission may— 
(a) make awards recognising achievements of employers in furthering the purpose of this Act; 
(b) research and report to the Minister on any matter relating to the application of this Act, including 
appropriate and well researched norms and benchmarks for the setting of numerical goals in various 
sectors; and 
(c) perform any other prescribed function.” 
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More can be done to offer support to employers.  The US Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission, for example, offers extensive enforcement guidelines on 
reasonable accommodation for specific kinds of disabilities, for specific classes of 
employers such as small businesses, and the establishment of procedures to 
facilitate reasonable accommodation.682  If resources are limited, it may be possible 
to channel support to employers through, for example, DPOs, organisations such as 
the Human Rights Commission and tertiary institutions.  
 
5.5.5 Attitudinal barriers to effective enforcement 
 
A disturbing trend in many of the admittedly small sample of reported cases is that 
employers often failed to make any attempt to accommodate and, if they did, they 
failed to communicate effectively with the disabled employee or, where applicable, 
relevant technical advisers.  In Lucas, for example, the arbitrator noted that it was 
not clear from the employer’s evidence what steps it had taken to accommodate an 
employee with back problems.683  Any attempts made seemed to have been initiated 
by her trade union representative.684 
 
Some cases also illustrate the limited awareness of disability as social oppression, 
how employers are implicated in the problem and their responsibilities in ensuring 
substantive equality.  In both Singh685 and Gebhardt,686 the relevant employers were 
aware that the relevant job applicants were disabled.  Both these employers were 
organs of state and showed scant regard for the disability rights of the two 
applicants.  In Singh, the response was that disability is not one of the factors to be 
taken into account in appointing magistrates – the emphasis falls on race and 
                                                          
682 See US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. “Selected Enforcement Guidances and 
Other Policy Documents on the ADA.” (1993-2007) 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/disability_guidance.cfm (Accessed: 6 February 2015). 
683 National Education Health and Allied Workers’ Union (NEHAWU) obo Lucas and Department of 
Health (Western Cape) (2004) 25 ILJ 2091 (BCA) para 31. 
684 Ibid. 
685 2013 (3) SA 66 (EqC). 
686 Gebhardt v Education Labour Relations Council and Others (2013) 34 ILJ 1183 (LC). 
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gender.687  In Gebhardt, the employer justified its decision on the basis that the 
human resource management system did not reflect that the applicant had a 
disability.688   
 
Robert Masambo, the chairperson of DPSA, in a parliamentary meeting in March 
2013 suggested some reasons why not all state departments have met the target of 
having 2% of their staff complement being disabled people: 
 
“Firstly, more work had to be done to change attitudes about disability, 
especially amongst senior public representatives and public servants, as they 
still saw disability from a welfare and medical perspective.  DPSA lamented the 
fact that certain departments were chasing targets, but were not really adding 
value to employment of disabled persons, in that they were employing disabled 
people at entry level positions only, and employing them ‘categorically’. […] 
There was one disabled senior state official who had been employed, but had 
not been provided with a personal assistant, and his spouse had been required 
to help with overall administration of their office.  DPSA emphasised that 
whenever someone was employed, reasonable accommodation must be 
provided to cater for needs, as virtually nothing had been done in this direction 
to date.”689 
 
Another potential attitudinal barrier lies in the tension that may develop between 
various designated groups.  The potential for this tension is illustrated by the facts in 
Gebhardt v Education Labour Relations Council and Others.690  Ms Gebhardt, a 
White woman, had been employed by the Western Cape Education Department 
since 1992.  In 2003, she suffered severe bouts of vertigo related to a middle-ear 
disease that affected her hearing to the point that she was deaf by 2006.  In April of 
that year she applied for a promotional post.  Even though she scored the highest in 
                                                          
687 At paras 20-22. 
688 At para 9. 
689 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘DPSA Briefing on Education’ 2. 
690 (2013) 34 ILJ 1183 (LC). 
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respect of selection criteria and was the preferred candidate, she was not appointed.  
Instead, Ms Van Voore, a Coloured woman, was appointed because in terms of the 
employer’s employment equity targets Coloured women were under-represented in 
the further education and training sector. 
 
As it transpired, the respondent employer had simply not taken Ms Gebhardt’s 
disability into account.  However, an underlying concern is how to create buy-in for 
restitutionary measures for disabled people when these measures seem to clash 
with providing restitution to Black people and women.  Given the history of racial 
oppression in South Africa, White disabled people are more likely to have had 
access to educational and other opportunities that will allow them a competitive 
advantage relative to their Black counterparts.  That is an issue that relates to the 
targeting of affirmative action measures and falls beyond the scope of the discussion 
here.  However, what is clear is that difficult issues regarding the intersection of race, 
gender and disability may affect implementers’ receptiveness to work towards 
improving access to employment for disabled people.  
 
5.5.6 Constraints facing job applicants 
 
The reported cases on reasonable accommodation of disability have mostly arisen in 
the context of dismissals for incapacity or misconduct.691  In light of this fact, as well 
as the fact that reported cases do not provide a holistic picture of what happens in 
organisations, it is difficult to assess how reasonable accommodation has impacted 
access to work for disabled job applicants.  There are ways, however, in which job 
applicants are likely to face different challenges than those disabled people who are 
already in employment. 
                                                          
691 See McLean v Sasol Mine (Pty) Ltd Secunda Collieries; McLean v Sasol Pension Fund 2003 (6) 
SA 254 (W); National Education Health and Allied Workers’ Union (NEHAWU) obo Lucas and 
Department of Health (Western Cape) (2004) 25 ILJ 2091 (BCA); Ferreira and Standard Bank of SA 
(2006) 27 ILJ 1547 (CCMA); Wylie and Standard Executors and Trustees (2006) 27 ILJ 2210 
(CCMA); Standard Bank of South Africa v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and 
Others (2008) 29 ILJ 1239 (LC); Abels and Dialogue Group (Pty) Ltd (2009) 30 ILJ 2167 (CCMA); 
Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union obo Strydom v Witzenberg Municipality and Others 
(2012) 33 ILJ 1081 (LAC); Granchelli and SA Revenue Service (2012) 33 ILJ 2481 (CCMA); and L S 
v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2014) 35 ILJ 2205 (LC). 
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Employers’ attitudes in general may be less receptive to providing reasonable 
accommodation to job applicants than to existing employees.  This may flow from 
employers’ belief that they owe a greater duty to current employees than to job 
applicants.  In contrast, they may hold the view that they should be unencumbered in 
their hiring decisions, a belief that flows from the sanctity of private property and the 
‘free market’ as the neutral, objective arbiter of relationships between all economic 
actors, as discussed in Chapter 3.692  Furthermore, faced with other appointable 
applicants, employers may simply justify the non-appointment of a disabled applicant 
on the basis that a more suitable person was appointed.  
 
Structural features of the South African labour market militate against the provision 
of reasonable accommodation.  There is a significant labour surplus in South Africa, 
especially at lower levels where most disabled people are likely to apply for posts.  
Triangular employment relationships in which labour brokers act as go-betweens 
between their clients and employees also create challenges.  While the law regards 
the labour broker as the employer, the client is the one that has to agree to 
reasonable accommodation measures.  Given the power dynamics between clients 
and labour brokers, disabled employees may be sacrificed to keep clients happy.  
This was prevented from occurring in Abels,693 and in Hoffmann the Constitutional 
Court emphasised that client preferences that are discriminatory do not justify 
employers’ discrimination.694  Despite these principles, a disabled applicant has to 
challenge the decision, which may be difficult. 
 
Attitudinal barriers may persist in the face of legal duties, especially if those duties 
are enforced in a manner that emphasises disability targets at the expense of the 
work experiences of disabled persons.  Seirlis emphasises the importance of 
attitudinal factors: 
 
“[I]n many cases, the reasonable accommodation issue does not lie with 
satisfying a physical requirement that the person with a disability needs.  
Accommodation lies rather with sensitising existing employees to honour and 
                                                          
692 See 3.2.2. 
693 Abels and Dialogue Group (Pty) Ltd (2009) 30 ILJ 2167 (CCMA). 
694 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 34. 
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respect the skills of the person with a disability and to understand the nature of 
the disability in order to develop a team spirit that is conducive to the 
deployment of those very skills that were employed.  It is this attitude in the 
workplace that commands the success or failure of introducing a person with a 
disability to the workplace – and these attitudinal factors, I boldly state, are far 
more important than obeying the letter of any law.  Persons with disabilities 
(along with many black people and women) have had far too many experiences 
of being tolerated as a ‘requirement’ or of being cynically used as ‘window 
dressing’, for us to underestimate the importance of attitudes.”695 
 
Another structural barrier faced by disabled job applicants is that recruitment is often 
not inclusive, a situation that may be exacerbated by the fact that many disabled 
people do not have access to networks that would allow them to participate.  The 
Public Service Commission, for example, has commented that current recruitment 
strategies in the public service were ineffective in reaching disabled people and that 
a combination of recruitment techniques should be used.696  One of these strategies 
is to work with DPOs.  Another is to work with, for example, tertiary institutions, 
schools and other organisations that may link prospective employers with 
prospective disabled employees.  Government’s role in facilitating access to 
employment by disabled people will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
5.6 Positive duties and structural change 
 
Ngwena argues that reasonable accommodation offers much in the way of 
transformative equality, but that there are significant constraints to its utility, foremost 
of which is the fact that employers are expected to bear the cost of 
accommodation.697  This ‘privatisation’ of redistribution means that accommodation 
                                                          
695 A Seirlis and L Swartz. Entrepreneurship, Employment and Skills Development:  Ari Seirlis in 
Conversation. In: B Watermeyer, L Swartz, T Lorenzo, M Schneider and M Priestley (eds). Disability 
and Social Change:  A South African Agenda. (2006) 361 at 364.  For a recent study on attitudes to 
disabled persons in the employment context, see C Wiggett-Barnard. Disability Employment Attitudes 
and Practices in South African Companies:  A Survey and Case Studies. (2013).   
696 Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘DPSA Briefing on Education’ 3. 
697 Ngwena ‘Search for Equality’ 500. 
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will be heavily dependent on the resources the employer has at its disposal relative 
to the expense required by a particular adjustment.698  There may be ways to 
subsidise accommodation costs and to create public-private partnerships to share 
the financial burden of accommodation, but such schemes do not yet exist in South 
Africa.  Possibilities created by the legislative and policy framework relating to 
employment services will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Another reason why reasonable accommodation is less transformative than it may 
initially appear is that it may create the possibility that some disabled people can 
participate without addressing the norms and practices that constitute the bulk of the 
structural oppression disabled people experience.  Seirlis has pointed out, for 
example, that reasonable accommodation, when used to refer to major structural 
changes to buildings to improve accessibility, shifts the focus from the fact that 
building regulations regarding accessibility should be complied with.699  It is the 
anticipatory duty to remove structural barriers that will be more effective, not 
reasonable accommodation and its focus on specific, situation-sensitive and cost-
effective solutions borne by individual employers.  The difficulty is that courts are 
likely to find that employers are not the ones who have to bear anticipatory duties.  
These duties therefore have to be performed by other role players, one of which is 
the state.  The issue of state obligations and their role in facilitating access to 
employment for disabled people will be addressed in the next chapter. 
 
5.7 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has engaged with the positive duties on employers to facilitate access 
to employment for disabled people.  While there is a combination of positive non-
discrimination duties and affirmative action duties, it was found that the positive 
discrimination duties were more powerful in securing immediate remedies for 
aggrieved persons.  However, these remedies do not necessarily lead to the 
establishment of structures that are receptive to and that can facilitate the inclusion 
                                                          
698 Ibid. 
699 Seirlis and Swartz 363-364. 
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of disabled persons.  The affirmative action structures established by the EEA may 
therefore be of some assistance in this regard.  However, the command-and-control 
regulatory approach to the enforcement of the EEA inhibits its potential to enrich 
consultation processes and to lead to change that is deeper than a mere focus on 
demographic representation. 
 
The reasonable accommodation duty, which is central to the legislative mechanism 
for advancing disabled people’s access to employment, has various advantages.  
However, costs to the employer are a significant limitation to its potential, as is the 
reactive, adversarial enforcement mechanism that, for various reasons, may be 
difficult for disabled job applicants to assert.  Furthermore, reasonable 
accommodation may include individual disabled people within employment without 
addressing the structural features of disabled people’s exclusion.  Courts are unlikely 
to hold employers liable for such exclusion, which means that at a macro level, the 
state’s duties to facilitate access to employment for disabled people have to be 






CHAPTER 6:  POSITIVE STATE DUTIES IN RESPECT OF ACCESS 




In the previous chapter, one of the main themes was the fact that the employer’s 
positive duties, including the duty to reasonably accommodate disabled employees, 
are applicable at the level of individual firms.  As a result, their scope is limited to the 
micro sphere and to disabled persons who are already in a position to take 
advantage of whatever employment opportunities exist – people who are suitably 
qualified.  In order to advance change that is more structural in nature, we will have 
to look to the state’s role in promoting redistribution and providing the support and 
assistance that disabled people may need in various socio-economic spheres.700 
 
In light of the weakening power of the nation state in a globalised world, the state 
fulfilling duties may not be the powerful mechanism it once was.701  However, in a 
labour surplus economy in which job creation is not occurring at satisfactory rates 702 
and in a context of gaping inequalities,703 active labour market interventions to 
                                                          
700 See E McLaughlin. “From Negative to Positive Equality Duties:  The Development and 
Constitutionalisation of Equality Provisions in the UK.” (2007) 6(1) Social Policy and Society 111, who 
argues that a country’s ‘equality regime’ consists of its “equality law together with the total 
redistributive or equalizing impact of its social welfare system.”  See, also, Bhabha ‘Disability Equality’ 
at 219, who writes:   
“As one of society’s most disadvantaged groups, often living precariously near or in poverty, 
protection of the interests of the disabled almost always requires positive measures.  The 
interrelation of equality and other rights, especially socio-economic rights, is therefore 
indispensable.” 
701 Hepple ‘Transformative Equality’ 5 asserts:   
“In the present period of almost unrestrained financial capitalism in which large sums of capital 
can be moved around the globe at the touch of a computer, the weakness of nation states in 
protecting the poor and vulnerable against the growing power of corporate private property is 
self-evident.” 
702 See 6.2.3.1. 
703 M Leibbrandt, A Finn and I Woolard. “Describing and Decomposing Post-Apartheid Income 
Inequality in South Africa.” (2012) 29(1) Development Southern Africa 19 at 26 conclude that money-
metric inequality in South Africa, on aggregate and intra-racially, has increased between 1993 and 
2008.  One of the striking findings (at 22) relates to the concentration of income across the 
distribution:  
“The results indicate that income has become increasingly concentrated in the top decile.  In 
fact, in 2008 the wealthiest 10% accounted for 58% of total income.  This trend is evident even 
within the top decile itself, as the richest 5% maintain a 43% share of total income, up from 
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support groups that are disproportionately disadvantaged, such as the youth, Black 
people, women, people in rural areas and disabled people, become imperative.704    
 
In addition to demand-side interventions, supply-side interventions are necessary to 
ensure that disabled people are able to make use of the opportunities with which 
they are presented.  Any job creation initiatives are bound to prove ineffective if we 
are unable to address the causes of disadvantage that may be present all along the 
private-public continuum of disabled people’s lives.  This is a central premise of the 
capability approach, as discussed in Chapter 3.705  It is also consistent with social-
model analyses of work that “reject the notion that unemployment and 
underemployment among disabled workers can be understood in isolation from other 
factors such as education, transport, the built environment, access, ideology and 
culture.”706 
 
6.1.1 Broad objectives 
 
It is not possible to address all those state duties that will contribute towards access 
to work for disabled people.  Instead, I will discuss the relevance of the content and 
implementation of one constitutional right, namely the right of access to social  
security, to this project.  I focus on this right because it is not clear whether the scope 
of the right encompasses access to work.  I will argue here that a combination of this 
right, together with an emphasis on substantive equality, can inform an approach 
that allows disabled people who are willing and able to work to gain access to such 
work.  The approach will also allow those who are not able to work to have their 
citizenship affirmed.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
about 38% in 1993.  Furthermore, the cumulative share of income accruing to the poorest 50% 
dropped from 8.32% in 1993 to 7.79% in 2008.” 
704 J Seekings. “Taking Disadvantage Seriously:  The ‘Underclass’ in Post-Apartheid South Africa.” 
(2014) 84(1) Africa 135 at 136 writes:  
“South Africa’s poor comprise both working poor and unemployed, and many poor households 
include both working poor and unemployed people.  The poor thus stand to benefit from both 
job creation and higher wages (unless higher wages result in job destruction).  Many 
unemployed people live in households with working people, and would benefit indirectly if such 
working people received higher wages.” 
705 See 3.3.2. 
706 Barnes ‘Working Social Model?’ 444.  See, also Seirlis and Swartz 363. 
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Furthermore, our understanding of the right may be enriched by considering the 
implications of the debates on social understandings of disability and substantive 
equality for the state’s duty to provide access to social security.  At the same time, 
the examination of how the right is to be realised may provide insights into the 
practical import of the theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
6.1.2 Chapter structure 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows:  Part 2 contains a summary of the salient features 
of the right to access to social security, as contained in jurisprudence and academic 
commentary.  In Part 3, I consider how access to work may be implicated in the right, 
if at all.  The focus in Part 4 is on some legislative measures for the provision of 
employment services and analysing these measures in light of disabled people’s 
rights to access to social security and to equality.  
 
6.2 The rights dimension of access to social security 
 
6.2.1 Duties imposed by the Bill of Rights in respect of all rights 
 
The right to access to social security is enforceable, because s 2 of the Constitution 
states that all the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled, while s 7(2) requires the 
state to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”.  These 
duties are imposed in respect of all the rights in the Bill of Rights, regardless of 
whether they are civil and political rights or socio-economic rights.707   
  
                                                          
707 In Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly:  In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras 77-78, the Constitutional Court 
rejected arguments that socio-economic rights should not be justiciable because these rights infringe 
on the separation of powers and because they invariably have implications for the way public money 
is spent.  The Court held that the enforcement of civil and political rights may also have budgetary 
implications.  It does not follow that, because socio-economic rights are more likely to have budgetary 
implications, such rights require courts to encroach impermissibly on the powers of the legislature and 




The primary duty to respect implies a duty to refrain from impairing or otherwise 
interfering with the enjoyment of a right holder’s rights.708  The secondary duty to 
protect does not require the transfer of money or resources directly to people, but 
rather that the state must establish and sustain legislative and other frameworks 
within which rights are protected without interference from others.709  The tertiary 
duty to promote and fulfil rights is less precise in scope and will largely depend on 
how the rights in question are formulated.710  Sometimes the state will have to 
facilitate rights holders’ realisation of their rights and, at other times, the state will 
have to provide food, healthcare or water when people cannot provide for 
themselves.711  All these duties are relevant to the scope of the right to access to 
social security. 
 
6.2.2 General interpretive principles 
 
A few general interpretive principles apply when decisions are made on the content 
and scope of rights.  Firstly, the right has to be interpreted in its textual, as well as its 
social and historical context.712  With regard to its text, an all-important principle is 
that all the rights in the Bill of Rights are interrelated and mutually supporting.713  We 
cannot, therefore, interpret the right in isolation from the other rights in the Bill of 
Rights.  For present purposes, our emphasis will be on the interrelationship of the 
right to access to social security and the right to equality. 
  
                                                          
708 UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. “General Comment No. 19, The Right to 
Social Security.” (2008) http://www.refworld.org/docid/47b17b5b39c.html (Accessed: 17 May 2015) 
(hereinafter referred to as “UN ‘General Comment 19’”) para 44.  See, also, Jaftha v Schoeman and 
Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) paras 31-34 for a discussion of the 
negative state duty in respect of the right to access to adequate housing. 
709 UN ‘General Comment 19’ paras 45-46.  See, also, P De Vos. “Pious Wishes or Directly 
Enforceable Human Rights?  Social and Economic Rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution.” (1997) 
13(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 67 (hereinafter referred to as “De Vos ‘Pious Wishes’”) 
at 83. 
710 De Vos ‘Pious Wishes’ 86. 
711 UN ‘General Comment 19’ refers to only three levels of duties, but states that the duty to “fulfil” can 
be subdivided into a duty to facilitate, promote and provide (at paras 47-51). 
712 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 
22. 
713 Grootboom para 23.   
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A consideration of the social and historical context of the right has to take into 
account the vast inequalities within South African society.  In Soobramoney, 
Chaskalson P (as he then was) reminded us of this reality: 
“We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth.  Millions of 
people are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty.  There is a high 
level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have 
access to clean water or to adequate health services.  These conditions already 
existed when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, 
and to transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, 
freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order.  For as 
long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow 
ring.”714 
 
The sheer magnitude of existing inequalities means that there is intense competition 
for resources and difficult allocative decisions have to be made.715  The 
Constitutional Court has recognised these difficulties, but has emphasised that 
socio-economic rights create obligations that courts “can, and in appropriate 
circumstances must, enforce.”716  Before enforcement becomes relevant, though, 
two aspects warrant attention, namely the scope of the right and the nature and 
extent of the obligations it imposes. 
 
6.2.3 The right to access to social security 
 
Section 27 of the Constitution provides the following in respect of access to social 
security: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to have access to— 
(a) […] 
(b) […] 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance. 
                                                          
714 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) para 8. 
715 Soobramoney para 11. 
716 Grootboom para 94. 
194 
 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these 
rights.” 
 
With regard to the structure of the section, the Constitutional Court has made it clear 
that the content of the right enshrined in s 27(1) is limited by a lack of resources and 
therefore has to be read conjunctively with s 27(2).  As Mokgoro J stated in Khosa,  
“[S]ection 27(1) and section 27(2) cannot be viewed as separate or discrete 
rights creating entitlements and obligations independently of one another.  
Section 27(2) exists as an internal limitation on the content of section 27(1) 
and the ambit of the section 27(1) right can therefore not be determined 
without reference to the reasonableness of the measures adopted to fulfil the 
obligation towards those entitled to the right in section 27(1).”717 
When interpreting the right to access to social security, it is therefore important not to 
divorce the ambit of the right from the state’s positive obligations in respect thereof. 
 
6.2.3.1 The ambit of the right 
 
The scope of the right to access to social security rests upon two pillars.  The first is 
the determination of who is protected in specific instances.  The second relates to 
what is meant by “access to social security”.   
 
In Khosa, Mokgoro J emphasised that the rights in ss 26(1) and 27(1) are conferred 
on “everyone,” unlike s 25(5), for example, which requires the state to promote South 
African citizens’ access to land.718  She also referred to s 7(1) of the Constitution, 
which states that the Bill of Rights “enshrines the rights of all people in our country”.  
She therefore held that, in the absence of any contrary intention, “everyone” must be 
interpreted to include permanent residents.   
  
                                                          
717 Khosa para 43. 
718 At para 46.  Section 25(5) of the Constitution reads:  “The state must take reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain 
access to land on an equitable basis [emphasis added].” 
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The decision on whether permanent residents are intended beneficiaries of the right 
in s 27 is not the end of the matter, because the right itself has an internal limitation.  
An assessment therefore has to be made on whether it was reasonable to exclude 
permanent residents from the scheme, bearing in mind the purpose of providing 
social access to social security; the effect exclusion would have on the excluded 
group, particularly how it would impact on other rights; as well as any resource 
constraints the state may face.719  The “reasonableness” standard is discussed 
below.720 
 
The second pillar of the ambit of the right is that it grants protected persons “access 
to social security”, not “social security”.  Yacoob J in Grootboom explained the import 
of the difference in the context of the right to “access to housing”.721  First, it means 
people are not only entitled to a house, but to all that is necessary for them to access 
housing, for example, land, water and sewerage services.  Second, it implies that it 
is not only government that must provide housing, but that other societal actors, 
including individual beneficiaries of the right, must be enabled to provide housing.  A 
distinction must be made between those who can afford to provide for their own 
housing and those who cannot.  In respect of the former, the state’s principal 
obligation is to unlock the system through regulatory measures such as planning 
laws and regulating access to finance.  In respect of those who cannot afford to build 
their own houses, government has a duty to provide.  
 
What, then, is the meaning of “social security”?  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 
suggest the following: 
“The term “social security” is a broad term which may be used to include both 
social insurance, directly contributed benefits of workers and their families, and 
social assistance, which includes needs-based assistance from public funds for 
the most vulnerable who have indirectly contributed as members of society.”722 
  
                                                          
719 Khosa para 49. 
720 See 6.2.4.1. 
721 At paras 35-36. 
722 MH Cheadle, DM Davis and NRL Haysom (eds). South African Constitutional Law:  The Bill of 
Rights. (2000) 501. 
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Similarly, the 2002 Taylor Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social 
Security System for South Africa Report No 3:  Constitutional Framework of Social 
Security in South Africa:  Regulation, Protection, Enforcement and Adjudication 
(hereinafter referred to as “Taylor Committee Report No 3”) stated the following: 
“Clearly evident from the wording of section 27(1)(c), is that the intention [is] 
access to social security in the comprehensive sense, and the specific issue of 
social assistance.  The former would also incorporate the social insurance 
system (e.g. contribution-based systems such as Compensation for 
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (COIDA), the Road Accident Fund 
(RAF) and Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), as well as, occupational 
retirement schemes). […]  Adopting a purposive approach towards the 
interpretation of fundamental rights, the underlying rationale and purpose of the 
right to access to social security and to social assistance is to provide to 
everyone an adequate standard of living.”723 
 
In both these extracts, the only additional measures included within the broader 
concept of social security are social insurance measures.  Both articulations, I argue, 
recognise that the scope of the right may be wider than just a combination of social 
assistance and social insurance.  The Taylor Committee Report No 3 further 
recognises that our interpretation of the ambit of the right has to be animated by the 
overall purpose of providing social security.   
 
The Constitutional Court has endorsed this purposive approach to the interpretation 
of the rights on numerous occasions.724  In addition, it has emphasised that the rights 
in the Bill of Rights must, as far as language permits, be accorded a generous 
interpretation so that individuals are extended the full benefit of constitutional 
protection. 725  The nature and extent of this protection must also be offered in ways 
                                                          
723 Taylor Committee Report No 3. 
http://www.sarpn.org/CountryPovertyPapers/SouthAfrica/taylor/report3.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 
2015) 43. 
724 See, for example, S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 9 and S v Mhlungu 
and Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) para 8;  
725 The general approach is encapsulated by this dictum from the Canadian case of R v Big M Drug 
Mart Ltd [1985] 18 DLR (4th) 321 at 395-396 and which was endorsed by Kentridge AJ in S v Zuma 
and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) para 15 and by Chaskalson P (as he then was) in S v Makwanyane 
and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 9: 
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that advance the founding values and objectives of the Constitution as a whole.726  It 
is in this spirit that we have to fashion the content of the term “social security”, as 
used in s 27. 
 
The connotations of the phrase ‘social security’ are contested and its meaning may 
differ from country to country and develop over time.727  Traditionally, social security 
is said to comprise social assistance and social insurance.  Social assistance has 
been defined in the South African context as “state provided basic minimum 
protection to relieve poverty, essentially subject to qualifying criteria on a non-
contributory basis.”728  Social insurance, on the other hand, is defined as a 
“mandatory contributory system of one kind or another, or regulated private sector 
provision, concerned with the spreading of income over the life cycle or the pooling 
of risks.”729   
 
Kaseke argues that the traditional view of social security emanated from Europe and 
North America at a time when the focus was on the protection of workers in the 
formal labour market.730  The assumption was that everyone who was willing and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
"The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter was to be ascertained by an 
analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it was to be understood, in other words, in the light 
of the interests it was meant to protect.  In my view this analysis is to be undertaken, and the 
purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and 
larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or 
freedom, to the historical origins of the concept enshrined, and where applicable, to the 
meaning and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated 
within the text of the Charter.  The interpretation should be [....] a generous rather than legalistic 
one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of a guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of 
the Charter's protection." 
726 In S v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) para 8, Mahomed J reiterated his own 
statements on this aspect in Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000 and 
Another 1994 (1) SA 407 (NmS) 418F-G: 
“A Constitution is an organic instrument. Although it is enacted in the form of a statute, it is sui 
generis. It must broadly, liberally and purposively be interpreted so as to avoid the 'austerity of 
tabulated legalism' and so as to enable it to continue to play a creative and dynamic role in the 
expression and the achievement of the ideals and aspirations of the nation, in the articulation of 
the values bonding its people and in disciplining its Government.” 
727 ILO. Social Security:  A New Consensus. (2001) http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_protect/---soc_sec/documents/publication/wcms_209311.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 2.  
See, also, MP Olivier. Social Security:  Framework. 13(2) The Law of South Africa. para 17;  A 
Dekker, L Jansen Van Rensburg, R Liffman, M Thompson and A Van der Walt. “Social Security:  A 
Conceptual View.” (2000) 4(1) Law, Democracy and Development 1 at 3.  
728 Taylor Committee Report No 3 at 36.  
729 Ibid. 
730 E Kaseke. Social Protection in SADC:  Developing an Integrated and Inclusive Framework – A 
Social Policy Perspective. In: MP Olivier and ER Kalula. Social Protection in SADC:  Developing an 
Integrated and Inclusive Framework. (2004) 1. 
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able to work would find work.731  This assumption is not valid in a country that has a 
high unemployment rate.732 The nature of unemployment in South Africa also has to 
be borne in mind.  Unemployment is systemic and concentrated amongst the youth 
(people aged between 18 and 35 years).733  The majority of unemployed people are 
semi-skilled or unskilled and there is a mismatch between the demand for labour and 
the skills profile of most work seekers.734  South Africa’s social security system, in 
                                                          
731 Kaseke 2. 
732 StatsSA, in its Quarterly Labour Force Survey (Quarter 4, 2014) 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02114thQuarter2014.pdf (Accessed: 17 May 2015), 
reported (at v) that the unemployment rate in South Africa from October to December 2014 was 
24.3%.  The survey used a narrow definition of ‘unemployed persons’, namely “those (aged 15–64 
years) who: 
a) Were not employed in the reference week and; 
b) Actively looked for work or tried to start a business in the four weeks preceding the 
survey interview and; 
c) Were available for work, i.e. would have been able to start work or a business in the 
reference week  
or; 
d) Had not actively looked for work in the past four weeks but had a job or business to 
start at a definite date in the future and were available.” (at xxiv) 
A broader definition of unemployed persons to include those who had not sought work in the 
preceding four weeks would see the figure of 24.3% rise appreciably. 
733 C Ardington, A Case, A Menendez, T Bärnighausen, D Lam and M Leibbrandt. “Youth 
Unemployment and Social Protection.” (2014) 
http://opensaldru.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11090/723/SALDRU%20Research%20Brief%20-
%20Dec%202013%20-
%20Youth%20unemployment%20and%20social%20protection.pdf?sequence=3 (Accessed: 6 
February 2015) write that youth unemployment in South Africa is severe and explain some of its main 
characteristics:   
“In 2012, the strict unemployment rate for youth aged 15-24 years was 40%, a measure 
requiring that individuals are actively looking for work.  On a broader definition that includes the 
country’s large numbers of ‘discouraged’ workers – those who are not actively seeking work but 
say they are willing to take a job – the rate was 66%.  Strong racial disparities are evident: 
unemployment amongst white youth is 18% compared to 41% among African youth.  Youth 
unemployment also reflects the spatial inequalities that stem from apartheid-era policies of 
‘separate development’.  Using the broad definition, youth unemployment in rural areas is 82% 
compared to 58% in urban formal areas.  The difference when using the strict definition is less 
pronounced (33% versus 44%), suggesting that rural youth are more likely to become 
discouraged in their search for employment.” 
Youth unemployment is a global crisis.  See ILO. “The Youth Unemployment Crisis:  A Call for 
Action.” (2012) 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_1
85950.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015), in which the ILO (at 3) stated: 
“In 2012, close to 75 million young people worldwide are out of work, 4 million more are 
unemployed today than in 2007, and more than 6 million have given up looking for a job.  More 
than 200 million young people are working but earning under US$2 a day.  Informal 
employment amongst young people remains pervasive.”   
The organisation urged governments, employers and workers to work even harder to “promote, create 
and maintain decent and productive jobs.”  It also called on all relevant national, regional and 
international organisations to “take urgent and renewed action to address the crisis.” 
734 J Streak and C Van der Westhuizen. “Fitting the Pieces Together:  A Composite View of 
Government’s Strategy to Assist the Unemployed in South Africa 1994-2004” (2004) 
http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0000962/ (Accessed:  6 February 2015) 1 at 1 and 23. 
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which social insurance is mostly based on formal employment and in which social 
assistance is targeted to specific groups, therefore reaches only a very small 
percentage of the population.735 
 
The ILO’s Convention 102 on Social Security (Minimum Standards) identifies nine 
social risks, namely “sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, 
invalidity, old age, death, provision of medical care and provision of subsidies for 
families with children.”736  It then defines social security as a set of measures that 
mediate the financial consequences when these risks eventuate.737  The measures 
either seek to replace income or to adjust income when exceptional expenditures are 
necessary.738 
 
Commentators have argued that the ILO definition has various shortcomings, 
particularly in the context of developing countries.739  It focuses on formal 
employment despite the high proportion of workers outside this system, as discussed 
above.740  The risk-based approach excludes provision for basic needs.741  The risks 
included are individual in nature and exclude contingencies that are highly prevalent 
                                                          
735 See M Olivier, J Masabo and E Kalula. “Informality, Employment and Social Protection:  Some 
Critical Perspectives for/ from Developing Countries.” (2012) 
http://ilera2012.wharton.upenn.edu/RefereedPapers/OlivierMarius%20JulianaMasabo%20EvanceKal
ulaUPDATED.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 5 and W Van Ginneken. “Extending Social Security:  
Policies for Developing Countries.” (2003) http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---
soc_sec/documents/publication/wcms_207684.pdf 7 (Accessed: 6 February 2015).  Van Ginneken 
points out that (as at 2003) in low-income countries more than 90% of people were not covered by 
social security, while the corresponding figures for middle-income countries range from 20% to 60%.  
It was estimated that worldwide only 20% of populations were covered. 
736 ILO Convention 102. “Social Security (Minimum Standards).” (1952) 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::p12100_instrument_id:312247 
(hereinafter referred to as “ILO ‘Convention 102’”) (Accessed: 6 February 2015). 
737 J Berghman. “The Resurgence of Poverty and the Struggle against Exclusion:  A New Challenge 
for Social Security in Europe?” (1997) 50(1) International Social Security Review 3. 
738 Ibid. 
739 See S Guhan. “Social Security Options for Developing Countries.” (1994) 133(1) International 
Labour Review 35 at 37 for an overview of the limitations of what the author terms “the formal model” 
of social security. 
740 LG Mpedi. “Pertinent Social Security Issues in South Africa.” (2008) 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/projects/socio-economic-
rights/Research%20and%20Publications/Research%20Series/Pertinent%20social%20security%20iss
ues%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf 6 (Accessed: 6 February 2015). 
741 Berghman 3; Mpedi 6. 
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in developing countries.742  The definition also does not include measures to prevent 
and remedy social insecurity.743 
 
Berghman also notes that in Europe in the late 1980s, social security policy 
discussions seemed to shift from a sole focus on income deprivation to a broader 
notion of “social exclusion”.744  The roots of social exclusion as a concept are related 
to the centuries-old notion that deprivation is both a cause and effect of people’s 
inability to participate in their communities.745  It has been defined as a failure in one 
or more of the following systems: “the democratic and legal system, which promotes 
civic integration; the labour market, which promotes economic integration; the 
Welfare State system, promoting what may be called social integration; the family 
and community system, which promotes interpersonal integration.”746  
 
Sen argues that the value of social exclusion lies in its emphasis on relational 
features of deprivation.747  The implication is that one group has the power to deny 
another group access to social goods and opportunities on the basis of criteria that 
the former has the power to set and seeks to justify.748  Consequently, the concept of 
social exclusion requires us to examine the causal processes that lead to exclusion, 
whether this is deliberate or incidental.   
 
Sen warns that not all deprivation can usefully be attributed to exclusion.  He cites 
the example of food shortages caused by a wide variety of factors, which may all 
linguistically be described as being the result of social exclusion, but all of which do 
not have relational causes.  Food shortages for a peasant family as a result of crop 
failure may not have a relational component that can usefully be described as 
                                                          
742 Olivier, Masabo and Kalula 5. 
743 Mpedi 6. 
744 Berghman 4. 
745 A Sen. “Social Exclusion:  Concept, Application, and Scrutiny.” (2000) 
http://housingforall.org/Social_exclusion.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 5. 
746 Berghman 6. 
747 Sen 6. 
748 South Africa. Taylor Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security System for South 
Africa (2002):  Report No 2:  The Socio-Economic Context:  An Imperative for Social Protection. 
http://www.sarpn.org/CountryPovertyPapers/SouthAfrica/taylor/report2.pdf (Accessed: 6 February 
2015) (hereinafter referred to as “Taylor Committee Report No 2”) at 17. 
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exclusion.  However, food shortage caused by the cancellation of food subsidies to 
certain groups may be the direct result of exclusionary processes.  Where food 
shortages occur due to unemployment eroding purchasing power, the causes of 
such unemployment may or may not be relational.  Efforts at promoting social 
security therefore have to focus on more dynamic, multi-layered processes of 
exclusion rather than just a static outcome of a shortage of money.749 
 
Berghman asserts that the goals of social security are best described by considering 
the basic policy chain that underpins social policy: 
“[W]e educate and train people to ensure that they may be adequately 
integrated into the (paid) labour market. Such integration would give them the 
opportunity to gain a primary income. And this income in turn enables them to 
have command over resources to guarantee their social participation.”750 
 
It is when this chain is endangered or broken that social security measures are 
necessary to provide a minimum level of income or replace lost income in order to 
safeguard social participation.751  The ultimate objective is to prevent deprivation, as 
well as vulnerability to deprivation,752 in order to achieve “equality, security and a 
share of wealth to all.”753  It also implies that when risks eventuate, measures may 
be required to (re)integrate survivors into the labour market and their broader social 
environment. 
 
The ILO, in its Recommendation 202 of 2012 on National Social Protection Floors, 
recognises the importance of prevention and (re)integration into the labour market.  
Article 10 reads:754 
“In designing and implementing national social protection floors, Members 
should: 
                                                          
749 Berghman 7-8.  See, also, Taylor Committee Report No 2 at 17-18. 
750 Berghman 9. 
751 Berghman 10. 
752 Van Ginneken 10.  
753 B Baron von Maydell. Fundamental Approaches and Concepts of Social Security. In: R Blanpain 
(ed). Law in Motion – International Encyclopaedia of Laws. (1997) 1029 at 1039. 
754 ILO Recommendation 202. “National Social Protection Floors.” (2012) 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:3065524 
(Accessed: 17 May 2015). 
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(a) combine preventive, promotional and active measures, benefits and social 
services; 
(b) promote productive economic activity and formal employment through 
considering policies that include public procurement, government credit 
provisions, labour inspection, labour market policies and tax incentives, and 
that promote education, vocational training, productive skills and employability; 
and 
(c) ensure coordination with other policies that enhance formal employment, 
income generation, education, literacy, vocational training, skills and 
employability, that reduce precariousness, and that promote secure work, 
entrepreneurship and sustainable enterprises within a decent work framework.” 
The Recommendation also emphasises “effective social dialogue and social” 
participation when the formulation and implementation of social security extension 
strategies are at issue.755  
 
The ILO Employment Promotion and Protection Against Unemployment 
Convention756 requires member states to “declare as a priority objective a policy 
designed to promote full, productive and freely chosen employment by all 
appropriate means, including social security.  Such means should include, inter alia, 
employment services, vocational training and vocational guidance.”757  This clearly 
envisages that such measures could form part of social security. 
 
At regional level, the African Union, in its Social Policy Framework for Africa, states: 
“Social protection includes responses by the state and society to protect 
citizens from risks, vulnerabilities and deprivations.  It also includes strategies 
and programmes aimed at ensuring a minimum standard of livelihood for all 
people in a given country.  This entails measures to secure education and 
health care, social welfare, livelihood, access to stable income, as well as 
                                                          
755 Article 13(1).  See also, ILO Convention 168 of 1988 (see below).  
756 ILO Convention 168. “Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment.” (1988) 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312
313 (Accessed: 17 May 2015). 
757 Article 7. 
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employment.  In effect, social protection measures are comprehensive, and are 
not limited to traditional measures of social security.”758 
 
From the above, it is clear that there have been consistent calls for a broader 
conception of social security that goes beyond social insurance linked to formal 
employment and cash transfers from government to vulnerable groups.  It is in this 
context that the notion of ‘social protection’ was born.  The Taylor Committee Report 
No 3 recommended an approach the Committee termed “comprehensive social 
protection”, which it defined as follows:   
 
“Comprehensive social protection is broader than the traditional concept of 
social security, and incorporates developmental strategies and programmes 
designed to ensure, collectively, at least a minimum acceptable living standard 
for all citizens. It embraces the traditional measures of social insurance, social 
assistance and social services, but goes beyond that to focus on causality 
through an integrated policy approach including many of the developmental 
initiatives undertaken by the State.”759 
 
It is evident that in the last two decades, at least, more comprehensive, proactive 
and forward-looking approaches to social security have been endorsed at 
international, regional and domestic levels.  Whether these changes call for a 
broader constitutional conception of ‘social security’ that encompasses more than 
discrete social assistance and social insurance measures is debatable.  I argue 
below that such a broader conception is more consistent with general principles of 
constitutional interpretation and notions of substantive, transformative equality and 
could prove strategically beneficial for disabled persons wishing to assert rights 
relating to access to work. 
  
                                                          
758 African Union. Social Policy Framework for Africa. (2008) http://sa.au.int/en/content/social-policy-
framework-africa (Accessed: 17 May 2015) para 13. 
759 Taylor Committee Report No 3 at 41. 
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6.2.3.2 Access to work for disabled persons 
 
Labour law and social security law intersect in various ways.  For most people who 
are socially secure, wage labour is the primary means through which to attain that 
security.760  Employment-based social insurance to cover risks such as 
unemployment and occupational injuries and diseases forms part of the social 
security system and is administered by the Department of Labour.  In some 
instances, inability to work or a lack of available employment is an eligibility 
requirement to qualify for social assistance. 
 
The interrelationship between labour and social security is clear.  What is not clear is 
whether the right to access to social security can be interpreted to include 
employment creation and unemployment prevention measures.  Govindjee and 
Dupper have argued that some form of constitutionalisation of, or the establishment 
of a legislative framework for, government’s employment creation and 
unemployment prevention activities is necessary.761  However, they dismiss the 
possibility that the right to access to social security, read with other rights, can be an 
appropriate vehicle through which to achieve this.762  In their view, “social security” 
has traditionally been interpreted narrowly to refer to only social insurance and social 
assistance measures and must be distinguished from the more general notion of 
social protection.763  Neither social assistance nor social insurance can, on their 
argument, be interpreted to impose obligations on government in relation to a right to 
work.764  
                                                          
760 A distinction must be drawn between those who are in formal employment and those in precarious, 
marginal jobs.  As Seekings points out (at 136), 
“[i]t is hard to argue that ‘labourers’ in marginal or precarious employment – for example, on 
farms or construction sites – are privileged in any substantial sense relative to the households 
we included in the ‘underclass’. […]  It is the unionized school teacher, car worker and even 
bus driver who are privileged relative to the working poor and underclass (although they are not 
nearly as privileged as the much richer, upper classes).” 
761 A Govindjee and O Dupper. “Constitutional Perspectives on Unemployment Security and a Right to 
Work in South Africa.” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 775 at 776, 793 and 797. 
762 Govindjee and Dupper 776. 
763 The passage (at 792) that is of import here reads:  “The right of access to social security and 
appropriate social assistance contained in section 27 of the Constitution may not, strictly speaking, be 
read in such a manner so as to automatically incorporate all components of the broader notion of 
social protection.  The term ‘social security’ is normally understood in a relatively narrow sense.  The 
social insurance and social assistance components of social security are, similarly, limited by the 
manner in which they are generally conceptualised and understood in practice.” 
764 At 797 they argue that social assistance is currently limited to state social grants, as provided for in 
the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004.  Any other measures to assist the unemployed, excluding social 
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In the conceptual framework proposed by Govindjee and Dupper,765 a distinction has 
to be drawn between unemployment security measures and unemployment 
protection measures.  In their proposed framework, the former consist of 
unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance, which would properly fall 
within the ambit of social security.  Unemployment protection measures, which 
consist of measures to prevent unemployment and employment creation measures, 
would not constitute social security. 
 
These authors also express the view that the right to choose and practice a trade, 
occupation or profession freely and the right to fair labour practices have not been 
interpreted to include a right to work or to regulate what they term unemployment 
protection measures.766  The result, they argue, has been that policy developments 
in relation to employment creation operate in the absence of a legal framework. 767  
They argue that the absence of a legal framework in what is an important part of 
government’s poverty alleviation and poverty elimination strategy is open to 
constitutional challenge.768 
 
South Africa’s ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is important in this context, because this Covenant 
includes a right to work.769  As Chenwi and Hardowar note, the right to work in the 
ICESCR not only implies that rights holders must be able to seek work freely, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
insurance measures such as unemployment insurance, would therefore not fall within the definition of 
social assistance or social security more broadly. 
765 Govindjee and Dupper 777. 
766 Govindjee and Dupper 793. 
767 Ibid. 
768 Govindjee and Dupper 776. 
769 Article 6 of the ICESCR (1966) available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx (Accessed: 17 May 2015) reads: 
“1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which 
includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he 
freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right. 
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training 
programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural 
development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding 
fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.” 
Article 7 then recognises the right to “just and favourable conditions of work”, while Article 8 
entrenches basic organisational rights in the work context.   
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also imposes a positive obligation on states to work towards achieving that right. 770  
These authors argue that ratification of the ICESCR may have positive 
consequences for those seeking expanded benefits in relation to the right to work. 
 
Mundlak states that the right to work generally has three components.771  The first 
relates to liberty and protects freedom of occupational choice.  This component is 
indeed protected in s 22 of the Constitution.772  The second component relates to the 
right individuals have, and the corresponding obligations on states or employers to 
provide work.  This is the component that is at issue here.  The third component of 
the right aims at ensuring that the work provided is decent work.  This component is 
arguably protected in the Constitution by the right to fair labour practices773 and the 
right to dignity.774 
 
If we accept that only the second component of the right to work is not obviously 
protected in the Constitution, the issue is whether such protection can be sourced 
from the existing text or whether it can be secured through other means.  Govindjee 
and Dupper suggest four methods that can be used to ensure accountability in 
respect of government’s employment creation activities.   
 
The first option would be to amend the Constitution to provide for a right they 
suggest would read as follows: 
“Everyone has the right to have access to unemployment security, including the 
right to work.  The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this 
right.”775 
  
                                                          
770 L Chenwi and R Hardowar. “Promoting Socio-economic Rights in South Africa through the 
Ratification and Implementation of the ICESCR and its Optional Protocol.” (2010) 11(1) Economic and 
Social Rights Review 3 at 4.   
771 G Mundlak. “The Right to Work:  Linking Human Rights and Employment Policy.” (2007) 146(3-4) 
International Labour Review 189 at 192-193. 
772 It reads:  “Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely.  The 
practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law.” 
773 Section 23(1) provides:  “Everyone has the right to fair labour practices.” 
774 Section 10 reads:  “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected.” 
775 Govindjee and Dupper 798. 
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The difficulties inherent in this option are that it is dependent on strong political will 
and that it would be time- and resource-intensive.  A speedier option, in Govindjee’s 
and Dupper’s view, is for government to pass legislation to regulate its own activities 
in respect of employment protection.776  By virtue of s 39(3) of the Constitution, such 
legislation would have constitutional support.  That section provides that “[t]he Bill of 
Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are 
recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent 
that they are consistent with the Bill.”  The relative weakness in this approach is that 
it is not clear that a right conferred by legislation would be accorded the same status 
as that conferred by the Constitution itself.  
 
The third option, according to Govindjee and Dupper, is to use the existing 
constitutional text and values to recognise unenumerated rights.777  Unenumerated 
rights are those rights that are not explicitly provided for in the constitutional text. 778  
The Constitutional Court has refrained from recognising unenumerated rights.779  In 
a political climate in which courts have to navigate a fine line between protecting 
individual rights and maintaining their own institutional legitimacy, it is unlikely that 
courts would take what may be regarded as a drastic step. 
 
The final option, which resembles the recognition of an unenumerated right, is to 
interpret an existing right expansively to cover challenges related to a right not 
expressly recognised in the Bill of Rights.780  Govindjee and Dupper argue that the 
right to dignity is the most obvious right that can be utilised in this way, with the right 
to life also offering some possibilities.  In Dawood,781 O’Regan J warned that the use 
of the right to dignity to incorporate interests not expressly protected must be used 
as a last resort.  If there is a specific right in terms of which cases can be decided, 
                                                          
776 Govindjee and Dupper 793. 
777 Govindjee and Dupper 795. 
778 See R Krüger and A Govindjee. “The Recognition of Unenumerated Rights in South Africa.” (2012) 
27 Southern African Public Law 195, who write (at 195-196):   
“Cases may occasionally give rise to issues not directly addressed by the fundamental rights 
enumerated in the Constitution and complete non-recognition of unenumerated rights may leave the 
claimants of such rights vulnerable.” 
779 Krüger and Govindjee 202. 
780 Govindjee and Dupper 796. 
781 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 
936 (CC) paras 35-36. 
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that specific right must be utilised.  The same principle would apply in respect of the 
right to life, and that is on the assumption that a court would be willing to apply the 
right to life in such an expansive fashion. 
 
While I share Govindjee’s and Dupper’s views on the need for a legal framework to 
protect employment creation activities, I am of the view that there are good 
arguments to interpret the existing right to access to social security to include work 
creation activities undertaken by the state.  Two possible means through which to 
effect a more expansive conception of social security exist.  The first is to adopt a 
generous interpretation of social assistance to include initiatives such as public 
works programmes.  Woolard, Harttgen and Klasen, for example, define social 
assistance as “transfers in cash or in kind [that] are made to deprived populations.  
These include public works programmes and cash transfer programmes. 782  
Govindjee and Dupper, on the other hand, argue that employment creation initiatives 
undertaken by government – including public works programmes – do not constitute 
social assistance, as this term is limited to social grants.783 
 
It is arguable that the fact that the Social Assistance Act784 (the SAA) does not make 
mention of public works programmes is relevant to the interpretation of the term 
‘social assistance’ in the Constitution.  A possible counter-argument is that the 
measures provided for in the SAA are not meant to exhaust the concept.  At the 
heart of the inquiry is the statement in s 27 of the Constitution that the state has 
obligations to provide social assistance to those who are “unable” to provide for 
themselves and their dependants.  The text is silent on whether this inability has to 
be located within the individual or whether it may also be caused by external factors 
                                                          
782 I Woolard, K Harttgen and S Klasen. “The History and Impact of Social Security in South Africa:  
Experiences and Lessons.” (2011) 32(4) Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue 
Canadienne D’études du Développement 357 at 358. 
783 Govindjee and Dupper 797.  S Van der Berg and K Siebrits. “Social Assistance Reform During a 
Period of Fiscal Stress.” (2010) 4 seem to hold the same view in that they equate social assistance 
with the grants system.  A Dekker and S Cronje. “Can Social Security Play a Role in Black Economic 
Empowerment?” (2005) 17(1) South African Mercantile Law Journal 19 at 25 explain the content of 
social assistance in a manner that may or may not include some employment creation programmes.  
These authors write: 
“The South African social assistance system comprises of (a) social assistance grants for care-
dependent persons; (b) financial awards to individuals for the social relief of distress; (c) special 
pensions, military pensions, gratuities and financial reparation for individuals who have suffered 
because of political confrontation; (d) financial awards to welfare organisations; and (e) state 
sponsored provision of social services, facilities and programmes.” 
784 Act 13 of 2004. 
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such as limited employment opportunities.  For present purposes, I will assume that 
the restrictive definition of ‘social assistance’ is correct. 
 
The second means through which to expand the ambit of the right to access to social 
security is to interpret the umbrella term of social security more generously.  
Ultimately, the difference between this approach and the constitutional amendment 
proposed by Govindjee and Dupper is not stark, as the interrelated and mutually 
supportive nature of the relationship between the rights in the Bill of Rights would 
allow for the intersection of a limited right to access to social security and a new right 
to unemployment security.  Furthermore, the structure and the wording of the right to 
unemployment security they suggest is exactly the same as the existing right to 
access to social security.  The only real difference between our proposals therefore 
lies in the interpretation of the term “social security”.   
 
Govindjee and Dupper do not explain fully why the ambit of the right to social 
security in the South African Constitution should be restricted to social assistance 
and social insurance.  The only reason that is apparent from their exposition is that 
the term has traditionally been understood to include only those two components and 
that social security is related to, but distinct, from the broader notion of social 
protection.  This form of reasoning is formal in nature,785 because it seems to 
suggest that ‘social security’ in s 27 must be interpreted to refer to only social 
assistance and social insurance, because that is how the term has been understood.   
It is not clear exactly who has been using the term in that restricted sense and for 
what purpose. 
 
One possible justification for limiting the scope of social security is that government 
understands the term in that way and has been planning on that basis.  The most 
obvious response is that government derives its power from the Constitution and has 
to comply with the Bill of Rights.  Within the constitutional scheme, courts have the 
power to interpret and pronounce on what constitutional rights require of 
                                                          
785 A formal reason relies primarily on the authoritative origin of a legal rule.  Substantive reasons, in 
contrast, would focus on social justifications for a rule (is it just, does it serve a good societal goal?) 
(See JC Froneman. “Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture:  Our ‘Vision’ of Law.” (2005) 16(1) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 3 at 4). 
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government.786  While government’s views on what it should and can provide are 
relevant,787 it would be more appropriate to consider these views at the stage of 
determining government’s obligations in particular instances, rather than to exclude 
all employment creation activities from the scope of the s 27 right.  This is consistent 
with the approach the Constitutional Court has endorsed whereby the scope of rights 
is interpreted generously before limitations of these rights are considered.788 
 
Furthermore, unemployment protection initiatives have been central to government’s  
social and economic policies.  These include the Expanded Public Works 
Programme, a national training layoff scheme in terms of which government provides 
training and allowances to employees during negotiated layoffs and an overall 
emphasis on skills development.789  Government clearly realises that it has 
obligations in this sphere.  A court expanding the notion of social security, as 
understood in the South African Constitution, would therefore not be compelling 
government to perform activities which government is not already undertaking. 
  
                                                          
786 In Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC) (hereinafter referred to as “TAC (No 2)”) paras 98-99, the Court stated: 
“This Court has made it clear on more than one occasion that although there are no bright lines 
that separate the roles of the legislature, the executive and the courts from one another, there 
are certain matters that are pre-eminently within the domain of one or other of the arms of 
government and not the others.  All arms of government should be sensitive to and respect this 
separation.  This does not mean, however, that courts cannot or should not make orders that 
have an impact on policy. […] 
Where state policy is challenged as inconsistent with the Constitution, courts have to consider 
whether in formulating and implementing such policy the state has given effect to its 
constitutional obligations.  If it should hold in any given case that the state has failed to do so, it 
is obliged by the Constitution to say so.” 
787 Sachs J in Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope and Others 2002 (2) 
SA 794 (CC) para 155 recognises that in balancing competing rights and interests, courts may be 
faced “with complex problems as to what properly belongs to the discretionary sphere which the 
Constitution allocates to the Legislature and the Executive, and what falls squarely to be determined 
by the Judiciary.”  
788 In S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) 391 (CC) para 100 Chaskalson P noted:   
“Our Constitution [the Interim Constitution] deals with the limitation of rights through a general 
limitations clause. […] [T]his calls for a "two-stage" approach, in which a broad rather than a 
narrow interpretation is given to the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter Three, and 
limitations have to be justified through the application of section 33. In this it differs from the 
Constitution of the United States, which does not contain a limitation clause, as a result of 
which courts in that country have been obliged to find limits to constitutional rights through a 
narrow interpretation of the rights themselves.” 
789 See T Cohen and L Moodley. “Achieving ‘Decent Work’ in South Africa?’” (2012) 15(2) 




Another possible justification for a limited conception of social security is that the ILO 
draws a distinction between social protection and social security, and that 
Convention 102 only makes provision for specified risks.  Constitutional Court 
jurisprudence has emphasised that international law “offers guidance as to the 
correct interpretation of particular provisions” in the Bill of Rights.790  However, 
Convention 102 only sets minimum standards and does not compel states to adopt 
particular frameworks.791  Similarly, General Comment No. 19 on Social Security 
recognises that “the elements of the right to social security may vary according to 
different conditions.”792  It further requires that social security for disabled persons be 
provided “in a dignified manner”.793  It recognises the interrelationship between the 
rights to social security and to work by warning that institutionalisation (unless 
necessary for other reasons) “cannot be regarded as an adequate substitute for the 
social security and income-support rights of [disabled] persons, as well as 
rehabilitation and employment support, in order to assist persons with disabilities to 
secure work.”794 
 
It is not necessary that a separate right to work should be recognised in South Africa 
in order to give effect to the ICESCR’s right to work.  Interpreting social security 
widely to include unemployment protection could achieve compliance.  Furthermore, 
the interrelation of the right to access to social security with the rights to substantive 
equality and dignity, along with an emphasis on the value of freedom, could ensure 
that disabled persons who are willing and able to work are given fair opportunities to 
do so. 
 
An interpretation of the constitutional right to access to social security that includes 
access to social protection measures is appropriate for various substantive reasons.   
These reasons are of prime importance, because s 39(2) of the Constitution compels 
courts to interpretations of the Bill of Rights that “promote the values that underlie an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.”  This 
requires an engagement with the concrete effects of particular interpretations.  
                                                          
790 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 35. 
791 ILO ‘Convention 102’.   
792 Para 10. 
793 Para 20. 
794 See fn 17 of UN ‘General Comment 19’. 
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Firstly, social insurance and social assistance795 measures fail to cover the most 
vulnerable people in South African society – those who are most socially insecure.  
These are the people who do not have access to any of the grants and who do not 
qualify for social insurance or, if they do, only qualify for a short period of time.  The 
criticisms of the traditional concept of social security are underpinned by objections 
to its exclusion of situations that involve people who are most in need.  Furthermore, 
as Kaseke points out,796 the traditional concept originated in circumstances that 
assumed that people would manage to find employment in the open labour market.  
This assumption does not hold true in contemporary South Africa.   
 
The exclusionary nature of the South African social security system also has to be 
placed within historical context.  Van der Berg summarises its development as 
follows:   
“Under apartheid, the trappings of a welfare state for whites were created.  
Over time, social security was gradually extended to other groups, and recently 
social assistance benefits were equalised.  This left South Africa with high 
social security levels for a middle-income developing country.  However, the 
social security system still largely reflects the historical needs of vulnerable 
white groups under apartheid, among whom unemployment was minimal, given 
their preferential access to jobs and education.  Thus the social security system 
now has inadequate provision for the most vulnerable, the unemployed.”797   
 
A restrictive interpretation of what is meant by social security would leave 
unadressed and, worse still, unquestioned, the historical roots of what originated as 
a deliberately exclusionary system.  It may be that a more generous interpretation 
does not have a discernable impact because of the internal limitation of the right, but 
at least it does not foreclose the possibility of holding government accountable in 
respect of its employment creation obligations.  The fulfillment of these obligations 
would be most crucial to the life chances of those living on the bottom rungs of the 
socio-economic ladder. 
                                                          
795 Here I am referring to social assistance in the narrow sense, i.e. targeted cash transfers to 
categorically eligible indigent persons. 
796 See 6.2.3.1 fn 730 and fn 731. 
797 Van der Berg 481. 
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Commentators have argued that the Bill of Rights, through its justiciable socio-
economic rights and other rights, envisions that everyone should have an adequate 
standard of living in that their basic needs are met.798  In Grootboom, the 
Constitutional Court stated: 
“The right of access to adequate housing is entrenched because we value 
human beings and want to ensure that they are afforded their basic human 
needs.  A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are 
provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and 
equality.  To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree 
and extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise.  Those whose 
needs are the most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is 
most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving 
realisation of the right.”799 
 
The inclusion of social assistance, social insurance and active labour market 
measures under one right would recognise the central purpose underpinning these 
components, which is to ensure an adequate standard of living for everyone.  There 
would be a holistic consideration of the policy measures government is undertaking 
in relation to social security for particular groups.  In the case of some disabled 
people, for example, government could be required to facilitate the realisation of the 
right to access to work, rather than to provide social assistance.  In other instances, 
government may have duties to promote and to provide, for example if the provision 
of assistive devices is recognised as assistance. 
 
Govindjee and Dupper argue that, at present, unemployed youth who do not qualify 
for any of the social assistance grants or for social insurance would be able to 
challenge government’s failure to provide them with social assistance, because the 
                                                          
798 See, for example, S Liebenberg. “South Africa’s Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-economic 
Rights:  An Effective Tool in Challenging Poverty?” (2002) 6(2) Law, Democracy and Development 
159; S Liebenberg. “Needs, Rights and Transformation:  Adjudicating Social Rights in South Africa.” 
(2006) 17(1) Stellenbosch Law Review 5; and D Bilchitz. “The Right to Health Care Services and the 
Minimum Core:  Disentangling the Principled and Pragmatic Strands.” (2006) 7(2) Economic and 
Social Rights Review 2. 
799 Para 44. 
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right is accorded to “everyone” in terms of s 27.800  Any government attempts to 
create employment for such youths through expanded public works programmes 
would not assist government in its response if the limited conception of social 
security were used.  However, if an expanded and, I argue, more purposive 
conception is used, employment creation measures would be considered part of the 
overall social security provisioning that government is undertaking.  It is therefore a 
more accurate representation of government’s activities in the social security sphere. 
 
Even if my argument in respect of the ambit of “social security” is not accepted, it is 
arguable that unemployment prevention and unemployment protection measures 
can be constitutionalised by using one of the methods suggested by Govindjee and 
Dupper.  If that were the case, several objections could be raised.  The most obvious 
one is that the constitutional drafters would have expressly included a right to work if 
they had wished for it to be part of the Constitution.  After all, they would have seen 
examples of a right to work in several international instruments and foreign 
constitutions.801  It is therefore not open to a court to infer a right that was specifically 
omitted. 
 
One potential response lies in the nature of the rights provisions in the Constitution 
and the drafting strategy adopted in respect of the rights in the Bill of Rights.  Du 
Plessis, who convened the Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights during the 
negotiation of the Interim Constitution, explains that the rights in the Bill of Rights 
were purposely drafted “as general norms, as broadly as possible, and reliance on 
lists of specific and detailed guarantees and conditions [were] avoided.”802  They 
were drafted in a context of deep disagreement and ultimate compromise, so every 
effort was made to simplify the text, aid accessibility and interpretation, avoid 
unintended restrictions that may result from too-detailed lists and allow for the 
                                                          
800 It is not clear whether the youths would be able to prove that government’s failure to provide them 
with social assistance is unreasonable, as the applicants in Khosa were able to do.  Let us assume for 
present purposes that they would be able to show that their exclusion would be unreasonable. 
801 In Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 106, Ackermann J 
noted that “the internal evidence of the Constitution itself suggests that the drafters were well 
informed regarding provisions in international, regional and domestic human and fundamental rights.” 
802 L Du Plessis. “The Genesis of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights in South Africa’s Transitional 
Constitution.” (1994) 9 South African Public Law 1 at 12. 
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interpretation of rights to evolve and grow as the context in which these rights were 
interpreted changed.803  
 
The socio-economic rights, in particular, were the subject of disagreement and 
uncertainty.  Haysom, writing in 1992, noted that South Africans seemed to be in 
general agreement that civil and political rights were necessary, but were more 
equivocal on whether socio-economic rights were indispensible.804  Brevity and 
simple language therefore would have been even more important in respect of these 
rights.   
 
An examination of the preliminary revised text of the African National Congress’s 
(ANC’s) draft Bill of Rights shows specific reference to a right to work in a composite 
right entitled “Freedom from Hunger, the Right to Shelter and the Right to Work”. 805  
It read:   
“Special attention shall be paid to securing freedom from hunger, reducing and 
where possible eliminating homelessness, unemployment and illiteracy, and to 
providing basic utilities, such as water, electricity and waste disposal for all.”806 
 
This draft Bill of Rights also enshrined particular rights for disabled persons, 
including the following: 
“Legislation shall provide for measures to promote the progressive opening up 
of employment opportunities for disabled men and women, the removal of 
obstacles to the enjoyment by them of public amenities and their integration 
into all areas of life.”807 
  
                                                          
803 Ibid.  In Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) (at para 59), 
O’ Regan J emphasised that what a right requires “will vary over time and context.”  
804 N Haysom. “Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights.” (1992) 8 
South African Journal on Human Rights 451 at 452.  He notes (at 453) that people’s political 
affiliations did not necessarily determine their views on socio-economic rights.  For example, the ANC 
had formally endorsed the inclusion of socio-economic rights in a Bill of Rights, but some 
commentators within the party had expressed reservations about the legal, political and economic 
implications of socio-economic rights and property rights. 
805 ANC ‘Bill of Rights’. 
806 Article 11(5). 
807 Article 9(2). 
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From this document, it is clear that one of the biggest role players in the negotiation 
process that led to the adoption of the Interim Constitution, and the current governing 
party, regarded positive steps to prevent unemployment, particularly for disabled 
people, as a socio-economic entitlement that needs to be protected and promoted.  
While this does not negate the possibility that reference to such measures could 
have been deliberately omitted, it allows for the possibility that it could have been 
subsumed into a more broadly stated right such as that to access to social security.   
This is so particularly in light of the fact that the social security concept includes 
measures to prevent social insecurity and to (re)integrate, where social risks have 
eventuated.  We have already seen that other components of the ICESCR right to 
work are protected by rights such as the right to freedom of occupation, trade or 
profession and the right to fair labour practices.808  In my view, it would therefore not 
be far-fetched to regard the second component of the right to work as part of a more 
holistic conception of what it means to be socially secure. 
 
The second set of objections to imposing a positive obligation on government in 
respect of unemployment protection and unemployment prevention is that it could 
encourage people creating and accepting employment that does not comply with 
minimum working standards.809  However, as Mundlak points out, the third 
component of the right to work recognised at international level aims to protect the 
qualitative dimension of work.810  The rights to fair labour practices and to dignity, as 
well as legislative and other measures to protect work standards, could alleviate the 
concern that the work provided would be exploitative and inconsistent with basic 
labour standards. 
 
Another argument against constitutionalising work protection measures is that it may 
legitimise government decreasing its focus on social assistance and social 
insurance.811  These concerns can be addressed if a holistic approach to social 
security is adopted.  Retrogressive measures are generally regarded as 
                                                          
808 See 6.2.3.2. 
809 Govindjee and Dupper 794. 
810 Mundlak 193. 
811 Govindjee and Dupper 794. 
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unreasonable.812  Furthermore, the intersection of substantive equality and socio-
economic rights may assist individuals who are aggrieved by their exclusion from 
certain benefits. 
 
A fourth class of objections to unemployment prevention and unemployment 
protection measures is based on the premise that work in capitalist conditions is 
inherently exploitative and that it therefore should not be a social good promoted by 
a Constitution or any rights instrument.  On this view, active labour market measures 
would often be experienced as a duty to work, particularly if people do not have the 
freedom to choose what they want to do or in circumstances that make work a 
condition precedent for benefiting from social assistance or social insurance 
schemes.813  A different, but linked, criticism is that such measures would valorise 
wage labour and diminish the social value of non-paying work such as care work, 
volunteer work and artistic expression.814 
 
Mundlak’s response815 to these objections is that the emphasis can be placed on 
dignified work and linking the implementation of the right to the purposes of 
enshrining the right in the first place.  Work does not have to equal access to the 
paid labour market, but can instead be linked to access to meaningful participation in 
social, political and economic life.  Furthermore, the promotion of wage labour does 
not necessarily entail a dismissal or depreciation of other forms of work.  I agree with 
these broadly framed arguments and expand on them below in relation to access to 
work for disabled persons.816 
 
A last category of objections to the right to work or active labour market interventions 
resembles those that relate to the justiciability of socio-economic rights in general.  
Concerns in this category relate to the difficulties in defining the ambit of social rights 
                                                          
812 In Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) para 34, 
the Court stated that “at the very least, any measure which permits a person to be deprived of existing 
access to adequate housing, limits the rights protected in section 26(1)” and has to be justified under 
the general limitations clause (s 36) of the Constitution.  See, also, UN ‘General Comment 19’ para 42 
for the view that there is a strong presumption that retrogressive measures in respect of the right to 
social security is prohibited under the ICESCR. 
813 Mundlak 196. 
814 Ibid. 
815 Mundlak 197. 
816 See 6.3.3 and 6.3.4. 
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and determining when they have been infringed; the perceived unsuitability of courts 
to pronounce on government’s positive obligations in the sphere of economic policy; 
the fact that government has little control over the labour market; and that creating 
rights that cannot be enforced adversely affects the legitimacy of the Bill of Rights as 
a whole.817 
 
Broadening the ambit of an existing socio-economic right would not be materially 
different from other socio-economic rights that have been held to be justiciable.  The 
Constitutional Court has stated that the fact that socio-economic rights would often 
require courts to make decisions that have budgetary implications does not require a 
court to perform functions that are very different from those they assume when 
deciding cases involving civil and political rights.818  Furthermore, the fact that 
government does not have total control of the resolution of a problem does not mean 
that it has no obligation in respect of alleviating the effect of that problem or to 
address it in some other ways.  Its obligations are stated in flexible terms and can be 
applied with due awareness of the limitations under which government functions and 
the constrained role of the courts in areas affecting economic and social policy.  It is 
to these limitations that we now turn. 
 
6.2.4 Limitations on government’s obligations in respect of access to work 
 
There would be considerable limitations on government’s obligations in respect of 
active labour market measures.  The right is to “access to social security”, not to 
social security.  Government therefore would not have a duty to provide work in all 
instances, but would have a duty to protect the right from interference by others and 
would also have the duty to facilitate employment for those who need support to 
realise the right.   
 
Section 27(2) delimits the state’s obligations in respect of the right to access to social 
security.  In general, the state is required to (i) take reasonable legislative and other 
                                                          
817 Mundlak 194-195. 




measures, (ii) within its available resources, (iii) to ensure the progressive realisation 
of the right. 
 
6.2.4.1 Reasonable legislative and other measures 
 
The reasonableness, or otherwise, of a particular state programme or scheme has to 
be determined on a case-by-case basis.819  Although considerable academic debate 
has raged over the desirability of such an open-ended standard against which to test 
government’s performance of its s 27 obligations, it is clear that some general 
principles can be distilled from the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence.  
 
For present purposes, it bears noting that a government programme has to be 
reasonable in both its inception and implementation.820  It is therefore not just 
legislation that will be subject to constitutional scrutiny, but state policies and 
programmes implemented in terms of these policies.  This does not mean that a 
court will substitute its opinion for that of the executive and the legislature.  The 
Constitutional Court has recognised that there may be a variety of measures that are 
reasonable and that courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon matters that may have 
multiple social and economic consequences.821  
 
With regards to implementation, an important factor is whether the plan is capable of 
review and whether necessary changes can be made in response to changing 
circumstances.  This was one of the important factors that led the Court in Mazibuko 
to hold that the City of Johannesburg’s free basic water policy was reasonable.822 
  
                                                          
819 Grootboom para 92. 
820 Grootboom para 42. 
821 TAC (No 2) para 38; Grootboom para 41. 
822 At para 95, O’Regan J stated:  “If the City had not continued to review and refine its Free Basic 
Water policy after it was introduced in 2001, and had taken no steps to ensure that the poorest 
households were able to obtain an additional allocation, it may well have been concluded that the 
policy was inflexible and therefore unreasonable.  This would have been so, in particular, given the 
evidence that poorer households are also often larger than average and thus most prejudiced by the 6 
kilolitre cap.  However, the City has not set its policy in stone.  Instead, it has engaged in considerable 
research and continually refined its policies in the light of the findings of its research.” 
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Another important component of reasonableness is whether attempts were made to 
engage meaningfully with people who would be affected by the way in which the 
state performs its obligations in respect of a particular right.  This duty to engage is 
said to be based in treating marginalised people with dignity, as well as to find 
cooperative processes through which to balance competing interests.823   
 
In the words of Sachs J in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers: 
“[T]he procedural and substantive aspects of justice and equity cannot always 
be separated. The managerial role of the courts may need to find expression in 
innovative ways.  Thus one potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving 
sustainable reconciliations of the different interests involved is to encourage 
and require the parties to engage with each other in a pro-active and honest 
endeavour to find mutually acceptable solutions.  Wherever possible, respectful 
face-to-face engagement or mediation through a third party should replace 
arms-length combat by intransigent opponents.”824  
 
The Constitutional Court has also emphasised that a reasonable government 
measure would take into account the needs of the most vulnerable people and make 
provision for short-, medium- and long-term needs.825  In Grootboom, for example, a 
housing policy had not made provision for the temporary housing of people who 
lacked basic shelter and was therefore found to be unreasonable.826 
 
6.2.4.2 Available resources  
 
The Constitutional Court has emphasised that the socio-economic rights in ss 26 and 
27 of the Constitution are themselves limited by a lack of resources.827  The 
obligation to provide access to work will therefore be limited by the resources at 
government’s disposal.  Resources may include government’s financial means, its 
                                                          
823 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) paras 10, 15-16. 
824 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 39. 
825 Grootboom para 43. 
826 At para 66. 
827 See, for example, Soobramoney para 11; Grootboom para 34; TAC (No 2) para 39; and Mazibuko 
and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) paras 49-50, 56. 
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ability to direct resources through regulation and the likely impact of any regulatory 
activities if such activities are implemented reasonably. 
 
An important issue is whether it is practicable for government to undertake certain 
tasks.  In Mazibuko, for example, the applicants argued that it was unreasonable for 
the City of Johannesburg to allocate free water per property stand rather than per 
person.828  The Constitutional Court held that it would have been “an enormous 
administrative burden”, if it were possible at all, to keep track of how many persons 
were living on a particular property stand in order to determine the allocation of free 
water to that stand.829 
 
Generally courts are not likely to decide whether resources are available for 
particular schemes or whether certain resources should be employed to achieve 
certain desired goals, but where it is clear that resources are available and that a 
specific action is required and can be taken, a court may order that such action be 
taken.830  This cautious approach is encapsulated by the following dictum by the 
Constitutional Court in TAC (No 2):  
 
“The Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the 
courts, namely, to require the state to take measures to meet its constitutional 
obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation.  
Such determinations of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary 
implications, but are not in themselves directed at rearranging budgets.  In this 
way the judicial, legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate 
constitutional balance.”831  
  
                                                          
828 At para 82. 
829 At para 84. 
830 MP Olivier. Constitutional Issues. In: MP Olivier, N Smit and ER Kalula (eds). Social Security:  A 
Legal Analysis. (2003) 45 at 76. 
831 At para 38. 
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6.2.4.3 Progressive realisation  
 
The Court has declined setting a minimum core for each of the socio-economic 
rights.  In the course of rejecting a minimum core in respect of the right to access to 
water, O’Regan J said the following in Mazibuko:   
“The purpose of the constitutional entrenchment of social and economic rights 
was […] to ensure that the state continue to take reasonable legislative and 
other measures progressively to achieve the realisation of the rights to the 
basic necessities of life.  It was not expected, nor could it have been, that the 
state would be able to furnish citizens immediately with all the basic necessities 
of life.”832 
The injunction to progressively realise the right therefore means that it is accepted 
that the right may not be immediately realisable.  
 
However, as Yacoob J emphasised in Grootboom:  “It means that accessibility 
should be progressively facilitated: legal, administrative, operational and financial 
hurdles should be examined and, where possible, lowered over time.”833 The 
Constitution thus requires a realistic, comprehensive plan to progressively facilitate 
the realisation of the right.  
 
South Africa ratified the ICESCR on 12 January 2015,834 which means that it is now 
bound by the provisions of this Covenant.  An important consequence is that South 
Africa’s socio-economic jurisprudence has to develop in harmony with the normative 
standards set by the ICESCR.  While the Constitutional Court has taken guidance on 
socio-economic rights from international law, one of the principles it has not 
endorsed is that socio-economic rights have a minimum core.  That refusal may now 
have to be reconsidered, which will be to the advantage of those claimants seeking 
orders aimed at facilitating fulfilment of their basic needs. 
  
                                                          
832 At para 58. 
833 At para 45. 
834 See UN Treaty Collection. “3.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” 
(2015) https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=iv-3&src=treaty 
(Accessed: 15 May 2015). 
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6.3 The right to access to work for disabled people:  Selected issues 
 
If these general principles in respect of a right to access to work are taken into 
account, what issues have to be addressed in respect of disabled people’s access to 
work?  It is not possible to canvass issues in depth here, nor to provide an 
exhaustive list of what needs to be addressed.  However, there are several points of 
interest that would have to be borne in mind when government’s obligations in 
respect of access to work for disabled people are considered. 
 
6.3.1 Improved statistics and information on disabled people’s access to work 
 
Accurate information is indispensable to policymaking and implementation.835  Such 
measurements serve as bridges between broadly stated entitlements and the details 
of what must be provided to whom and at what time.  This reality is recognised in the 
CRPD and in constitutional jurisprudence.  The CRPD requires states parties to 
“collect appropriate information, including statistical and research data, to enable 
them to formulate and implement policies to give effect” to that Convention.836  This 
information is to be used to, inter alia, help assess the implementation of states 
parties’ obligations and “to identify and address the barriers faced by persons with 
disabilities in exercising their rights.”837 
 
While this explicit requirement in the CRPD can be used to put pressure on 
government to collect relevant information, it is only directly enforceable at the 
international level.  This is because it has not been incorporated into South African 
law.838  One domestic-level remedy to compel appropriate data collection can be 
                                                          
835 NE Groce. “Disability, Poverty, Human Rights and the Need for Accurate Data to Promote Action.” 
(2009) 3 ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 185: 
“The need for empirical data is imperative if persons with disabilities are to be effectively 
reached by programs that address social inclusion and poverty reduction.  This need for solid 
data is all the more important as the field of global development is currently framed by the 
Millennium Development Goals which emphasize the need for measurement, monitoring and 
evaluation to track progress or identify impediments to progress.  Empirical data has become 
the lingua franca of global development.” 
836 Article 31(1). 
837 Article 31(2). 
838 See TP Van Reenen and H Combrinck. “The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities in Africa:  Progress after 5 Years.” (2011) 8(14) Sur International Journal on Human Rights 
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derived from the positive obligations imposed on government in terms of 
progressively realizable socio-economic rights. 
 
Due to the multi-faceted and non-static nature of disability and the different purposes 
for which disability is assessed, disability statistics are generally not comparable over 
time and location, and may also be difficult to interpret.839  The inadequacy of 
disability statistics worldwide led to the formation in 2001 of the Washington Group 
on Disability Statistics under the auspices of the UN Statistics Division.840  Its primary 
function was to address “the scarcity and general poor quality of data on disability, 
especially in developing countries, and the lack of internationally comparable 
measures, even among developed countries.”841 
 
The Washington Group has shifted the focus from an impairment-based one that led 
to questions such as “Do you have a disability?” to an approach steeped in the 
ICF.842  The emphasis of the group has been to develop questions that elicit 
comparable information on “experienced difficulties in basic actions, more complex 
activities and barriers to participation.”843   
 
Schneider, Dasappa, Khan and Khan write that a StatsSA survey found that the 
Washington Group questions elicited more effective disability prevalence figures 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
132 at 139-140.  Section 231(2) of the Constitution provides that an international agreement binds 
South Africa only after it has been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces.  It becomes law in South Africa if it is enacted into law by national 
legislation, but a self-executing provision that has been approved by Parliament is law unless it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament (s 231(4)); Azanian People’s Organization 
(AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [1996] 8 BCLR 1015 
(CC) para 26.  In Glenister v President of the RSA and Others 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) para 99, the 
Court set out the three ways in which this enactment may be done:  (a) by embodying the provisions 
of the agreement into an Act, (b) by attaching the agreement as a schedule to an Act, or (c) by 
enacting enabling legislation that authorizes the executive to bring the agreement into effect as 
domestic law by way of proclamation or notice in the Government Gazette.).  It is not clear when a 
provision is self-executing, but the nature of the agreement and how it fits in with domestic law are 
factors that seem to be relevant (L Chenwi. “Using International Human Rights Law to Promote 
Constitutional Rights:  The (Potential) Role of the South African Parliament.” (2011) 15 Law, 
Democracy and Development 1 at 11). 
839 JH Madans, ME Loeb and BM Altman. “Measuring Disability and Monitoring the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  The Work of the Washington Group on Disability Statistics.” 
(2011) http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/11/S4/S4 (Accessed:  6 February 2015) (hereinafter 
referred to as “Washington Group”) 3. 






than the “Do you have a disability?” type questions used in the 2001 South African 
Census.844  The Washington Group questions have been used since the 2009 
Household Survey and were used in the 2011 National Census.845 
However, it is instructive that these authors note the following:   
“The findings are not conclusive as to the effectiveness of identifying the 
population at risk for disability-related disadvantage and discrimination using 
only basic domains of functioning, rather than including questions on more 
complex domains.  Further research is required to understand these 
findings.”846 
 
The StatsSA ‘Disability Profile’ also implies that the information gathered could not 
be used to determine the weight to be attached to the various causes of the 
employment inequalities experienced by disabled persons.847  Thus, although the 
questions used in censuses have developed and become more nuanced, the 
emphasis is still on individual limitations on functioning.  This is consistent with the 
concerns expressed by commentators that the ICF approach and interactive 
approaches generally may still attach more weight to individual factors rather than to 
environmental and social barriers.848   
  
                                                          
844 M Schneider, P Dasappa, N Khan and A Khan. “Measuring Disability in Censuses:  The Case of 
South Africa.” (2009) 3(3) ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 245 at 262. 
845 StatsSA ‘Disability Profile’ 20.  The report (at 14-16) expands on the evolution of disability-related 
questions in censuses.  It explains the findings of two surveys conducted by StatsSA to determine 
whether the Washington Group (WG) approach ought to be followed in South Africa:   
“Results from both studies showed that use of the WG questions led to much higher disability 
estimates compared to the traditional questions of 'Do you have any serious disability that 
prevents your full participation in life activities?'  In both studies, the term 'difficulty' instead of 
'disabled' seemed to be more acceptable among persons with impairments who did not identify 
themselves as being disabled.  Furthermore, the use of the response options that allow for 
more nuanced responses rather than a stark 'Yes/No' response allowed people with mild or 
moderate difficulties to report these.  If they were required to choose between 'Yes' and 'No' 
they may have responded 'No'.  Both studies recommended use of the WG questions for 
Census 2011.” 
846 Schneider, Dasappa, Khan and Khan 262. 
847 StatsSA ‘Disability Profile’ 11.  The relevant part reads:   
“This low representation of persons with disabilities in the work place leaves a number of 
questions unanswered: is it noncompliance, prejudice or insufficient skills, or a combination of 
factors including environmental obstacles, (sic) Misconceptions and prejudice about capabilities 
of persons with disabilities to perform certain jobs remain one of the major obstacles to 
employment opportunities and their exclusion from opportunities for promotion in their careers.” 
848 See 2.3.1.1. 
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If one compares the Washington Group questions with those suggested by Abberley 
in the previous chapter,849 it is notable that the latter set of questions is more 
explicitly focused on social and environmental conditions and circumstances that 
prevent or make it difficult for people to function.  These shortcomings do not 
suggest that the census information is not useful – it can clearly guide policy 
planning and implementation.  However, it does not provide much insight into social 
and environmental barriers to individual functioning and is therefore of limited use in 
planning regarding positive actions to be taken to remove such barriers. 
 
Censuses are perhaps not the most appropriate mechanisms through which to elicit 
information about discrimination and structural inequalities in the employment 
sphere.  One potential source of information is the reports completed by designated 
employers in terms of the EEA.850  However, such reports do not have to indicate 
how many people with disabilities had applied for employment with a particular 
employer and why they were not interviewed, appointed or both.  In terms of 
recruitment figures, employers are required to indicate new recruits for the reporting 
period in terms of their race and gender, but the form states that people with 
disabilities must be included within those categories.851  The result is that recruitment 
figures are not disaggregated based on disabilities.  This is in contrast to the existing 
workforce profile, which includes people with disabilities as a separate category.852  
 
The information in the CEE reports, unsurprisingly, mirrors that disclosed in the 
employer reports, as the former are compiled through aggregation of all employer 
reports.  The latest CEE report therefore has information on disability representation 
in existing workforces, but expressly indicates that no separate workforce movement 
data is available for disability.853 
 
It would seem that targeted research that tracks disabled work seekers’ experiences 
when they apply for work is needed to gain more insight into the barriers that operate 
                                                          
849 See 5.7.1. 
850 See Form EEA2 in the EE Regulations. 
851 See Item 2, Form EEA2 of the EE Regulations. 
852 See Item 1.2, Form EEA2 of the EE Regulations. 
853 CEE 28, 35, 42 and 47. 
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to exclude them.  Employment service providers could provide support for such 
research, as could DPOs and other organisations to which disabled work seekers 
have access.  The scope and design of such research endeavours fall beyond the 
scope of this work. 
 
6.3.2 Positive non-discrimination duties and affirmative action duties as 
components of unemployment protection 
 
In the previous chapter I set out the positive duties that employers are expected to 
perform to facilitate access to employment for disabled persons.  Government also 
has a crucial role to play in the enforcement of these obligations.  There are 
indications that the resources devoted to the enforcement of the EEA have not been 
adequate and that labour inspectors are unable to perform the necessary functions.  
The question that arises is whether there are ways in which to hold government 
accountable if it fails to implement or enforce positive duties in respect of access to 
work. 
 
One mechanism is to argue, on the basis of s 9(1) of the Constitution, that 
government is not protecting aggrieved persons’ right to “equal protection and 
benefit of the law”.854  In particular, it is not clear whether the standard to be applied 
is rationality or one of general fairness.855  It is also not clear whether a comparator 
has to be identified to show that aggrieved persons have been treated less 
favourably than those in comparably similar positions.856  The latter requirement, in 
particular, may cause difficulties. 
 
Strategically, if unemployment protection and unemployment prevention measures 
are accepted as falling within the scope of s 27(1) of the Constitution, the 
assessment of government’s performance in regulating positive non-discrimination 
duties and affirmative action duties that impact on disabled persons’ access to work 
can occur within the framework of s 27(2).  The jurisprudence emphasises that 
                                                          





programmes must be reasonable in their inception and implementation and that 
adequate resources must be made available to achieve the stated objectives.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the limited number of labour inspectors, the 
reported shortcomings in the training of these labour inspectors and the time 
constraints on labour inspectors when enforcing employment equity may give rise to 
allegations that government’s failure to enforce employment equity constitutes a 
failure to put in place reasonable measures to facilitate unemployment protection.857 
 
I do not suggest that it will always be strategically beneficial to place reliance on s 27 
rather than s 9.  It may be that the uncertainty about the scope of s 27 and other 
considerations render reliance on s 9 the preferable approach.  However, pointing 
out the social security implications of the regulatory failure may assist aggrieved 
parties.  The constitutional principles on reasonableness, available resources and 
progressive realisation may also provide a clearer framework within which to assess 
government’s compliance with its constitutional obligations. 
 
6.3.3 Interrelationship of social assistance, social insurance and work 
 
In many instances, the various arms of social security are assessed separately.  The 
focus, for example, would be the exclusion of certain groups from social assistance 
or the coverage or benefits of a social insurance scheme.  In my view, however, an 
important issue for disabled people – reflected in the discussions in Chapters 2 and 
4 – is that their exclusion from productive work is at the heart of their exclusion from 
social activities and the social life of their communities more generally.858  An 
approach to the social security of disabled people that is disproportionately skewed 
in favour of cash transfers to disabled persons would therefore not be effective in 
addressing one of the root causes of many disabled people’s social exclusion. 
 
This argument is made with due cognisance of the dangers of exposing disabled 
people who are unable or who do not want to work to judgements that they should 
‘earn their keep’ rather than relying on state assistance.  A holistic approach would 
                                                          
857 See 5.5.3. 
858 See 2.3 and 4.5. 
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take care in distinguishing between such persons from those who want to and are 
able to work, but who are prevented from doing so.  In the words of Weber, “the aim 
of the disability rights movement is not integration into the workforce for integration’s 
sake but integration into society for the sake of dignity and equality of people with 
disabilities.”859  This intersection of social security and equality is one of the reasons 
for me suggesting that the value of freedom, either independently or as part of 
dignity, should be developed to underpin the promotion of access to work for 
disabled persons.   
 
In terms of transformative equality, the promotion of more active forms of inclusion 
would generally be a positive development and consistent with a constitutional ethos 
built on “freeing the potential of each person”.860  In this regard, Sabates-Wheeler’s 
and Devereux’s advocacy of what they call “transformative social protection” is 
prescient.861  They emphasise that long-term poverty reduction has to be based on 
the creation of positive relationships between “livelihood security and enhanced 
autonomy or empowerment.”862  This notion is consistent with Stein’s argument that 
it would violate disability human rights to fashion and implement “presumably well-
intentioned yet paternalistic welfare systems that provide subsistence to people with 
disabilities in lieu of workplace participation.”863 
 
Disabled People South Africa seems to have worked from this premise when it 
specifically advocated for a right to work for disabled people in the ANC draft 
Constitution and emphasised the social inclusion of disabled people in all spheres.  
Work is not just about money – as Mundlak puts it, “[w]ork is about income, about 
individual fulfilment, about the constitution of one’s identity, about social inclusion” 864  
In a context in which the participation of disabled persons in the formal labour force 
                                                          
859 MC Weber. “Disability Rights, Welfare Law.” (2011) 32(6) Cardozo Law Review 2483 at 2505. 
860 Preamble of the Constitution. 
861 R Sabates-Wheeler and S Devereux. “Social Protection for Transformation.” (2007) 38(3) IDS 
Bulletin 23. 
862 Ibid. 
863 Stein ‘Human Rights’ 103-104. 
864 Mundlak 189. 
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appears to be regressing,865 proactive strategies to shift social protection measures 
to promote employment are imperative. 
 
Viewing unemployment protection and unemployment prevention as part of social 
security or, at least, as a socio-economic good may also hold advantages for policy 
coherence.  Commentators have argued that there is an apparent paradox between 
disability rights’ focus on social causes of disability and the provision of social 
assistance for disabled people, especially because the latter is the more established 
and often still the predominant element of social security.866  A holistic approach 
would cement the idea that social security is not limited to cash transfers and does 
not exclude the active participation of disabled persons.  It would also recognise that 
the promotion of access to work for disabled people does not negate the need for 
social assistance to disabled persons.867 
 
On the contrary, a holistic approach may reinforce that a combination of measures 
may be appropriate to promote the rights of disabled persons.  Lorenzo, reporting on 
a study in which disabled women who live in wooden shacks in peri-urban areas 
outside Cape Town related their “experiences of what helped or hindered their social 
and economic development since becoming disabled”, relayed the multi-faceted 
struggles these women revealed.868  They struggled to provide for their families with 
their grants and sometimes by running small businesses.  They faced discrimination, 
exploitation and abuse within their families.  They reported limited opportunities for 
them to develop skills that would help them to find work or run their own businesses.  
  
                                                          
865 See 1.1. 
866 See, for example, Weber (at 2501) who argues that some might view social assistance as based 
on charity and begging, which is precisely what the disability rights movement has condemned as 
inimical to true social equality.  See, also, L Waddington and M Diller. “Tensions and Coherence in 
Disability Policy:  The Uneasy Relationship Between Social Welfare and Civil Rights Models of 
Disability in American, European and International Employment Law.” (2000) 
http://dredf.org/international/waddington.html (Accessed: 6 February 2015) 2:  “In various ways, 
people with disabilities are told they should work, but are simultaneously encouraged to stay home or 
shunted into segregated work settings.  Employers are instructed to provide jobs, and yet are excused 
from doing so.” 
867 Weber (at 2502-2503) notes that “[i]t is hardly a retreat from anti-discrimination efforts to recognize 
that public assistance on the basis of disability needs to continue as long as discrimination on the 
basis of disability persists.” 
868 T Lorenzo. “No African Renaissance without Disabled Women:  A Communal Approach to Human 
Development in Cape Town South Africa.” (2003) 18(6) Disability and Society 759 at 766-768. 
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The research team in the above study facilitated a process through which these 
disabled women could create parallel narratives that emphasised their “strengths 
and spirit of survival.”869  Lorenzo highlights the findings that community-based 
rehabilitation has to focus on more than just rehabilitation and that equalisation of 
opportunities and social integration also need to be achieved.870  She suggests that 
some of the aspects that warrant attention include the development of “emotional 
resourcefulness”, the “nurturing of children and families in disability issues” and 
“renewing spirituality and Ubuntu in disability and development programmes.”871 
 
Government can create programmes that would provide broad-based support to 
persons in similar situations to the women in the study.  Some relevant duties states 
parties undertook to perform in terms of the CRPD include obligations to raise 
awareness about disability issues within families and communities;872 actively 
promote work for persons with disability;873 ensure disabled persons’ freedom from 
exploitation, violence and abuse;874 take measures that allow disabled persons to 
                                                          
869 Loreno 769. 
870 Lorenzo 772. 
871 Ibid. 
872 Article 8 of the CRPD reads: 
“1. States Parties undertake to adopt immediate, effective and appropriate measures: 
▪ To raise awareness throughout society, including at the family level, regarding persons with 
disabilities, and to foster respect for the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities; 
▪ To combat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful practices relating to persons with disabilities, 
including those based on sex and age, in all areas of life; 
▪ To promote awareness of the capabilities and contributions of persons with disabilities. 
Measures to this end include: 
a. Initiating and maintaining effective public awareness campaigns designed: 
i. To nurture receptiveness to the rights of persons with disabilities; 
ii. To promote positive perceptions and greater social awareness towards persons with 
disabilities; 
iii. To promote recognition of the skills, merits and abilities of persons with disabilities, 
and of their contributions to the workplace and the labour market; 
b. Fostering at all levels of the education system, including in all children from an early age, an 
attitude of respect for the rights of persons with disabilities; 
c. Encouraging all organs of the media to portray persons with disabilities in a manner 
consistent with the purpose of the present Convention; 
d. Promoting awareness-training programmes regarding persons with disabilities and the rights 
of persons with disabilities.” 
The Taylor Committee Report No. 9 at 370 noted:  “[T]he need for clear, accessible information for 
people living with disability, their families, and their supporters has long been recognized, yet this 
remains a principle [sic] weakness in the system.” 
873 Article 27. 
874 Article 16. 
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live independently and as included members of their communities875 and facilitate 
the personal mobility of disabled persons.876 
 
6.3.4 Network of social security laws that are relevant to access to work 
 
In light of the holistic approach I argued for in the previous section, it is necessary to 
consider social security laws that are relevant to how disability is constructed and to 
disabled persons’ access to work.  It is not possible to discuss all the technical 
aspects of these laws here, given their breadth.  Such aspects would offer fertile 
ground for future research.  In a context in which disabled persons struggle to 
access work, it is important to consider the impact of these laws.  
 
The guiding principle that animates the discussions of these laws is the need for the 
creation of a comprehensive, integrated system of social protection.877  Such a 
system has to be alive to the realities of contemporary South Africa and its history.  
Furthermore, integration has to occur at various levels – policy-making, institutional 
coordination, service delivery arrangements, benefit design and information 
sharing.878  The subsequent discussions of various social security regulatory 
frameworks have to be understood in the context of these principles. 
 
6.3.4.1 The regulatory framework for social assistance 
 
The SAA and its regulations provide for the payment of disability grants, grants-in-
aid879 and social relief of distress,880 all of which may assist disabled persons in 
                                                          
875 Article 19. 
876 Article 20. 
877 M Olivier, O Dupper and A Govindjee. “Redesigning the South African Unemployment Insurance 
Fund:  Selected Key Policy and Legal Perspectives.” (2011) 22(2) Stellenbosch Law Review 396 at 
399. 
878 Olivier, Dupper and Govindjee 398. 
879 Section 12 of the SAA provides that a person is eligible for a grant-in-aid if he or she meets the 
general requirements set in s 5 of the Act and if he or she “is in such a physical or mental condition 
that he or she requires regular attendance by another person.”  Regulation 5 sets additional 
requirements, including that the person concerned must be in receipt of a disability grant, an older 
person’s grant or a war veteran’s grant and must be certified by a medical practitioner as meeting the 
requirement of s 12 of the SAA.  Anyone housed in a state institution is ineligible for the grant-in-aid. 
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some way.  However, the conception of disability in the SAA and its regulations is 
one steeped in the medical model of disability.  In order to qualify for a disability 
grant, an applicant has to show that he or she is, “owing to a physical or mental 
disability, unfit to obtain by virtue of any service, employment or profession the 
means needed to enable him or her to provide for his or her maintenance.”881  The 
SAA itself does not contain a definition of disability.  The regulations provide that a 
“disability is confirmed by an assessment,”882 and define an “assessment” as “the 
medical examination by a medical officer of a person or child in order to determine 
disability or care-dependency for the purposes of recommending a finding for the 
awarding of a social grant.”883  
 
The medical assessments that are done will often have to be conducted by health 
care personnel in an overburdened public health care sector.884 There is little to no 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
880 Section 13 of the SAA provides for social relief of distress on prescribed grounds.  Regulation 9 
expands on this general provision and requires that an applicant be “in need of immediate temporary 
assistance.”  Such applicant must also show that he or she: 
“(a) has insufficient means; and 
(b) is a South African citizen or a permanent resident or a refugee and complies with any 
of the following conditions - 
(i) the person is awaiting payment of an approved social grant; 
(ii) the person has, for a period of less than six months, been assessed to be medically 
unfit to undertake any remunerative work; 
(iii) no maintenance is received from a parent, child or a spouse obliged in law to pay 
maintenance and proof is furnished that efforts made to trace such a person or obtain 
maintenance were unsuccessful; 
(iv) the breadwinner of that person's family has died and the application is made within 
three months of the death of such breadwinner; 
(v) the breadwinner of that person's family has been admitted to an institution funded by 
the State; or 
(vi) the person has been affected by a disaster as defined in the Fund-raising Act, 1978 
(Act No. 107 of 1978) or the Disaster Management Act, 2002 (Act No. 57 of 2002); 
and 
(vii) refusal of the application for social relief of distress may cause undue hardship as 
contained in the Procedure Manual for Social Relief of Distress approved by the 
Minister.” 
881 Section 9(b) of the SAA.  This is in addition to an age requirement. 
882 Regulation 3(b). 
883 Regulation 1. 
884 JM Tumbo. “Factors that Influence Doctors in the Assessment of Applicants for Disability Grant.” 
(2008) 50(2) South African Family Practice 65 at 65a writes the following about disability 
assessments:   
“Doctors in state hospitals and clinics are tasked with the duty of assessing applicants for this 
grant.  Ideally, the assessment is done by an institutional committee consisting of a doctor, 
physiotherapist, social worker, occupational therapist and specialised nurses.  This is not 
always the case, however, because of a shortage of personnel, particularly in rural areas.  In 
my setting, the assessment committee usually consists of the doctor, a social worker and the 
physiotherapist.  On some occasions only the doctor is available for the assessment of 
applicants for a disability grant.” 
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consideration of social barriers that prevent people with impairments from working.  
Projects that sought to have assessments done by panels that would consider 
environmental and social factors that impact on people’s ability to work were 
undertaken, but there has now been a return to what are considered to be “objective” 
medical criteria.885  However, these criteria may ignore the social and environmental 
barriers that make it difficult for persons with impairments to access work or prevent 
them from gaining such access altogether.886  As Kelly points out, “the confusion 
between medical diagnosis and actual functional capacity” has also often led to 
disability grants being awarded to people who may have been able to work.887 
 
Medicalised assessments are relatively easier to conduct, are arguably easier to 
oversee and to apply consistently and require fewer human and other resources.888  
However, the trade-off is that people who may be able to work with appropriate 
support or other accommodations are declared unfit to work.  Similarly, people with 
atypical physical, intellectual or psychosocial characteristics may be prevented from 
working by social and environmental barriers, but narrow medical assessments may 
find that they are fit to work.   
 
More empirical work needs to be done on the effects of the assessment system – 
who it includes and excludes, the likely consequences if it were to be amended and 
the resources that would be necessary to administer an amended assessment 
regime.889  In addition, the links between the content and enforcement of disability 
                                                          
885 G Kelly. “Regulating Access to the Disability Grant in South Africa, 1990-2013.” (2013) 
https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/8576/WP%20330.pdf?sequence=1 (Accessed: 16 May 
2015) 38. 
886 See 2.3.1.1. 
887 Kelly 24-25. 
888 For a discussion of the factors – most of which are subjective – that influence doctors when 
assessing disability, see Turnbo 65a-65b. 
889 See L Swartz and M Schneider. Tough Choices:  Disability and Social Security in South Africa. In: 
B Watermeyer, L Swartz, T Lorenzo, M Schneider and M Priestley (eds). Disability and Social 
Change:  A South African Agenda. (2006) 234-244 for a useful discussion of the different balancing of 
interests that needs to take place in assessments.  These authors cite (at 241) a passage by Jette 
that encapsulates the challenges inherent in disability assessment: 
“This assessment has to be sensitive and specific, so it can deal with false positives as well as 
with false negatives […]  In addition, it has to be practical, safe, and ideally, inexpensive to 
administer.  That is no easy task.  In fact, anyone who has done work on assessment knows 
that attaining this goal is like searching for the ‘holy grail’.  It cannot be done; it is extremely 
challenging to try to meet all of these criteria.  A major challenge […] in trying to measure 
disability is to balance the scientific concerns (like reliability and validity) with the practical and 
pragmatic concerns requiring real-world trade-offs.  One has to give up some reliability and 
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equality laws that require the inclusion of disabled workers on the one hand, and 
applications for social assistance on the other, have to be explored further. 
 
6.3.4.2 Occupational injuries and diseases and Return-To-Work (RTW) 
measures 
 
The COIDA is the general workers’ compensation scheme for those who suffer 
occupational injuries890 or contract occupational diseases.891  The system 
compensates in cases of temporary disability, permanent disability and death.  
Provision is also made for the payment of medical expenses and for the payment of 
additional compensation in situations where employers or their representatives were 
negligent.  Compensation is calculated based on the earnings of the employee prior 
to disablement or death, as well as on the degree of disablement.  The latter is not 
calculated according to functional capacity, but rather according to values attached 
to different body parts or, in the case of psychiatric conditions, unknown criteria. 892  
This reflects a biomedical conception of impairment and disability. 
 
A further indication of the relatively little attention that has been paid to structural 
barriers that face persons whose impairments can be ascribed to work-related 
causes, is the fact that RTW measures have not been incorporated into COIDA or 
the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act (ODMWA).893  The result is that 
such workers are often left with little compensation and are not provided with 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
validity, sensitivity and specificity if, in fact, the goal also is to come up with something really 
practical and inexpensive to administer.  It is not possible to achieve all of these.” 
See, also J Andrews, M Fourie and R Watson. Issues in Disability Assessment. In: B Watermeyer, L 
Swartz, T Lorenzo, M Schneider and M Priestley (eds). Disability and Social Change:  A South African 
Agenda. (2006) 245-259. They note (at 256) that the method of assessment will differ, depending on 
the purpose for which the assessment is done, that the applicant for benefits must be placed at the 
centre of the assessment and that various options for him or her must be considered.  He or she must 
be given an opportunity to relate his or her experiences.  Their exposition of what needs to be 
assessed for different types of productivity (at 257) is particularly useful.  See, also, R Gorven. “The 
Implications of a Social Understanding of Disability for Assessment in the Disability Grants Application 
Process.” (2014) Responsa Meridiana 32. 
890 Section 22 of COIDA. 
891 Section 65 of COIDA. 
892 See M du Plessis. Compensating Employees who Suffer Work-related Psychiatric Harm in the 
Course and Scope of their Employment. (2007) 21-23. 
893 Act 78 of 1973. 
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opportunities to be (re)integrated into the labour market.894  They are likely to 
become dependent on social assistance grants, even if they are willing and able to 
work.895 
 
Olivier, in a comprehensive 2011 report to the Compensation Fund, proposed that a 
chapter be inserted into COIDA to provide for RTW mechanisms.896  In his view, this 
chapter could incorporate the following changes: 
“Describe and define the roles, functions and responsibilities of various role-
players, in a manner which creates legal obligations; 
• Identify the range of incentives (positive and negative) to promote 
participation in RTW interventions; 
• Adjust, in COIDA, the notions of ‘benefits’, ‘medical aid’ and ‘rehabilitation 
activities’ to ensure that the complete range of RTW-linked rehabilitation 
activities is covered; 
• Extend the range of benefits/ services available in the event of occupational 
diseases to specifically include rehabilitation and reintegration within the 
framework of RTW; 
• Introduce a legal obligation to keep the position of an occupationally injured/ 
diseased employee open for a particular period of time, subject to 
participation in an agreed rehabilitation plan; 
• Extend dismissal protection, also within the context of the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995, to specifically protect occupationally injured/ diseased 
employees from being dismissed or otherwise disadvantaged while they are 
engaged in an agreed rehabilitation activity.  This protection could be time-
bound; 
                                                          
894 The fact that compensation is earnings-related works to the detriment of low-income workers, who 
are often more at risk of suffering harm due to occupational injuries or diseases.  R U’Ren and M 
U’Ren. “Workers’ Compensation, Mental Health Claims, and Political Economy.” (1999) 22(5-6) 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 451 at 460 note: “In terms of health, individuals in lower 
social status groups have the highest rates of morbidity and mortality for almost every medical and 
psychiatric disorder.” 
895 M Olivier, A Govindjee, E Cheong and M Azman bin Aziz Mohammed. “Return-To-Work and 
Disability Management in the Developing World:  Developments in South Africa and Malaysia, with 
Reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Comparative 
Precedents.” (2012) http://ilera2012.wharton.upenn.edu/RefereedPapers/CheongEdmund.pdf 
(Accessed: 16 May 2015). 
896 M Olivier, A Govindjee, A Wolvaardt and M Nyenti. “Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Return-To-
Work of Workers who have Suffered Occupational Injuries or Diseases.” (2011) 
http://eiifa.org/download/publ/Compensation%20Fund%20(RTW%20project)(FINAL%20POLICY%20
DOCUMENT)(April%202011).pdf (Accessed: 16 May 2015) 11-12. 
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• Consider the adoption of similar interventions and forms of protection in 
ODMWA (Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act) and in 
environments not covered by COIDA, to ensure consistency of treatment of 
all workers in South Africa; 
• Clarify certain provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 
(UIA), including the introduction of a provision which would disqualify a 
beneficiary in the event of refusal or failure to participate in a RTW-based 
rehabilitation programme; 
• Establish a new multi-level or multi-tiered dispute resolution framework, 
impacting on RTW and rehabilitation within the COIDA framework; and 
• Reformulate COIDA provisions regarding the position of migrant workers 
and (South African) workers abroad.” 
 
An in-depth analysis of these proposals falls beyond the scope of this work.  
However, in principle, RTW measures could promote access to work for disabled 
persons and be consistent with social understandings of disability that emphasise 
autonomy and substantive equality.  The implementation of RTW measures warrants 
considerable attention, especially the extent to which it takes cognisance of social 
and environmental barriers that prevent disabled persons from functioning.  This 
element assumes particular importance if punitive measures are used against those 
who refuse or fail to participate satisfactorily in RTW programmes.   
 
6.3.4.3 Unemployment insurance regulatory framework 
 
Unemployment insurance in South Africa is regulated by the UIA and the 
Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act.897  The scheme can be characterised 
as passive in that it only provides short-term income protection through the payment 
of benefits to contributors who satisfy prescribed criteria.898  The five types of 
benefits are for unemployment, illness, maternity, adoption and dependants.   
  
                                                          
897 Act 4 of 2002. 
898 A Govindjee, M Olivier and O Dupper. “Activation in the Context of the Unemployment Insurance 
System in South Africa.” (2011) 22(1) Stellenbosch Law Review 205 at 209. 
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The long-term unemployed are not covered, nor are those in atypical employment 
and those who work in the informal economy.899  These cohorts are likely to include 
many disabled persons.  Those who resign or suspend their own employment are 
also excluded.  The reason for the exclusion is to prevent abuse of the system, but it 
also has the consequence that people who leave employment to study further or to 
undergo skills training and those who want to start their own businesses are affected 
adversely.  Dupper, Olivier and Govindjee therefore propose that unemployment 
benefits be extended to those who leave their employment to pursue further 
education or training, to become self-employed or for any compelling reason relating 
to their families.900 
 
This proposal may benefit people who, for disability-related reasons, want more 
flexibility or need to change their occupations and therefore choose to study or 
become self-employed.  It would also offer some protection to people who pursue 
these options due to unwelcoming or unsupportive work environments, particularly if 
the enforcement of positive non-discrimination duties and affirmative action duties is 
weak. 
 
Apart from issues of coverage, the unemployment insurance framework also does 
not link unemployment insurance to active labour market policies that seek “to 
influence the employment prospects of the unemployed by encouraging or 
mandating participation in job-search assistance programmes and skills training, or 
by directly increasing the returns to labour (for example through wage subsidies).” 901  
Disabled persons’ access to work could be improved through such measures. 
 
While active labour market policies as part of unemployment protection would, in 
principle, be a positive development, mandatory participation in RTW programmes, 
the denial of benefits to those who refuse, without just cause, to undergo training and 
vocational counselling with a view to obtaining employment under any scheme raises 
concerns about unjustifiable compulsion and denial.902  In response to these 
                                                          
899 O Dupper, M Olivier and A Govindjee. “Extending Coverage of the Unemployment Insurance-
system in South Africa.” (2010) 21(3) Stellenbosch Law Review 438 at 449. 
900 Dupper, Olivier and Govindjee 447. 
901 Govindjee, Olivier and Dupper 205. 
902 Section 16(2) of the UIA.  See Govindjee, Olivier and Dupper 212-214. 
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concerns, Olivier, Dupper and Govindjee argue that the UIA ought to be amended to 
clearly indicate that an unemployed contributer is not compelled to take up a non-
suitable position.903 
 
In my view, the non-suitability inquiry is of particular importance for disabled people.  
It has to take into account environmental and social barriers that include the 
characteristics of particular jobs, as well as wider structural impediments.  Issues 
such as the provision of effective reasonable accommodation measures, if 
necessary; the availability of suitable transport to and from work; and the 
organisation of work and how it would affect persons with particular impairments or 
conditions will have to considered carefully and pro-actively.  In this regard, 
comprehensive, integrated measures such as the provision of accessible transport 
and health care systems, accessible buildings, employment support and vocational 
guidance have to be implemented. 
 
6.3.4.4 Disability benefits in the ‘private’ sphere 
 
Disability benefits are provided for by ‘private’ pension funds, as well as insurance 
companies.  Definitions of disability are contained in individual pension funds’ 
rules904 or in the terms and conditions of policies that provide disability cover. 905  
However, disability assessments would generally consider applicants’ personal 
profiles, their job descriptions and work experience, the aforementioned disability 
definitions and the fund rules, as well as applicants’ medical conditions and how 
such conditions affect their functioning.906 
 
The debates around the causes and assessment of functional l imitations discussed 
above would be equally applicable in this context.907  Furthermore, the respective 
roles of employers and health care professionals warrant attention.  Employers, at 
                                                          
903 Olivier, Dupper and Govindjee 406. 
904 Section 13 of the PFA provides that these fund rules are binding on “the members, shareholders 
and officers thereof, and on any person who claims under the rules or whose claim is derived from a 
person so claiming.”  
905 Andrews, Fourie and Watson 248. 
906 Ibid. 
907 See 2.3.1.1. 
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the very least, have an obligation to act in good faith in the interests of members of 
occupational funds and beneficiaries908 and are expected to inform pension funds or 
insurers timeously if employees have been incapacitated.  Employers must also not 
usurp the discretion of insurers to decide entitlements to disability benefits.909  
Employers’ failures to comply with these obligations are detrimental to affected 
employees, who may receive less generous withdrawal benefits or no benefits at 
all.910  The Pension Funds Adjudicator911 has awarded damages in favour of 
complainants against employers where such complainants did not access disability 
benefits because the employers had failed to inform the relevant pension funds or 
insurers of the complainants’ disabilities.912 
 
Health care professionals also have to act in the interests of patients.  In some 
instances, for example, employees may be found to be incapacitated, but that is not 
a guarantee that they would gain access to permanent disability benefits.  Writing in 
the context of medical boarding on psychiatric grounds, Mokoka, Rataemane and 
dos Santos note: 
“Patients should be informed that being medically boarded on psychiatric 
grounds is likely to make it extremely difficult to obtain alternative permanent 
employment, and even further insurance.  Also, being medically boarded does 
not guarantee that the patient’s medical disability policies will be paid out.  The 
patient should be advised to obtain full details from the insurance company or 
broker beforehand about the conditions and requirements of these policies.  
The long-term financial implications should be discussed with a financial 
advisor.  It would be prudent for psychiatrists to warn their patients that they 
may find themselves unemployed and without an adequate income, even when 
there are sufficient grounds for medical boarding.”913 
  
                                                          
908 Tek Corporation Provident Fund and Others v Lorentz [2000] 3 BPLR 227 (SCA) 235B-D. 
909 N Jeram. “Participating Employers under Scrutiny in Disability Claims.” (2008) 29 Industrial Law 
Journal 51 at 57. 
910 See the discussion of the Namane, Fortuin and Swanepoel cases in Jeram 51-56. 
911 Established in terms of s 30B of the Pension Funds Act. 
912 See, for example, Swanepoel v Samancor Ferrometals Ltd and Samancor Group Pension Fund , 
Unreported Case no. PFA/GA/644/2002/RM, 15 February 2005. 
913 MT Mokoka, ST Rataemane and M dos Santos. “Disability Claims on Psychiatric Grounds in the 
South African Context:  A Review.” (2012) 18(2) South African Journal of Psychiatry 34 at 40. 
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This passage also raises the issue of disabled persons falling through the cracks of 
uncoordinated incapacity determination systems and eligibility requirements for 
private disability benefits.  Government needs to exercise its regulatory functions to 
ensure better coordination or, at the very least, to provide measures that will 
ameliorate the consequences of incapacitated persons not receiving or receiving 
inadequate disability benefits from ‘private’ pension funds or insurance policies. 
 
6.3.4.5 Employment services  
 
Another aspect in which it would be important to highlight the intersection of 
substantive equality and access to work is in the provision of employment services to 
disabled people.  The Employment Services Act914 (the ESA) has laudable 
objectives that include the promotion of employment, the improvement of access to 
the labour market for work seekers, the promotion of the employment prospects of 
work seekers, and vulnerable work seekers in particular, and the facilitation of 
access to education and training to the same category of persons.915   
 
These objectives are to be achieved through the provision of “comprehensive and 
integrated free public employment services”, the coordination of public service 
activities that impact on the provision of employment services, the encouragement of 
partnerships to promote employment, the establishment of “schemes and other 
measures to promote employment” and the provision of a “regulatory framework for 
the provision of private employment services.”916 
 
In terms of the ESA, the Minister of Labour may, after consulting the Employment 
Services Board, establish work schemes that aim to enable “youth and other 
vulnerable work seekers to enter employment, remain in employment or be placed in 
opportunities for self-employment.”917  These schemes must provide work that 
complies with the employment standards set in the Basic Conditions of Employment 
                                                          
914 Act 4 of 2014.  The Act was assented to on 7 April 2014 and at the time of writing its 
commencement date had yet to be proclaimed. 
915 Section 2(1). 
916 Section 2(2). 
917 Section 6(1). 
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Act (BCEA) or collective agreements.918  The Minister of Labour may also issue 
regulations that require employers to notify the Department of Labour of any 
vacancies in their organisations, if any work seeker referred by a labour centre has 
been employed and any information that may be relevant to the provision of effective 
job matching services.919 
 
Chapter 6 of the ESA is entitled “Promotion of Supported Work for Persons with 
Disabilities”.  It provides for the establishment of “Supported Employment 
Enterprises” (SEE) as a national government component920 consisting of a Head of 
SEE and any staff members he or she appoints.921  The Act gives no indication of 
how many staff members would be appointed, but provides that the Minister of 
Labour may decide on post structures after consulting the Minister of Finance. 922  
The SEE is to be financed from “money appropriated by Parliament for this purpose”; 
“income earned from services rendered by it”; “grants or donations made to it”; and 
“money received from any other source.”923 
 
The SEE’s functions are listed as being to: 
“(a) facilitate supported employment; 
(b) provide work opportunities for persons with disabilities; 
(c) develop and implement programmes that promote the employability of 
persons with disabilities, including persons with permanent disablement as 
defined in the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 1993 
Act No. 130 of 1993), in the light of their evolving needs in a changing 
economy; and 
(d) perform any other function as may be prescribed by the Minister.”924 
 
There are several notable aspects to the scheme of the ESA, as briefly set out 
above.  The first is that persons with disabilities are not specifically listed as 
                                                          
918 Section 6(2). 
919 Section 10. 
920 Section 42. 
921 Section 45(c). 
922 Section 46. 
923 Section 47. 
924 Section 43. 
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vulnerable work seekers (youth is the only specified category), but it is hoped that 
they are recognised as such.  In light of the definition of persons with disabilities 
used in the Act,925 it would be difficult to argue that such persons are not vulnerable 
work seekers. 
 
Secondly, the provisions on supported employment imply that all persons with 
disabilities qualify for or are in need of supported employment.  The interpretation 
clause in the ESA states that its provisions must be interpreted in line with the 
Constitution and relevant international labour standards and treaties.  It is therefore 
submitted that on the basis of substantive equality, the relevant provisions must be 
read to mean that supported employment must be promoted for people with 
disabilities who cannot work in the open labour market.  As Liebenberg points out, 
any services that are “delivered in ways which reinforce stereotypes and undermine 
the dignity of the recipients” would infringe the right to equality.926  Furthermore, the 
work and employment provisions in the CRPD emphasise that states parties must 
facilitate “the right to the opportunity to gain a living by work freely chosen or 
accepted in a labour market and work environment that is open, inclusive and 
accessible to persons with disabilities.”927 
 
The third notable aspect of the scheme is the unreliable funding structure for the 
SEE.  It may be that it is funded extensively, but nothing in the legislation guarantees 
adequate funding.  Disabled People’s Organisations and other interested parties will 
therefore have to monitor the operations of the SEE closely in order to ensure 
accountability and the effective provision of supported employment to those who 
want and need it. 
  
                                                          
925 It provides (in Section 1):  “‘persons with disabilities’ includes persons who have long-term 
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in interaction with various barriers, may 
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others [emphasis in the 
original].” 
926 S Liebenberg. Equality Rights and Children:  Moving Beyond a One-Size-Fits-All Approach. In: 
Hall, K; Woolard, I; Lake, L and Smith, C (eds). South African Child Gauge. (2012) 24 at 28. 
927 Article 27(1). 
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6.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Positive obligations imposed on government may assist in the achievement of 
structural changes that have a wider ambit and that can promote the achievement of 
substantive equality.  Particular focus was placed on the role that can be played by 
the socio-economic right to access to social security and its implications for access 
to work or, alternatively, by an independent right to access to work.  Significant 
limitations operate in respect of the rights in s 27 – they are progressively realisable 
and their content is limited by the lack of resources.  However, these rights place an 
obligation on government to account for its policies and the implementation of 
policies and programmes in the social sphere. 
 
This obligation to account may conceivably be used to improve information gathering 
on disabled work seekers; frame positive non-discrimination duties and affirmative 
action duties as components of unemployment protection; promote recognition of the 
interrelated, mutually supportive nature of the components of social security and 
monitor the inception and implementation of employment services for disabled 
persons.   
 
At various points, I have highlighted the intersection of substantive equality and the 
socio-economic right relating to access to work.  In particular, I have emphasised the 
development of the value of freedom in relation to disabled work seekers, as 




                                                          
928 See 3.4.1.1. 
245 
 




The primary research question that this work set out to answer relates to the 
potential synergies and points of frictions between social understandings of disability 
and conceptions of equality and social security in the context of promoting access to 
work for persons with disability in South Africa.  The approach followed in order to 
answer this question focused on five components.  Firstly, the nature and content of 
the debates on conceptions and, by extension, causes of disability within a field 
loosely described as disability studies were examined.  The second component 
contained an examination of the approaches to substantive equality, the goals such 
approaches envision and how these would apply in relation to disabled persons’ 
access to work.  Component three highlighted the duties of restraint that operate in 
the non-discrimination framework and also focused attention on the conception of 
disability used to determine who should qualify for protection from unfair 
discrimination.   
 
After the first three components, which were theoretical in orientation, the rest of the 
work contained analyses of constitutional and legislative provisions, and how these 
laws have been interpreted, applied and enforced, with particular emphasis on 
positive obligations on employers and government.  Component four considered 
these positive obligations in the realm of employment equity, which comprised both 
non-discrimination duties and affirmative action duties.   In light of the limitations 
identified in respect of the employment equity duties, the fifth and final component 
then examined how positive obligations can be widened in terms of their scope and 
spheres of application in order to assist potential work seekers who are disabled at 
earlier junctures than when they are already in position to apply for work and in order 
to improve government’s accountability in respect of its enforcement of employers’ 




In what follows, I highlight the most prescient insights that flowed from the above 
analyses and the conclusions reached.  I also suggest possible lines of inquiry that 
can be pursued in light of these insights and which could not be pursued here. 
 
7.2 Social understandings of disability 
 
The simple, yet profound, premise that undergirds social understandings of disability 
is that disability is not an attribute of the individual, but a socially contingent 
phenomenon located at the intersection of an individual’s attributes and his or her 
physical and social environment.  As a result, the meaning of disability shifts over 
time and place. 
 
The most important implication of this premise is that societies can shape their social 
structures, work processes, physical environments and cultural traditions and 
practices to minimise activity limitations experienced by individuals who have 
physical, intellectual or psychosocial characteristics that deviate from general norms.  
These changes can occur through reshaping norms, through the elimination of 
barriers disabled persons face in attaining these norms or through a combination of 
these. 
 
What is recognised as work and the organisation of work have been central to 
disabling people.  In contemporary societies, global capital mobility and technological 
change offer opportunities as well as pose challenges for disabled persons’ access 
to work.  While regulation by national states is not the powerful tool it once was, it 
can be used to contribute to changes that would promote such inclusion.   
 
When we consider what these processes of inclusion should achieve, insights from 
the debates within disability studies suggest that there must be recognition of the 
interaction between impaired or atypical bodies and their environments; that 
attention must be paid to addressing both the material and the socio-cultural 
disadvantages experienced by disabled persons; and that analyses of the barriers to 
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inclusion and how these can be overcome must consider both objective facts and the 
affected disabled persons’ experiences of their conditions and circumstances. 
 
7.3 Substantive equality 
 
The notion of substantive equality is consistent with the idea that society must treat 
disadvantaged groups more favourably in certain circumstances in order to ensure 
equality.  If structural barriers that impede disabled persons’ access to work are to be 
removed, positive action will be imperative.  However, in traditional non-
discrimination law, it is difficult to impose extensive positive obligations on employers 
when they are not the cause of whatever disadvantages exist.  This tendency to 
individualise also influences the identification of who is protected from unfair 
discrimination, and decisions on the causes of discrimination may exclude 
consideration of many structural factors that contribute to disabled persons’ 
disadvantage.  Concerted efforts therefore have to be made to contextualise 
disability, to emphasise its social contingency at all points in organisational and legal 
processes and to highlight the social dimensions of rights. 
 
Another important aspect that warrants attention is the determination and 
communication of the principles that underpin the imposition of positive obligations 
on employers and government in ensuring access to work.  In this regard, dignity as 
a guiding value of the right to equality is useful, but its social dimensions have to be 
developed.  Furthermore, the value of freedom, particularly as used in the 
capabilities approach developed by scholars such as Sen and Nussbaum, has to 
animate the conception and implementation of laws that aim to facilitate access to 
work.  Such an approach would recognise the importance of support to disabled 
persons without reducing them to passive recipients of benefits who have little to no 
autonomy in how they earn a living.  A focus on the development of capabilities 
would also highlight that it is not just the provision of work opportunities that is 
needed, but also various forms of support that can expand disabled persons’ 




7.4 Unfair discrimination and affirmative action 
 
The prohibition of unfair discrimination is important to curb ongoing disadvantage 
that can be linked to particular statuses.  However, duties of restraint have limited 
use in contexts where structural factors inhibit access to social processes and 
benefits.  
 
The Constitution, the EEA and the PEPUDA all contain relatively progressive 
positive obligations.  The duty to reasonably accommodate disabled work seekers, 
which is a positive non-discrimination duty as well as an affirmative action duty, is 
useful in situations of indirect discrimination where it is necessary to balance the 
interests of employers and work seekers.   
 
However, it is particularly difficult to enforce this duty in relation to work seekers, 
because employers are able to hide their reasons for not appointing a person who 
requests accommodation; the remedies that are available are reactive and aggrieved 
unemployed persons often do not have adequate support to pursue such remedies; 
the power differentials in the negotiation process are skewed and employers are 
likely to be less inclined to provide accommodations to work applicants as opposed 
to existing employees; and current enforcement processes provide little to no 
information on the extent and the modes of operation of barriers to the fulfillment of 
reasonable accommodation. 
 
The positive non-discrimination duties in the EEA have the potential to remove 
barriers that may operate to disadvantage people with specific kinds of disabilities 
more generally.  In this sense, these duties can be used more proactively than 
reasonable accommodation duties.  Similar duties that are even more specific 
operate in the context of affirmative action.  However, the duty bearers are limited to 
designated employers.  If these duties are enforced, there is a possibility that they 
may contribute indirectly, through networks, to the removal of barriers in 
organisations that are not designated employers. 
 
Although positive obligations on employers are an important tool, the enforcement of 
these duties could be improved, both in inception and implementation.  In particular, 
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more could be done to clarify the goals that underpin the imposition of the duties in 
respect of disabled persons, as the guidelines to employers still tend to individualise 
disability.  There could also be more dynamic negotiation of the interrelationship 
between regulatory goals and employer aspirations.  The quality of the consultations 
between employers and employees can be enhanced.  Overall, more resources are 
required to monitor compliance effectively and impose sanction where appropriate. 
 
Finally, an important limitation of positive employment equity duties is that they are 
imposed on individual employers and their content is largely dependent on the 
resources available to particular employers.  Their scope and ability to effect 
structural change are therefore limited.  Ways have to be conceived of imposing 
duties on social actors with a wider reach and who have relatively more regulatory 
power.  This is where positive obligations on government are relevant. 
 
7.5 The state’s positive obligations in respect of access to work 
 
The state is already making and implementing policy that accords it an active role in 
employment creation.  At present, it is unclear whether the rights in the Constitution 
can be interpreted to hold government accountable for its performance of these 
functions beyond reviews for rationality or in respect of administrative action.  I argue 
that a generous, purposive interpretation of the ambit of the right to social security 
can be utilised for this purpose.   
 
Imposing positive obligations on the state in respect of access to work would create 
opportunities to strengthen claims for the state to improve the enforcement of 
employment equity measures, which are in essence unemployment protection 
devices.  It can also be used to compel information gathering in respect of the 
barriers disabled work seekers face and their socio-economic circumstances.  
Furthermore, if we regard unemployment protection as one component of social 
security, invoking principles of substantive equality would allow the questioning of 
paternalistic forms of social support that emphasise cash transfers at the expense of 




7.6 Final concluding remarks 
 
If we revert to the original research question, it is clear that there are important 
synergies between social understandings of disability and mainstream approaches to 
substantive equality.  Both foresee the imposition of positive action to address the 
disadvantage caused by past and continuing discrimination.  However, the law 
operates within limitations that inhibit its potential to effect deep, revolutionary 
change.  At best, it can be one tool in what are essentially social, political and 
economic processes.  At worst, it can mask failures to effect change and insulate 
these failures by protecting the status quo. 
 
The conception and implementation of employment equity laws and social security 
laws reveal that social understandings of disability have not permeated micro-
processes sufficiently to ensure the kind of transformation disability movements 
would like to see and experience.  Disabled work seekers are at a particular 
disadvantage because they are not likely to be viewed in the same light as existing 
employees and they face legal and structural impediments if they are in a position to 
challenge unfair discrimination. 
 
The varied resources required for this transformation are limited and it is obvious that 
government faces a difficult task in balancing diverse and urgent demands.  At the 
very least, we can seek to hold government accountable for its use of all the 
available resources and to require that all relevant role players work progressively to 
ensure access to work for those disabled persons who can and want to work in an 
accessible, open labour market.  For those disabled persons who cannot work in the 
open labour market, supported employment and other means of productive work can 
be fashioned in ways that recognise the inherent worth of these individuals and their 




7.7 Recommendations for future research  
 
The broad analyses conducted in this work have left open various questions that can 
form the basis for future research.  Some of these potential research projects could 
attempt to address all, or part, of the following questions: 
 
(i) If social theories of impairment are developed within disability studies or 
within the social sciences more generally, what are the implications of 
such theories, if any, for equality laws and how these are implemented? 
 
(ii) How can the value of freedom, as it applies to persons with disabilities, be 
utilised in other contexts in which disabled persons’ autonomy is infringed? 
 
(iii) In which ways can the enforcement regime for employment equity be 
improved to work more effectively to promote access to and retention of 
work for disabled persons? 
 
(iv) If proactive approaches to the enforcement of equality for disabled 
persons are to be pursued, how would such laws be designed and what 
are the preconditions for effective implementation? 
 
(v) How can a broader conception of social security be used to inform 
submissions in policy processes that seek to offer social protection not 
only to disabled persons, but also other vulnerable groups? 
 
(vi) Do the law of evidence and evidentiary processes strike an appropriate 
balance between consideration of ‘objective’ facts and the articulation of 
disabled persons’ experiences in particular areas of law, for example 
criminal law, labour law or personal injury law?   
 
(vii) What contextual factors operate to the advantage and to the detriment of 
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